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ABSTRACT
The method of modular decomposition of a fault tree that has been
used in the PL-MOD code is extended to include several calculational
features, and to remove some of the restrictions presented in its
methodology. The PL-MOD's methodology consists of piecewise collapsing
and modularizing portions of the tree until eventually the fault tree
structure is described as a set of modular equations recursively
relating the top event to its basic component inputs. In particular,
the PL-MOD code demonstrated the ability to evaluate large fault trees
in an economic, efficient and accurate manner. The PL-MOD code is
written in PL/I language in order to use the dynamic core utilization
techniques available in this language. Accordingly, the extensions of
the code developed in this work have all been performed by using the PL/I
language.
Time dependent models were developed to include the effect of
different classes of time-dependent components in a fault tree to the
top event unavailability at different instants of time. This new version
of the code has been designated PL-MODT. One of the features that is
incorporated into the PL-MODT is the automatic reduction of large fault
trees. In this procedure a CUTOFF valve is defined for the Vesely-Fussell
importance measures, in order to eliminate those components and modules
of the fault tree whose importances are less than this prescribed value.
A Monte-Carlo simulation package is also incorporated into the PL-MOD
code for the Monte-Carlo simulation of those input parameters to the fault
tree for which uncertainties can be assigned. The code obtained by
incorporating this package into the PL-MOD Code, is called PL-MODMC. In
the PL-MODMC Code, failure rates, repair duration, average downtime, and
unavailability per demand are the failure parameters in a fault tree to
which a probability density function (p.d.f.) can be assigned. The log-
normal distribution is chosen to represent this p.d.f. Some of the
restrictions in the PL-MOD code such as the limitation on the appearance
of a component in all of the domanins of a fault tree are removed.
An algorithm is developed for deriving all simple minimal cutsets
from the Modular cutsets. This algorithm allows the determination of
cutsets of all proper modules presented in the set of modular cutsets. Then
by assigning these cutsets to the corresponding modular minimal cutsets,
3a complete set of simple cutsets for the top event of the tree can be
obtained. This algorithm is incorporated into the PL-MOD code in order to
obtain the MODCUT code. The cutsets of higher order modules can be
discriminated, and thus be reduced in the MODCUT code, based on any
defined criterion. Presently the code uses the size of the cutsets as the
discrimination criterion. In particular, it is found that a common cause
discrimination criterion can be easily incorporated, and with a substantial
saving in the computer time over other common cause failure analysis codes,
a complete set of common cause candidates can be obtained.
A thorough review of common cause failure analysis is performed, and
packages MOCUS-BACFIRE, and MODCUT-BACFIRE develoepd to identify, directly
from the system fault tree, a set of cutsets which are common cause
failure candidates. Common cause quantification methods are studied and
a quantitative model is proposed in order to obtain the common cause
failure unavailability directly from the cutsets that are identified as
common cause candidates.
Several fault tree examples are evaluated by using PL-MODT, PL-MODMC,
and MODCUT codes. The results obtained from these examples have emphasized
the accuracy, efficiency and effectiveness of these codes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Fuel Tree Analysis and Its Role
Modern technology has developed much larger more complicated systems
that often have the potential for accidents with substantial safety and
economic consequences. Consideration of these possible economic and
health risks has become of increasing importance in new technological
enterprises. In the last few decades a variety of methods for evaluating
these risks have been developed and applied. Typically these methods
estimate the risks by calculating both the probability of system failures
and their consequences. In these analyses, a quantitative measure of
the system's likelihood of successfully performing the design goals
is defined, and called the system "reliability". There are various
definitions of reliability; for instance, reliability has been defined
in [1] as follows:
"Reliability is the characteristic of an item expressed by
the probability that it will perform a required function
under stated conditions for a stated period of time."
The characteristic called "unreliability" is just the numerical
complement of the reliability. Thus, in a general sense, the field of
reliability analysis consists of determining the probability of a system
failing under various conditions and in various modes.
A commonly used method for analyzing system failure modes is called
fault tree analysis. In this approach the analyst defines a specific
undesired state of the system. This state is called the "top event",
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and the analyst then proceeds through a logical step-by-step procedure
to determine what combinations of basic event failures lead to the top
event. As an example of this procedure refer to Figures (1.1.1) and
(1.1.2), which show a pressure tank system and the fault tree developed
for the pressure tank rupture.
Although the fault tree approach is the most widely used method of
system failure analysis, there are other methods which can be used.
Among these are failure mode and effect analysis, success tree analysis,
and reliability block diagrams. Each of these methods has applications
where it may be the method of preference. However, this study is
denoted to improving methods for analyzing complex fault trees, and the
other methods will not be discussed here.
Especially during the last decade there have been a number of
applications of the fault tree method to problems of practical interest.
The System Reliability Service of the United Kingdom, under the direction
of F. R. Farmer, did much of the pioneering work and applied this method
especially to the nuclear and chemical industries [2] . The reliability
analysis in safety studies of nuclear power plants has been advocated
since the mid 1960's in the United States [3,41. The major step towards
the effective use of a quantitative reliability analysis has been made
by the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) [5] (WASH-1400), which is now
followed by similar efforts in various other countries, e.g., West
Germany. Aside, perhaps, from the Apollo program and major defense
projects, WASH-1400 is the most concentrated effort of its kind thus
far. The purpose of the study was to estimate the risks to the public
from potential accidents in U. S. commercial Nuclear Power Plants.
The analytical backbone of the WASH-1400 methodology is fault tree and
event tree analysis.
C2 Pump
Motor
Figure 1.1.1 Pressure Tank Example
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F)igure 1.1.2 The Pressure Tank
System Fault Tree
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WASH-1400 concluded that the best estimated value for the probability
of a core melt-down is 5 x 10-5 per reactor-year. This estimate seems
reasonable, because the experience over past operations of nuclear
power plants suggests that a core melt should be much less likely than
-310 , and that the best estimate is probably less than a factor of 10 off.
In a recent assessment of the RSS results by the Lewis review group {:6]
it has been concluded that error bounds on probability estimation are
probably underestimated, mainly due to the lack of precise data base.
However, the group has emphasized the substantial advance achieved by
the WASH-1400 over previous attempts to estimate the risk associated with
the operation of nuclear power plants. In particular, the use of the
fault tree/event tree approach is recommended as the "..best available
tool with which to quantify probabilities.
WASH-1400 has stimulated much interest in the use of fault
tree analysis methods in safety systems. There is now widespread use
of fault tree methods to achieve safety goals. Perhaps the most ambitious
program in the safety area is in connection with the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor (CRBR) [7] . This program is aimed at calculating different
reliability measures for the Shut Down System, and the Shut Down Heat
Removal System in the CRBR. Most of the methods used in WASH-1400 are
also being employed in this study; in particular, the fault tree
analysis forms the basis of this research program. In a study whose
goal was to assess the accident risk of a conceptual high-level waste
management [8] fault tree analysis has been extensively used. This
study concluded that the accidental release of radioactive waste at any
stage of the waste management is very small.
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In many other nuclear safety studies [9-21], fault tree analysis
has been the principal tool for qualitative and quantitative evaluation
of the study. In summary, fault tree analysis has become an important
segment of an effective system reliability analysis, and hence there is
a need for further development and use of this method in the reliability
analysis of complex technical systems.
1.2 Some Basic Definitions of the Frequently Used Terms in This Thesis
Because the basic elements of a fault tree are the same, regardless
of the types of events or systems being analyzed, a standard set of
symbols (as shown in Figure (1.2.1)) has been developed to represent the
events and operations. This set of definitions is listed below and
can be more fully understood by studying the sample fault tree shown in
Figure (1.1.2). These definitions are given to facilitate the
understanding of what follows in the thesis.
1. Basic Fault [1]: Basic fault is represented by a circle
and requires no further dissection, since the probability
of such an event is derived from empirical data; this
probability is an input to the fault tree only when the
quantitative analysis is performed.
2. Fault Assumed Basic to the Given Fault Tree [1]: This
is represented by a diamond. Although this event can
be further developed down to basic failures, it is not
developed because of its lack of significance in such
a fault tree, lack of details to develop it further, or
availability of failure data.
B C
1 2...n
OR Gate NOT Gate
Resultant Event Fault Assumed Basic
Basic Fault
IN OUT
Transfer Gates
K/N
2...n
K-out-of-N Gate
Figure 1.2.1 Fault Tree Symbols
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OUTPUTS
- 1 2...n INPUTS
AND Gate
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3. Resultant Events: These events result from the
combination of events of the types described above
through the input of a logic gate. It is shown by a
rectangle.
4. AND Gate: The AND gate represents the intersection
of inputs to the gate; that is, an output event
occurs if and only if all the inputs occur.
5. OR Gate: The OR gate represents the union of
the inputs to the gate; that is, an output event
occurs if only one of the inputs occurs.
6. K-out-of-N Gate: The K-out-of-N gate represents the
condition that if any combination of K components
out of the N input components occurs, it will
result in the occurrence of the output from the
K-out-of-N gate.
7. NOT Gate {35]: The NOT gate represents the
complement of input to the gate; that is, an output
event occurs if input has not occurred.
8. Transfer Gates [35]: These gates are only symbols
to provide a tool to avoid repeating sections of
the fault tree. The "transfer-out" gate represents
the full branch that follows it, represented by a
symbol, for example Al, and indicates that the
branch is repeated somewhere else. The "Transfer-in"
26
gate represents the branch, here Al, that is
already drawn somewhere else. Instead of drawing
it again it is simply input at that point.
In order to avoid any misinterpretation and confusion with
other definitions, some of the most frequent terms used in this
thesis are explicitly defined below.
AVAILABILITY: The probability that an item, a subsystem,
a module, or a system will be operational at a randomly
selected future instant of time [1].
COMPONENT: A basic constituent of the system for which
a failure is considered a primary failure (see the
definition of a primary failure) in a particular fault
tree, and has a unique defined function. Therefore, a
circle, diamond, or rectangle in a fault tree could be
considered a component;(e.g. a component can be anything
from a wire to a complete system).
GATE DOMAIN: The set of all primary failures that logically
interact to produce the resultant event of the gate in
question.
FAILURE: The termination of the ability of an item or
a system to perform its required function [1].
FAILURE RATE: The expected number of failures of a given
type, per item, per unit of time [1] (e.g. a failure rate
of 6 x 10- 6/hr for tube breaks represent 6 breaks per
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million hours of operation time) .
IMPORTANCE: Ranking of basic events and cutsets according
to their contributions to the occurrence of the top
event. Different methods of ranking exist which will be
further discussed in following chapters.
MODULE: An assembly of basic components which can by
itself be treated as a component of the system [291.
All basic components appearing in the module do not appear
anywhere else except in the module.
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE EVENTS: Events that cannot exist
simultaneously [1].
PRIMARY FAILURE: Failure of a component within the design
envelope,i.e., failure due to the inherent characteristics
of the system's element under consideration.
RELIABILITY: The characteristic of an item expressed by
the probability that it will perform a required function
under stated conditions for a stated period of time [11.
REPLICATED COMPONENT: A component of the system whose
failure has multiple effects on the system. In a fault
tree, a replicated component appears more than one time
in different domains of the tree.
RISK: The expected detriment per unit time to a person
or population from a given cause [1}.
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REPLICATED GATE: A gate that is repeated more than once in
a fault tree.
SECONDARY FAILURE: Failure of a component outside its
design envelope, i.e., failure due to excessive environmental
characteristic or operational stress on the component,
(e.g. failure of a component due to excessive heat of an
accidental fire).
SYSTEM: An orderly arrangement of components that performs
some task or functions.
TEST DURATION: Required time to inspect and test an item,
a subsystem, or a system.
TEST INTERVAL: The elapsed time between repetitions of
an identical test of the same item or system.
UNAVAILABILITY: The numerical complement of availability.
UNRELIABILITY: The numerical complement of reliability.
1.3 Fault Tree Evaluation
Fault tree evaluation consists of the analysis of the tree once
it has been drawn. The evaluation can be either qualitative, quantitative,
or both.
1.3.1 Qualitative Evaluation
Qualitative evaluation of a system fault tree consists basically
of identifying "minimal cutsets" of the tree. A cutset is a set of basic
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events whose simultaneous occurrence causes the top event to occur.
A cutset is minimal if it cannot be reduced and still insure the
occurrence of the top event. Minimal cutsets are very helpful in
identifying different modes of system failure, and determining the
design inadequacies.
The number of the cutsets dramatically increases with the size
of the fault tree. For a complex fault tree the number of the cutsets
is very large, thousands or more, and most of the time it is simply
impossible to generate all of the cutsets in a reasonable amount of
computing time.
Different methods have been proposed for the generation of the cutsets
and in Appendix A some of these methods are summarized and discussed.
Fault trees with only AND, OR and K-out-of-N gates are called coherent
fault trees. However, some systems include gates other than AND and OR,
e.g. EOR , NAND, NOR, or NOT gates. For analysis of these systems the
modes of failure of any given system are no longer referred to as the
cutsets, because the system fault tree becomes non-coherent. In section
1.5.1, a description of coherent and non-coherent fault trees is represented.
In the non-coherent fault trees the concept of minimal cutset should be
replaced by the concept of "prime implicants" [22] in Boolean Algebra.
Similar to cutsets, a complete set of prime implicants gives all the
failure modes of a non-coherent fault tree representing the system.
Fortunately, for. most complex technical systems, it is possible to
represent the failure modes through the use of only coherent fault
trees.
Minimal cutsets are often closely associated with each other,
that is, there is a certain set of cutsets' components which are
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repeated in all cutsets. If these sets of components are replaced by
a super-component (i.e. a module) then minimal cutsets may be
represented by "modular cutsets". However, modular cutsets can be
directly found from the fault tree without generating the cutsets [23]
Modular cutsets are important because they often greatly reduce the number
of cutsets needed to represent the fault tree. The method used in
this study will take advantage of this property of modular cutsets.
1.3.2 Quantitative Evaluation
A second goal of the fault tree analysis is to provide a method
for calculating the probability of the occurrence of the top event.
Fault trees can also be used to calculate the relative importance of mini-
mal cutsets to the top event, or the relative importance of a specified
basic event to the top event.
To calculate the probability of the top event based on the minimal
cutsets, one can use the Inclusion-Exclusion principle. For example,
let, K , K 2 . ..K be a minimal cutset K of basic events for a1 2 n - s
fault tree [24]. By assuming that all basic events are subject to
only primary failure, and are independent of the failure of each other,
(i.e. they are statistically independent), then it follows that the
probability that cutset K. occurs would be:
Pr(E,) = i P. 1.3-1
16 K
S
If the fault tree has n minimal cutsets, then
Pr(TOP EVENT) = Pr(T) = Pr(C U C U C ... C )1 2 3 n 1.3-2
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By the Inclusion Exclusion principle, Equation (1.3-2) can be developed
as:
K K
Pr(T) = Pr(C.) - I Pr(C.OC.) +
i=1 i<j 3
K
Pr(C.C. C
i<j< 3 J 9
K-1lf+ ... + (-1) Pr(C C C ... Cn
1 2 3 n
K
Pr (T) = I( 1 )rl
r=1 r
where
i = 2 Pr(C.OC,0..PC. )
r 31 32 r
$1<j 2 <j3 '''0 < r
therefore,
K
P(T) < i = II g.
j=1 i E K.
J
and
P (T) > i1 
-
i
2 (1.3-6)
Therefore, by using Equations (1.3-1) through (1.3-6) one would be
able to calculate from the cutsets of a fault tree, the bounds on the
probability of occurrence of the top event. However, the exact top
event probability for statistically independent events in a cutset
or
(1.3-3)
(1.3-4)
(1.3-5)
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would be obtained from the following equation:
Pr(T) = J q. (1.3-7)l<i<K j s qj(.
It is clear that the use of equations (1.3-5) and(l 6 3-6) is
more convenient than equation (1.3-7). However, for calculating the
exact top event probability the use of equation (1.3-7) is inevitable.
It is clear, however, that the assumption of statistical independence
is not always valid. In cases where one failure can cause another,
often called common cause failure, changes in the analytical procedure
are required. This will be the subject of Chapter 6 of this work.
In case the components in a cutset are dependent, one can find the following
useful bounds on the probability of the top event [25].
max IT q. < Pr(Top Event) < min 1 q. (1.3-8)
iEK iEP
s r
1.4 Fault Tree Modularization
Fault tree modularization techniques have recently become very
attractive and have proven to be a very efficient and reliable technique
for the analysis of complex systems. This is because the modular
fault tree is a compact representation of the original fault tree, and
calculations based on the modular fault tree are much simpler than those
based on the original tree. In this section some of the important
methodologies for modularizing fault trees are discussed. Particularly,
PL-MODts methodology will be presented along with its advantages over
other modularization techniques.
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1.4.1 Introduction to the Modularization Technique and its
Mathematical Concepts
Birnbaum and Esary [29] define a module as follows:
"A module of a system is a subset of basic components
of that system which are organized into some structure
of their own and which affect the system only through
the performance of their subtree. Rephrasing, a module
is an assembly of components which can by itself be
treated as a component of the system."
Before getting into the mathematical concepts of modularization technique,
and since our prime interest is coherent systems, a brief mathematical
formulation of the characteristics of coherent systems will be
presented.
Coherent binary systems are systems whose performance improves
as the performance of their components improves. Suppose a set
C = {c1 , c2, ... , cn}describes a set of components in a system. In
the binary model each component is capable of two performance states,
either functioning or failing. The joint performance of the components
in C is indicated by
x = (x
- 1" X 2 IeeeP'xn)
where x, = 1 indicates that component c, functions and x. = 0 indicates
that ci has failed. The whole system is capable of these two states, and
the performance of the system can be represented by the so-called
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Structure Function # corresponding to the joint component performance
x If # (x) = 1 the system is functioning, and if $(x) = 0 it fails.
Thus, the system described above can be completely represented by the
notation (C,#).
A coherent system is a system (C,#) for which two conditions
are satisfied. These conditions are as follows.
1. #(x) < #(y) whenever x < (i.e., x, < y.) (1.4-1)
This condition implies that the state of the system is not degraded
by changing a component from a failed state to a working state.
#(0) = 0, where 0 = (0, 0, ... ,0). (i.e., a state where
all components have failed); (1.4-2)
# = 1 where 1 = (1, 1, ...,1). (i.e., a state where
all components are functioning) (1.4-3)
2. Each component is essential to the system.
A component c1 is inessential to a system (C,#) if
the performance of the component has no effect on the performance
of the structure, i.e. if
#(1., x) = $(O., x) for all (- , x) (1.4-4)
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where
1 . 1~ iif 'xi n
(0., X) = Cx , ... , x , , xi 1 ' ' ng t x
(Oi, x) = (x , ... , x , 0, x.i+1' ''' Xi 1 i-l 1 i+1 n
Since non-essential components can be deleted from a system with
no effect, they can be excluded from the tree. Therefore, we always
assume that
#li., x) > #(0., x) for all (-., x) (1.4-5)
In a coherent system fault tree the top event may always be
represented by the Boolean Structure Function #(x). Therefore,
1 if the top event occurs
; (x) = (1.4-6)
0 otherwise
Since AND and OR gates represent intersection and union of input
components, respectively, the vector #(x) will be defined as follows:
n
# AND(x) x* x* x * X. (1.4-7)
i=l
n
OR(x) = 1- (1- x )(1 - x2) ''' ( i (l.4-8)
+ 1 2 n(148
36
A cutset of a coherent binary system (C,#) is a set of components
QC C such that (9, 9Q) = 0, where Q' is the complement of Q
Q Q(i.e., C = Q U Q'), and 0 and are the component performance
vectors for which x. = 0 when C.EQ, and x. = 1 where C.EQ'. A cutset
Q is a minimal cutset of (C,#) if there is no cutset P such that P Q.
From the above definition for a coherent system and by using
the definition of a module, one can find [29] the Structure function
of a system using its modules. Consider a subset A of components in
the system (C,#), (i.e., ACC), such that A is not empty nor exhaustive.
A is a modular set of system (C,#) is
#(x) = #(X Ax) = A [XA(x A), X A (1.4-9)
where
A'UA = C
(A, X A) is a coherent system, and T is the structure function of a
coherent binary system whose components are C EA'. When A is a modular
set we say that (A, X A) is a module of (C,#).
The application of this definition for a fault tree is demonstrated
for the sample fault tree given in Figure (l.4.l). Some of the
modules in this fault tree are as follows.
A1 = {a, b, c, XA= Xa Uxb U x
A2 = {a, b, c, d, e, f}, XA =(Xa U xb U x (x d U xe U x f)
A3 = {g, h, i}, XA = U xh U x
A = {a, b, c, d}, XA =(xa U xb U x )xd
G2 G5
G4
G3
a b c
Figure 1.4.1 Sample Sub-Tree I with No Replications [23]
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One of the most useful representations of a Boolean function is its
pivotal decomposition about one of its coordinates, i.e.,
$(x) = x. $(. x) + (1 - xi) )(0, X) (1.4-10)
If (A, X ) is a module of (C,4), then from Equation (1.4-9) it follows
that:
AA' A A'
$x) X (X . x ) + [1 - XA(x )]Y(0, x ) (1.4-11)
Equation (1.4-11) is a general form of representing mathematically
the relations between the system modules and the system itself. The
method of finding the modules by using the system fault tree is not
unique. In the next section some of the potential methods available
for finding the modules are discussed.
1.4.2 The PL-MOD Methodology
The method of modularization that is utilized in the code PL-MOD [23]
to decompose a fault tree is based upon the definitions given in the
previous section (1.4.1). In terms of fault tree decomposition, an
intermediate gate event will be a module to the top event if the basic
events contained in the domain of the gate do not appear elsewhere in the
fault tree. This module would, therefore, act as a "super-component".
In this case, the modularization of fault trees having no replicated
events can be easily accomplished, since all of the intermediate gates
may be considered as independent. modules input to the top event. For
trees with replicated components the procedure is much more complicated.
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This case will be discussed later in this section.
If a fault tree is modularized such that no further modularization
is possible, then the fault tree has reached its Finest Modular
Representation. The Finest Modular Representation of a fault tree must
have the following conditions.
1. All the branches of the fault tree are independent.
2. The logic function XA(x A) associated with each gate is
either "prime" or "simple", having no inputs from other
"simple" gates of the same type.
Higher order "prime" gates are defined to be Boolean logic functions
which are not further modularizable. Prime logic functions are thus
characterized by an irreducible set of Boolean cutset vector equations.
As a result, from the aforementioned conditions, and for obtaining
the finest modular representation of the fault tree shown in Figure (1.4.1),
by using the PL-MOD's methodology one should change the fault tree
representation of this figure to the one shown in Figure (1.4.2). This
change is obtained by coalescing gates G and G and, as a result, its1 ana2 eut t
modular structure is given by the following set of recursive equations:
AND x
AND {A, Al} (x) =X =X * X * XA, ={A 5'X A A AX1 3 4 5 + A A A A
OR
A3 {a, b, c, XA = xa U xb U xc
4 A a n ceORA ={d, e, f}, X A= x U x U x
ORA =(gh, i}, X = xU x U x.
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G3
a b c d e
Figure 1.4.2 Finest Modular Representation of Sample Sub-Tree [23]
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Suppose that the fault tree in Figure (1.4.1) has a replicated
component as shown in Figure (1.4.3). Then, one must first realize
that events {a,b}, {g,i}, and {d,e,f} form modules associated with
simple OR gates. Therefore:
OR
A O ={fa,bo, X =x U3 A 3 a xb
OR
A = {d,e,f}, XA Xd U xe Uxf
4 A4
OR
A = {g,i}, X = x U x.
5 A5 1
It should be noted that in the subset A3, A4 and A5 there are only
non-replicated events. Furthermore, these modules, together with the
replicated event r, will become the input to a higher prime gate G,
as shown in Figure (1.4.4). Note that gate G is not a simple AND gate,
rather it is a special gate representing a set of Boolean vectors
for input component and modules. The structure function for gate G
would ther9fore be:
0(4) = (xr ,XA3 A , XA5
with the following set of Boolean vectors for the occurrence of gate G
(i.e. Modular cutsets):
S = (1, 0, 1, 0)
S = (0, 1, 1, 0)
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G1
G2 
- G5
ri
+ G 4
G3 +
e I
a b r
Figure 1.4.3- Sample Sub Tree II with Replications [23]
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r
G3
a b d e f g i
Figure 1.4.4 Finest Modular Representation of Sample Sub Tree II [23]
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Obviously, these Boolean vectors represent the following modular
cutsets:
(1) r, A4
(2) A3, A4 , A5
These two modular minimal cutsets are a compact representation of
the usual basic event minimal cutsets (i.e. simple cutsets) for the
fault tree in Figure (1.4.3).
These simple cutsets are as follows:
(1) r, d
(2) r, e
(3) r, f
(4) a, d, g
(5) a, d, i
(6) a, e, g
(7) a, e, i
(8) a, f, g
(9) a, f, i
(10) b, d, g
(11) b, d, i
(12) b, e, g
(13) b, e, i
(14) b, f, g
(15) b, f, i
Based on the methodology described above, the Code PL-MOD is
constructed to modularize the tree and find the modular minimal cutsets,
as well as probability calculations based on the modular minimal cutsets.
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The PL-MOD Code is written in PL/I language, because PL/I is the only
language that can handle the algorithms discussed above most effectively.
Also, PL/I provides several features normally found only in Assembler or
list processing languages. The essence of list processing is the ability
to dynamically allocate blocks of core storage to link these blocks
together into a structure to store and retrieve data from blocks. It
should be noticed that list processing for complicated data structures
such as those required by PL-MOD are very difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve through manipulation using FORTRAN. In Figure (1.4.5) a
flow chart is given for the structure of the PL-MOD code. The fault
tree modularization is achieved by performing a series of manipulations
on its nodes outlined below:
(a) Each NODE in the fault tree is defined as a gate
operator (AND, OR, or K-out-of-N) together with a
set of attached input gates and basic event components.
(b) A NODE's output will be an input to another NODE (except
to the top event), defined to be its NODEROOT.
(c) NODEshaving common replicated inputs are interconnected.
These interconnections then identify sets of nodes
which are not immediately modularizable in the original
form of the fault tree.
(d) The true modular decomposition is simultaneously
started at all bottom gate nodes defined to be those
having no gate inputs (GATELESS NODES).
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INPUT TREE
CONNECT INTER-
DEPENDENT NODES
FIND ALL GATES
HAVING NO GATE
INPUTS .
CHECK IF
IS INPUT
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Figure 1.4.5 Fault Tree Modularization Algorithm
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A
47
(e) Simple (AND,OR) gateless nodes having as their NODE.ROOT
another gate of the same type are coalesced with their
NODE.ROOT by transferring all their inputs to the NODE.ROOT
(f) Simple gateless nodes having a gate of a different type
NODE.ROOT are modularized. Those gateless nodes haring
replicated components or submodules as inputs are
temporarily transferred into "nested modules", unless
they are found to contain a set of replicated events
within the gate. In this case they are complete, and
modular minimal cutsets can be determined.
(g) Symmetric (K-out-of-N) gate NODEs are immediately
modularized.
(h) NODEs which have been transferred into proper modules
or temporary nested submodules are attached to their
NODE.ROOT.
(i) As steps (e), (f), (g) and (h) reduce the number of
gate inputs to a gateless node, a new set of gateless
nodes will necessarily be obtained. Therefore, steps
(e) through (h) will be successively repeated until
the top event is reached.
Once the modular structure of the fault tree has been obtained,
the quantitative evaluation of reliability and importance parameters
of the tree can be more efficiently performed because of the
reduction in the calculations. In particular, the probability of
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the occurrence of the top event is obtained by means of a series of
recursive calculations requiring the evaluation of the probability
expectation value of each module combined in the tree.
From the foregoing evidence the computational advantages of using
the PL-MOD's methodology to evaluate fault trees in a modular manner
are:
(a) The probabilities of the occurrence of the top and
intermediate gate events are efficiently computed by
evaluating these modular events in the same order
in which they are generated.
(b) The modular and component importance measures are
easily.computed by starting at the top tree
event-and successively using a modular importance
chain rule.
(c) The modular minimal cutsets represent all of the
simple cutsets in a compact form. For qualitative
fault tree evaluation, such as common cause failure
analysis, the modular minimal cutsets can be
efficiently used.
1.4.3 Other Modularization Methodologies
In this section two modularization methods are described; one
is Chatterjee's method and next the PATREC-RCM's method.
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1.4.3.1 Chatterjee's Method
Chatterjee's algorithm [30,31] finds an equivalent representation
of a given fault tree in terms of the finest modular representation
of that tree. This algorithm is shown in Figure (1.4.6).
Minimal cutsets disjoint modules described in Step 2 of
Figure (1.4.6) and obtained as follows:
For example, suppose the cutsets
K = {(1, 2, 3), (3, 4), (2, 4, 5), (3, 5), (6, 7), (6, 8),
(6, 9), (7, 8, 9), (10, 7, 8)} are given for a fault tree.
The disjoint min cutset modules can be obtained by using the
following graph, and by connecting cutsets that share at least one
replicated component.
1,2,3 3,4 6,7 6,8
2,4,5 3,5 6,9 7,8,29
10,7,8
It is evident that, due to the definition of a module, those sets
of components that are independent of each other can be put into a
module. Obviously, components (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and (6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
constitute two modules of the system because they are totally independent
of each other.
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Figure 1.4.6 Chatterjee's Methodology for Modularizing a Fault Tree [31]
t
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It is evident that this algorithm is different from that of PL-MOD
for deriving the modular decomposition of the fault tree. In Chatterjee's
method the modules are found from minimal cut and path setsof a fault
tree whereas, in PL-MOD's method, the modules are found directly from
the fault tree diagram. The obvious advantage of the latter is that
there is no necessity to go through the time consuming cutset
determination prior to the modulariztion procedure.
The Code FTAP (see Appendix A) finds the families of minimal
cutsets based on the simple modules (easy modules), and is capable
of generating the cutsets such that they can be most conveniently used
in Chatterjee's algorithm for modularizing a tree (i.e. FTAP performs
step 1 and obtains the MCS of the system shown in Figure (1.4.6).
In summary, the method of fault tree modularization developed
by Chatterjee is not a potentially useful algorithm for following
reasons:
(a) the algorithm is not wholly automated in the
form of a computer program
(b) the algorithm consists of determining all
minimal cutsets, which by itself is very time
consuming
(c) the use of this algorithm for complex fault trees
is very difficult, if not impossible; due to the
presence of a large number of minimal cutsets
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(d) probability calculations from the modules obtained
by using simple cutsets are more time consuming- than
calculating probabilities from the cutsets directly.
Because, once the cutsets are obtained, calculating
probabilities constitutes a negligible fraction of
the computation time necessary to evaluate the fault
tree through its cutsets.
1.4.3.2 PATREC-RCM's Method
PATREC-RCM [32] is a computer code based on a modularization
algorithm, and is the new version of the PATREC Code [33]. The latter
does not handle replicated components. The PATREC-RCM algorithm does
not attempt to determine minimal cutsets or modular minimal cutsets.
Rather, PATREC-RCM calculates unavailabilities directly from the
modularized fault tree diagram. The effect of the presence of replicated
events will be treated by a mathematical formulation rather than a
logical disorientation of the fault tree (e.g. similar to the PL-MOD
and Chatterjee's method).
The modularization algorithm used in the code PATREC-RCM is based
on a complete modularization without treating any dependences between
the components. In this case the modularization process is very simple,
and is identical to the PL-MOD modularization process when no replicated
component exists in the fault tree. Therefore, by starting from the
bottom of the tree and replacing all simple modules by a "super-component"
and repeating this procedure, the whole tree will be finally represented
by a single "super-event"o
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As was discussed earlier, the effect of the presence of replicated
components is treated mathematically during the probability calculations
by the PATREC-RCM. Suppose the probability corresponding to the
modular structure in terms of the primary events is as follows:
h(g) = h(Pa' b' a *'' p x Px ' ''' P ) in which x., x 2 ' ''' xn1~ X 2  Xn
are replicated components, and suppose
h(l., ) = (P a P , ... , P , . Po = 1, .. 1 P ) and
h(O. P = (Pa' b' ''' x ' '' ' x. 0''.'' P ).
1 a. n
one obtaines the probability P of the occurrence of the top event by
applying Bayes' theorem:
h. (P) = P h(1., P) + (1 - P )h (0., ) (1.4-12)ix. 1 x. 1
Therefore, a single module representing the top event of a fault tree
with r different replicated events could be replaced by 2r "super-events"
with no replicated events. Therefore, the total probability of the
top event would be as follows:
r
Pr(Top Event) = h.(P) (1.4-13)
i=1
The efficiency of this method in PATREC-RCM is therefore, highly
dependent upon the number of replicated events. For large fault trees
with a large number of replicated events equation (1.4-12) must be
evaluated for each replicated component. Therefore, the time consumed
by the computer becomes prohibitive.
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In summary, the use of the PATREC-RCM Code to calculate probabilities
highly depends on the system fault tree. The PATREC-RCM Code is not
capable of making any qualitative fault tree evaluation, because the
modular minimal cutsets, or simple cutsets, are not found by the
code. Further, for trees with many replicated events, the quantitative
calculations cannot be efficiently performed.
1.5 Objectives of This Study
In section (1.4) the PL-MOD methodology along with the Chatterjee
and PATREC-RCM methods were discussed. In general, the PL-MOD methodology
has the advantage of deriving modular minimal cutsets directly from the
fault tree diagram in an efficient and effective manner. Chaterjee's
methodology is simply not practical and economical for large fault trees,
due to the need for determining minimal cutsets prior to the modularization
process. The PATREC-RCM's methodology is capable only of finding
probability of the top event, and therefore is not suitable for any
qualitative analysis. Even PATREC-RCM's methodology is incapable of
finding the top event probability for a large fault tree consisting of
many replicated events, because of the numerous mathematical calculations
involved.
The objective of this thesis is mainly concentrated at developing
the methodology and capabilities of the PL-MOD Code. For a complete
description of the PL-MOD code the reader is referred to Appendix A
of this thesis and reference [23]. The objectives of this research can
be divided into the following three categories:
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i) removal of some of the important restrictions in
the PL-MOD Code;
ii) addition of more capabilities to the PL-MOD Code;
iii) investigation for potential use of the PL-MOD Code
series in the present reliability and safety analysis
problems.
Developments under Category (i) will include the following efforts:
(1) PL-MOD can only handle replicated modular gates that
are independent from all other replicated gates and
the fault tree itself. In other words, replicated
components can only appear within the domain of a
replicated gate or the top event. In practice, however,
there are many fault trees where the replications
are outside the replicated gate domain. This
restriction will be removed in the context of this
research.
(2) PL-MOD allows the explicit treatment of symmetric
(K-out-of-N) gates only if the inputs to these gates
are non-replicated component or super-component events.
An attempt will be made in this thesis to eliminate
this restriction.
(3) The input and output to the PL-MOD Code is based on
the numerical values assigned by the user. In addition,
much information about the fault tree must be applied
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as input, such as number of gates, number of components,
and number of replicated components. Replicated components
must be given special numbers and the number of their
occurrences must be specified. A change had to be
made such that this input information is calculated
by the computer and the user would then only input the
logical corrections of the fault tree by using alpha-
numeric names.
Developments under Category (ii) include the following efforts:
(1) PL-MOD analyzes deterministically steady-state
probabilities for the top event. To account for
maintenance repair and test, a time-dependent (kinetic)
tree analysis is implemented during the course of this
research. The result of this development i.s the PL-MODT
Code (T stands for Transient).
(2) PL-MOD lacks the capability of accounting for uncertainties
associated with the basic event input probabilities.
A Monte-Carlo package is therefore implemented into
this code, resulting in the version of PL-MODMC to
account for uncertainties associated with component failure
rates, repair time, test duration,...., etc. (MC stands for
Monte-Carlo-.)
(3) PL-MOD determines the modular cutsets of a tree through
its input description of the fault tree diagram. Thus far,
these have not been reduced to the simple cutsets commonly
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used in the FTA. Rather, all simple cutsets are buried
in the modular cutsets. However, for the qualitative
analysis of fault trees, one needs fault tree analysis
codes in order to present the adequacy and efficiency
of the methods developed in this thesis. This task has been
performed by developing the MODCUT code.
(2) For large systems, the identification of cutsets affected
by common cause events are generally not feasible at the
top event level due to prohibitively large numbers of
cutsets. It is believed that the modularizations
procedure developed for the PL-MOD Code would be
well suited for the identification of common cause
candidates. A thorough investigation of common cause
analysis methods is performed in the context of using
different computer codes, including MODCUT and MOCUS, for
generating cutsets, and identifying common cause
candidate cutsets. The possibility of using modular
decomposition methodology in common cause analysis is
alsoinvestigated.
Finally, it should be stressed that with the newly developed version
of PL-MODT, PL-MODMC, and MODCUT a package has been obtained which is
able to cover the broad spectrum of required tasks in present day
reliability and fault tree analysis studies. Particularly, this would
become more clear by reviewing the fault tree evaluation codes
presented in Appendix A of this thesis. Most of these codes suffer
a restriction of one kind or another in their application. In the
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following chapters of this thesis, the mathematical concepts and
computer implementation of these mathematical concepts are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
TIME DEPENDENT FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
The use of modularization techniques in fault tree analysis provides
an efficient and fast method to determine the unavailabilities of
the modules and the top tree event. The modularization technique
is specifically advantageous for the analysis of fault trees comprised
of components with time-dependent behavior. This is because the time-
dependent evaluation involves many calculations of the same kind at
different time steps.
In this chapter, four different classes of components are considered
for use in the PL-MOD Code for evaluating the fault tree. The four
classes of components are:
1. Time-independent or constant unavailability
components (i.e., A = constant).
2. Nonrepairable components in which the failure
rates are time independent.
3. Repairable components, failure of which is
immediately detected (revealed:faults). The
failure and repair rates are time independent
for this class of components (monitored components).
4. Repairable components, failure of which is
detected upon inspection (periodically tested
components).
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A detailed discussion of these four classes of components is
provided in Sections 2.2 through 2.5. These four classes of components
are incorporated into the PL-MOD Code, and the new code is named PL-MODT,
where the abbreviation, T, stands for the transient features of the
code.
In the PL-MODT code, all features of the PL-MOD code are
essentially kept the same. The new code is able to handle
large fault trees with time-dependent components as well as small
trees in an efficient, fast and economical way. During this development,
an attempt has been made to incorporate most of the important;features
of the present time-dependent codes such as KITT [6] and FRANTIC[4]
into PL-MODT.
2.2 Class 1 Components: Time Independent Components
A time-independent leaf (component) in a fault tree takes into
account the presence of failures whose probability of occurrence does
not change during the component's operation. These failures can
occur as a result of physical phenomena such as operator faults, loss
of power, faults due to the complementary components, etc. The
occurrence of these faults has a specific likelihood which is not
time dependent. For example, if a fault tree leaf could be in
n-different failed states given that there exists only one non-failed
state, then a Markovian model can be formulated such as the one shown
in Figure (2.2.1). In this figure the different transition probabilities
are given by a, a, y and 6.
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NON
FA ILED FAILED apa2 -- an
STATES STATES
NFF
Y , ,2 -,--
Figure 2.2.1
A Markovian Model for Time Independent Components
Each of these n failed states could be one of the failure modes
of the time-independent component. For example, faults caused by
an operator, accidental loss of power or by a missile produced from
a turbine failure are three different mutually exclusive faults
occupying three failed states of the components. Therefore the
probability that the component is in its non-failed state can be
calculated as follows. The transition matrix A is given by
Equation (2.2-1) as follows:
NF F F2 F
NF a $2' .' ' '2' n
F1i Yl a 1  0 .. 0
A F 00 e- - -
A F2 Y2 2 * All zeros
F Y All zeros
n n n
(2.2-1)
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if P = [P P P , then the solution of the equation
P * A = P would provide a discrete value for P which is also a time-
independent value for the probability that the leaf is in its non-
failed state. To illustrate this point consider the example given
below.
Example: Figure (2.2.2) shows different transition probabilities
for a component with one non-failed state and two failed states. The
problem is to calculate the likelihood that the component is in its
non-failed state.
14 2
/2 
2
F1  F2
Figure 2.2.2
A Markovian Model
2
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The transition matrix A for this example is given as:
NF
A = F
- 1
F 2
Therefore,
NF
1/2
1/2
1/2
the
F1 F2
1/4 1/4
1/2 0
0 1/2
matrix equation has the following form:
[P P P ] A =[P P P NF F F -NF F F1 2 1 2
Solving the above equation one finds the matrix P as follows:
P = [1/2 1/4 1/4];
and thus
P = 1/2.
2.3 Class 2 Components: Nonrepairable Components
For Class 2, 3 and 4 components, the total unavailability can
be divided into two separate parts: first, the probability that at
an initial time (t = 0) the component K is down (unavailable);
second, the probability that during the operation, component K becomes
unavailable. Therefore, one can write
A(t) = (1 - V.)At) + V.A .t)l 1 1 d
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where
V. = probability that K is down at t = 0
A (t) = probability that K is down at t = t given that
K was up at t = 0
Ad(t) = probability that K is down at t = t given that
k was down at t = 0
For class 2, 3 and 4 components, we assume that V. 0, which
is a valid assumption in many practical cases. Therefore, it is
assumed that i(t) = A (t) .
In the code PL-MODT the unavailability equations are formulated
in terms of A (t) since this reduces the amount of calculations.
v
The value of A (t) for any class 2 component for a mission time
t may be calculated exactly by the expression
t
2
Av = 1 - exp [- { h(t) dt] (2. 3-1)
tl
where
h(t) = hazard rate (instantaneous rate)
t = stated time duration of the mission which begins
at time tiand ends at t2 '
Equation (2.3-1) is an exact relation for the unavailability of the
class 2 components. Generally, data are not available to give a good
description of the hazard rate throughout a component's lifetime
especially during break in and wear out periods. However, it has been
demonstrated that for most components, there is a long period of useful
life during which the hazard rate is relatively constant. If the hazard
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rate is constant then Equation (2.3-1) can be expressed as:
A (t) = 1 - exp [-Xt] (2.3-2)
where X is the constant component failure rate which is a characteristic
of the exponential distribution. We will see later in Section 2.4 that,
for a special case, class 3 components can be reduced to class 2 and
therefore Equation (2.3-2) should be obtainable from class 3 unavailability
equations. Equation (2.3-2) has been adopted in PL-MODT as an approximation
for calculating the unavailability of non-repairable components. As
noted above this is a good approximation in many practical cases.
2.4 Class 3 Components: Repairable Components
For this class of components, it is assumed again that
A(t) = A (t) (i.e. that the component is in the unfailed state at t = 0).
For calculating A (t) it would be more convenient to use a Markovian
approach employing a constant failure rate X(hr 1) and a constant repair
rate X(hr ). Figure (2.4.1) presents a Markovian model for this class
of components.
x
UP DOWN
STATE 
-STATFE
/L-
Figure 2.4.1
A Markovian Model for Repairable Components (Revealed Faults)
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It is assumed that the transition rates X and 11 have a probability
density function f(t) and g(t), respectively. Assuming that state 1
is the UP state, and state 2 is the DOWN state, then
P1 2 (T) = probability that the component K goes from.
1 to 2 in the time interval At(t to t + At)
Therefore
P12 = XAt + higher order terms
Similarly, P2 1 = PAt
(2.4-1)
(2.4-2)
Using Equations (2.4-1) and (2.4-2) we can determine the transition
matrix A as follows:
P' -
1
2
1
1 - XAt
yAt
2
1 -At
1 - -PAt
(2.4-3)
By subtracting 1 from the diagonal elements of the matrix P
one obtains the identity matrix.
1
2
1
- XAt
ydt
2
XAt
- yAt
(2.4-4)
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From the identity matrix P we get the transition matrix which reads
(2.4-5)
To evaluate P2 (t) = A (t)2V the method of Laplace transform is
applied.
((S+Q
(SI - A) =
The inverse of the matrix, Equation (2.4-6), is calculated as
follows:
-1(SI - A) =
S+ 1
S(S + X + p)
S(S + A + y)
S(S + X + y)
S + X
S(S + X + p)
*1
PA P i
A+ y + y +y
yy+SS +A +-
+_ A ~ +y
Taking the inverse of Equation (2.4-7) we can evaluate A v(t)
+p P ~ +
-(A + y)t
-1+
A+i (2.4-8)A + yk
(2.4-6)
A+
1
A + y j'(2.4-7)
X + y A + y
A =
From Equation (2.4-8) it follows that
(t) = P (t) = (1 - e +v 2 A+ yP
Equation (2.4-9) approaches an asymptotic value of
A v(t) 
= + y
for large t.
Equation (2.4-10) could be reformulated as follows:
r
- _ r
A 
- + T.
r
where
0 = = mean time between failures (MTBF)
and
T= - 1= mean time to repair (MTTR)
r y1
Sometimes Equation (2.4-10) is given in the alternate form:
- 1 T rAv T+ 1 (2.4-12)
r
Equation (2.4-9) can be used to determine unavailability of
non-repairable components. It is known that for non-repairable
components (class 2) the repair is zero because no repair is
conducted which corresponds to Tr = o. Therefore, by setting y = 0
in Equation (2.4-9), it reduces to the form given by Equation (2.3-2),
71
(2.4-9)
(2.4-10)
(2.4-11)
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i.e., A (t) = 1 - e .
Equation (2.4-9) i-s used in the code PL-MODT to determine the
unavailability of repairable components.
2.5 Class 4 Components: Periodically Tested Components
Suppose that the component k is inspected at the times t ,
t 2,...t . If k is found to be failed, it is then repaired.
en = time needed to inspect an intact component at
the n-th inspection
Tn = time needed to repair a failed component at the
n-th inspection; and
0 + T = time needed to inspect and return to service a failed
n n
component at the n-th inspection
This time will in general be less than the inspection interval so:
n + T < t - t
n n n+l n-
Assuming that the times t are known (inspection times), then the
n
unavailability for any time t given t < t < t could be calculated.
n n+1
If
x = t - t - e for n > l
n n n-l n-l
y = x - T - 1 and
nl nn
x = t 
a
Then the unavailability at different times t l, t2, ... tn would be [2]
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Av (t) F (x
Av (t 2 ) F (x 1 ) F (y2 ) + [ - F(x ) ]F(x 2 ) = F (x 2 ) - [F (x2) - F (y2 F(x 1
Av (t 3) (F (x2) - [F (x) - F (y2) ]F(x ) }F (y 3) +
fl - F(x 2 ) + [F (x2 ) - F (y2) ]F(x 1) }F (x3)
= F (x3) - [F (x3) - F (y3) ]F (x2) + [F (x3) - F (y3) ][F(x 2) - F (y2) ]F(x 1)
n n
v (t ) =1 F (x) [F (xk) - F (yk) ] (2.5-1)
n-J. k=j+1
Equation (2.5-1) can be considerably simplified if the inspection
time and inspection period are fixed values, that is:
Inspection interval = t 2 - t = t3 - t2 - *. . tn1
Inspection period = = =... = = 6
(Duration) 1 2 n
Repair period =T =T 2 =n T
(Duration)
Equation (2.4-1) becomes as follows:
n
A (tn) = F (T - e) [F(T1 - e - t) - F(T -)
v fl
+ [F (t1) - F (T) - e)I[F(T - e - t) - F (T) - e) ]n-l 2.5-2)
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Equation (2.5-2) can be written as follows [2]:
I(t )= F( - 6) 1 - [F(r -6)- F(n - e - T)]n
v n 1 + F(n - ) (T - e -
+ [F(ty) - - 6)][F(n - 6 - T) - F(n- 6)]n-1 (2.5-3)
Since F(r - 6) - F(I - 6 - T) in Equation (2.5-3) is usually very small,
then Equation (2.5.3) can be approximated by
F (n - 8)
r A (tn 1 + F(r -
- 6 
- T)n-6)<- (2.5-4)
The expression for the unavailability as a function of time can
be written as [2]
A (t) = A (t )S(t ,t) + [1 - A (t )]ca(t ,t)v v n n v n - n
where
a (t nt) = probability that the component k is down at
time t given k was up at tn and,
S(t , t) = probability that component k is down at time t
given k was down at t
n
Thus,
a(t , t) = l(t - tn) - l(t - t - en) + F(t - t - 6)
(2.5-5)
(2.5-6)
and
(t ,t) = 1(t - tn) - 1(t - t - e - T) + F(t - t - e - T )
(2.5-7)
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where
l(t - t ) is a unit step function given as follows:
n
(1 for x > 0
0 for x < 0_
Now if F(t) = 1 - exp [-At] where X is the constant failure
rate of the component, after some approximations [2] we obtain
from Equation (2.5-4)
t - mT
A Ct-(t - mn)Xeff - (2.5-8)A (t) 1 e e
where 
- T k
eff = ( + -) + 2 1 - (2.5-9)
TI q I2
r = gamma function of and,-
q q
q = Ln[3-Ln(6X)) and, (2.5-10)
m = 1, 2, ... , n
Figure (2.5.1) shows the unavailability calculated by Equation
(2.5-8) for one inspection interval and the following data for a
specific periodically tested component as the solid line assumes the
system is unavailable during test process. The dashed line assumes
that with a probability of 60 percent the system is not available
during the test procedure.
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e = 1.5 hrs, T = 19 hrs, n = 720 hrs, X = 3 x 10-6 hr 1
It should be noted here that Equation (2.5-8) can be changed
into a simpler form. To do this consider the term in brackets of
Equation (2.5-8), that is
_t -mrl
1 - e
For typical values of q, fl, and 0, this part of the equation approaches
unity near the end of the inspection period (i.e. for t > mn + 0),
so for this condition we can approximate Equation (2.5-8) as follows:
- -(t - m-n)XeffA (t) % 1 - e 2.5-8a
If this approximation is used for the operating times t > m + 8, some
computing time can be saved. Thus, for -only a small fraction of time 0,
Equation (2.5-8) could be used and for the rest of the test interval
the simplified form (i.e. Equation 2.5.8a) can be applied. (Note that
e is always in the order of a few hours and n typically varies between
several days to several months.) The simplified form of Equation (2.5-8)
is not presently incorporated into PL-MODT but it is recommended as
a way to release calculational time if that becomes a problem.
Equation (2.5-8) provides the unavailability of a periodically
tested component with equal test intervals. It is known, however, that
sometimes the first test interval is longer than the subsequent ones and,
therefore, Equation (2.5-8) is not quite adequate for this interval.
Equation (2.5-8) can be modified such that the longer test interval can
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be handled. Specifically at t = 0 we have A (0) = 0 and TI = n for the
first test interval, with rj2  n3 ' I n n' for subsequent ones.
A new form of Equation (2.5-8) is actually utilized in the PL-MODT code
for the first test interval by changing t -+ t + e and setting m = 1, and
n = n . Therefore, Equation (2.5-8) becomes
[t - + qA (t) = 1 - e e -Xeff 1 - (2.5-11)
Also, it should be noticed that in the PL-MODT the second term in
Equation (2.5-9) is approximated as follows
21 - (1/q) 6/n2 % 0.2 x e/T2  (2.5-12)q
This approximation will save substantial amounts of computation
time and will not change the computed unavailabilities since 0/n 2
is very small compared to the first term of Equation (2.5-9).
Override probability* P can be accounted for in Equation (2.5-8)
by multiplying Av (t) during the inspection period (0) by the override
probability P. Therefore,
A (t) A (t) - P (2.5-13)
v v10
where P is given by
P = q + (1 - q 0) (1 - e - (2.5-14)
*Override unavailability is the probability that a component cannot
function properly during its inspection period if it is demanded.
Therefore, with an override unavailability equal to one, the component
is totally unavailable during the inspection interval.
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and
q = override unavailability.
Equation (2.5-14) can be derived by using Equation (2.5-8) to
calculate the unavailability at the end of the test interval. The
effect of incorporating an override probability is also shown in
Figure (2.5-1) for q0 = 0.6. The overall effect is a reduction in
the average unavailability of the component and thus an increase in the
system availability.
2.6 General Time Dependent Relations for the Evaluation of Fault
Trees by Using the Modular Concept
Consider a module with a set (m1, 2 ... , mn}. The structure
function for this module will be
(t) = S[a 1 (t), a (t), ... , a (t) (2.6-1)M l 2 m
where
a.(t) = a .(t) (i = 1, 2, ... , n)also,
a. (t) {1 when module i has occurred at time t
0 otherwise
The expectation value of Equation (2.6-1) is as follows
h (t) = Efa M (t) 26( .6-2)
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Similar to the steady state analysis, for a simple AND module
in which M = M, ,... ,2} we have
1 2 n
n
h (t) = E{a (t)} = h (t) * h (t)...h (t) = H h (t) (2.6-3)
1  2  m i=l i
Similar expressions can be derived for an OR gate module, namely
for a set M where:
M= M 2'. M , UI
n
h (t) = 1- [1- h (t)][1 - h (t)]...[1 - h (t)] = J h. (t)
a1  a2  n i=l
(2.6-4)
For higher order modules, (improper modules),we have the following
relationship
N
k
CrM (t) =U J IT, a (t) (2.6-5)
j=l ick .
J
where Nk = number of modules, replicated and free components connected
to a higher order module or the top event.
Using the minimal cut-set upper bound formula, one obtains
Nk 
Nk
h (t) = i1 1 h (t) h .) (2.6-7)
j=l iEk. 1 j=l isk. 1
J J
which is simply the union of modules and components which are
attached to a higher order module or the top event.
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2.7 General Relations for Time Dependent Simple Modules Consisting
of Only Repairable Components (Class 3 Components)
The unavailability of a repairable component as given by
Equations (2.4-9) and (2.4-10) can be used to derive an approximate
failure rate A and a mean dead time T for simple AND and OR gates.
A simple AND gate or module is a module consisting of only
simple component inputs. From Equation (2.4-10) by employing the
common assumption that .T. << 1, one obtains
1 1
h. (t) = F. < \.T. (2.7-1)
where
h. (t) = unavailability of the component i input to a module.
Once these basic relationships have been established, the next
step is to find the failure and repair rates of the module.
The primary event in an AND module can occur in the time interval
t to t + dt, with the remaining events having already occurred at time t,
or the second primary event can occur in the time interval t to
t + dt, with the remaining events having already occurred at time t,
or .... Keeping these observations in mind, the following equation
is obtained.
n n
f(t) = pr{F 0 RI = F. (t)X. e dt fl F. (t) (2.7-2)
.~ 3 1 .
=1 i=l 1
i/j
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where n = number of components input to the AND gate
(t) =1 - F(t)
To obtain f (t) the occurance rate of an AND gate, let H(t)
be designated as:
n
F(t) = R . (t) (2.7-3)
i=1
By substituting Equation (2.7-3) into Equation (2.7-2), the following
expression results
n H t)
f (t) = F.(t)X. x (2.7-4)
j=1 i t
Since F. (t) is close to unity and the remaining terms are. very
small, Equation (2.7-4) can be approximated as
n A.
f(t) < 5(t) (2.7-5)
j=l F . (t)
By substituting Equations (2.7-1) and (2.7-3) into Equation (2.7-5)
the following result is obtained:
n n
f(t) = f = R X.T. 1 (2.7-6)
11 =1
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By using the general hazard rate formula, it is possible to evaluate
A for the AND gate as follows
A (t) = (2.7-2)
R(t)
where
R(t) = reliability of the AND gate.
A(t) is approximately equal to f(t) since R(t) in most cases is close
to 1. Therefore, Equation (2.7-7) reduces to the following form
A AN(t) = f (t) or, from Equation (2.7-6) ,
n n
A = n .T-i (2.7-8)
Similarly, by using the definition of the mean dead time for a
simpler gate, it follows that
T(t) = H(t) (2.7-9)
H(t)A(t)
Therefore, the mean dead time for a simple AND gate can be obtained
using Equation (2.7-9):
n
= (2.7-10)
n n n
.1 i Ti . I i . T.I
i=1 1=1 1 Z.
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n
Since <.T. < 1, it can be assumed that (1 - T .) 1 and thus
Equation (2.7-10) can be written as follows
T =N (2.7-11)
1
In a similar way, one can obtain the value of A(t) and T(t)
for OR gates. The first primary event in an OR gate can occur in
the time interval t to t + dt with the remaining events not having
occurred at time t, or the second primary event can occur in the time
interval t to t + dt with the remaining events not having occurred
at time t or,....
Similar to Equation (2.7-2), the following equation results:
n n
g (t) - dt - G. (t) X.dt IE G. (t) (2.7.12)
j=1 3 i=1
ifj
Applying the same approximations made for Equation (2.7-2),
Equation (2.7-12) can be reduced to the following form
n
g (t) = L (t) I X. (2.7-13)
j=l J
where
n n
L (t) = I G. (t) 1 - (G. t)
i=1 i=I 1
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*
From Equation (2.7-13) it follows that
n
A (2.7-14)
OR i=1
Using a definition similar to that in Equation (2.7-9) for the mean dead time
(t) L(t)L (t)A (t)
n n
By approximating L A. T. as T , then TR follows as
.~ 1 .=i OR
n
T = (2.7-15)OR n n
j=l i=1
n
A special case in which (1 - .T.) is close to unity would
result in very simple form for TOR, namely,
n
A OR . (2.7-16)
JL=1
and
n n
T = AT T. (2.7-17)
1=1i=l1
The values obtained for A and T for simple AND and OR modules
can be further investigated. For example, take Equations (2.7-8)
and (2.7-11) for an AND module. If we were to approximate this module
behaving as a simple component, with the same approximation stated in
* Note that AOR = g (t) /L (t)
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Equation (2.7-1), it follows that the unavailability of the
module is given by
n
A = A .T = A.T (2.7-18)
AND AND AND .i 1 (
Equation (2.7-18) can also be obtained by using the asymptotic
unavailabilities of individual input components to this AND gate.
Similarly, from Equations (2.7-16) and (2.7-17), it follows that:
n
A OR = T = X.T. (2.7-19)
which is again the exact asymptotic unavailability of this OR module.
Equations (2.7-18) and (2.7-19) show that the approximation of
assuming that a simple module behaves as a simple component would have
no effect whatsoever on the simple module's asymptotic unavailability,
if and only if A T << 1.
The above discussion indicates that, within a certain range of
time, Equation (2.4-9) could be used to. determine the unavailability
of the module. By examining many typical simple modules, it has been found
that the approximation of assuming that modules would behave as
components will not provide an adequate value for the unavailability
of the module for times t < 2T. Figure (2.7-1) shows a comparison
between the exact unavailability of a typical simple AND module with
two input components; Table (2.7-1) summarizes the parametric
characteristics of these input components.
Approximate Unavailability
I.0x10~4
i 5x10~
> -5
<I.0xIC0
z
5x10 -6
-6IxI0
True Unavailability
Poll- -0
APPROXIMATION
IS NOT VALID
100 200 300 1
TIME (HOURS)
I
'4
APPROXIMATION
IS VALID
Figure 2.7.1 Unavailability of an AND Module as a Function of Time
co
*
60
I
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TABLE 2.7.1
Component Input to a Simple AND Module
Input Component Failure Rate (hr 1)
13 x 10 4
2 2 x 10-5
Mean Dead Time (hr)
100
150
Therefore,
-5 1 -6 -l
AAND 9 x 10 x - = 1.5 x 10 hr
TAND = 60 hrs
100 150
2.8 General Relationships for a Time-Dependent Simple Module
Consisting of Only Non-Repairable Components (Class 2 Components)
For a non-repairable component, the unavailability is given by
Equation (2.3-2).. For a simple component i, the unavailability would
be
F. (t) = 1 - e' (2.8-1)
For small values of X.t we can approximate Equation (2.8.1) as
F. (t) % X.t. Therefore, by using Equation (2.6-3) one obtains under
1 1
these circumstances
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n
A (t) = ( .t (2.8-2)
i=l
where n = number of input components to the AND gate. For the case
of an OR gate, AOR is derived by using Equation (2.6-4)
n
A R= X (2.8-3)
OR . - ii=l
Treating an OR module as a simple component will result in
exactly the same unavailabilities and no approximation is involved
by using Equation (2.8-3). Treating an AND gate as a simple component
by using Equation (2.8-2) is possible only if X.t is small, namely,
X.t < 0.1. In that case, Equation (2.8-2) provides the failure rate
of a simple AND module. Therefore, for t > 0.1/X. the approximation
n
is no longer valid and the general equation A(t) = I F.(t) must be
i= 1
used. Table 2.8.1 summarizes the formulas discussed in this section.
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Table 2.8.1
Failure Characteristics of Simple Modules Having
Repairable or Non-repairable Component Inputs
Repairable Components
T
Non-repairable
Components
A
n n
1 T
. ii 1 T.
Li=lli=1 Ti
n
A .
i=l1
1
n
, _.
i=1 i
n
i=l1
I ]tn-1
n
i=l
m k
l i Cik=1 i=1
m k -k
m 
-k [-
i=1 ,i= ,
*In the K-out-of-N Gate the value of m is given as follows:
N!M = kCN =k!(N-k)ol
Type of
Module
A
AND
OR
K-0-N*
m - k 
- k 1
1 Hxi Ti T
k=1 ,i1J =1 i
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CHAPTER 3
REDUCTION OF LARGE FAULT TREES BASED ON THE
VESELY-FUSSEL IMPORTANCE MEASURES
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the fault tree reduction method which is incorporated
into the PL-MODT code is discussed. This reduction method is based
on the Vesely-Fussell importance measures which are calculated by the
code. A value called the cut-off value is defined and any higher
order module, simple module, or component which has an importance less
than this value is eliminated. The remaining part of the original
fault tree is called the reduced version. Essentially, it must have all
of the characteristics of the original fault tree. The reduced version
simplifies further analysis of the tree. This chapter describes the
method of reduction and the selection of the cut-off range to be used.
3.2 Importance Measures and the Use of PL-MOD to Calculate the V-F
Importance Measures
The code PL-MOD is able to calculate the importance measures for
large fault trees very effectively and economically. Olmos and Wolf [1]
have further developed V-F importance measures to calculate importance
of simple and higher order modules in a fault tree.
For example, a higher order module is shown in Figure (3.2.1).
Obviously, this higher order module can be shown by a set of modular
minimal cutsets, as is shown in Figure (3.2.1)
Modular
Cut-sets
14 '' M n1 nTM
= 0 l
S
= (0,. .. L..L.
Higher Order Prime Gate Super-Module
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1
K
NT.r a =
Figure 3.2.1
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To evaluate the V-F importance of modules such as the one shown
in Figure (3.2.1), it follows that
N3
k
C3= (a, a, ... , a) = .L I a. (3.2-1)
M 2 n . 1
Z=l isk
j Ek,
(i = 1, 2, ... , n)
where aM is the structure function for module j, N is modular
minimal cutset. The probability that module i will contribute to the
failure of its parent module M, given that the parent module has
failed is the definition of the V-F importance measurd ;and is given by
Pr (( , a ..VF k 1 21 * 0S,a. Pr[S(a , a2, ... , a ) = l]j 1 2 n
now if
Pr[ (a, ,.., a )] = h (3.2-3)1 a2 , n aM
then Equation (3.2-1) implies that is given byk
NI
k
3 =J.- V a (3.2-4)k z
jEk
Thus, the V.F. importance for module j with respect to the top event
will be
-N3
k
Pr .L aj= 1
V.F. V.F. j k
eI = I = (3.2-5)
2 aM
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In the code PL-MOD the procedure IMPORTANCE is constructed to
evaluate the Vesely-Fussell importance (IV.F.) for every module and
basic component in the fault tree. IMPORTANCE provides these quantities
by starting from the top event and taking the top event importance to
V.F.
be equal to 1 (i.e., I = 1), and then proceeds to higher orderTOP
modules, simple modules, and finally basic components of the fault
tree. For a simple AND module, all of the input components and modules
must fail in order to have the failure of the AND module. Therefore,
given that the AND module is failed, all input components and modules
are equally important to the failure of the AND module. Hence it
follows from the foregoing that
I V.F. I V.F. (i = 1, 2, ... , n)
c. M
and
IV.F. V.F. i 1, 2, n)M. M
V.F. V0F.
where I and I * are importances of components and lower order
c. M.
V.F.
modules input to hand module M with a V-F importance of I .M
For a simple OR module we have
P
V.F. V.F. i = 1, 2, ... , n)I = I -- i=l2, n
c. M P
1M
PMV.F. V.F. i.
I = I -- (i = 1, 2, n)M. M P
1 M
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where P., PM , and P are probability of occurrence of component i,
i1 M M
moduls M. and higher order module M, respectively. For the case
of higher order prime gate (super-module) the following equations
are used in the IMPORTANCE procedure.
P(k.)
j,r. E k.
IV.F. V.F. 3 3.2-6)
r. M P(M)
P (k.
V.F. V.F. jM. e k.
I M (3.2-7)
M. P(M)
1
The numerator of Equations (3.2-6) and (3.2-7) is calculated in
the IMPORTANCE procedure, whereas all other probabilities are already
calculated in the EXPECT procedure.
The pressure tank system [1] will be analyzed here to show the
procedure for V.F. importance calculations. Figure (3.2.2) shows
the pressure tank system and Figure (3.3.2) shows its fault tree. This
fault tree consists of 13 free components and one replicated component
with no replicated module. Failure data for the fault tree in Figure (3.2.3)
are given in Table (3.2.1). The different modules which exist in the
pressure tank system fault tree are presented in Figure (3.2.3). To
calculate the importance measures, the following calculations are
performed in three steps. It should be recalled that all probabilities
are calculated prior to the use of the IMPORTANCE procedure.
OUTLET
1
INFINITE
.RESERVOIR
PUSH Si TO START FILLING TANK
PRESSURE
TANK
-4
Figure 3.2.2 Pressure Tank Example
I
I
VALVE
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Table 3.2.1
PRESSURE TANK RUPTURE FAULT TREE FAILURE PROBABILITY DATA
Basic Event i Event Description Failure Rate
(per Loading Cycle)
2
3.,
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Replicated
(300Y
Pressure Tank Failure 10-
Secondary failure of Pressure Tank due to
Improper Selection 10-
Secondary failure of Pressure Tank due to
Out-of-tolerance Conditions 10-
K2 relay contacts fail to open 10-
Sl switch secondary failure 10-
Sl switch contacts fail to open 10-
External reset actuation force remains on
switch Sl 10-
Kl relay contacts fail to open 10-
Timer does not "time-off" due to improper
setting 10-
Timer relay contacts fail to open 10-
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor 1 10-
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor 2 10-
Pressure switch not actuated by sensor 3 10-
Event i Event Description Failure Rate
(Per Loading Cycle)
Common Cause failure among
1) relays Kl, K2 and timer T 10-5
8
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
MODULES IN THIS TREE
GATE CORRESPONDING TYPE OF COMPONENTS AND
TO A MODULE MODULE MODLES ATTACHED
TO THE MODULE
9 SYMMETRIC 1I, 12, AND 13
4 NESTED Mg
OR SIMPLE 1,2, 3, 4,
MODULE
5 NESTED 5,6,7,8,9 AND 10
G3
G9
G5
G6
G8
Figure 3.2.3: Pressure Tank Rupture Yault Trrc and Associated Modules
(Failure Rate for Component 1, X. 1x10- 8 hr-l;
all otherm X = .x10-5 hr-1 )
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STEP 1
= 1
P
IV.F. _r = 2.49937 x 1~
rP (TOP)
M 1
=- PTO1 = 7.500625 x 10-1
P (TOP)
IV.F.
M 5
P P
m45 
-10
- M5 = 4.49887 x 10
P (TOP)
V.F. V.F.
1 M 1
1 = 2.49937 x
P
m 1
V.F. V.F. V.F. V.F.
2 3 4 M 1
0-510 ~
P
My
2.49937 x ol1
STEP 2
= 4.49887 x 10-10
V.F. V.F. =V.F. V.F. V.F. =V.F.
5 6 7 8 9 10
= 7.49812 x 10~11
-59V.F. , 10
M P
5 M
V.F. V.F. V.F. V.F.
1 12 13 9
-5 2
x 2(10 ) = 2.299924 x 10 10
m 9
V.F.
TOP
V.F.
M 1
V. F.
M
4
IV.F.
M 9
=V.F.
M 4
STEP 3
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Therefore, if we were to reduce this fault tree based on the above
calculations for a cut-off value of 104 , we should perform the following
procedure.
STEP 1
IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10 1 KEPT
r
(since larger than 10~ )
I = 7.500625 x 10 KEPT
M1
V.F. V.F. -10
I = I = 4.49887 x 10 CANCELLEDM 4 MS
Therefore, module M and components 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 will be
automatically cancelled
IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10 4KEPT1
V.F. V.F. V0 F. -l
I2 = 3 1 4 2.49937 x 10 KEPT
From this discussion, the reduced version of the fault tree in
Figure (3.2.3) is given in Figure (3.2.4). Naturally, the same
procedure is adopted to reduce large fault trees by the use of the
IMPORTANCE procedure in the PL-MOD code. The method applied is presented
in the next section.
102
TOP EVEN
Gl .
TOP EVENT
G2
------- 
- G l
3oooZ
Fg30
Figure 3.2.4
Reduced Version of the Fault Tree in Figure 3.2.3
G3
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3.3 Use of the Code PL-MOD for Reducing Large Fault Trees
As discussed in Section 3.2, the procedure IMPORTANCE in PL-MOD
provides the V-F importance measures for all of the fault tree components
as well as simple and higher order modules. This procedure is modified
to a new form such that it accounts for the cut-off value to exclude
those components and modules that have V-F importances less than this
prescribed value. For any further evaluation, the new reduced form
of the fault tree can be used.
Obviously, the cut-off value plays an important role in the
reduction strategy. That is, different values of the cut-off value
result in different reduced fault trees. Therefore, a great deal
of attention must be paid to the selection of the cut-off value in
order to achieve a desired and accurate form of the reduced fault tree.
The new form of the IMPORTANCE procedure is linked with the code
PL-MODT, so that for future developments of the code, the reduced
version of fault trees can be used by the code to evaluate time-dependent
behavior of the fault tree.
In the modified form of the IMPORTANCE procedure, the top event
importance will be set equal to 1. By starting from the top event it
proceeds to the bottom. First, V-F importances of the higher modules
and replicated events that are connected to the top event are calculated.
Next, the code automatically removes all modules and replicated events
whose V-F importances are less than the prescribed cut-off value. Each
higher order module which is removed contains some other modules and
free components that are attached to them. Therefore, there is no need
to compute the V-F importance of any of these attached members of the
104
removed higher order modules, because their importances are always
equal to or less than that of the parent module which is lower than
the cut-off value. If, however, the higher order module is not removed
because its importance is higher than the cut-off value, the code
will proceed to calculate importances of simple modules and components
attached to it, and to automatically remove components and simple
modules with an importance below the criterion.
Thus, starting from the top event of an unreduced fault tree, all
of the branches of the tree will be eliminated if their importance is
below the cut-off value. The pruned tree is the reduced version of
the original tree.
3.4 Reductions of LPRS and HPIS Fault Trees
In order to demonstrate the reduction process, the reduced fault
tree of the Low Pressure Recirculation System presented in Appendix II
of WASH-1400 is further reduced by using different values for the
cut-off limit. The maximum change in the top event occurrence probability
for a range of cut-off values from 10-2 to 10-5 has been calculated.
The maximum change is obtained when the cut-off value is 10-2. Therefore,
the following inequality can be written for this range of the cut-off
values.
P(TOP) reduce (1 + 0.01) P(TOP)unreduced
For example, for the LPRS with 6 replicated and 61 non-replicated
components, the results for the various reduced versions which
follow from the application of the different cut-off values are
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summarized in Table (3.4.1).
Table 3.4.l
Percentage of Increase in the Top Event Occurrence of
- Reduced Trees of LPRS for Different Cut-Off Values
Number of Free Percentage
Cut-off Components Number of Replicated Change in the
Value Remaining Components Remaining Top Event
10-5 43 5 No change
10~4 37 5 No change
10-3 20 4 No change
10-2 12 2 1.1%
It becomes obvious from Table (3.4.1) that for cut-off values
in the range of 10-5 to 10-3 no chanige in the top event occurs and,
therefore, one can safely use the upper bound (i.e., 10-3) for the
cut-off value without affecting the accuracy, thereby saving,
computation time. Even the use of 10-2 for the cut-off provides a
still reasonable fault tree for the LPRS which results in a change of
only 1.1% compared to the originally published version. Investigation
of the reduced fault trees shows that they have essentially the same
low order cut-sets as the original fault tree.
It is very important to understand that a component with low
probability or unavailability will not necessarily result in a low
V-F importance. For example, for the pressure tank example, Component 1
is found to have
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IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10 4 and
r
V.F. -ll
I = 7.49812 x 105-10
However, P, = 10-8 and P5-10 = 10-5, and, therefore, even though
the replicated event has a probability of occurrence which is by
3 orders of magnitude less than that of components 5 through 10, its
importance is 7 orders of-magnitude larger. This means that any
reduction process which is solely based on the orders of event
probabilities does not necessarily result in an accurate reduced fault
tree. To have the same order of magnitude for the importance of the
replicated event one needs to reduce the probability of the replicated
-15
component down to P = 10 which results in
r
IV.F. = 2.49937 x 10 11
r
From the above discussion it follows that the reduction schemes in
the code PL-MODT provide an excellent objective means of reducing a fault
tree.
The same kind of study is performed for the HPIS for a cut-off
value of 10- 3. The HPIS fault tree consists of 142 free and 13 replicated
components. The reduction process resulted in a tree with 53 free
and 9 replicated components. The top event remained unchanged and the
low order cut-sets are almost the same.
Since there are no calculations or iterations involved in the
reduction procedure, the computer cost increase is negligibly small
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compared to the modularization process. For example, for the LPRS
fault tree, the CPU time for modulation and evaluation by the PL-MODT
amounts to 0.46 seconds where it is about 0.47 seconds if a reduction
with cut-off value equal to 10-2 is requested in addition to the
above calculations. Although the saving does not become apparent
for this steady-state example, it should be pointed out that a
substantial saving will result if one uses the reduced version for time-
dependent fault tree for subsequent analysis. This is particularly
true for Monte Carlo simulation..
It is very important to realize the fact that the V-F importance
measures are calculated by assuming that the modules and components of
fault trees are statistically independent. However, if a fault tree
is used for the common cause failure analysis, the reduced version
obtained by using the V-F importance measure may no longer be adequate
for this purpose, because, the components of the fault tree may not be
statistically independent. Methods can be employed to reduce only those
modules and components that are not dependent due to common causes in
the system. These methods are not currently incorporated into the
PL-MODT code. But, due to the importance of the common cause failure
analysis, it would be highly valuable to acquire this capability.
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CHAPTER 4
MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION OF TOP EVENT PROBABILITY
4.1 Introduction
The quantification of the probability of the top event in a
fault tree is straight-forward when point values are used for the component
failure probabilities. However, such a point value calculation gives
no insight into the possible uncertainties of the top event probability.
A common way to overcome this difficulty is to use a Monte-Carlo
procedure to develop a probability distribution for the top event.
In this procedure each component failure probability is represented
by an appropriate distribution. In calculating the top event probability
one samples, using a Monte-Carlo Procefure, each of these distributions
for a particular value and then calculates the top event probability.
The calculation is often repeated several thousand times to generate
a distribution in probability for the top event. From this distribution
one can obtain a median value and upper and lower bounds at some
prescribed confidence level. The procedure is often called a Monte-Carlo
simulation.
The codes SAMPLE [1], LIMITS [2] , and FRANDOM [5], are three
examples of codes which have recently been used for Monte-Carlo simulation.
The SAMPLE code gained widespread attention because it was used in the
Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) [1] to calculate the reliability bounds
of reactor safety systems. All the aforementioned Monte-Carlo codes
require a system function as input to identify the logical dependence
of componetns in the systems that are being analyzed. For very large
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fault trees, the construction of this equation is a non-trivial process,
and there is a high probability of introducing errors. Therefore,
for large fault trees there is an advantage in using the fault tree itself
as the input rather than the system equation derived from the cutsets.
This chapter describes the modifications made, to the PL-MOD Code,
to permit such Monte-Carlo simulations. These modifications permit the
simulation to be carried out for fault trees with components that are
of any of the following types: constant failure probability, non
repairable time-dependent, monitored, or periodically tested. In its
present form it is restricted to log-normal input distribution
for the failure rates, time to repair,average downtime, and test
duration. The PL-MOD Code also had to be modified to permit any type
of replicated event in the fault tree. This new modified code is called
PL-MODMC.
The PL-MODMC uses the same sorting procedure employed by the LIMITS
code developed by D. L. Shell [8]. PL-MODMC uses an efficient PL/I
random number generator that is developed in this study to generate
normal random numbers by using the Central Limits Theorem Approximation.
The output of the PL-MODMC code consists of the mean, standard
deviation, and 90% error factors for the top event probability as well
as the point value of the average unavailability for different confidence
levels. The following sections discuss the mathematical formulation
and methodology of the PL-MODMC Code.
II
4.2 The Log-Normal Distribution
In this section the justification for use of log-normal distribution
in this work and its mathematical concepts are discussed.
4.2,1 Justification for Use of Log-Normal Distribution
The log-normal distribution has a number of properties that make
it particularly valuable for many of the problems encountered in reliability
analysis. For this reason it was adopted in the Reactor Safety Study
(WASH-140J)[l]. In this study it was found that the failure rate data
for the various fault tree components was rarely precise enough to permit
the parent data distribution to be inferred. In fact an analysis of
this data revealed that any of a number of distributions were possible
parent distributions. Since one of the distributions that was consistent
with the observed data was a- log-normal, and since it has many
mathematical properties that are desirable for the calculations it was
chosen. In the Reactor Safety Study it was found that the final answer
for system unavailability was quite insensitive to the choice of input
distribution, further justifying the use of log-normal distributions.
4.2.2 Characteristics and Some of the Mathematical Concepts of Log-Normal
Distribution
A random variable t has a log-normal distribution if its logarithm
follows a normal distribution. The distribution is skewed to the right.
A log-normal distribution for which 90% of the data lies between t/f
and t.f (f is referred to as the "90% error factor" or sometimes only
"error factor") can be transferred into a normal distribution centered
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at log t with 90% of the data lying between log t - log f and log t + log f.
The variation of most of the failure parameters can be conveninetly
described by giving median m, and 90% error factor f. For example, a
failure rate estimated at 10-6 could vary from 10 to 10-5 which is
1-6 -6(10 x 10) to (10 /10).
The log-normal distribution has a probability density function
(Pdf) of the following form:
f(t) = 1 exp -~(Lnt -) < t < 00 (4.2.1)
cat& -2 2a 2
and a cumulative distribution of the form:
1 -Lnx 2_
F(x) = exp V- ) dy (4.4.2)
aTr2i 0 2a 2
For describing a log-normal distribution one can only specify
median m, and 90% error factor f, i.e.:
Pr(t > m.f) = 0.05; or
Pr(t < m/f) = 0.05
From variables m and f, the parameters i and d in equations (4.2.1)
and (4.2.2) can be obtained as follows:
= Ln m (4.2.3)
a = Ln f/1.645 (4.2.4)
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The mean t and variance v of a log-normal distribution can also
be computed from the variables y and a as follows:
y + a 2/2
t=e (4.2.5)
2pi+ a2  2
v =e - (e -1) (4.2.6)
With these relationships the log-normal distribution is completely
described. Mathematical operations with the log-normal distributions
are easily performed as will be shown in the next sections.
4.3 Mathematical Concepts used in PL-MODMC for the Monte-Carlo Simulation
The PL-MODMC Code provides the following capabilities:
(1) The ability to compute a point estimate for the
average unabailability value of the top event and/or
(2) The ability to propagate error or uncertainty bounds
on several failure parameters including failure rate,
average downtime, average repair time and average test
duration.
Table (4.3.1) shows the set of four component types and corresponding
unavailability equations that are employed in PL-MODMC. These equations
are used in the FRANTIC Code [4]. Equations for Class 2, 3 and 4
components are all approximate equations to calculate average component
unavailability over a specific period of time. In all equations, it
is assumed that the failure rates are small (i.e., X Kb 10- 2). Each
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TABLE 4.3.1
AVERAGE UNAVAILABILITY FUNCTIONS USED IN THE PL-MODMC
Class Component Type Unavailability Function (Average)
1 Cyclic, Constant Q
Unavailability
2 Non-repairable 1 TM
3 Repairable, A T
Monitored D
4 Repairable,
Periodically X T + X TR T
Tested
where
Q = unavailability per demand
TM = mission length (hr)
TD = average down time (hr)
T = test interval (hr)
TR = average repair time (hr)
T = average test time (duration)(hr)
X = failure rate (hr1 )
parameters for which uncertainty bounds can be propagated are
Q,X A, TD and TR
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fault tree basic event is modeled as one of these four component types.
It is assumed, as a result of the discussion in the foregoing section
that the log-normal distribution holds for all failure data and average
unavailabilities.
In Classes one and two, uncertainty bounds can be assigned to Q and X.
The value of TM in a Class 2 component type is the period of time that
the component is operational and is independent of the physical properties
of the component; thus, no uncertainty is involved in its value. In
Class 3 and Class 4 component types, where addition and multipliacation
of lognorml distributions occur, the error factors can be obtained as
follows:
(a) For Class 3 component types both X and TD may be associated
with uncertainties and therefore the average unavailability distribution
is the multiplication of the two log-normal distributions. Because of
the multiplicative properties of log-normal distributions, the average
unavailability for a Class 3 component is also a log-normal distribution
with the following parameters:
Q = mQ = median = m x mTD (4.3.1)
where mX and mT are median values of X and TD'
D
(Ln- 2 2 + (L F )2 (4.3.2)(nF ) = (Ln Fx) +(n FTD
where Fx = 90% error factor for A
FTD = 90% error factor for TD
F = 90% error factor for Q
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(b) For a Class 4 component type the values of X, TR and T
may have uncertainties associated with them, and therefore each term
of the average unavailability equation is a log-normal distribution.
The total average unavailability is thus the summation of these three
log-normal distributions. The log-normal distribution parameters of
each term can be defined as follows
m
Q = median= mq = 1/2 m x T + m x +T (4.3.3)
where
M = median value of X;
TRn, = median value of T ; and
MT = median value of t
F = F (4.3.4)
(Ln F2) = (Ln F )2 + (Ln FT 2  (4.3.5)
(4.3.6)
F = F3 T
where Fl, F2 and F3 are 90% error factors for the first, second and
third terms of the Class 4 average unavailability equation of a component
respectively. For the exact evaluation of the distribution associated
with Q, samples must be taken from each of these distributions, and
summation of these samples provides a sample for the average unavailability
of the Class 4 Component type. However, approximations may be performed
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so as to represent the average unavailability distribution of Class 4
component types by a single log-normal distribution. This approximation
would significantly reduce the Monte-Carlo calculations in a fault
tree with several periodically tested components. The validity and
accuracy of this approximation is discussed in Section 4.4.
One of the important factors in a Monte-Carlo simulation is its
accuracy. In applying the Monte-Carlo method to obtain the top event
unavailability distribution, one must have confidence in the
numerical values obtained. This usually involves an estimate of the
statistical errors in these values. The law of large numbers in the
probability theory states that the accuracy of an estimate of a
quantity tends to improve as one averages larger and larger samples of
observations of the value of the quantity. To apply this to our Monte-Carlo
calculations, suppose that ti, t2, ... , tn are sample values of the
random variable t. If the sample mean
t t. (4.3.7)
i=l
is formed, the law of large numbers states that the sample mean, with
a probability that approaches 1 as n increases to infinity, approximates
the population mean (or true mean).
The law of large numbers can be demonstrated quite simply. To do
this, however, we need a very general result in probability theory known
as Chebyshev's inequality. Given a random variable, t belongs to a
distribution with mean p and standard deviations a; it is easy to deduce
a quantitative value about the closeness of t to the mean y in terms of
the standard deviation a and for all values of parameter h, i.e.,
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Pr {|t - pI < ha} > 1 -
h2
or
Pr {It - -pi > ha} < - (4.3.8)
h
For example, for a bionomial distribution in which a random
variable t takes the value 1 with probability P, and value 0 with
probability 1 - P = q, we find the Chebyshev's inequality. Suppose
n samples of variable t are taken from the bionomial distribution.
Then
t. (4.3.9)
n I
represents the frequency of successes (i.e., when t takes the value 1)
in n trials. Therefore,
lim Pr {[t - PI < s} 1 (4.3.10)
n-+om
or, alternatively,
lim Pr {It - P| > s} = 0 (4.3.11)
n-+<x>
Since the random variable t has mean P and variance P(l - P), it
follows that t has mean P and variance [P(l - P)]/n. Applying
Chebyshev's inequality with c = ha, it follows that
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Pr{ P < E} = 1 P(l 2 P) (4.3.12)
n E
and
lim Pr {jt - P| < e} = 1 (4.3.13)
n--w
regardless of the value of P.
Similarly, if t. is a random sample of random variable t with finite
mean m and standard deviation a, then the arithmatic mean of the n
independent variable t., ... , t is given by equation (4.3.9). t hasi n
mean y and variance a 2/n. Again it follows from Chebyshev's inequality
that:
2
Pr{ 
-y < e} < 1 2
n E:
or
2
lim Pr { - Iy < E} < 1 - 2 (4.3.14)
Thus the (weak) law of large numbers has been demonstrated for the
case of identically distributed random variables with mean and variance
finite.
It is demonstrated [5,6] that equation (4.3.12) can be shown as
follows:
Pr {It - P| < -} = f e-U l2 - dU + R (4.3.15)
which can also be given in the following form:
Pr {|t - P < E} = erf (t/v'2) + R (4.3.16)
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where
pq
R = error associated with the probability measure.
erf = error function
The value of R is given by the following equation
2
e-t /2 0.2 + 0.25|P - gl -(3/2) EPqIR e - + nPq + e (4.3.17)
One may adopt [2] equations (4.3.16) and (4.3.17) to calculate
the accuracy of the unavailability calculations provided by Monte- Carlo
simulation of variables that are log-normally distributed. Using the
same analogy, equations (4.3.16) and (4.3.17) can be used in the PL-MOD14C
code. However, the value t may be changed to X(p), where X(p) is the
actual confidence limit (sometimes referred to as the probability
limit ). Therefore, equations (4.3.16) can be written as follows:
Pr {IX(P) - P < } = erf (t/2) + R (4.3.18)
The term erf (t//2) represents the probability that the
unavailability calculated for the confidence level P lies between P + E.
(e.g. for P = 99% confidence limit, e = 0.5%, and n = 1200 trials
the value of erf (t//2) is 0.918, which indicates that with the probability
of 91.8 percent the unavailability calculated for the 99% confidence
level lies between the 98.5% and 99.5% confidence levels.) The maximum
error calculated from equation (4.3.17) represents the highest error
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associated with probability given by erf (t/y/Z). (e.g., for P = 99%,
6 = 0.5% and n = 1200, the value of |RI is 0.685%. Therefore, the
maximum interval probability for 99% confidence level would be 91.1%).
4.4 Distribution Models for the Modules of a Coherent System Fault Tree
In this study, through extensive data observation and mathematical
formulations, it became apparent that the unavailability distribution
of the modules of system fault trees are closely related to their input
component unavailability distribution.
As is discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there are two types
of proper modules, namely:
(a) AND modules or
(b) OR modules.
Because of the multiplicative properties of log-normal distributions,
the distribution of the unavailability of an AND module is log-normally
distributed, if all of the input components have log-normal distributions.
Suppose module M( ) has the following set of components as input:
C = [c1, c2, ... , en
The log-normal distribution which represents the unavailability of the
ANDmoduleM(C) has the following parameters.
r
M H m. (4.4.1)
i=l
r 2 1"2
f = EXP [ (Ln f.)2 (4.4.2)
mil 1
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where
m = median value of the AND module's unavailability distributions
fm = 90% error factor of the AND module's unavailability distribution;
f. = 90% error factor fo the i-th component unavailability distribution
input to the AND module
For the case of OR gates in which addition of log-normal distributions
exists, the outcoming distrigution is no longer a log-normal distribution.
However, it is known from the Central Limit Theorem that the sum of a
population of statistically sufficient probability distributions of any
type is a normal distribution. In practice, it is found in this study
that most of the OR modules created from coherent system fault trees
do not have statistically sufficient input components (i.e., 15 or more
input components). Thus, a normal distribution is not an ideal distribution
for the OR modules. An extensive review of the component failure data
and observation of typical OR modules in this study showed that log-normal
distribution is still a potential candidate to represent unavailability
distribution of the OR modules. Because, sum of a statistically low
population of log-normal distributions can be approximated by a log-
normal distribution. A broad data observation, using the LIMITS Code
verified that for the practical data range the sum of a small population
of log-normal distributions can be still closely approximated as a
log-normal distribution. By using the 50% median value and 90% error
factor obtained from the simulation of the sum of these log-normal
distributions from the LIMITS code, all of the parameters of a log-normal
distribution for the sum were found. Chi-square tests were performed and
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showed that, for the practical range of interest, an OR module could
well be represented by a log-normal distribution. Also, in all of these
data observations, the approximate log-normal unavailability distribution
obtained for the OR module produced slightly longer tails compared to
the real distribution. For example, consider an OR module with four
input components. Suppose all of the input components have an
unavailability that is log-normally distributed. The log-normal
distribution parameters are shown in Table (4.4.1).
TABLE 4.4.1
LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS FOR THE
UNAVAILABILITY OF THE COMPONENTS INPUT TO AN OR MODULE
Component Number Median Value 90% Error Factor
1 7.0 x 10-2 9.0
2 1.3 x 10~4 9.0
3 2.0 x 10~4 5.0
4 7.0 x 10-3 5.0
Figure (4.4.1) compares the true unavailability distribution obtained
by a Monte-Carlo Simulation of the summation of these four input
components and an approximate single log-normal unavailability assigned
to the OR module. The effect of longer tails becomes negligible
after 5% and before 95% confidence levels, and both approximate and
true distributions estimate almost the same median value (i.e. 8.5 x 10- 2
The longer tails for the module's unavailability before 5% and after 95%
confidence levels would result in a more conservative unavailability
distribution for the top event. The longer tails and the adequacy of the
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Figure 4.4.1 Comparison of the True and Approximate Log-Normal
Distribution for an OR Module
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approximation. justifies the use of this approximation in the fault tree
simulation procedure.
To obtain parameters of an approximate log-normal unavailability
distribution for the OR modules,- the mathematical methods for the sum
of distributions [7] will be used.
Consider r independent random variables xi, x2 ' ''' n that
are summated such that
z = x + x2 + ... + xr
One can obtain mean and variance of variable z from x, x2 ' '''' r as
follows:
t = + + ... + t (4.4.3)
z xi x2 xr
V = V + V + ... V (4.4.4)
where
a = mean for variate a
V = variance for variate a
The values of Z and V are given by equations (4.2.5) and (4.2.6).
Therefore, for an OR module M( ), we have:
2 2
OR "0R/2  r f
tOR
+ a2 /2
c.
(4.4.5)
2 r 2pc
VOR -R [eOR- 1] = e l
+ }2 a 2
+ c c.
e -1
-
(4.4.6)
orby substituting equation (4.4.6) into (4.4.5) it follows:
aOR
2 2
2y [ i+ aci [ac -1r 2c, c c
- + - +a
r + c /2
e
1 (4.4.7)
mOR eOR FOR = exp[1.645 YOR
Therefore, by using equations (4.2.3) and (4.2.4), the values
of P and a can be calculated for each component of the OR module.
Finally, from Equations (4.4.7) and (4.2.4), the error factor for the
approximate log-normal distribution of the OR module is found.
Another crude and simple method to calculate a more conservative
value for the error factor of an OR module, would be the method of
the geometric mean. It is observed in this study that the geometric mean
of the error factors of the components input to an OR module provides
a sufficiently accurate estimate of the error factor of the OR module
itself.
and
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For example, an OR module.MX(c) would have a log-normal
unavailability distribution with the following error factor:
r /
F O (R f )/r (449)
OR .~ c.
where f is the 90% error factor of the ith component input to the
.
OR module. Equations (4.2.4) and (4.4.5) will provide the module's
median value.
Data observations proved that most of the time the crude geometric
mean method provides slightly longer tails- for the modules' unavailability
distribution compared to the other method or the exact distribution.
However, in the geometric mean method, slight errors appear when we are
dealing with high input unavailabilities (e.g. 0.05 to 1) or large error
factors (e.g. 30 and up). It should be noticed that in practice large
unavailabilities or large error factors do not exist (the 90% error
factor is often in the range of 2-20, and the unavailability in the range
of 10-2 to 10~ ). In Figure (4.4.1) the unavailability distribution
obtained by using the geometric mean method for determining the 90%
error factor of the sum of the four log-normal distributions discussed
earlier is compared to the true unavailability distribution.
The OR module approximation can also be applied to class 4 components
(periodically tested components). The average unavailability equation
for this class of component consists of the sum of 3 terms, each of which
has a log-normal distribution. Therefore, one can use the approximation
of fitting of the log-normal distribution for the class 4 average
unavailability. The models discussed in this section are extensively
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used in the PL-MODMC code, and several tests and comparisons with other
Monte-Carlo codes have been performed to determine the accuracy of these
models. Some of these comparisons are presented in Chapter 8 of this
thesis.
4.5 The PL/I Random Number Generator in the PL-MODMC Code
The task of the PL-MODMC's random number generator is to provide
random numbers for the sampling process. Random number generation is a
time-consuming process. Thus, a random number generator must be made
such that it is both efficient and accurate. The PL-MODMC code employs
the Central Limit Theorem to program the random number generation procedure.
First, in this method, n uniformly distributed numbers between zero and
one are generated. Then if n is a statistically large number by adding
these n uniform numbers, the resulting number would become a member
of normally distributed data with a mean n/2. This results from the
Central Limit Theorem which states that the sum of statistically sufficient
uniformly distributed variables is normally distributed, Usually ten
to twenty is assumed to be a statistically sufficient number. In most of
the practical cases the value of n is taken as being 12. However, this may
not be adequate for special cases, especially when we are interested in
the confidence levels close to 0.0 and 1.0. In the PL-MODMC, the value
of n can be given by the user in the input, and has a default value of 12.
In general, the Central Limit Theorem applies when the measurement,
or random variable that we consider, is the sum of a large number of
other variables. For example, let Fl, (2' '''' n be uniformly distributed,
mutually independent random variables for any value of n, with common mean
y and standard deviation a.
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n
E = I E (4.5.1)
j=l '
We have, as n +o [9],
Pr (E < x) % $ x0 -fny (4.5.2)
which states that ( is asymptotically normal with (ny, crvn). In
particular, the mean x of a random sample of size n is asymptotically
normal with (p, a/Vn). n is called the Central Limit Theorem
Approximation.
The form of the Central Limit Theorem stated here is applicable
to independent, uniformly distributed random variables with finite means
and standard deviations because this version of the theorem is sufficient
for our needs. Another useful version of this important theorem applies
to independent random variables that are not uniformly distributed.
The interested reader should consult the literature [10, 1] for a
broader coverage of this theorem.
The programming configuration of the PL-MODMC's random number
generator will be described in Chapter 7. Several tests proved the
accuracy and efficiency of this random number generator. In particular,
it is found that the mean and variance of the PL-MODMC random numbers
are identical to those of the SAMPLE and LIMITS for the same value of
n and identical large population of data. However, Chi-square tests
showed that with a probability of 99.9 percent, 5000 random numbers
generated by the PL-MODMC's random number generator with a Central
Limit Theorem Approximation of 20 are normally distributed with a mean of
9.97, and a standard deviation of 1.374. The application of this
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random number generator in the PL-MODMC code has provided a powerful tool
with which to sample failure parameters from this log-normal distribution.
Finally, it is found that this random number generator forms only a
negligible fraction of the total Monte-Carlo simulation time consumed
in the PL-MODMC code.
4.6 The Monte-Carlo Algorithm in PL-MODMC
The Monte-Carlo algorithm in the Code PL-MODMC is very simple and
straightforward. This algorithm is shown in Figure (4.6.1). Once the
log-normal distributions parameters m and f are known for the failure
parameters of all components in the fault tree, the log-normal parameters
for the average unavailabilities are calculated by using the mathematical
formulations discussed in Section 4.3. Prior to the Monte-Carlo calculation,
PL-MODMC generates the modular minimal cutsets which provide the logical
information of the tree to calculate the top event probability in an
efficient manner. By using equations (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) the exact
log-normal distribution parameters of the AND modules in the tree can be
obtained. The OR module approximation would also provide a log-normal
distribution with the parameters calculated from either equation (4.4.7)
or (4.4.9). Presently, for the practical range of parameters m and f,
equation (4.4.9) is used in the PL-MODMC Code. However, for large error
factors or large average unavailabilities, equation 4.4.7 can be used.
At present, all of the members of the modular minimal cutsets.are
represented by equivalent log-normal distributions.
The Monte-Carlo simulation starts by selecting samples from the
module or replicated component's log-normal distribution. The random
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Figure 4.6.1 The Monte-Carlo Algorithm in PL-MODMC
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number generators described in Section 4.5 is used to select samples from
the modules or replicated events in the modular cutsets., A sample is
selected by using the following equations:
n
t =a( R. - ) + (4.6.1)i=11  2
x =et (4.6.2)
where x is the sample taken from the log-normal distribution with
parameters a and y calculated from equations (4.2.3) and (4.2.4).
R is a uniformly distiibuted random number between zero and one
generated by the random number generator, and n is the number of
terms in the Central Limit Theorem Approximation.
At each Monte-Carlo trial a single top event value is calculated.
by using the modular cutsets and by providing a single point unavailability
value from Equation (4.6.2) for all modules and replicated components.
This procedure is repeated for a large number of trials to make sure
that an empirical distribution of the top event unavailability is
adequately obtained. Top event unavailabilities obtained from the
trials are sorted to obtain, unavailabilities associated with different
confidence levels.
Comparison with other Monte-Carlo Codes has proven the accuracy
and efficiency of the PL-MODMC Code. For example, Figure (4.6.2)
shows the CPU time consumed for a Monte-Carlo analysis of the fault
tree shown in Figure (4.6.3). It should be noticed that input to PL-MODMC
is the fault tree, and thus part of the CPU time shown in Figure (4.6.2)
has gone to the modularization and modular cutset! generation of the
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Figure 4.6.2
The Execution Times of LIMITS, SAMPLE, and PL-MODMC Codes
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Figure 4.6.3: Reduced Fault Tree of the Reactor Protection
System for a PWR
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input fault tree. Therefore, the actual simulation time has
taken even less CPU time than that shown in Figure (4.6.2).
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CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CUTSET DISCRIMINATOR CODE MODCUT
5.1 Introduction
The analysis of a large fault tree can lead to the generation of
an enormous number of cutsets, if they are all included. In most
analyses one desires only to retain those cutsets that make a significant
contribution to the probability of the top event. Thus, it is useful
to have an appropriate procedure for discriminating between various
cutsets so that those contributing less than some prescribed amount
to the top event probability can be eliminated. A computer code MODCUT
based upon PL-MOD is developed which will systematically eliminate
cutsets whose contribution lies below some specific value. MODCUT
presently uses cutset size as the criterion for the cutset elimination.
However, it is formulated so that other types of criteria may be used
(e.g. cutset probability, or susceptibility to a common cause failure).
MODCUT generates cutsets in two steps. First, cutsets of all proper
modules are determined. Second, cutsets of proper modules found in
the first step are inserted into the modular minimal cutsets of the
top event in order to find top event cutsets. Obviously, the
discrimination procedure can be applied in the first step and, if so,
expansion of the number of top event cutsets in the second step can
be effectively reduced to those cutsets that meet the discrimination
criterion.
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5.2 MODCUT Methodology
MODCUT is a computer program to reduce and generate the cutsets for
the modules and top event of a complex fault tree. Since cutset
generation is a time-consuming process, special methods are often used
in order to reduce the problem to a manageable size. MODCUT uses the
modular approach that was first developed in the PL-MOD code [1]. Bit
strings are used to store the cutsets. Each cutset is represented by a
bit-string. Therefore, each component in the tree occupies and is
represented by only one bit in the computer. This significantly
reduces core storage requirements. Bits that are 1 in a bit-string
indicate a "failed", and 0, a "success" state for the corresponding
component.
Figure (5.2.1) shows the algorithm which is used in the code MODCUT
to generate simple cutsets from the modular cutsets. As can be seen,
the cutsets are determined by a two-level process:
(a) generation of cutsets pf. all proper modules;
(b) generation of cutsets of all replicated gates,
K-out-of-N gates, and the top event from their
modular minimal cutsets.
These two steps are clearly shown in Figure (5.2.1). In MODCUT, cutsets
at the intermediate levels can be properly reduced by using any
discrimination criterion and, thus, reduce the number of top event
cutsets down to a manageable size. The reduction process can be
performed by applying a cutset size discrimination criterion, and/or
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Figure 5.2.1
Cutset Generation Algorithm in MODCUT
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any other criterion (e.g. common cause failure). Presently, reductions
are made based on a cutset size discrimination.
Prior to the minimal cutset generation, the number of minimal cutsets
for the intermediate levels and the top event can be efficiently calculated
in MODCUT, in order to investigate the complexity, to adopt proper
reduction policies, and to choose a reasonable value for the discrimination
criterion. The number of cutsets for each gate is obtained by using the
fact that OR gates increase the number of cutsets, and AND gates increase
the size of the cutsets.
At the end of each reduction step, all of the spaces occupied by the
unnecessary bit-strings, arrays, and structures will be freed in the
computer, and thus an optimized computer core space will be maintained
throughout the calculations. It is not necessary to indicate in the
input the number of times that a component or a gate replicates, or in
which domain it replicates. This will be automatically calculated by
MODCUT through a special search for replicated events. However, in
the code PL-MOD it is necessary to explicitly identify replicated gates
and components by a special set of numbers (see Reference [1]).
Two size options may be input into MODCUT; one for the cutset size
discrimination of the top event, and one for the cutset size discrimination
of all replicated and K-out-of-N gates in the fault tree. In most of the
large fault trees with many cutsets, the cutset size criterion for the
replicated modules and K-out-of-N gates can be assigned a lower value than
that of the top event. Because, if these replicated and K-out-of-N
gates are interacting with some AND gates in the domain of the top event,
then the size of the top event cutsets becomes larger than those of the
replicated and K-out-of-N gates. However, only those top event cutsets
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that are.found by using the cutsets of replicated and K-out-of-N gates
will have a larger cutset size than the size of the cutsets of replicated
and K-out-of-N gates. In the next section (Section 5.3) it will be shown
that using a lower size criterion will significantly save computer time for
large fault trees.
MODCUT is capable of handling K-out-of-N gates, and also components
with a complement (A and A). Benchmark tests with other cutset
generation codes such as MOCUS and MICSUP have proven MODCUT to be an
accurate, fast and easy program for qualitative fault tree evaluation.
Some of the fault trees which have been analyzed with the MODCUT code
are presented in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
To clarify the algorithm described in this section an example is
presented in the next section. In this example the proper modules and
mdoular cutsets are first obtained and then simple cutsets are derived
from them. The method of obtaining proper modules and modular cutsets
has already been explicitly described in Reference [1] and Chapter 1
of this thesis. The example presented in the next section considers
a typical fault tree and the steps shown to derive simple cutsets are
exactly similar to thosecused in MODCUT. This example is used again in
Chapter 8 as an example for using the MODCUT code, and the complete
output of the MODCUT is given in that chapter. In order to more easily
understand the MODCUT procedure for the fault tree described in the next
section, the reader may simultaneously follow the MODCUT output for
this example which is given in Table (8.4.3) of Chapter 8.
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5.3 An Example Showing the Generation of Simple Cutsets by the
MODCUT Algorithm
The fault tree shown in Figure (5.3.1) is an arbitrary fault tree
containing replicated gate and components. Component C5 in this
fault tree appears in both domains of replicated gate G8 and the top
event gate TOP. In order to generate the simple cutsets of this
fault tree, all of the replicated components are treated in a way
similar to that of the non-replicated components. Hence, in Figure
(5.3.1) gates G2 and G8 would temporarily become independent of each
other. Similarly, gates G6 and G7 as well as Gl and G5 become independent.
The modularization process for such a fault tree is straightforward.
First, the free modules are found and then the simple cutsets are
immediately generated by calling an external procedure called CUTSET
(i.e. step (a) shown in Figure (5.2.1)). The free modules in this
example are G7, G9, G4, and G8. Modules G7 and G9 contain no input
module, but modules G4 and G8 have modules G7 and G9 as inputs,
respectively. The cutsets of free modules (step (a) shown in
Figure (5.2.1)) are found in the following steps:
Step 1 FREE MODULE NAME = G7
TYPE = AND
COMPONENTS INPUT = C3, C4
MODULES INPUT =
CUTSETS (1) C3 C4
Free, nested,and parent modules are all considered proper modules.
Figure 5.3.1 Sample Fault Tree for the MODCUT Algorithm
LO
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Step 2 FREE MODULE NAME = G9
TYPE = OR
COMPONENTS INPUT = ClO, Cll
MODULES INPUT = -
CUTSETS (1) C10
(2) Cll
Step 3 FREE MODULE NAME
TYPE = OR
COMPONENTS INPUT
MODULES INPUT =
CUTSETS (l) C6
(2) C3
Step 4 FREE MODULE NAME
TYPE = AND
COMPONENTS INPUT
MODULES INPUT =
CUTSETS (1) C5
(2) C5
= G4
C6
G7
C4
= G8
G9
C9
C9
C5, C9
C10
Cll
It should be noted that, for the free and nested modules, the
cutsets that are obtained will not be minimized, unless the user requests
their cutsets by using the appropriate option in the input. However,
the minimization procedure will always be performed automatically for
the replicated gates and the top event.
Since the gate G8 in this example is a replicated gate, the
minimal cutsets are automatically calculated and, if requested, they
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will be printed out too. In this specific case no non-minimal cutsets
exist. Also, the cutset size discrimination will be performed before
finding the minimal cutsets. For example, if the maximum cutset
size for the replicated and K-out-of-N gates is specified to be equal
to 2, both cutsets of the replicated module G8 will be eliminated before
the minimization procedure starts (in this special case no cutset
remains for the minimization procedure if the cutset size discrimination
is less than 3). It is obvious that this significantly reduces the
computation effort for determining minimal cutsets of all proper or
improper modules in which the gate G8 is an input (e.g. gates G6, G3
and TOP). The minimization method that is used in MODCUT will be
discussed in more detail later in this section.
At this point all of the cutsets of free modules are calculated and
minimized by the MODCUT Code. However, all of these cutsets are in the
form of bit strings. For example, cutsets of the module G8 that are
found in the CUT-SETprocedure are stored in a structure called CUTSET.
COMP(I) stores the bit-strings corresponding to the minimal cutsets.
Therefore, from our discussion in Step (4) regarding finding cutsets
of free modules, it transpires that the structure CUTSET for the module G8
must have the following values:
CUTSET. NAME = G8
CUTSET. LIL(l) = C5
CUTSET. LIL(2) = C9
CUTSET. LIL(3) = C10
CUTSET. LIL(4) = Cll
CUTSET. COMP(l) = '1 1 1 0 'B + C5 C9 C10
CUTSET. COMP(2) = '1 1 0 1 'B + C5 C9 Cll
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Obviously, the first bit in the CUTSET.COMP(I)bit-string corresponds
to the component stored in variable CUTSET-LIL(l) and the second bit
corresponds to CUTSET.LIL(2),...,etc. It is noticed that the CUTSET
structure is allocated for module G8 such that the length of the bit-strings
is 4 and their dimension is 2, because~there are 4 different components
in the cutsets of module G8 and a total of 2 cutsets present. Similar
to module G8, the CUTSET structure of the modules G7, G9 and G4 would
have the following values:
CUTSET.NAME = G7
CUTSET.LIL(l) = C3
CUTSET.LIL(2) = C4
CUTSET.COMP(1) = 'l l' B + C3 C4
CUTSET.NAME = G9
CUTSET.LIL(l) = ClO
CUTSET.LIL(2) = Cll
CUTSET.COMP(l) = 'l 0' B + C10
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '0 1' B + Cll
CUTSET.NAME = G4
CUTSET.LIL(l) = C6
CUTSET.LIL(2) = C3
CUTSET.LIL(3) = C4
CUTSET.COMP(l) = 'l 0 0' B + C6
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '0 1 1' B + C3 C4
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After determining the simple cutsets of the free modules, the
modularization algorithm continues by generating the modular minimal
cutsets for the gate Gl which is a 2-out-of-3 gate. These modular
cutsets are as follows:
SYMMETRIC MODULE NAME = Gl
TYPE = 2 out of 3
MODULES INPUT = G4
MODULAR CUTSETS = (1) Cl C2
(2) Cl G4
(3) C2 G4
Similar to the CUTSET structure, the modular cutsets are represented
by the following bit strings in the MODCUT code;
(1) '1 0 1' B
(2) '0 1 1' B
(3) '1 1 0' B
where the last bit represents the appearance of module G4, and the first
two bits represent Components Cl and C2, respectively. To generate
simple cutsets of module Gl, MODCUT replaces the last bit with its
corresponding simple cutsets calculated in step 3.The length of simple
cutsets for module G4 is 3, and there have been 2 simple cutsets previously
calculated for this module. Hence, the length of bit-strings
representing the cutsets of module Gl is 5 (i.e. 2 components are
directly input to gate Gl, and 3 components represent gate G4 which
is input to the symmetric gate Gl; therefore, a total of 5 components
represent module Gl). Also, a total of 5 bit-strings can be obtained
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for gate Gl (i.e. 5 simple cutsets exist for moduel Gl). Because
module G4 has 2 cutsets and the last two modular cutsets of module Gl
contain module G4, therefore each represents 2 simple cutsets, and the
first modular cutset represents only one simple cutset. Thus, a
total of 5 simple cutsets exists for module Gl. At this point MODCUT
would automatically allocate the CUTSET structure with both length
and dimension of the bit strings equal to 5. The following values are
assigned to the CUTSET structure in MODCUT through a special procedure
called TOP-SET. The TOP-SET procedure performs step (b) shown in
Figure (5.2.1).
Step 5
CUTSET.NAME = Gl
CUTSET.LIL(1) = Cl
CUTSET.LIL(2) = C2
CUTSET.LIL(3) = C6
CUTSET.LIL(4) = C3
CUTSET.LIL(5) = C4
CUTSET.COMP(l) = '1 0 1 0 0' B + Cl C6
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '1 0 0 1 1' B + Cl C3 C4
CUTSET.COMP(3) = '0 1 1 0 0' B + C2 C6
CUTSET.COMP(4) = '0 1 0 1 l' B + C2 C3 C4
CUTSET.COMP(5) = '1 1 0 0 0' B + Cl C2
The procedure for finding the minimal cutsets is performed by MODCUT
in this step and no non-minimal cutset is identified. However, if
non-minimal cutsets were found, the computer storage occupied by them
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would be released internally by the MODCUT code in order to maintain
a minimum storage requirement. In addition, elimination of non-minimal
cutsets in a gate, say G, would reduce expansion of the number of
cutsets for all gates in which gate G is an input. Also, size discrimination
would eliminate the non-essential minimal cutsets and thus reduce the
trend in expansion of the cutsets. For example, size discrimination,
of say 2, could reduce the number of cutsets in module Gl from 5 to 3
by eliminating cutsets numbers 2 and 4 that are of size three.
MODCUT continues the cutset generation procedure. for further modularizing
the tree. For generating the modular minimal cutsets of the top event,
the presence of the replicated module G8 must be accounted for. Thus,
some of the gates should become nested modules, e.g. the input
replicated event G8 is removed, so as to change the modules by which
gate G8 is an input to proper modules. Components C5 and C8 are
coalesced because gates G2, G3 and TOP are all AND gates. The cutsets
of the newly-created nested and parent modules are calculated in a way
similar to that of the free modules discussed earlier in this section by
calling the CUT-SET procedure. Hence, the following steps will determine
the cutsets of all nested and parent modules in this tree. These
steps are all automatically performed in MODCUT.
Step 6 PARENT MODULE NAME = *TOP
TYPE = AND
COMPONENTS INPUT = C5, C8
MODULES INPUT = Gl
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CUTSETS (1) C5 C8 Cl C6
(2) C5 C8 Cl C3 C4
(3) C5 C8 C2 C6
(4) C5 C8 C2 C3 C4
(5) C5 C8 Cl C2
Since the parent moduel *TOP is an AND gate with input components,
C5 and C8, and gate Gl, it would be sufficient to add components C5
and C8 to all of the cutsets of the gate Gl to obtain cutsets of the
parent module *TOP. This procedure is automatically performed in the
CUT-SET procedure of the MODCUT Code. Similarly, the cutsets of all
nested modules are obtained by MODCUT as follows:
Step 7 NESTED MODULE NAME = G5
TYPE = OR
COMPONENTS INPUT = C2
MODULES INPUT = -
CUTSETS (1) C2
Step 8 NESTED MODULE NAME = G6
TYPE = OR
COMPONENTS INPUT = C3 C7
MODULES INPUT = -
CUTSETS (1) C3
(2) C7
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Finally, the modularization algorithm generates the modular
cutsets for the top-event (i.e., gate TOP). The modular cutsets
are as follows:
Step 9 TOP EVENT = TOP
REPLICATED MODULES INPUT = G8
PARENT MODULE INPUT = *TOP
NESTED MODULES INPUT = G5, G6
MODULAR CUTSETS (1) *TOP G5 G6
(2) *TOP G8
Due to the presence of the replicated components C2, C3, and C5, there
are dependences between modules *TOP, G5, G6 and G8 in which these
components are input. However, we now generate cutsets of the
top event regardless of these dependences. In the next step proper
action must be taken in order to treat the effect of these-dependences.
The "ORing" method is used to treat these dependences. In this method,
bits corresponding to a specific replicated component will be ORed
with each other by using the OR operator of the Boolean Algebra.
The "ORing" method will be further discussed later in this section
when the dependences between the bits in the bit-strings of the TOP
gates are being treated.
In MODCUT the two sets of modular cutsets shown in Step 9 are
represented by the following bit-strings for the gate TOP (i.e. top
event).
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(1) '0 1 1 l' B
(2) 'l 1 0 0' B
In these two sets of bit-strings, bits 1 through 4 represent
modules G8, *TOP, G5 and G6, respectively. The first set, which
represents 10 simple cutsets, is obtained by multiplying the number
of simple cutsets in modules *TOP, G5 and G6. Similarly, the second set
consists of 10 cutsets. Therefore, a total of 20 non-minimal cutsets
(with a length of the representative bit strings equal to 14) exist for
the top event. The length of the bit strings is the sum of the length
of bit-strings for all of the modules in the modular cutsets of the TOP
gate (i.e. G8, *TOP, G5 and G6). Procedure TOP-SET will determine the
simple cutsets of the top event from its modular cutsets (step (b)
in Figure (5.2.1)). This process is similar to the one discussed
previously for the symmetric gate Gl. At this step the CUTSET
structure would 'have the following values in the MODCUT Code:
Step 10 CUTSET.NAME = TOP
CUTSET.LIL(l) = C5
CUTSET.LIL(2) = C9
CUTSET.LIL(3) = C10
CUTSET.LIL(4) = Cll
CUTSET.LIL(5) = C5
CUTSET.LIL(6) = C8
CUTSET.LIL(7) = Cl
CUTSET.LIL(8) = C2
CUTSET.LIL(9) = C6
CUTSET.LIL(10)
CUTSET.LIL(12)
CUTSET.LIL (12)
CUTSET.LIL(13)
CUTSET.LIL(14)
CUTSET.COMP (2)
CUTSET.COMP(2)
CUTSET.COMP (3)
CUTSET.COMP (4)
CUTSET.COMP(5)
= C3
= C4
= C2
= C3
= C7
= '0 0
= '0 0
= 'O 0
= '0 0
= 'O o
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
l l 1 0 1 0
l l 1 0 0 1
1 l 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
CUTSET.COMP(20)= '1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0' B
It is clear now that whenever simple cutsets are to be generated
from the modular minimal cutsets (i.e. improper modules), the procedure
TOP-SET is called (Step (b) in Figure (5.2.1)), and if simple cutsets are
to be found from proper modules (i.e., free, nested, and parent modules)
the procedure CUT-SET is called (Step (a) in Figure (5.2.1)).
To treat the replicated events the ORing concept is used. For
example, in cutset number 3 of the top event, the bits representing
replicated components C5, C2 and C3 are shown below:
C5 C5 C2 C3 C2 C3
CUTSET.COMP(3) = ' 0 .0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 ' B
1 2 3 4 5 -6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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0
0
0
1 1 0'
1 0 1'
1 1 0'
1 0 1'
1 1 0'
B
B
B
B
B
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It can be seen that components C2, C3 and C5 each appear twice in this
cutset, which is logically impossible. Only one is sufficient to
indicate the appearance of these components in this cutset. The simultaneous
appearance is due to the fact that the replicated events were made
independent of each other before the modularization process started.
Therefore, one of the bits representing this identical appearance of
components must be changed to zero along with its corresponding
CUTSET.LIL(I). In MODCUT the first appearance of a replicated component
is always considered to represent that component in the bit strings. Thus,
the bits representing a replicated component after its first appearance
should be ORed with the first bit showing the appearance of that
component, and their values must be set to zero. Obviously, if two bits
that are ORed result in zero then both bits must be zero; otherwise,
the outcome of ORing is always 1. The bit-string CUTSET.COMP(3)
would thus change to the following form after this ORing process.
C5 C5 C2 C3 C2 C3
CUTSET.COMP(3) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0' B
This procedure must be repeated for all cutsets and the following
form of the bitstrings is obtained for the bit strings representing the
top event cutsets:
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CUTSET.COMP(l) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0' B
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1' B
CUTSET.COMP(3) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0' B
CUTSET.COMP(4) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 l' B
CUTSET.COMP(5) = '1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0' B
CUTSET.COMP(20)= 'l 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0' B
The discrimination step would further eliminate some of the cutsets
which do not meet the required criteria. For example in case of cutset
size discrimination, if the maximum size of the cutsets is specified as
6 for the top event, then CUTSET.COMP(4) must be eliminated. After the
descrimination procedure, the non-minimal cutsets from the remaining
cutsets should also be removed. MODCUT uses the ORing method for the
identification of bit-strings representing the non-minimal cutsets. For
example, if CUTSET.COMP(1)CUTSET.COMP(2), where I is the OR sign in
Boolean Algebra, is equal to either CUTSET.COMP(1) or CUTSET.COMP(2),
that CUTSET is non-minimal. For instance, it can be seen that
CUTSET.COMP(3) CUTSET.COMP(4) = CUTSET.COMP(4), and therefore CUTSET.COMP(4)
is a non-minimal cutset.
The identification of the non-minimal cutsets is the most time-
consuming part of the MODCUT, and of similar cutset generation codes;
this is because each bitstring must be compared to all other bit strings
that are not tested through the minimization procedure.
Cutset descrimination policies can significantly affect the expansion
of the simple cutsets. Sometimes lower order cutset size may be specified
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as the discrimination criterion for replicated and K-out-of-N gates in
the fault tree. For example, in the fault tree given in Figure (5.3.1),
due to the presence of AND gates attached to the top event the lowest
order of the simple cutsets that can be obtained from the proper modules
input to the top event is 3. And suppose the maximum size of the cutsets
requested for the top event is 5, then all the cutsets of the gates having
a cutset size of more than 2 can be eliminated. One would therefore use
the maximum size of 2 for the cutsets of gates Gl and G8 (i.e. K-out-of-N
and the replicated gate) if the top event cutset size is 5. This reduces
the number of bit strings of the top event from 20 to 11, and still
results in the same set of cutsets with order 5 and less for the top
event. As a result of this action, the computation time for generating
cutsets from the modular structure of the tree would be reduced from 1.02
seconds to 0.4 seconds, which is a factor of 2.5 gain. This factor
becomes much larger as the fault tree gets larger.
After determining the minimal cutsets for the intermediate gates
and the top event, they can be printed out if requested by the user.
However, before they are printed out a procedure should be used in
order to sort the cutsets from the lowest to the highest order. The
method of sorting in MODCUT is very simple. During the size discrimination
an array called CUT is allocated to store the values of the cutset sizes
that are lower than the specified maximum cutset size. Later in the
minimization procedure the corresponding size values in the array CUT
for the non-minimal cutsets are also removed. Finally, a DO loop orders
the cutsets by selecting the lowest value in the CUT array to the
highest. Therefore, the DO loop operates and selects cutsets from size 1
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to the maximum size of the cutsets specified by the user for the
top event (see Chapter 7 for more detail).
Minimal cutsets of up to size 5 for the top event of the fault
tree shown in Figure (5.3.1) are as follows:
1) C5 CS C2 C6 7
2) C5 C8 C2 C6 C3
3) C5 C8 C2 C3 C4
4) C5 C8 Cl C2 C7
5) C5 C8 Cl C2 C3
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CHAPTER 6
COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
Common cause failure analysis is becoming an increasingly important
segment of a complete system reliability analysis. A common cause
failure (sometimes called common mode failure) is any occurrence or
condition that results in multiple component failures. A common cause
failure analysis attempts to identify those events which result in
system failure by multiple component failures due to a single cause.
In highly redundant systems quite often common cause events are
dominant contributors; hence the need for an effective method for
analyzing these events. In this chapter some of the methods of common
cause failure analysis from the qualitative and quantitative points
of view are studied. The use of MOCUS [1], BACFIRE [2] and MODCUT codes
in qualitative common cause failure analysis of complex technical systems
has been studied. Further, the MOCUS-BACFIRE and MODCUT-BACFIRE packages
are developed to simplify the use of these codes by coupling them.
In this chapter some of the results obtained through the review of
qualitative and quantitative aspects of common cause failures in
complex technical systems are summarized. In addition, a brief review
of available common cause failure quantification models along with a
potential model which is developed in this study is presented.
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6.2 Review and Background Information
Common cause failure analysis is not new. Methods for a systematic
approach to common cause failure analysis have been presented in the
literature. However, the complexity of the current reactor safety
systems has made this type of analysis very difficult without the
substantial aid of computers. Even the computer-aided approaches are
often prohibitive in terms of computation time and computer storage for
complex systems.
Concern over common cause failure (CCF) in nculear safety systems
has been expressed for a number of years. In 1957, Siddall [3] reported
the importance of common design and maintenance in Canadian reactor
protection system. In the United States there were early developments in
multichannel instrumentation systems in the naval reactor development
program and at the National Laboratories. In 1961 Epler [4], in his
review of the Heat-Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 3 (HTRE-3) excursion,
called the phenomenon a Systematic Failure. The phenomenon was
acknowledged as an issue in 1968 and called a common-mode failure
during an information meeting convened by the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) to explore the possibility of using the same instrumentation for
both protection and control. In 1969, Epler [5] commented on several
common cause failures that had occurred in safety systems which utilize
redundant instrument channels. He stated that:
"With such an array of four or five identical channels,
the probability of all, or nearly all, failing because
of randomly occurring internal faults can be made
extremely small....it is not evident, however, that the
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probability of all of the channels failing as the
result of a single external or environmental event
is acceptably small."
Certainly, the most thorough CCF analysis was performed as
part of the RSS [6] in each of the following analysis steps:
Event tree construction
Fault tree construction
Fault tree quantification
Event tree quantification
Special engineering investigations
In particular, in the fault tree construction stage the following steps
were considered:
Resolution of failures to a level such that common system
hardware will be identified
Fault tree constructions which identify human interfaces,
test and maintenance interfaces, and other interfaces of
potential dependency.
Computerized efforts in the qualification and quantification
procedure of common cause failures were begun with special emphasis
after the publication of the RSS. Burdick reported on the COMCAN
code. [7]. This code is designed to aid in the qualitative determination
of:
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1. Single secondary events that could fail entire
minimal cut sets.
2. Common links among components such as common circuitry,
common maintenance personnel or common manufacturer
for components having events in the same minimal cutsets
As a result COMCAN requires, as one of its inputs, a set of minimal
cutsets which have been obtained by some other qualitative analysis
code. This approach presupposes, as Burdick rightly observed, an
accurate fault tree for the system and requires at the same time retention
and analysis of higher order minimal cutsets than are usually required
for a reasonably accurate analysis. It is quite apparent that for
large fault trees with a high degree of replications and the possibilities
of several common cause failures, the computational efforts involved in the
minimal cut set sorting become tremendous, if not impossible, due to the
large amount of minimal cutsets.. This is certainly the most apparent
drawback of the striaghtforward application of any minimal cutset
approach. Furthermore, no mention was made of how minimal cutsets
of arbitrarily high order are generated. COMCAN does not offer any
quantitative analysis capability. However, the development of this
code laid the ground for the first time of certain rules which are
basic and will be common to all future efforts involving common cause
handling. The most important thing which was realized during the course
of the codels development was the recognition of the importance of generic
classification since the possible physical sources for a specific secondary
event can develop into an absolutely endless list. Only a unique generic
calssification makes the search for minimal cutsets sharing
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susceptibilities a tractable task. For this purpose, a preprocessor
has been implemented which needs as input generic categorization of
secondary causes. A special category has been added which links
conditions among components to locate potential common-cause failures
of minimal cutsets. The other three categories considered by COMCAN
are:
Mechanical or Thermal
Electrical or Radiation
Chemical or Miscellaneous
Wagner et. al., [8,9] recognized the same importance of generic
classification. Moreover, they realized that existing methods such
as COMCAN need to be extended because they require all the system
hardware minimal cut-sets. However, the determination of all minimal
cut-sets including those of highest orders for a complex system is not
possible due to computer limitations. Therefore, these authors
presented an alternative which does not require all such minimal cut-sets
and yet predicts the same results as if those were determined. In
essence, Wagner followed basically the INEL approach by describing
the three broad categories of generic causes which have already been
mentioned. However, Wagner et. al., [8,9] suggested a new procedure
to identify common cause failure of intermediate minimal cut-sets by
using the concept of a dummy event which contains all the information
necessary for the analysis of the next level of the fault tree. The
dummy events are expanded and common cause candidates for the TOP event
are obtained on a step-by-step analysis progressing from the bottom
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to the top of the fault tree. From there on the intermediate
minimal cut-sets are formed by conventional means.
In a review study for the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)[10]
(Lewis Review Group) it is stated that "...it is of course true that
even for common cause failures all the normal defenses of diversity
and redundancy are at least to some extent active. We believe that
the principal assurance against common cause failures must be in
dealing with the initiating events".
There has been some controversy as to the adequacy of methods
of quantifying CCF's. The state-of-the-art in common cause quantification
is largely determined by the work described in WASH-1400 and the new
developments by Vesely [11]. Whereas in WASH-1400 common cause failure
probabilities were evaluated using upper and lower probability bounds,
Vesely showed that common cause failure probabilities can also be evaluated
directly by using the multivariate exponential model devised by Marshall
and 01kin. For this purpose, Vesely developed a statistical estimation
technique for cases where common cause failures are repairable. Two
special cases were examined, the constant failure rate case and the
binomial failure rate case. A BWR scram system served as an example.
In a recent paper, Johnson and Vesely [12] applied the same technique to
the common mode analysis of valve leakage. In both papers, actual data were
used from EPRI records and Licensee Event Reports (LER), respectively.
It should be noticed that the quantification model used is dependent
upon the population and presupposes that the components from a given
defined population are subject to similar failure causes.
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Fleming [131 developed the S factor method f or quantification of common cause
failures. Fleming and Raabe [14] have compared this method to the two mentioned above.
The objective of their paper was to show the validity of the common cause
coupling S-method as compared to the bounding technique of the RSS
and the multivariate exponential distribution by Marshall and 01kin.
It can be safely said that the quantification of common cause is
still in its developmental phase where Vesely's approach shows a
seemingly high potential for future application.
In summary, the trends in the qualitative common cause failure
analysis are fully recognized by the industry. They also indicate that
well-organized approaches are introduced for effective common cause
failure qualification. However, these approaches are not fully
computerized, particularly, for the complex technical systems. The
quantification of CCF needs further study. Vesely's methodology seems
to be a promising one.
6.3 Some Qualitative Aspects of Common Cause Failure Analysis
The common cause failure analysis literature discussed in the
previous section emphasizes the significance of common cause failures,
and therefore the need for an effective approach to identifying and
quantifying CCFs. Since redundancy was first used in an attempt to
achieve highly reliable systems, the common cause phenomenon has been
inherent in system designs. The concern is that highly-reliable
systems are subject to compromise by human error and environmental factors.
Potential common cause failures are, most of the time, the result of
adding complexity to simple system designs and external undesirable
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environments (e.g. earthquakes, ... , etc). They are partly the
product of a supersafe philosophy.
A significant common cause event is a secondary cause that is
common to all the basic events in one or more minimal cutsets of the
system fault tree. The minimal cutset for which the significant cause
event is applicable is called a common cause candidate. In addition,
if all the components represented by the basic events in that minimal
cutset share a "common location", that minimal is a crucial common
cause candidate.
Wilson, J.R., et. al. [15, 16] have used a method which is
concerned only with locating crucial common cause candidates and, where
possible, identify the associated significant common cause events.
This method is based on the use of the system fault tree and at the
present time is the most widely used method in the industry. In what
follows, a description of Wilson's method which is adopted and used
in this study for identification of common cause candidates is presented.
To analyze common cause failure one needs to consider only the
most significant generic causes in each of four broad categories for each
failure event. The categories are as follows:
(i) mechanical/thermal
(ii) electrical/radiation
(iii) chemical miscellaneous
(iv) special conditions
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A suggested list of generic causes for these categories which can be
easily updated without modification methodology is given in Tables (6.3.1)
through (6.3.4). Using these tables, the analyst chooses those generic
causes applicable to his analysis, adds quantifying details (e.g.,
temperatures over 500 0C), and combines causes where desired (e.g.,
conducting medium, oxidation, and high temperature to represent steam,
or impact and vibration to represent earthquake).
In Wilson's method a cutset can be a common cause candidate if all
the components implied by the basic events in that cutset share a special
condition as described in Table (6.3.1) (e.g. all components in a cutset
produced by the same manufacturer), or if all the basic events in
the minimal cutset share one or more generic causes described in Tables
(6.3.2) through (6.3.4) and all these basic events are located in a common
physical location in which the generic cause is applicable. It is clear
that in the list of common cause candidates obtained by this method,
those cutsets that have two or more components susceptible to a common
cause failure are neglected. It is found in this study, however, that
the effect of neglecting these types of common cause candidates might
occasionally result in serious underestimation of probabilities in the
quantification of CCF.
The Wilson method is used in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL) in order to develop the code COMCAN [7]. Similarly, the code
BACFIRE [1] used the same methodology and is developed by the University
of Tennessee. BACFIRE has more capability than the COMCAN code. These
codes will be discussed later in this chapter.
For common cause failure analysis by COMCAN or BACFIRE cutsets must be
Table (6.3.1)
COMMON LINKS RESULTING IN DEPEIDENr AMONG COMPONENTS
Common Link
E
C
Symbol
Table (6.3.2)
MECHANICAL OR THERMAL GENERIC CAUSES
Symbol Generic Cause
Impact
V Vibration
P Pressure
G Grit
H Moisture
Stress
TemperatureT
Example Sources
Pipe whip, water hammer, missiles, earthquakes,
structural failure
Machinery in motion, earthquake
Explosion, out-of-tolerance system changes
(pump overspeed, flow blockage)
Airborne dust, metal fragments generated by
moving parts with inadequate tolerances
Condensation, pipe rupture, rainwater
Thermal stress at welds of dissimilar metals,
thermal stresses and bending moments caused by
high conductivity and density of liquid sodium
Fire, lightning, welding equipment, cooling
system faults, electrical short circuits
Energy source
Calibration
Installations
contractor
Maintenance
Operator or
operation
Proximity
Test procedure
Energy flow paths
Example Situations
Common drive shaft, same power supply
Misprinted calibration instructions
Same subcontractor or crew
Incorrect procedure, inadequately trained
person
Operator disabled or overstressed, faulty
operating procedures
Location of all componehts of a cut set in
one cabinet (common location exposes all
of the components to many unspecified
common causes)
Faulty test procedures which may affect
all components normally tested together
-Location in same hydraulic loop. location
in same electrical circuit
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M
0
P
T
N
I
S
Table (6.3,3)
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ELECTRICAL OR RADIATION GENERIC CAUSES
Generic Cause
Electromagnetic
interference (EMI)
Radiation damage
Conducting medium
Out-of-tolerance
voltage
Out-of-tolerance
current
Example Sources
Welding equipment, rotating electrical
machinery, lightning, power supplies,
transmission lines
Neutron sources, charged particle radiation
Moisture, conductive gases
Power surge
Short circuit, power surge
Table (6.3.4)
CHEMICAL OR MISCELLANEOUS GENERIC CAUSES
Symbol Generic Cause Example Sources
A Corrosion Boric acid from neitron control system,
(acid) acid used in maintenance for removing rust and
cleaning
0 Corrosion In a water medium or around high temperature
(oxidation) metals (for example, filaments)
R Other Galvanic corrosion; complex interactions of
chemical fuel cladding, water, oxide fuel, and fission
reactions products; leaching of carbon from stainless
steel by sodium
C Carbonization Hydrocarbon (hydraulic fluid, lubricating oils,
diesel fuel) in liquid sodium
B Biological Poisonous gases, explosions, missiles
hazards
[a] Sodium-water and sodium-air reactions have been left out of the
table because the resulting failure modes can be represented by
other generic causes included in the other tables, e.g., tempera-
ture and biological hazards. However, the analyst, for clarity,
may expand the table to include sodium reactions.
Symbol-
E
R
M l
V
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input to these codes. It would be much more convenient if the user could
input only the fault tree. The approach we employ is to use the code
MOCUS [17] for this purpose, because MOCUS is a fast and simple program
for generating cutsets, and is written in FORTRAN. It is well suited for
generating the cutsets needed for the common cause analysis. A combination
of MOCUS and COMCAN, or MOCUS and BACFIRE, would therefore provide a
FORTRAN package which could be used conveniently to identify potential
common cause failures of a system through its fault tree. The MODCUT
code which is developed in this study would also provide cutsets very
effectively for large fault trees, but it is written in the PL/I language
so is not used here. We have chosen MOCUS because it is in FORTRAN,
and both BACFIRE and COMCAN codes are also written in FORTRAN. The code
BACFIRE is used here as the common cause analysis code, because it is
exactly similar to COMCAN but it allows multiple appearance of components
in more than one domain [18].
However, we have also used the cutset generator code MODCUT to
determine cutsets for use in BACFIRE. The package obtained by coupling
MODCUT and BACFIRE codes (i.e. MODCUT BACFIRE) verified the accuracy
and effectiveness of the MOCUS-BACFIRE package.
In the next section the two common cause failure analysis packages,
MOCUS-BACKFIRE, and MODCUT-BACFIRE are discussed.
6.4 MOCUS-BACFIRE, A Convenient Code Package for the Identification of
Common Cause Candidates from a Fault Tree
In sections 6.2 and 6.3, the importance and the significance of common
cause failures are discussed. The codes COMCAN and BACFIRE are available
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to select from the cutsets of a fault tree, those cutsets that
are common cause candidates. In the INEL a methodology has been
developed in order to perform a complete CCF analysis [15]. COMCAN
and BACFIRE can be effectively used as a part of this methodology.
Based on this methodology, the following steps are necessary to
perform a common cause analysis:
1. Determine a complete list of component minimal cutsets
from the system fault tree.
2. Obtain the common cause failure data for all of the
components in the cutset.
3. Search for those cutsets that are common cause failure
candidates (see Section 6.3 for the proposed methodology).
4. Select significant common cause events from the common
cause candidates.
5. Identify common cause mechanisms which would result in
the significant common cause events.
Obviously, for the performance of these steps, maximum use of the
computer is necessary. Particularly for Steps 1 and 3 several computer
codes are available. However, these codes must be used separately for
Steps 1 and 3. And it would be much more convenient if both steps were
performed by one and the same code. In this section we will mainly discuss
selection and implementation of a code to perform Steps 1 and 3 together.
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As discussed in the previous section, to obtain minimal cutsets
that are common cause candidates, two codes are available, namely,
COMCAN and BACFIRE. The methodology utilized in these codes to
obtain common cause candidates has been discussed previously. COMCAN
and BACFIRE are similar, but in addition to COMCAN, the BACFIRE Code
allows multiple physical locations to be input for the basic events.
Therefore, the use of the BACFIRE Code seems to be more appropriate for
our particular interests. BACFIRE utilizes minimal cutsets as input.
Therefore, it would be more conveninet, due to the high population of the
cutsets, to couple a cutset generation code with BACFIRE and use the
resulting packer along with the system fault tree and common cause failure
data.
Computer programs for determining the minimal cutsets of a fault
tree are discussed in Appendix A. A review of these programs showed
that the code MOCUS is a fairly good candidate for our particular case,
because MOCUS is written in FORTRAN and the coupling of MOCUS and
BACFIRE provides a convenient FORTRAN package for our future practical
use. Therefore, the MOCUS code is coupled with BACFIRE and the resulting
package is called MOCUS-BACFIRE. An alternative to this package is
MODCUT-BACFIRE (next section). But MODCUT is written in PL/I, and future
code development programs are under study to incorporate into the MODCUT
a fast PL/I procedure to directly perform a common cause failure
discrimination process. Therefore, MOCUS has been preferred to be
coupled with BACFIRE. However, in the course of our research project,
a MODCUT-BACFIRE code is also developed so as to test the MOCUS-BACFIRE
package and make the common cause analysis of more complex fault trees
possible.
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The coupling procedure of MOCUS and BACFIRE is very simple and
straightforward. The rows of the matrix in which the cutsets are stored
in MOCUS are, one at a time, transferred to the same array that
BACFIRE uses to read and store cutsets. Therefore, fault tree and common
cause failure data must be first read by MOCUS and BACFIRE, then MOCUS
generates all cutsets, and finally BACFIRE reads the cutsets through
the array we discussed above and tests the cutsets for a possible common
cause candidacy. More details with regard to the programming concepts
of couplingMOCUS and BACFIRE are presented in Chapter 7. A user's
manual is also provided in Appendix D of this thesis for the MOCUS-BACFIRE
Package.
6.5 MODCUT-BACFIRE - An Alternative to MOCUS-BACFIRE
In the analysis of complex systems the determination of the complete
list of minimal cutsets becomes a difficult task, and is for highly
complex systems nearly impossible. The code MOCUS is limited to small
and medium size fault trees. Thus, use of other cutset generating codes
becomes necessary for complex fault trees. The MODCUT code is a
potential cutset generator for this purpose. However, MODCUT is written
in PL/I and confusions might arise by coupling MODCUT and BACFIRE.
Hence, for simplifying the task of coupling these two codes it has
been decided to use the Conversational Monitor System (CMS) using MIT's
370/168 IBM [18].
The method of coupling is simple and very few changes have been
made in both MODCUT and BACFIRE to allow for the use of CMS input and
output files. First, MODCUT statements that involve writing the cutsets
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have been changed so as to write the cutsets on a defined output file.
Second, BACFIRE statements in which the cutsets are read have been
changed so as to read the cutsets, in a free form format from the output
file created by the MODCUT code.
To perform the coupling procedure a file with the file name MOD-BAC
and a file mode EXEC is created [18]. Object modules of the MODCUT
and BACFIRE codes are obtained by compiling them separately, and storing
them in separate files. In the MOD-BAC EXEC file the commands for the
following purposes are stored:
a. defining the input file to MODCUT,
b. defining the output file from MODCUT,
c. executing MODCUT MODULE file,
d. defining the input files to BACFIRE; and
e. executing the BACFIRE MODULE file.
The user automatically gets the common cause candidates after he
provides input files for MODCUT (i.e. fault tree) and BACFIRE (i.e.
common cause failure data), by using only mod-bac command to execute
the commands that are stored in the MODBAC EXEC file. It is clear
that no extra work need be performed for obtaining common cause candidates
directly from the fault tree, because the provisions of input data for
MODCUT and BACFIRE is sufficient to run the MODCUT-BACFIRE Code.
MODCUT-BACFIRE has been compared to MOCUS-BACFIRE and both have
resulted in identical common cause candidates for the same input fault
tree and the same common cause failure data. For a typical fault the
having 30 components and 22 gates the MODCUT-BACFIRE package is 1.29 times
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faster than the MOCUS-BACFIRE for identical susceptibility data.
However, the advantage over the latter is that it is entirely written
in FORTRAN IV and its use is more convenient, especially for users who
have access only to FORTRAN compilers. One of the important features
of the MODCUT-BACFIRE is its advantage of writing the cutsets on a file
provided on auxiliary disks. Because a high amount of storage can be
provided in this fashion to store as many minimal cutsets as exist
in a complex fault tree.
As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, the MODCUT code is constructed
for discrimination processes and a few methods of discrimination based
on common cause failures have been carefully studied for future
developments in the context of the MODCUT code. These methods of
discrimination provide the basis for the quantification methodologies
which will be discussed in the following sections. The presentation
of potential methods of common cause discrimination for use in MODCUT
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Future reports related to the
development of the MODCUT code will discuss those issues.
6.6 Quantification of Common Cause Failures Using the Cutsets of
a Fault Tree
Quantification of common causes has an important role in reliability
engineering and risk assessment. Recent publications on this subject
have emphasized the importance of considering potential common cause failures
in estimating the probability of failure of complex redundant systems [19].
In most of the reliability calculations in the pastthe probability of
system failure was seriously underestimated by ignoring common cause
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failure contributions to the failure of systems. A number of methods
have been proposed to quantify common cause effects [20, 21, 11, 6].
In this section, by using the Markovian approach, the effect of
dependancies among components of a cutset due to a common cause failure
is quantified. The Markovian approach is selected because equivalent
rates may be assigned to different states of system failure.
6.6.1 Quantification Methodology using a Set of Common Cause Candidates
As has been discussed previously, a MOCUS-BACFIRE package is
developed to identify cutsets and potential common cause candidates.
However, identification of the common cause cutsets would not provide
a numerical basis for judgement on the likelihood of these common
cause failures, and reduction in the availability of systems due to the
presence of the common cause failures.
In what follows, a method will be demonstrated for common cause
quantification, based on the cutsets of the tree which are identified
as common cause candidates as well as those cutsets that are not identified
as common cause candidates (i.e. these indicate only random failure).
This method may be applied to the general form of common cause candidates
in which two or more members of the cutsets are identified as common
cause candidates from cutsets in which all of the cutsets are dependent
due to a particular cause. Therefore, this method may be applied to a
more general form of common cause candidates.
Suppose cutset C = (C1, C2, .. , C n) consists of n members, and
a number of these members, say n, are susceptible to cause i, and located
in the same susceptibility domain, or share a similar special condition
177
(e.g., identical manufacturer). There would be two ways in which this
cutset might contribute to a system failure. One is that all members
of the cutset would simultaneously fail due to a "random failure" (cause);
and next if two or more of the members of this cutset fail due to a
"common cause failure" and the rest of them, if any, fail due to a
random failure.
The Markovian Model presented in Figure (6.6.1) shows failure of the
system due to the failure of a single cutset. It is assumed that a total
of three states may represent the modes of system operation due to a
particular cutset, say a. First, state S represents the mode in which
cutset a does not cause any system failure and that all of the members
of the cutset are functioning. Second, State N.F.C.C. represents the
mode in which some or all of the members of the cutset a are failed due
to a common cause failure. Third, state F represents the mode in which
all of the members of the cutset a are failed due to a random cause
failure, common cause failure, or a combination of these. It is further
assumed that transitions between the states are exponentially distributed.
Thus, this verifies the use of Markovian approach. Finally, to
simplify the model, the possibility of repair is neglected. The values
of X and X' may be calculated by using Table (2.8.1) of this thesis from
the following equations (see also reference [22]);
n
A(t) = Ln[1 - 11 (1 - e )] (6.6.1)
i=l
n-m 
-X.t
A'(t) = - Ln[l - R (1 - e )] (6.6.2)t~
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Figure(6.6.1) Simplified Markovian Model
x xiCco
= common cause failure rate due to cause i which has
resulted in simultaneous failure of two or more components
in the cutset
A = average random cause failure rate of the whole cutset
= average random cause failure of those components in the
cutset that are not involved in common cause failure
S = success state (UP)
F = failed state (DOWN)
N.F.C.C. = Non-Failed state due to Common Cause failure
Xi
cec.
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where X. is the failure rate of individual components in the cutset,
n is the total number of components in the cutset, and m is the
number of components failed due to a common cause. By using average
unavailabilities over a mission length TM, constant values of X and X'
may be obtained from equations (6.6.1) and (6.6.2) [23].
n-1 n
X = (1/2 T . i) (6.6.3)
S=(1/ T n-m-l n-in
xT (X/ T)) (6.6.4)
i=1
By using figure (6.6.1) the differential equations representing
the Markovian Model can be written as follows:
dP (t)..
s dPP+ (6.6.5)
dt .. s
N.F.C.C. 
_ i i X) A P (t) (6.6.6)dt C .C. s N.F.C.C.
dP (t).f = ' P (t) + x P (t) (6.6.7)
dt N.F.C.C. s
where parameters X , X', and X are defined in Figure (6.6.1)C.C.
and P indicates probability associated with cause i for state A,A
and at time t. Differential equations presented above may be written
in the following general form:
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dP(t)
dt = P(t) A (6.6.8)
where A and P(t) are matrices. For example, P(t) = (P (t), P .F.C.C.
P (t)). The initial conditions for these differential equations are
as follows:
P(0) = (1, 0, 0) (6.6.9)
To obtain the exact probability that the system would go into
State (N.F.C.C.) must be multiplied by P , where P is the probability
o 0
that cause i would occur (e.g. fire, earthquake, ... , etc.). The
solutions to the set of differential equations (6.6.5) through (6.6.7)
with the initial conditions given in Equation (6.6.9) are as follows:
- (X + X)t
P (t) = e C C.
S
(6.6.10)-
P i XI
P (t)0= 0.C. -t
N.F.C.C. Xi + X X
C.,C.
Pi i
P (t) = 0  C.C. 1 -A t
C.C.
P X1 X' - X(Xk + A - X')
o C.C. C.C.
.C. CC'+
i-(A +
_ C.,C. ]
[1 - e
- (X + X)tC.C.
(6.6.11)
1
(6.6.12)
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For satisfying these equations the following condition must
be satisfied:
i + ) > (6.6.13)C .C.
The reason is that if V' is greater than (X + X) then the rateC .C.
at which a system fails due to random failures is greater than that
of common cause failures and, therefore, before a system could fail
due to a common cause it has already failed due to a random cause
in which the state (N.F.C.C.) would become meaningless. Equation
(6.6.12) can be reduced to the system unavailability for non-repairable
components in which the system is not subject to common cause. In
this case X = 0, and equation (6.6.12) reduced to the form given
in equation (6.6.14) which can also be obtained by other methods as
well, namely
PF(t) = ( - t (6.6.14)
For calculating the total unavailability of the engineering systems
through the cutset of its fault tree, it would be possible to use
equation (6.6.12) for each cutset, and to form the union of all causes (i),
and finally all cutsets (a) would result in the total unavailability of
the system. Hence, if aP (t) is the unavailability of the system due to
the cutsets a and cause i at time t, the total system unavailability
at time t would be as follows
PF(t) = JL.P i (t) (6.6.15)Fi F
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For small XP (t), equation (6.6.15) reduces to the form given
below:
PF(t) a E P t) (6.6.16)
F F
Availability of the system would thus be:
PA(t) = 1 - PF t
It should be noted here that for the special case that all of the
members of a cutset are identified as common cause candidate due to
a single cause i, then the (N.F.C.C.) state does not exist and equation
(6.6.12) for this special case can be written as follows
-t
P (t) = (1 - P )(l - e ) + P (1 - e * ) (6.6.17)
Equation (6.6.12) can be simplified for some of the special cases
of common cause failures. For example, in the case of a rare event
FIRE
such as fire, the probability of P is small. However, given that
0
fire has occurred there would be a very high probability that a set
of components identified in a cutset to be succeptible to fire would
-A t
simultaneously fail (i.e. e ' C 0). If it happens that two or
more members of a cutset were involved in a fire with the probability
FIRE
of P , equation (6.6.12) can be rewritten in the following form.
0
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PFire = PFire 6.6.19)
F o
which is a logical result. Therefore, for a system with a high
probability of fire in its vicinity, components in the cutsets
of the system should not be placed within the same thermal barrier.
Another special case would be the situation where there are common
links resulting in dependence among components. For instance, having
the same power supply, same test procedure, same maintenance, same
manufacturers, ... , etc. These types of common causes have a high
probability for the initiation of the cause (usually in the range
of 0.01 to 1). In this case equation (6.6.12) would become more
simple. Specifically, most of the time the value of X is, particularly,
much smaller than XC.C. and thus, equation (6.6.12) can be written
as follows:
i i i tIo C.C. -0't C.C.P (t) = [1 - e ]- - -e ] (6.6.20)
C.C. - . C.
Equation (6.6.20) holds for most of the practical studies concerning
the quantification of common causes.
Another method for quantification of common causes through fault
tree cutsets suggests the direct use of Equation (6.6.14) for each of
the members of the cutset. For example, if h members of a cutset out
of a total of n members, are identified as common cause contributors,
then the system unavailability due to this cutset would be:
due to the
cutset a
Unavailability due to
random cause given no +
cause for a common
cause failure exists
robability that
cause i exists
Probability that cause Probability that the rest of
i fails h members of the members of cutset c&
the cutset a 7 (i.e. n-h) fail due to a
L A L random cause
This can be mathematically written as follows:
m -X.t
P (t) = (1 - P') 1T (1 - e 3 ) + P'(l - e
j=1 0
-X t m -X.tC' ) 1 (1 - e 3)
j=1
(6.6.21)
where m = n-h
X. = jth cutset member random failure rateJ
Average system unavailability can be obtained by using the average
unavailability of each member (see Table 4.3.1):
n n mml
P (t) =( - )( IT X.)(1/2 T ) + P 1 ( IT X.)(1/2 Tm+F3 M o C.C.j=1 (6.6.22)
6.6.2 A Method for Calculating XC.C.
The difficulty of using Equation (6.6.14) or (6.6.21) for quantifying
common causes is how to obtain an accurate and reliable estimate for
X C.C.'s. Vesely [11] has used the method of statistical sampling from
the past failure data.
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There are two basic models that Vesely has used to evaluate common
cause failure rates. The First Model, the constant failure rate (CF)
is a one-parameter model, and the second model, the Bionomial Failure
Rate (BFR), is a two parameter model. The basic assumption of the CFR
model is that common cause failures are equally likely to affect any
specific component set in a population. In the BFR model, the common
cause occurrence rate can be dependent upon the number of components
in a specific component set. Either one of the CFR or BFR models
would provide a basis for calculating X C.C. Particularly, the CFR
seems more simple and still accurate for calculating C.C.s. Johnson
and Vesely have used the BFR model to obtain the probability of valve
leakage due to common causes [12]. They used the Licensee Event Report
(LER) to obtain failure rates due to common cause. (LER) is computer-
based data file information extracted from licensee reports on incidents
reportable to the N.R.C. The LER also identifies the type of components
involved and the system containing the component. Failure rates due
to common causes (X C.C.) could therefore be obtained from (LER) by a
sampling process. For complete and accurate values of X C.C.'s more
study and failure data would be required and the N.R.C. is pursuing
projects whose goal is to collect these data.
6.6.3 Common Cause Analysis of the Aux Feed System (AFS)
A simplified version of the AUX feed system is shown in Figure (6.6.2)
and is described in detail in [6]. As can be seen from Figure (6.6.2)
the system consists of two diesel generators in parallel with a pump
and two valves. The pump and values are in series.
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Figure 6.6.2
Block Diagram of the Aux-Feed System
Valve Pump Valve
Diesel
Diesel
5
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It is intended to calculate the total unavailability (common cause
and random failure) of the AFS for the First cycle of its operation befor
a test will be performed (i.e. TM = 1440 hrs.). By assuming that the
test duration is negligible compared to the test interval (test duration
is about one hour), all test intervals are equal, and at the end of the
test operation the AFS becomes totally available, it transpires that
the total unavailability for all test intervals would be equal.
Therefore, analysis of only one test interval is sufficient. Further,
in order to simplify the problem it is assumed that only fire, and the
effect of common test procedures can result in a significant common
cause contribution. The rest of the common cause failures will be
neglected (a crude assumption).
It is known that some of the test operations are not perfect
and that there is always a possibility that the system can fail due to
an inadequate test procedure. Conservatively, it is assumed that
TEST
one out of ten tests is non-perfect (i.e., P = 0.1). A failure
due to this inefficiency in the testing procedure could result in a
common cause between the tested components. Further, it is known that
in the AFS the diesel generators are tested. A review of the operational
records of diesel generators has shown that in a two-year period only
one common cause failure of both diesel generators was due to faulty
testing.
TET1 -5 -1TEST = 5 7 x 10 hr
C.C. 2(365)(24)
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Probability of fire is fairly low and it is known that it is
FIRE -4
about P = 0.5 x 10 . However, it would be logical to assume
that if fire would occur with a probability of 0.5 x 10 , it would
be almost certain that the components involved would fail and thus,
with some conservatism equation (6.6.18) could be used for the analysis
of fire based on common cause failures.
Figure (6.6.3) and Table (6.6.1) present the fault tree for the
AFS and the failure data for the components of the fault tree,
respectively. It is known that the two diesel generators are
located in the same room and share the same thermal barriers.
Based on the above assumptions, the following cutsets are
identified along with their common cause candidates:
1. D.G.1 D.G.2 VALVE 1
Common Causes
a. FIRE (D.G.1, D.G.2 )
b. TEST (D.G.1, D.G.2)
2. D.G.1 D.G.2 PUMP 1
Common Causes
a. FIRE (D.G.1, D.G.2)
b. TEST (D.G.1, D.G.2)
3. D.G.1 D.G.2 VALVE 2
Common Causes
a. FIRE (D.G.1, D.G.2)
b. TEST (D.G.1, D.G.2)
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Figure(6.6.3)
Fault Tree for the AFS
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Water
To
H.X.
OR
-
190
TABLE (6.6.1)
FAILURE DATA FOR THE AFS COMPONENTS
Component
Number
1
2
3
4
5
PFIRE0
P TEST
0
Component
Name
D.G. 1
D.G. 2
PUMP 1
VALVE 1
VALVE 2
Failure
Rate-6
(l x 10 )X
42
42
3
0.3
0.3
Test
Interval CCF Rat Test
(days) (1 x 10~)CC
60
60
60
57
57
57
0
0
= 0.5 x 10~4
= 0.1
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For the first cutset the variables in equation (6.3.14) are
as follows:
xTEST = 5.7C. C. x 
10-5 hr-
PTEST = 0.10
= (X DGl X XDG.2 x XALVE 1)(112x1440)2= 2. 7 x10 10 hr1
'= VALVE
FIRE
C.C.
PFIRE0
1 = 0.3 x 10-6 
hr-I
= 0.5 x 10~4
For the second cutsetsone gets:
D.G.1 D.G.2 PUP -1 )(1/2 x 1440)2 = 2.7 x 10~9 hr~1
GPUMP = 3 x 10-6 hr~1
ATEST 5.7 x 10 hr 1
The third cutset is similar to the first one. The results for
different time steps are shown in Figure (6.6.4) for the two causes,
and the total unavailability due to both random and common cause
failures. The result obtain for the system unavailability by using
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Figure(6.6.4) AFS Unavailability due to Random
and Common Cause Failures
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the PL-MODT code for the Class 2 component type shown in Chapter 8
(i.e. non-repairable- time dependent), without considering the common
cause effect, is compared with the total unavailability calculated for
both random and common cause failures. The differences between the
two unavailabilities are different at different instants of time.
This difference is on the order of 2 to 100 larger, if the effect
of the common cause failure is taken into account. Particularly,,
larger differences between the random and common cause failure unavailability
contribution to the top event exists in the early hours of system
operation after the test has been performed. This difference in
unavailabilities would, therefore, prove the importance of considering
the system common cause failures in reliability and risk assessment
studies. To verify the results obtained for the unavailability of
the AFS, the Geometric Mean Method is used to determine the unavailability
due to common cause. The result are compared with the method discussed
in this section (see Figure 6.6.4). Since the Geometric Mean Method is
a rather rough estimate of the common cause failure probability, it is
interesting that the two methods give such close agreement.
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CHAPTER 7
DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
DEVELOPED IN THIS WORK
7.1 Introduction
As noted previously, several computational advantages will be
obtained by using the modular representation to analyze fault trees [1].
PL/I language was used to develop the computer code PL-MOD because
several advantages can be obtained by using the PL/I language [2,3]
namely the ability to use:
(1) structure variables (i.e. a hierarchial collection
of related data items of different types) to
represent the nodes and modules of the fault tree;
(2) pointer, based and controlled variables to provide
the ability to dynamically allocate blocks of core
storage to link those blocks together into a structure,
and to store and to retrieve data from the blocks;
(3) bit-string variables, to represent and treat modular
and simple cutsets.
In this chapter the extended versions of the PL-MOD code
(i.e. PL-MODT, PL-MODMC and MODCUT) and the code developments in the
area of common cause analysis (i.e. MOCUS-BACFIRE, and MODCUT-BACFIRE)
are discussed. The PL-MOD Code is the backbone of the PL-MODT,PL-MODMC
and MODCUT codes, and a detailed discussion of organization and
procedures used in the PL-MOD is presented in reference [1]. Important
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procedures used in the PL-MODT, PL-MODMC, MODCUT, MOCUS-BACFIRE and
MODCUT-BACFIRE are discussed in this chapter in somewhat less detail
compared to that presented for the PL-MOD code in [1]. The reader who
is interested in those details is referred to this reference.
7.2 Organization of the Procedures used in PL-MODT
The original PL-MOD code handles only Class 1 components, and
therefore it is only able to evaluate time-independent components.
The other three classes of components have been incorporated into the
PL-MOD code, and thus the extended version is called PL-MODT, which
also comprises all of the other features of the PL-MOD code. The
incorporation of Class 2, 3 and 4 components is performed by adding 3
internal procedures to the external procedure NUMERO, and changing some
of the main routine statements in the NUMERO and EXPECT procedures
to allow more flexibility to the PL-MODT code. The NUMERO and EXPECT
procedures are discussed in [1] in detail. Here only the changes
in the main routines of these procedures are discussed.
The IMPORTANCE procedure in the NUMERO is also changed to allow
fault tree reduction based on the Vesely-Fussell importance measure.
A full description of methodologies and mathematical concepts used in
PL-MODT have been presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. The
following procedures are added to NUMERO in order to account for the
time dependent classes of components:
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(a) Procedure SHORE to evaluate Class 2 component
type (i.e. non-repairable).
(b) Procedure CECA to evaluate Class 3 component type
(i.e. repairable monitored components).
(c) Procedure SHR to evaluate Class 4 component type
(i.e. periodically tested components) and to account
for a combination of Class 1, 2, 3 and 4 components
in a tree.
Also, the following extensions have been added to allow more
flexibility for the calculation of unavailabilities.
(a) Further developments in the context of the old
NUMERO procedure to enable it to calculate average
unavailability over a period of system operation for
Classes 2, 3 and 4 or combinations of them. In
addition, internal procedures PLUS and MINUP were
modified to allow the code, treatment of unavailabilities
which are close to one (e.g. during the test process of
a periodically tested component).
(b) Further developments in the IMPORTANCE internal
procedure to allow fault tree reductions based on
the Vesely-Fussell importance measures.
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7.2.1 Development of the SHORE Procedure
The SHORE procedure is designed to evaluate fault trees consisting
of only non-repairable components (Class 2 componnets). In the SHORE
procedure, the value of the unavailability for simple AND modules
can be calculated for different time steps (i.e. DEL9T (1,J) by using
equations (2.8.2) and (2.3.2) up to a time TIE where TIE = 0.1/X and
A is the largest failure rate of the corresponding components in the
module. After the time TIE, the components should be considered
individually and thus only equation (2.3.2) can be used.
For the simple OR modules, the unavailability can be calculated
by using equations (2.8.3) and (2.3.2). No limitation exists for the
OR module and hence equations (2.8.2) and (2.3.2) can be used for the
entire operational period.
The total number of time steps in each time interval
mesh is calculated as follows:
TIE(l,I) = AUN(1,I)/DEL9T(1,I);
where AUN(l,I) is the time span in which the time step DEL9T(l,I)
is applied and DEL9T(1,I) is the time step for the I-th mesh interval.
At each TIE(l,I) time step, first the unavailability values are
calculated for the various components of the fault tree using equation
(2.3.2). Next, these unavailabilities are assigned to the arrays
STATE(1,I) and STATD(1,I) for free and replicated components, respectively.
Finally, the procedures EXPECT and IMPORTANCE are called respectively
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to calculate the top event and the unavailability of higher order
modules as well as the Vesely-Fussell importance measures. The same
procedure is applied for all other time interval meshes [AUN(l,l),
AUN(1,2), ... , AUN(1,N),. At the end, unavailabilities are added to
N
evaluate the mean unavailability over the period of T = 2 AUN(1,I).
I=1
It should be noted that after the first time step where procedure
SHORE is called, some of the variables that are calculated remain
unchanged for other time steps. Therefore, after the first call, the
procedure SHORE will be called starting from the entry procedure DOBA
to avoid recalculation of some already calculated variables.
The procedure SHORE based on equation (2.3.2) is shown in
Table (7.2.1)
7.2.2 Development of the CECA Procedure
The CECA procedure is designed to evaluate fault trees consisting
of monitored components (Class 3 components). Similar to the SHORE
procedure, different time interval meshes along with their corresponding
time steps are used to evaluate the unavailability of components, modules,
and the whole system for each time step. The time step interval and
its corresponding time step length are stored in the allocated arrays
AUN(l,I) and DEL9T(lI), respectively. Four other arrays, STATS, STATT,
STATTE, and STATED, are allocated to store the failure and repair rates
of free and replicated components.
At the beginning of the system operation, the approximations
discussed in Section 2.8 of this thesis are not applicable due to the
small unavailability values and, therefore, unavailability of replicated
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Table (7.2.1) Procedure SHORE
SHORE: PBCC: PLM02020
P=DEL PLM02030
PUT EDIT('THIS IS A TI1E DEPEEDENT UNAILABILITY CALCULATION', PL02040
'FOR CNLY NONBEPAIEAELE CCtPCNENTS') PL2.02050
(SKIP (6) ,X (12) ,A (49) , X(1),A.(2)) PLiO2060
GET LIST (CH); PLM02070
ALLOCATE AUN; PLM02080
ALLOCATE DEIST; PLt0209O
DC I=1 T0 MOH; PLM02100
GET LIST(DELST(1,I),AUN(1,I)); PL1021l10
END: PLM02120
GET LIST(FUN); PL802130
PUT EDIT('NUM FBEE EVENT INPUTS=',FUN) PLMO2140
(SKIP (2) ,A (22) F (5)); PL02150
GET LIST(DUN) ; PLm02160
PUT EDIT('NUM EEPLICATED EVENT INPUTS=',DUN) PLM02170
(SKIP (2) , A(28) , E(5)) PLM02180
ALLOCATE STATS; PLM02190
ALLOCATE STATE; PL1102200
ALLOCATE STATT; PLM02210
ALLOCATE STATD; PLM02220
DO I=1 TO EUN; PLE02230
GET LIST(ISTATT(1,I)); PLM02240
END; PLM02250
DO I=1 TO DUN; PLM02260
GET LIST(I,STATS(1,I)') PLM02270
END; PLM02280
TIE=TIE+DEL9T (1,1) PLM02290
DOEA: 2UTRY; PLM02300
PUT EDIT('FREE INPUT','AElIABILITY') PLM02310
(SKIP (2) ,X (2) ,A(10) ,X(3), A (11)); PLM02320
DO 1=1 TO BUN; PLM02330
STATE (1 ,I)=1-EXP(-STATT(1,1) *TIE); PLM02340
PUT EDIT(I,STATE(1,I)) (SKIP (2),F(12),E(18, 6 )); PLM02350
END; PL02360
PUT EDIT('DEP INPUT', 'RELIABILITY 4 ) PLM02370
'{SKIP (2),X (3),A (9) , X (3), A {11)) PLM02380
DO I=1 TO DUN; PLM02390
STATD (1,1) =1-EXP (-STATS (1,1) *TIE); PLH02400
PUT EDIT(ISTATD (1,I)) (SKIP(2),F(12),E(18, 6 )); PLH02410
END; PLA02420
END SHORE: PLM02430
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and free components must be calculated directly by using equation (2.4.9).
However, for larger times where the components approach their asymptotic
values (usually when t > 3 ), the approximate equations summarized in
Table (2.8.1) can be used.
Unavailability values calculated at each time step will be assigned to
the STATE(l,I) and STATD(1,I) arrays. After calling the internal
procedures EXPECT and IMPORTANCE, the top event and the unavailability
of higher order modules and the importance will be calculated as well
as simple modules and component unavailabilities. The same procedure will
be repeated for all other time steps. Similar to the SHORE procedure
for the second time that the CECA procedure is called, the calculation
of the unavailability automatically starts from the SOBA entry procedure,
in order to avoid unnecessary recalculations. Table (7.2.2) summarizes
the statements used in the CECA procedure to evaluate the unavailability
of a system composed of only monitored components.
7.2.3 Development of the SHR Procedure
The SHR procedure is developed to evaluate fault trees composed of
only periodically tested components (Class 4), or a combination of the
four classes of components. Thus, the SHR procedure is a general routine
which can be applied for many types of fault trees composed of time-dependent
components. In the SHR procedure the use of different mesh intervals
plays an important role for the accurate determination of the top event
unavailability. For example, during the inspection period, very small
time step meshes should be used in order to calculate a detailed
behavior of the system unavailability, which usually results in large
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Table (7.2.2) Procedure CECA
CECA: PRCC;
P=DEL;
PUT EDIT('THIS IS A TIME DEPENDENT UNAVAILABILITY',
'CALCULATICIN FOR REPAIRAELE CCMPCNENTS')
(SKIP(6),X(10) ,A(39) ,X (1) ,A 437));
GET -LIST (MCH) ;
ALLOCATE DEL9T;
ALLOCATE AUU;
DC 1=1 TC MOH;
GET LIST(DEL9T(1,.),AUN(1,I));
END;
GIT LIST(FUN);
PUT EDIT('NUM FREE EVENT INPUTS=' ,FUN) (SKIP (2), A (2
GET LIST (EUN);
PUT EDIT('NUM REPLICATEE IVENT INPUTS=",LUN)
(SKIP(2),A(28),F(5)):
A1LOCATE STATS;
ALLOCATE STATE;
AILOCATE STATT;
AILCCATE STATD;'
ALLOCATE STATTE;
ALLOCATE STATED;
T E=TIE+1;
2TO=TTMC+DEL9T(1,1);
DC 1=1 TO FUN;
GET LIST (I,STATT (1,I) ,STATTE (1,I));
END;
DO I=1 TC rUN;
GET LIST(I,STATS(1,1),STATED (1,I));
END;
SCBA: ENTRY:
PUT EDIT('POINT NUMBER=',TIE) (SKIP (2),X(2) ,A (13) ,F
PUT EDIT('FREE INPUT','EEIIABILIIY1 )
(SKIP(2),X(2),A(10),X(1),A(11)) ;
DO 1=1 TO FUN;
STATE(1,I)=(STATT(1,1)/(STATT(1,I)+STATTE(1,)) )*(1-EXP(-(S
STATTE(1,1))*TTMC)) ;
PUT EDIT(I, STATE (1,1)) (SKIP(2),F(12),E(18,6));
END;
PUT EDIT(DEP INPUT .','BEIAEILITY')
(SKIP (2) ,X (3) ,A (9) ,X (1) ,A (11));
DC I=1 TC DUN;
STATD(1,I)= (STATS (1,.I)/(STATS(1,I) +STATED(1,I)))*(1-EXP(-
+STATEE{ 1,I) )*TTMO) ) ;
PUT EDIT(I,STATIC(1,I)) (S1IP(2),F(12),E(18,6));
END:
END CECA;
2),F(5));
(15) ) ;
TATT (1,1) +
(STATS (1,1)
PLM02440
PLM02450
PLd02460
PLM02470
PLM02480
PLM02490
PL02500
P1M02510
PLM02520
PLM02530
PLt02540
PLM02550
P1402560
PLM02570
PLM02580
PLM02590
PIM02600
PLM02610
P1112620
PLM02630
PLM02640
PLM02650
PLM02660
PIM02670
PLM02680
PLM02690
PLM02700
PLM02710
PLM02720
PLM02730
PLM02740
PLM02750
PLM02760
PLM02770
PLM02780
PLM02790
PLM02800
PL 102810
PL.102820
PLM02830
PLM02840
PLM02850
PLM02860
PLM02870
PLM02880
PL02890
PLM02900
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system unavailabilities during this short interval of time (see examples
in Section 8.2 of this thesis).
The arrays STATT and STATD are allocated to store the failure rates of
free and replicated components respectively. The arrays ETTA and ETTAD
are used to store the test interval (Tn), TTETA and TTETAD to store
the inspection period (6), whereas TAUU and TAUUD are employed to
store the repair duration (T).
The values of X and q from equations (2.5.9) and (2.5.10) are
calculated for each free and replicated component and are stored in the
arrays STATTE and STATTED, QUUE and QUUED, respectively, for free and
replicated components. At each time step, a special procedure is employed
to determine the value of m in equation (2.5.8). The statements
performing this task in the SHR procedure are summarized in Table (7.2.3).
Variable TTMO indicates the time for which the unavailability will be
calculated. The value of m provides the number of the specific test
interval that should be used. For m = 1, the code will use equation
(8.5.11), since it indicates that the component is in its first test
interval. For m > 1 the equation (2.5.8) will be used with the
assumption that the subsequent test intervals are identical (i.e., only
the first test interval differs from the other).
The unavailabilities calculated at each time step are assigned to
arrays STATE (1,I) and STATD(1,I) in order to calculate the top and
higher order module unavailabilities. For periodically tested components,
no approximations such as those discussed in Section 2.7 can be applied,
since it seems that no correlation exists between a simple module inspection
and repair duration, and its input components' parameters (i.e. TI, 6, T,
and X).
Table (7.2.3) The List
the Cycle
Operating
TTM01=0;
EM=0;.
DO WHJILE(TTjC>TTC1)
EHd=Eanf'1;
TTMO1=(EMM'-1)*ETTA (1,1) +FIRTV. (1,
PCCRD=1;
IF (EM-G) T1HEN)
ELSE 3CSK=TT30O-TTMO1+ETTA(1,I);
of Statements to Indicate
in which a Component is
1);
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PLd03680
PLH03690
PLA03700
PLM03710
PLE03720
PLE03730
PL.03740
PL03750
PLHI03760
PLH03770
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If the override unavailability has a value of less than unity, and
if the time step is within the inspection period of the components, then
the value of the predicted unavailability will be multiplied by a value
called POORD, where POORD is the override probability calculated from
the following equation:
POORD = q + (1- q)(l - e eff
q = override unavailability
Therefore, the arrays STATE(l,I) and STATD(1,I) will change to
the following form:
STATE(1,I) = POORD*STATE(1,I) and
STATD(1,I) = POORD*STATD(1,I)
The list of the statements of the SHR procedure is presented
in Table (7.2.4). Similar to the procedures SHORE and CECA, after
the first time step the calculation switches to the entry point
SAROGH in order to avoid recalculation and reallocation of different
variables that remain the same throughout the calculations.
The SHR procedure is also designed to combine different classes
of time-dependent components. This enables the code to treat any combination
of different classes of components. Handling of trees with different
classes of components is performed by the use of the zero test interval
condition for those components that are not periodically tested (i.e.,
ETTA(l,I) = ETTAD(1,I) = 0). If the zero test interval condition arises,
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Table (7.2.4) Procedure SHR
SHE: PROC;
P=DEL;
PUT EDIT("THIS IS A TIME rEPENCENT UNAVAILABILITY',
'CALCULATION FOR PERIODICAILY TESTED CCdFCNBNTS')
(SKIP (6) ,X (10) ,A (39) ,X (1) ,A (46))
GET LIST (1O1H)*
ALLOCATE ELIST;
ALLOCATE AUN;
DO 1=1 TC MCH;
GET LIST(DEL91(1,I),AUN(1,I));
END:
GET LIST(FUN)
PUT EDIT('NUM FREE EVENT INXUIS=',FUN) (SKIP(2),A (22),F(5))
GET LIST(DUN);
PUT EDIT('NUM EEPLICATED EVENT INPUTS=',DUN)
(SKIP J2),A (28) , F(E));
ALLOCATE STATS;
ALLOCATE STATE;
ALLOCATE STATT;
ALLOCATE STATD;
ALLOCATE ETTA;
ALLOCATE TTETA;
ALLOCATE TAVV;
ALLOCATE ETTAD;
ALLOCATE TTETAD;
ALLOCATE TAVVD;
ALLOCATE QUUE;
ALLOCATE CUUED;
ALLOCATE STATTE;
ALLOCATE STATED;
ALLOCATE QUZB;
ALLOCATE QUZRD;
ALLOCATE FI TM;
ALLOCATE FIRTMD;
TOTTMO+DELST(1, 1)
TIE=TIE+1;
DO I=1 TO FUN;
GET LIST (I,STATT(1,I) ,ITTA(1,I),TTETA(1,l),TAVV(1,1),
FIRTM(1,I),QUZR;(1,&))
EPND;
(continued)
PLM02910
PLM02920
PLE0293a
PLM02940
PLM02950
PL902960
PLMO2970
PLE02980
.P L M102990
PLM03000
PLM03010
PLM03 020
PLM03030
P103040
PLM03050
PLM03060
PLMO.3 070
PLM03080
PLM03090
PL1103100
PLM03110
PLM03120
PLM03130
PLM03140
PLM03150
PLM03160
PLM03170
PLM03180
PLM03190
PLM03200
PLM03210
PLM03220
PLMO3230
PLM03240
P103250
PLM03260
PLM03270
PLM03280
PLM03290
PLM03300
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Table (7.2.4)(continued)
DC I=1 70 BUN;
GET LIST (I,STATS (1,I) ,ETTAD (1,I) ,TETAD (1,I) TAVVD (1,I),
FIRTeD(1,I),CUZED(1,I)):
END;
DO 1=1 To FUN;
IF ETTA(1,I)=0 THEN DO;
OUU E 01)=0; STATTE (1,1) =C;
END;
ELSE O;
QUUE (1, 1) =lCG(3-LCG (TTETA (1 ,1) *STATT (1 ,1));
STATTE (1 ,I) =STATT (1,I) * (1 -TTETA (1,I) /ETTA (1,1)) (1-TTETA(1,
I)/ETTA (1,1) +2*TAVV(1,1)/ETTA(1,I))+0.2*TTETA(1,I)/ETTA (1,
I)**2;
END;
END;
DO I=1 TC CUN;
IF ETTAL(1,I)=0 THEN CC:
QUUED(1,I)=0; STATE (1 1) =0;
END;
ELSE nO:
QUUED (1,I) =LOG (3-LOG (TTET AD (1,I) *STATS (1, I)));
STATED(1,I)=STATS(1,I)* (1-TTETAD (1,1)/ETTAD (1,I))*(1-TTETAD(
1,I)/ETTAD(1,I)+2*TAVVD(1,I)/ETTA1(1,I))+C.2*TTETAD(1,I)/
ETTAD(1,I)**2;
END;
END;
SAEOGH: ENTRY:
PUT EDIT('ECINT NU.MER=',TIE) (SKI? (2) ,X(2), A (13) ,F (15));
PUT EDIT('FFEE INPT','ELIABILITY')
(SKIP(2) ,X (2) ,A (10) ,X (1) , A( 11));
DC 1=1 IC FUN;
IF ETTA(1,I)=0 71EN DO;
STATE (1,1)=(STATT (1, 1) / (STATT (1,I) + TTET A (1, 1) )*(1-EXP (-(STATT (1,1) +
TTETA 1, 1)) *TTMC));
PUT EDIT(ISTATE(1,I)) (SIFIP (2),F(12),E(18,6));
E9D:
ELSE DO:
TTMO1=0;
EMM=0;
DO WHILE(TTMC>TTPC1)
Emm=EmH+1
TTO1=(EMI-1)*ETTA (1,1) +FIPT( 11,1);
END;
PCCBD=1;
IF(EM=1) THEN
MOSK=TTMO+TAVV (1,1) +'TTTA (1,I);'
ELSE MCSK=TTMO-TT,O1 +ETTA(1,I)
IF (QUZR (1,1)=1) THEN GO TO MACH;
ELSE IF (MOSK>TTETAt1,I)) THEN GO TC MACH;
ELSE POCRD=QUZR(1,I)+(1-CUZE(1,I))* (1-EXP(-ETTA(1,I)*STATTE
(1.I))) ;
MACH: STATE(1,I)= (1-EXP(-MOSK*STATTE(1,I))* (1-EXP(-(MOSK/TTETA(1
,I) )**QUUE (1,1I)))) *PCED;
PUT EDIT (I,STATE (1 ,) ) (SKIP (2) F (12) ,E (18,6)) ;
END:
(continued)
PLM03310
PLM03320
PLM03330
PLM103340
PLM03350
PLM03360
PLM03370
PLI!03380
PLM03390
PL03400
PLM03 410
PLM03420
PL1103430
PLM03440
PLt03450
PLM0346C
PLM03470
PLM03480
PLM03490
PLM03500
PL?403510
PLM03520
PL?03530
PLM03540
PLM03550
PLM03560
PLM03570
PLM03580
PLN03590
PLM03600
PLM03610
PLM03620
PLI03630
PLM03640
PLM03650
PLIM03660
PLM03670
PLM03680
PLM03690
PLL%103700
PLM03710
PLM03720
PLM037 30
PLE03740
PL403750
PLM03760
PLM03770
PLM03780
PLM03790
PLM03800
PLM03810
PLM03820
PLM03830
PLM03840
PLM03850
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Table (7.2.4) continued
END; PL903860
PUT EDIT('DEP INPUT $,IEELIABILITYI) PLM03870
(SKIP(2 ),X(3),A(9),X(1),A(11)); PLM03880
DO 1=1 10 CUN; PLM03890
IF ETTAD(1,I)=0 THEN EC; PIM03900
ST-LATD(1,I)=(STATS(1,I)/(STATS (1,I)+TTETAD (1,I)))*(1-EXP(- (STATS(1,I)PLE!03910
+TTETAD (1,I))*TTMC)) ; PLH03920
PUT EDIT(I,STATD (1,1))(SHIP(2),F(12),E(18,6)); PLM03930
END; PLH03940
.EISE DO: PLH03950
E HM=0; TTMC1=0; PLM03960
DO WHILE(TTMC>TTHC1) PLM03970
EMH=EMM+1; PLM03980
TTHO=(EH-1*ETAD(1I)+ISTE(1I);PLM03990
END; PLZI04000
PCCRD=1: PLIM04010
If Eltl=1) THEN PLE04020
SOSK=TTHO+TAVVD (1,1) +TTETAD (1,I); PL04030
ELSE SCSK=TTEfC-TTIEC1.ETTAC(1,I); PLM04040
IP(QUZRD(1,I)=1) THEN GO O GACH; PLH04050
ELSE IF(SOSK>TTETAD(1,I)) THEb GC TC GACH; PL1104060
ELSE PCORD=QUZED(1,I)+(1-CUZRD(1,I))*(1-EXP(-ETTA D(1,I)* PLd04O7O
STATED(1,I))) ; PLM04080
GACH: STATD (1,I) = (1-EXP (-S0SK*STAT ED (1,I)) * (1- EXP ((SOSK/TT ETAD (1 PLM0I4090
,I)) **QUUEr (1,1)))) *PCCER; PLI04100
PUT EDIT(ISTATD(1,I)) PLM04110
(SKIP (2),F (12) ,E (18,6)) PLH104120
END; PLH04130
END; PLM04140
END SHR: PLM04150
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then PL-MODT will automatically apply equation (2.4.9) and thus will
not evaluate equations (2.5.8) through (2.5.11)
It should be noted here that in the case of non-repairable components
(Class 2), equation (2.4.9) reduces to the form given by Equation (2.3.2)
with the repair rate equal to zero (i.e. 1 = 0). Therefore, for a non-
repairable component we have ETTA(1,I) = ETTAD(1,I) = TTETA(1,I) =
TTETAD(1,I) = 0.
One final note discusses the usefulness of the procedures SHORE and
CECA. Since the SHR procedure can handle not only periodically tested
components, but also repairable (revealed fault) and non-repairable
components, there is seemingly no need for the procedures SHORE and
CECA. It should be pointed out, however, that the use of SHORE and CECA
saves computation time due to the fact that no procedure exists in
these subroutines to recognize the class of each component at each
individual time step. Furthermore, if the fault tree components would
consist of only one class, then the corresponding procedure should
better be used because of its compactness and simplicity.
7.2.4 Modifications Performed in the Old External Procedure NUMERO
The modifications in the external procedure NUhERO include the
addition of a special routine to the main routine of the NUMERO procedure
to select one of the procedures STAT-IN, SHORE, CECA or SHR depending
on the fault tree component type(s). Also, this special routine is
designed to select time steps and change the time step length for
different periods of operation. In addition, calculation of the
average unavailability over the period of operation is carried out in
this routine.
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The unavailability as a function of time can be calculated by
assuming that after unavailabilities of two successive time steps-
are found for the top event, the unavailability changes linearly
between these two points. Therefore, the unavailability as a function
of time for the top event of a fault tree would look like the curve
shown in Figure (7.2.1). In Figure (7.2.1) the effect of smaller
time steps for the calculation of higher unavailability values during
a small period of time is shown. Particularly if all time steps were
large, a portion of the two peaks in the unavailability curves shown
in Figure (7.2.1) could not be evaluated accurately; and by using a
small time step for the whole operation time, the cost of computation
would become very high. The total area under the curve in Figure (7.2.1)
is calculated by adding the areas occupied by each time step interval,
and using the linear unavailability approximation between the two time
steps. The total area is then divided by the total operation time t,
N
where T = AUN(1,I), to get the average unavailability. The set of
i=1
statements in Table (7.2.5) shows the routine added to the old procedure
NUMERO. In these statements variable ESF is read in the input, and
indicates the class of the components in the fault tree. Variable
REY represents the top event unavailability. At each time step, the
value of REY is determined by calling the EXPECT procedure. TTMO and
TIE variables represent the time and number of time steps for which
the calculation is performed.
Other changes in the procedure NUMERO are related to the internal
procedures PLUS and MINUP. These procedures calculate the unavailability
of OR modules and evaluate the unavailability of improper modules through
Figure 7.2.1 Unavailability as a Function of Time
:
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Table (7.2.5) Modifications in' the Main Routine of the NUMERO Procedure
/* NUMERC */ PLM00880
GET LIST (FOX),- PLM00890
IF(FOX-=O) THEN GO TO STAC91; PLM00900
RETURN: PLM00910
STAC91: GET LIST(ESF); PLN00920
If(ESF-=1) THEN GO 10 TM9rE; PLM00930
ELSE DO; PLl00940
CALL STATIN; PLM00950
CALL EXPECT; PLM00960
CALL IBECRTANCE; P1000970
ND; PLM00980
. ZTURN; PLM00990
TH9DE: IF(ESF-=2) THEN GO TO T719DE2; PL01000
ILSE DO; 
-PLM01010
CALL SHCE; PLM01020
CALL EXPECT; PLM01030JAVI= (REY/2) *DEL9T (1, 1); PLM01040MACAR=REY; PL01 050CALL IMPORTANCE; PLr.01060
DO WHILE(SISICMOH); PLM01070
SISI=SISI+1; PL?01080
DO WHILE (TLE<AUN (1,SISI)) ; PL01090
TIE=TIE+DEL9T (1 ,SISI) ; PL'101100
PUT EDIT('THIS IS A NEW IIME STE',IIE=', TIE) PLM.1110
(SKIP(4) ,A(23),X(3),A(4),F(10)); PL01120
CALL COEA; PL201130
CALL EXPECT: PLM01140
JAVI=JAVI+((IACAR+REY)/2)*CE19T(1,SISI) ; PLM01150
MACAR=REY PLZ101160
CALL I2IPORTANCE: PLM01170
END; PLM01180
END; PLM01190
END-; PLM01200
JAVI=JAVI/TIE; PLM01210
PUT EDIT('MEAN UNAVAILABILITY=',JAVI) (SKIP(5) ,X(19) ,A(20) PLM01220
,E(18,6)); PLM01230
RETURN; PLIN01240
TM9EE2: If(ESF,=3) THEN.GO TO TM9DE3; PLM01250
ELSE DO; PLYM01260
CALL CECA; PLM01270
CALL EXPECT: PLM01280
JAVI=(rEY/2)*DEL9T(1,1); PL301290
MACAR=REY; PLM01300
CALL ImECBTANCE; PLM01310
DO WHILE(SISI<MOH); PLM01320
SISI=SISI+1; PLM01330
MASHAD=3ASHAD+AUN (1,SISI)/DEL9T(1,SISI) ; PLM01340
DO WHILE(TIE<NASHA) ; PLM01350
TTMC=TTO+DEL9T(1, SISI) ; PL, 01360
TIE=TIE+1; PLIS01370
(continued).
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Table (7.2.5) continued
PUT EDIT("THIS IS A NEW TIME STEP' ,'TIE=',TIE,'TTIC=',
TTMO) (SKIP (4),A (23) ,X (3) ,A (4) ,F(10) ,X (8) ,A (5),F (10)) ;
CALL SOBA;
CALL EXPECT;
JAVI=JAVI+ ((1ACAE+REY)/2) *DEL91(1,SISI) ;
MACAR=REY;
CALL IMPCRTANCE:
END;
END;
END:;'
J AVI=JAVI/TMO;
PUT EDIT('MEAN UNAVAILABILITY=*,JAVI) (SKIP(5),X(19) ,A(20)
,E(18,6));
RETURN
TZ9DE3:IFfESF,=4) THEN GO TC TM9EE4;
EISE DO;
CALL SH;
CALL EXPECT:
JAVI=(MEY/2) *DEL91 (1,1);
MACAR=REY;
CALL IMECRTANCE;
DC WHILE(SISI<30H);
SISI=SISI+1;
MASHAD=fASHAD+AUN (1,SSI)/DEI9T (1,SISI)
DO WHILE(TIE<MASHAC)
TTO=TTMO+DEL9T(1,SISI);
TIE=TIE+1;
PUT EDIT('THIS IS A NEW TIME STEP.',TTF='- TT-'rTTC=- I
TT.blO) (SKIP (4) ,A(23),X (3),A (4) ,E(10),X(8) ,A(5),F(10)) ;
CALL SABCGH;
CALL EXPECT;
JAVI=JAVI-((MACAR+REY)/2)*DEL9T(1,SISI) ;
MACAR=nBY;
CALL IMPCETANCE;
END:
END;
JAVI=JAVI/TT 110
PUT EDIT('MEAN UNAVAILAEIITY=',JAVI) (SKIP(5),X(19),A(20)
,E(18,6)) ;
RETURN:
T1K9DE4: PUT EDIT('OPTICN NOT KNON') (SKIP(1),A (16));
GC TO SOSCL;
PLM01380
PLM01390
PtE01400
PLM01410
PL110 1420
PLM01430
PLM01440
PLM01450
PLM01460
P101 470
PLM01480
PLG0 1490
PL01500
PLM01510
PL?01520
PL1401530
PLM01540
PLM01550
PLM01560
PLM01570
PLM01580
PLU01590
PLM01600
PLM01610
PLM01620
PLM01630
PLM 01640
PLM01650
PLM01660
PLM01670
PLM01680
PLM01690
PLM0 1700
PLM017 10
PLM01720
PL2101730
PLY01740
PLM01750
PLm01760
PLMO 1770
220 1780
PLM01790
PLE01800
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the modular minimal cutsets, respectively. In the old version of the
PLUS and MINUP procedures, the unavailabilities for components and
modular cutsets were found by adding them together. For time-dependent
analysis, since there are periods of time in which the unavailability
becomes large (greater than 0.2), the approximation of adding unavailabilities
is no longer valid. Therefore, the procedures PLUS and MINUP had to be
changed to evaluate the union of component unavailability in the PLUS
procedure, and the union of the modular cutsets in the MINUP procedure.
Table (7.2.6) shows the new form of the PLUS procedure. Changes in the
procedure MINUP are very similar to the PLUS procedure and,therefore,
only the MINUP procedure is shown here.
7.2.5 Modifications Performed in the Internal Procedure IMPORTANCE
As has been discussed in Section 3.2, the procedure IMPORTANCE
in the PL-MOD Code provides the V-F importance measures for all of the
fault tree components as well as simple and higher order modules. This
procedure is modified to a new form such that it accounts for the
CUT-OFF value to exclude those components and modules that have V-F
importances of less than this prescribed value. For any further evaluation,
the new reduced form of the fault tree can be used.
Obviously, the cut-off value plays an important role in the reduction
strategy. That is, different values of the cut-off value result in
different reduced fault trees. Therefore, a great deal of attention
must be paid to the selection of the cut-off value in order to achieve
a desired and yet accurate form of the reduced tree.
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Table (7.2.6) Procedure PLUS
PLUS: PROC(EAT,EXA); PLM104440
DECLARE EAT PCINTEE; PLM04450
DECLARE EXA LABEL; PLM04460
PT=BAT: PLM04470
REX=O: PLM04480
IF (PRCP.LIN=1 & PFOP.TIL(1)=0) THEN GO TO PLUA; PLMO4490
DO J=1 TO PROP.IIM; PLMO4500
REX=REX+STATE (1, PRCP.TIl(J)); PL04510
END; PLM04520
PLUA: IF (PROP.M1I=1 & PROP. IM(1)=NULl) THEN GO TO PLUD; PLMO4530
DO J=1 TC PECP.MIM; PL904540
IF (PROP.PIM(J)->PECP.HCST-=NULI) THEN DO; PLM04550
PR=PEOP.P Im (J) ->PROP. HOST; PLM04560
REX=REX+pE.BEL(1) PLM04570
END; PLIM04580
ELSE BEX=REX+PRCP.PIM (J) ->PROP.BEL (1); PLM04590
END ; PLM04600
PLUB: IF BEX<0.2 THEN GO TO ZACH; PLM04610
PLBO4620
IF (PHOP.LIM=1 & PFOP.TIL(1)=0) THEN GO TO SLDA; PLM04630
DO A=1 TO PPCP.UI; PLM04640
REX=REX*(1-STATE(1,PRCP.TIL (J))); PLM04650
END: PLIS04660
SLUA: IF (PROP.MIM=1 & PROP.PIM (1)=NULL) THEN GO TO SLUB; PLQ4670
DO J=1 TO PROP.MIM; PLM04680
IF (PROP.PIN(J)->PROP.HCST-NULL) THEN DO; PLM04690
PR=PROP.PI1i (J) ->PROP. HOST; PLMO4700
REX=REX*(1-PR.RIl(1)) PLN04710
END; PLM04720
ELSE REX=REX*(1-PROP.PIM(3)->PFCE.REL(1)) ; PLMO4730
END: PLM04740
SLUE: REX=1-REX; PLM04750
ZACH: PBOP.PEL(L1)=REX; PLM04760
GO TO EXA; PLM04770
END PLUS: PLM04780
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The new form of the IMPORTANCE Procedure is linked with the code
PL-MODT, so that for future developments of the code, the reduced
version of fault trees will be used by the code to evaluate time-
dependent behaviour of the fault tree.
In the modified form of the IMPORTANCE subroutine, the top event
importance will be set equal to 1. Starting from the top event it
proceeds to the bottom. First V-F importances of the higher order
modules and replicated events that are connected to the top event
are calculated. Next, the code automatically removes all modules
and replicated events whose V-F importances are less than the prescribed
cut-off value. Each higher order module which is removed contains some
other proper modules and free components that are attached to them.
Therefore, there is no need to compute the V-F importance of any of
these attached members of the removed higher order modules because
their importances are always equal to or less than that of the parent
module, which by itself is lower than the cut-off value. If, however,
the higher order module is not removed because of its importance being
higher than the cut-off value, the code will proceed to calculate the
importances of simple modules and components attached to it, and to
automatically remove any component or simple module with an importance
low enough to be cancelled.
Therefore, starting from the top event of an unreduced fault tree,
all of the branches of the tree with low importances will be cut. Those
lower order branches and leaves which show low importances compared
to the cut-off value will be cancelled. The pruned tree is the reduced
version of the original tree.
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The pruning process is performed by setting the variable STATE(2,I)
which is the measure of V-F importance for components equal to zero.
If the module is reduced, then automatically all components input to
this module are cancelled (i.e. STATE(2,I) = 0).
For example, the removal of a simple AND module proceeds as follows:
IF(PROP.LIM=l & PROP.TIL(1)=0)THEN DO;
PROP.REL(2) = 0;
GO TO EMEl;
(To calculate the importance of the NOT gate if any)
END;
ELSE PROP.REL(2) = PER.REL(2);
IF(PROP.REL(2) < CUT-OFF)THEN PROP.REL(2) = 0;
DO IT = 1 TO PROP.LIM;
STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT)) = PROP.REL(2);
END;
Therefore, all of the components input to the AND gate will have an
importance which is either equal to zero (i.e. cancelled) or equal to
the importance of the AND module.
Table (7.2.7) lists a set of statements that form the new
IMPORTANCE procedure. The following sets of statements in the new
procedure are particularly added to the old IMPORTANCE Procedure to
identify modules and components that should be cancelled:
Table (7.2.7) Procedure IMPORTANCE 219
/* IMPCSTANCE (VESELY- FUSSELL) */ PLM06040
IMPORIANCE: PSOC; PLM06050
IF(DEL=1) THEN GC TC ASAC; PLM06060
DECLABE CUT OFF FLOAT DECIMAL(16); PLM06070
GET LIST (CUT.CFF) ; PLM06080
IF(CUTCFE=O) THEN PLM06090
P.'UT SKIP LIST( 'NO REDUCTICN BASED CN IMPORTANCE IS REQUESTED*); PLM06100
ELSE PUT SKIP IIST('AUTCMATIC SEDUCTICN WILL BE PERFORMED'); PLt06110
BUG=1; PLM06120
PT=STCRK: PLI1406130
IF ;ROP.HOST-=NULL THEN GC TO IMA; PLM06140
BUM=PBCP. MIN: PLM06150
ALLOCATE CLM (BUM); PL16160
OLM=PRCP.PIM; PL1106170
PBCP.PDEL(2)=1; PLM06180
PUT EDIT (0 MODULE=*,PROP.NAE,IMP= ',ROP.REL(2)) PL06190
(SKIP(1) A (7) ,F(5) ,A (4) E (18,6)); PLM06200
IF PROP.VALUE=1 THEN DC; PL106210
IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PROP.TIL(1)=C) THEN GO TO IME; PLE06220
DO 1=1 TO PEOP.LIM; PLM06230
STATE (2, PROP. TIL (I)) =1; PLM06240
END: PLM06250
END; PLM06260
IF PROP.VALUE=2 THEN DC; PLM06270
IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PROP.TIL(1)=0) THEN GO TO IME; PLM06280
DO 1=1 IC PICP.LIM; PLM06290
STATE(2,PROP. SIL(I))=STATE (1,PECP.1IL (I) )/PROP.REL\(1); PLM06300
IF (STATE(2,PECP.TIL(I) ) <CUT.OFF) THEN STATE(2,PROP.TI1L(I))= ; PLM06310
END; PLM06320
END; PLM06330
GO TC I3E; PLM06340
/* CUT SET CASE */ PLK06350
IMA: PR=PBCP.HCST; PLK06360
IF (PROP.IIM=1 & PRCP.PIMl(1) =NULL) THEN DO; PLM06370
BUM=O; PLM06380
BUN=0; PLM06390
END; PL06400
ELSE DO; 21M06410
BUM=PRCP.MIMI; PLM06420
BUN=1; PLIS06430
END; PLM06440
BU=BUM+PER .LEAL; PL906450
BUZ=BUM; PL.06460
DO IK=1 TO PER.RAM; PLM06470
MA=PER.TAR (IK); PLM06480
DA=-CEIL (-MA/10000) PT1106490
JA=-CEIL(-3A/1000); PLM06500
JAK=JA- 1C*CA; PLM06510
IF JAK=9 THEN DO; PLM06520
EUs=BUm+1; PLM06530
END; PLM06540
END; PLIS06550
BUZ=BUM-BUZ; PLM06560
ALLOCATE OLM(BUI); PLM06570
If BUN=O THEN DO: PLM06580
I=1; PLM06590
GO TO IMAO; PL806600
(continued) .
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Table (7.2.7) continued
END ;
DO 1=1 TO PEOP.MId;
ENE;
IMAO: DO IL=I TC BUM-BUZ;
OLL(IL)=PE.KI(I-I+1) ;
END;
IF (BUZ,=0) THEN CO;
DO IK=1 TO PER.RAM;
HA=PEE.TAB (IK) ;
DA=-CEIL(-MA/1000) ;
JA=-CEIL (-?A/ 1000) ;-
JAK=Ja-10*DA;
IF.(JAK=9) THEN CC;
DO IX=1 TO EMCD;
IF (TBIM(IX)=,A) THEN GC TC IEA4;
E ND;
IMA4: OLM (IL)=PRIN (IX) ->A?.SPIT; -
PUT EDIT ('INDEX=',IL,'PROP=',CLM (IL)->PFROP. N AM E)
(SK IP (1) , A (6)F, (5) , A (5) ,F (5)
END;
END;
END;
PEE. REL (2)=1;
PUT EDIT('PAT=',PROP.NAME,'IMP=',PER.REL(2))
(SKIP11) ,.A(5) ,F15) ,A(4),E (18,6));
IF P.P.OP. VAL UE)2 THES GO TC TM A2 '
I? PROP.VALUE=1 THEN DO;
IF (PHOP.LIM=1 & PEC-.TIL(1)=0) THEN DO
PRCP. BEL 12) =0;
GO TO IMA1;
END:
PROP.REL (2)=1;
DO I=1 TO PIOP.LIM;
STAIE( 2,PRCP.T11(1))=1;
END,
IND:
IF PRCP.VALUE=2 THEN EC;
IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PROP.TIL(1)=0) THEN DC;
PROP.BEL(2)=0;
GO TO IA1;
END:
PBCP.BEiL(2=POP.EEL(1)/PR.EEI(1);
IF(PROP.EEL(2)<CUT_CFF) THEN 25CP.EEL(2)=;
DO 1=1 TC EBOF.LId;
STATE (2, PRO?.TIL (I))=STATE (1,PRCP. TIL (I) )/PER .REL (1) ;
IF (STATE (2,PROP.TIL(I)) <CUTOCFE) THEN STATE(2,PROP.TL(I))=O0
END;
END:
IMA1: DO I=1 TO PER. RAM;
EX-1;
TIERBA=PE:
QT=PER.DEXTER;
CAll INUP(EX);
(continued)
PLE06610
PLi 06620
PLM06630
PLE06640
PLM06650
PLM06660
PLM06670
PLL1106680
PLM06690
PLM06700
PLM06710
PLM06720
PLM06730
PL14106740
PLM06750
PLM06760
PLM106770
PLM06780
PLM06790
PLM106800
PL06810
PLM06820
PLM06830
PLL 06840
PLM06850
PLM06860
PLM06870
PI106880
PLM06890
PLM06900
PLM06910
PLM06920
PLM06930
PLM06940
PLM06950
PL,106960
PLH06970
PL06980
PL106990
PLM07000
PL07010
PL07020
PLM07030
PLM07040
PLM07050
PLM07060
PLM07070
PLM07080
PLM07090
PLM07100
PL307110
PL1w07 120
PLM07130
PLM07140
PLM07150
221Table (7.2.7) continued
PUT EDIT '=':,I, PER.TA?=',PEF.TAk (I) ,'PEY= 1,REY) PLM07160
(SKIP f2),A (2),1 (5),A (8),F (5),oA (4),-Z(18,6)) P L?07 170
5A=PEB.TAR LI); PLM07180
DA=-CEIL(-3A/100C) ; PLM07190
JA=-CEIL(-.3A/1000); PLM07200
JAK=JA-1C**EA; PLM07 210
NA=HA- (1000) *JA; PLLM07220
IF (JAK-=2) THEN STATE(2,NA)=BEY/EER.EEL(1); PLZ 07230
IF(STATD(2,NA)<CUTOFF) THEN STATE(2,NA)=0; PLM07240
IF (JAK=2) THEN DC; PLM07250
SNCT=REY/PEB.BEL(1) ; PLM07260
PUT EDIT ('NOTSTATE=' ,MA, 'IMP=' ,SNCT) PLM07270
(SKIP(2),A(9),F(5),X(2),A(4),E(18,6)); PLM07280
ENE; PLM07290
END; PLM07300
GC TO IME; PLE07310
/* SYMMETRIC CASE */ PLM07320
IMA2: PROP. EEL (2)=0; PL407330
IF (PEE.RA=1 & PER.TAE(1)=0) THEN GO TO IME; PLM07340
ELSE DC 1=1 TO PER.RAM; PLM07350
PLM07360
TIERRA=PR; PLM07370
QT=PEE.DEXTER; PL07380
CALL SINUP (EX) ; PLH07390
PUT EDIT ('I=',I,'IER.TAF=',PER.TAR(I),'REY=',REY) PLM07400
(SKIP 12),A (2) , F(5) ,A(8), f(5), A j4),E(18,6)) PLM07410
STATE(2,PE.E.TARI))=REY; PLM07420
IF (STATE(2,PER.TAf(I))<CUTC-F) THEN STATE(2,PER.TAR(I))0; PL07430
END: PLM07440
GO TO IZE: PLM07450
/* LCCP STAETS EEE */ PLH07460
I M20: EC WHILl (BUG-=0); PL07 470
BUG=BU13; PLM07480
PUT LIST('BUG=',BUG) ; PLM07490
IF (BUG=0) THEN GO TO IH2; PLM07500
ALLOCATE GOLD (DUG); PLM07510
DO 1=1 TC BUG; PLM07520
GOLD (I) =OL (I); PLM07530
PUT EDIT('GOLD=',I,'PROP=,GCLE(I)->PRO.NAME) PLI07540
(SKIP (1) ,A (5) ,F (5), A (5) ,F (5) ) ; PLM 07550
END; PLM07 560
FREE OLM; PLM07570
BUM=0; PLM07580
DO I-1 TC BUG; PL,107590
PT=G0LE(I); PL07600
IF PROP.HOST=NULL THEN EO: PLM07610
IF (PROP.MIM=1 & PROP.PIA(1)=NULL) THEN GO :0 IME3; PLK07620
ELSE BUM=BUM+PROP.MIM; PLM07630
GO TO IME3; PLM07640
END; PLM07650
ELSE PEPBCE. HOST; PLM07660
IF (PROP.MIH=1 & PROP.PIM(1)=NULL) THEN GO TO IME2; PLZ107670
ELSE BUM=BUM+PBOP.MIM; PLM07680
IZE2: IF (PER.LEAL=1 & PER.KIM(1)=NULL) THEN GO TO IM21; PLM07690
ELSE BUM=BUM+PER.LEAL; PL1 07700
(continued)
Table (7.2.7) continued
IME1: DO IX=1 TO PER.RAd;
MA=PEB. TAB (IX) ;
DA=-CEIL (-MA/10000);
JA=-CEIL (-MA/10CO) ;
JAK=JA-10*CA;
IF JAK=9 THEN DC;
BUM=BUM+1;
END;
END;
I NE3: END;
I BUM=0 THEN GC TC :M13;
ALLOCATE OLM(BUM);
11=0;
DO I=1 .1 EEUG;
PT=GOLD(I);
IF PRCP.HCST=NULL THEN LO;
IF (PROP.MIM=1 & PRCP.PIN(1)=NULL)
DO IT=1 TO PROP.MIM;
ILIL+1;
0IM (II) =PRCP.PId(IT)
END;
GO TO IMI4;
END;
ELSE PR=PRCP.HCST;
PUT EDIT('HOST','PEOP =,PECP. NAME)
(SKIP (1),A (4),A (5),F (5));:
IF (PROP.MIM=1 & PROP.PIM(1)=NULL) T
DO IT=1 TO PRCP.MIM;
11=1t+1;
OL (IL)=PROP.PIM (IT);
IM12: IF (PER.LEAL=1 & PER. KIM(1)=NULL) T
DO IT=1 TO PER.LEAI;
IL=IL+l1;
OL(IL) =PER. KIM (IT)
END;
I1I1: DO IK=1 TO PER.RAM;
MA=PER.TAER (IK) ;
DA=-CEIL (-mA/10000)
JA=-CEIL i-MA/1OO) ;
JAK=JA-10*DA;
IF JAK=9 THEN DC;
DO IX=1 TC FMOD;
IF (TRIM(IX)=MA) TH.EN GC TO IKl;
END;
IlIK1: CLM (lL+1 )=PRIN (lX) ->AP. SPIT;'
IL=IL+ 1;
END;
END;
THEN GO TO IM14;
HEN GO TO !M12;
HEN GO TO IMI1;
114: END;
/* ASSIGN IMPORTANCES CF CIDEE GENERATICN
IMI3: DO 1=1 TC BUG;
PUT EDIT('I=',.I) (SKIP(1),A(2),F(5));
PT=GOLD(I);
CAT=PECP.RCCT:
(continued)
PLM07710
PLM07720
PL607730
PLM07740
PLM07750
PLM07760
P107770
PLM07780
PL207790
PLM07800
PLM07810
PLM07820
PL107830
PLM07840
PLM07850
PLM07860
PLM07870
PLM07880
PLM07890
- 11107900
PLM07910
PLM07920
PLM07930
PLM07940
PLM07950
PLM07960
PLM07970
PL907980
PLM07990
PLM08000
PL808010
PLM08020
PLM08030
PLM08040
PLM08050
PLM08060
PLM08070
PLM08080
PLM08090
PLV108100
PLM08110
PLM08120
PLMO8130
PLM08140
PIM08150
PLM08160
PLM08170
PL08180
PLM08190
PLM08200
PL08210
P1M08220
PLM08230
PLM08240
PLM08250
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Table (7.2.7) continued
IF (CAT->PROP.TIPO=0) THEN CC;
APT=CAT;
MA=AP.NAP;
JA=-CEIL (-MA/1000)
NA=MA-(100O)*JA ;
IF (PROP. HOST-=NUL.L) THEN EC
PR=PECP. HCSTI
TIERBA=PR;
QT=PER.DEXTER:
PEF.BEL(2)=STA'D(2,NA)
GO TO IK3;
END:
ELSE PROP.REL (2)=ST ATD (2, NA)
IF(PBOP.BEL (2)<CUTOF) THEN 2OP.REL(2)=0 ;
GO TO IK2;
END;
IF CAT->PROP.HOST-=NULL THEN GC TO EMA2;
IF PROP.HOST-=NULL THEN GO TO EMA1;
11K4: IF CAT->PROP.VALUE=1 TEEN PROP.EEL(2)=CAT->PRCP.REL(2);
ELSE PROP. REL (2) PROP.REL (1)*CA'->PEOP.REL (2)/CAT->PROP.REL(1);
IF(PROP.REL (2)<CUT_OFF) THEN PFCP.RZL(2)=0 ;
11K2: IF PROP.VALUE=1 THEN O;
IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PROP.T1L(1)=0) THEN GC TC AME;
DO IT=1 TC PRCP.LIM;
STATE (2, PROP. IL1(IT)) =PROP.REL (2)
GO TO AME;
END; -
ELSE DC;
IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PRCP.IIL(1)=0) THEN GO TO AME;
DO IT=1 TC PRCP.LI!;
IF (PROP.REL (2)=0) THEN STATE (2,PRCP.TIL (IT) )=0
ELSE STATE(2,PRCP.TIL(IT))=STAILE(1,PROP.TIL(IT))*PROP.REL(2)/
PROP.REL (1);
IF(STATE(2,PhOP.TIL (IT)) <CUTCFF) THEN STATE(2,PROP.TIL (IT)
)=0;
GO '0 AME;
END;
EMA1: PR=PRCP.HCST;
TIERRA=PR;
QT=PER.DEXTER;
IF CAT->PROP. VALUE=1 THEN PER.REL(2)=CAT->PROP.EEL(2)
ELSE PEk.REL(2)=PEL.EE[1)*CAT->PFCP.REL(2)/CAT->PROP.REL(1);
1JM3: IF P10P.VALUE=1 1HEN EC;
.IF (PROP.LIM=1 & PEOP.Tll(1)=0) THEN DO;
PEOP..BEL (2) =0;
GO TO EMEl;
END;
ELSE PROP.REL (2) =PER.REI (2)
IF(PROP.BEL(2)<CUTOFF) THEN PEC.REL(2)=0 ;
DO IT=1 I PROP.LIM;
STATE (2,PECP.TIL(IT))=fO F.REL(2)
END;
GO TO EME1;
(continued)
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PL808260
PLM08270
PLM08280
PL08290
PLM08300
PLM08310
P11108320
PLM08330
PL1M08340
PLM08350
PLM08360
PLK08370
PLM08380
PLE08390
.PLM08400
PLISG8410
PLM08420
PLM08430
PLd08440
PLM08450
PLM08460
PLM08470
PLMO8480
PLM08490
PLM08500
PLM08510
PLM08520
PLM08530
PLM08540
PLM08550
PLE08560
PLM08570
PLM08580
PL1108590
PLM08600
PLM08610
PLM08620
PLM08630
PLM08640
PLMC8650
PLM08660
PLM08670
PLM08680
PLM08690
PLM08700
PLM08710
PIM08720
PLM08730
PLM08740
PLM08750
PLM08760
PLM08770
PLM08780
PL08790
PLM08800
Table (7.2.7) (continued)
END;
IF PROP. VALUE=2 THEN DO;
IF (PROP.LIz1=1 & EBOP.TIL(1)=0) THEN DC;
PRCP.REL (2)=0;
GO TO EMl1;
END;
ELSE PROP.REL(2)=PER.REL (2)*PECP.REL(1)/PER.REL (1);
IF(PECP.REL(2) <CUT_0FF) THEN PBCP.REL(2)=0
DO IT=1 TC PROP.LIZ;
IF(PROP.REL(2)=0) THEN STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT))=0
ELSE STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT7))=STATE(1,PRCP.TIL(IT))*PROP.REL(2)/
PRCP.REL (1) ;
IF(STATe(2,PROP.TIL(IT))<COTCFF) THEN STATE (2,PROP.TIL(IT)
)=0;
ENE;
GO TO EME1;
END;
IF PROP.VALUE>2 THEN DO;
PBCP.REL (2)= 0;
IF (PER.RAM=1 & PER.TAR(1)=0) THEN GO TO AME;
DO IT=1 TO PER.RAM;
EX=IT;
CALL MINUP(EX);
-STATE(2,PEE.TAB(IT))=REY*PER.REL (2)/PER.REL(1)
IF (STATE 12,PER.TA.R (IT))<CUT CEF) THEN STATE (2, PER.TAR (IT)) =0;
ENE;
GO TO AME;
ENE;
2Z21: DC IT=1 TO PER.ZAM;
EX=IT;
CALL MINUP(EX)
HA=PER.TAR(IT);
DA=-CEIL (-MA~/10000);
JA=-CEIL (-?1A/1C00)
JAK=JA-1G*DA;
NA=MA-1000*JA;
IF (JAK-,=2) THEN STATD(2,NA)=REY*PER.REL(2)/PER.REL(1)
IF(STATE(2,NA) <CUT CFF) THEN STATD(2,NA)=0;
IF JAK=2 THEN DO:.
SNOT=REY*PER.EEL(2)/PEE.EEI(1);
PUT EDIT(*NOTSTATE=',A,'IMP=',SNOT)
(SKIP (2) ,A (9) ,F (5) ,X (2) ,A (4) ,E (18,6))
END;
END;
GO TO AME;
/* NESTED CASE */
ENA2: PR=CAT->PRCP.HCST;
TIERRA=PR;
QT=PER.DEXTER;
DO IT=1 TO PER.LEAL;
IF PER.KlMI(IT)=GOLt (I) THEN GC TO EMA3;
END;
GO TO IK4;
EMA3: IF CAT->PRCP.VALUE<=2 THEN EX=IT+1+PER.EAM;
ELSE IF (PEH.EAM=1 & PEE.TAR(1)=0) THEN EX=IT;
(continued)
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PLE08810
PLH08820
PLM08830
PLI408840
PL1108850
PL08860
PLM08870
PL08880
PLM08890
PLM08900
PLMO8910
PLM08920
PLM08930
PL1108940
PLM08950
PLY.08960
PLM08970
PLM08980
PL08990
PLM09000
PLM09010
PLM09020
PLM09030
PLM09040
PLE09050
PLM09060
PLM09070
PLM09080
PLM09090
PLM09100
PLM09110
PLM09120
PLI409130
PLM09140
PL809150
PLM109 160
PLM09170
PLM09180
PLM09190
PLZ09200
PLM09210
PLM09220
PLM09230
PLM09240
PL09250
PLM09260
PLM09270
PLM09280
PLM09290
PLM09300
PL809310
PL1109320
PL109330
PL1.09340
PLM09350
Table (7.2.7) continued
ELSE EX=IT+P!E.RAH;
CALL HINUP(2X)
IF (PROP.HOST,=NULL) THEN CO;
PHCP.HOST->PER.REL(2)=EYMPER.PEL (2)/PER.REL(1)
IF(PROP.HOST->PER.EEI 2)<CUT OEF) TEEN
PROP.HOST->PBR.EEL(2)=0;
PR=PHOP. HOST;
TIERRA=PR;
0T=PEB.DEXTEE
.GO TO Idx3:
END;
ELSE PROP.REL (2)=REY*PER. BEL (2)/EE. BEL(1);
IF(PEOP.EEL (2)<CUTOEF) THEN PEOP.REL(2)=0;
IF PROP.VALUE=1 THEN CC;
IF(PROP.LIM=1 & PEOP.TIL(1)=0) THEN GO TO AME;
ELSE DO IT=1 TO PROP.1H;
STATE(2,PRCP.TIL(IT))=5FP.REL(2);
END:
END:
IF PROP.VALUE=2 THEN CC;
IF (P3OP.LIH=1 & PROP.TILj1)=0) THEN GO TO AME;
ELSE DO IT=1 TO PEOP.LIM;
IF(?RO?.REL(2)=0) THEN STATE (2,PBOP.TIL (IT) )=0
ELSE STATE (2, PROP. TIL(IT)) =STATE (1,PROP.TIL (IT)) *PROP.REL (2)/
PErP.REL(1);
IF(STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT))<CUTOff) THEN STATE(2,PROP.TIL(IT)
)=0;
END:
AME: END
FREE GCLD;
END;
PUT SKIP(2) LIST('VESELY-FUSSELL IMPORTANCES');
PUT SKIP(2) LIST('FREE EVENTS');
IF(CUTOFF=0) THEN GO TO ENAS;
DO 1=1 TO FUN;
PUT SKIP DATA(I,STATE(2,I));
IF(STATE(2,I)=0) THEN PUT SKIP LIST (CANCELED');
END;
PUT SKIP'(2) LIST('EEPLICATED EVENTS');
DO 1=1 TO DUN;
PUT SKIP DATA(I,STATD(2,I));
IF(STATD(2,I)=0) THEN PUT SKIP LIST('CANCELED);
END:
PUT SKIP(2) LIST('MCDULIS') ;
DC 1=1 TO IB;
PT=BOST (I);
PUT EDIT(VHODULE NAME=',PROP.NAME,'IMP=',PROP.EEL(2))
(SKIP (1) ,A (12) F (5) ,X (2),A (4),E (18,6))
IF(PBOP.REL(2)=0) THEN
PUT SKIP(2) LIST('THIS MODULE AND ITS COMPONENTS ARE CANCELED');
IF (PROP.HOST-=N LL) THEN DC;
PUT EDIT (2IMP=' ,PRCP.11CST->PEE .EL(2)
[F(PROP.HOST->PER.REL(2)=0) THEN
(continued)
PLML09 360
PLN09370
PLM09380
PLM09390
PLH09400
PLH,09410
PLM09420
PLMO9 430
PL09440
PLI109450
PLM09460
PLM09470
PL?09480
PL109490
PL09500
PLM09510
PL909520
PLH09530
PLM09540
PL09550
PLH09560
PLM09570
PLH09580
PLM09590
PLM09600
PL?09610
PLM09620
PLM09630
PLM09640
PLH09650
PIL09660
PLM09670
PLM09680
PLM09690
PLH09700
PLM09710
PLE09720
PLH09730
PLM09740
PLM09750
PLE09760
PL09770
PLM09780
PLM09790
PLM09800
PLM09810
PLM09820
PLM09830
PLM09840
PLM09850
PLM09860
PLH09870
PLM09880
PLM09890
PLM09900
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Table (7.2.7) continued
PUT SKIP (2) LIST('THIS MODULE ANE ITS COMPONENTS ARE CANCELED'); PLM09910
fND; PLM09920
END PLMV^9930
ENAS: DO I=1 TO FUN; PLM09940
PUT SKIP EATA (I,SIATE(2,I)) ; PLM09950
IND; PLM09960
PUT SKIP(2) IIST('REPLICATEE EYENTS'); PLM09970
DO I=1 TC DUN; PLM09980
PUT SKIP CATA(I,STAT(2,I)); PLA09990
END; PLM10000
PUT SKIP(2) LIST ('MODULES') ; PL310010
DO I=1 TO IB; PLM10020
PT=BOST(I); PLM10030
PUT EDIT('MCDULE NAVE=', ECE . A,'IMP=', PROP.REL(2)) PLM10040
(SKIP (1),A (12),F (5),X (2),A (4),E (16,6)) PLM10050
IF -(PROP.HCST-=NUI.I) THEb DC; PL510060
PUT EDIT('IMP=',PROP.HOS:->PER.REL(2)) PLM10070
(X (6),A(4),E(18,6)); PL1110080
IND; PLM10090
El N; PLM10100
ASAC: END IMPOBTANCE; PLM10110
SOSOL: END NUMERC; PLH10120
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(1) PLM06270 through PLM06330
(2) PLM06990 through PLM07100
(3) PLM07240 through PLM07290
(4) PLM07330 through PLM07440
(5) PLM08310 through PLM09250
(6) PLM09380 through PLM09650
7.3 Organization of the Procedures used in PL-MODMC
PL-MODMC is a computer program to perform Monte-Carlo analysis of
complex fault trees. In addition, this code has the capability, if
requested, to calculate the point unavailability or the average
unavailability of the top event over a specific period of time. This
code is constructed in two separate steps. In the first step, the
restriction of not allowing a replicated component to appear in the
domains of two or more replicated gates or the top event is removed.
In the second step, a Monte-Carlo package is added to the code in
order to perform a Monte-Carlo simulation of the top event occurrence
probability. In this section, some of the logical and computer
programming concepts that are implemented are discussed.
7.3.1 Removal of the Restriction of Component Replication in
Different Domains of Fault Trees
This restriction has been removed by temporarily disconnecting
the dependences between the replicated gates and the top event, caused
by the presence of identical replicated components in their domains.
Components which have a complement in the tree have been widely used
to perform the disconnection process. Basically, two distinct procedures
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perform all the logical changes for handling this extension. They
are as follows;
(1) TREE-IN Procedure;
(2) TOP-SET Procedure.
The TREE-IN procedure existed already in the PL-MOD code, but it
has been completely changed here in order to perform the disconnection
process prior to the modularization process. The TOP-SET procedure
is used, after the modularization of the fault tree, to properly treat
the effect of disconnection that has been performed by the TREE-IN
procedure.
To clarify the calculations and treatments performed in the TREE-IN
procedure, the fault tree shown in Figure (7.3.1) will be studied.
This fault tree consists of seven components where components C2, 3
and C5 are replicated, and have appeared in the domains of replicated
gate G7 and the top event Gl. A preprocessor assigns proper numerical
values to the gates and components of the fault tree, such that the
input becomes acceptable to the old version of the PL-MODMC code.
Except for the components that are replicated, the preprocessor assigns
regular numbers (instead of numbers in the form of, say, 30005).
However, the same number will be assigned to other palces where this
replicated component appears. Therefore, Table (7.3.1) shows the numeric
values that are assigned through the preprocessor to the alphanumeric
names shown in Figure (7.3.1)
229
Figure 7.3.1
FAULT TREE FOR A MONTE-CARLO ANALYSIS
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TABLE 7.3.1
Corresponding Numeric Values for the
Components and Gates of the Fault Tree
in Figure (7.3.1)
Component
Name
Corresponding
Numeric Value
Gate
Name
Corresponding
Numeric Value
Gl (TOP)
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
G7
G8
Cl
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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At the end, the preprocessor transfers these numeric values of
the nodes and components of the tree, to the controlled NODEIN structure.
A NODE based structure would be allocated for each gate of the tree
to transfer all information with regard to the nodes of the fault tree.
The composition of the NODEIN and NODE structures are the same as in the
PL-MOD, and the details of these structures are clearly discussed in
Reference [1]. All the pointers identifying the NODE structure are
stored in the SPINE array [1]. This array will be used in the TREE-IN
procedure to refer to the NODE structure for changing some of the
values that are modified during the disconnection process.
The TREE-IN procedure starts by assigning name, value, gate inputs,
and component inputs to a NODE structure from the NODEIN structure. Then
the following DO loop assign NODE.ROOT and NODE.SPIT values of the
gates to the NODE structure in question (see Reference [1]);
DO L=l TO GINO;
NODE.SPIT(L) = SPINE(NODEIN.PIT(I,L));
AT = NODE.SPIT(L);
AT ->NODE.ROOT = NT;
END;
GINO indicates the number of gates input to the NODE structure with
the pointer NT, and NODE.SPIT(l) stores pointers NT of the input gate's
NODE structure.
Arrays BOOK and NPOINT are allocated and have the
following declaration form:
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DECLARE BOOK(NRG,NCOMP) FIXED BINARY CONTROLLED;
DECLARE NPOINT(NRGNCOMP,15) POINTER CONTROLLED;
DECLARE GATNO (GUM)POINTER CONTROLLED;
NRG and NCOMP are the number of replicated gates and the top gate,
and number of components in the fault tree, respectively. The BOOK
Attay will store the number of times that a component appears in each
domain, and the NPOINT array stores the NT pointers for each appearance.
GATNO is an auxiliary array to store NT pointers during the counting of
the number of appearances of the components in each domain. Table (7.3.2)
summarizes a set of statements in the TREE-IN procedure which performs
the counting of the components in different domains of a fault tree.
For the fault tree in Figure (7.3.1) the following values will be assigned
by the set of statements shown in Table (7.3.2)
NRG = 1 + 1 = 2
(there are two main domains in this fault tree: one is the
domain of the top event TOP and one is the domain of the
replicated gate Gl)
1 2 1 1 1 0 0
BOOK =
.0 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The first row shows the appearances of each component in the TOP domain
and the second row shows the appearance of the components in the gate
G7. Therefore, from the BOOK array it is clear that components 2, 3 and 5
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Table(7.3.2) Set of Statements to Count Replicated Components in Each Domain
U1GRMOD+1; WHOU6220
DCOR=G U':; WHOO6230
ALLCCATE BOOK; WHO06240
ALLOCATE NPOINT; WHC06250
BOOK=0; WHO06260
EPCIUT=NULL; WHC06270
ALLOCATE GATNO; WHO'6280
GATNC=NULL; WHC06290
HAUO=0; WHO06300
GNO=Z; ; WH00631 0
TREE=NULL; WH006320
AT=SPINE TCPENO) ; WHO06330
AGAIN: IF(AT->NCE.GIN,1=0) T HI DO; WHC06340
GINO=AT->NCDE.GINT; WHC06350
DO L=1 TO GINO WHC6360
MANO=MANO+1; 
W I06370
GATNO 'HANC)=AT->NODE.SPIT1L); WHC06380
END ; WH06390
IND; WH006400
MCOH= AT->NODE.LI; W0H006410
DC M=1 TC MCCH1; WHC06420
HISU= AT->NODE.TIL (1)W; H006430
IF"MISH='!) THEN GC TC FINE; WHO06440
BCCK (1, MISH)=BOOK (1,.1IS1) +1 WH006450
N=BOGK 1,&ISH); 9HO06460
NPINT 1,MISHN)=AT; WH006470
FINE: END; WHO061180
GNO=GN0+1; W11006490
AT=GATNO (GNO); WH006500
IFAT-='NU11L) THEN GC TC AGAIN; WHC006510
DO IX= 1 TO RMO; WH006520
GATNO=IU1Il WH006530
GNO=0; WHO06540
MANO=0; WHO06550
FG=TRIN (IX) ; W H006560
AT=-SPINE 'RG) WHO06570
BGAIN : IF(A:->NCDE.GINT-=0) TBIN eO; WHO106580
GINO=AT->NGDE.GINT; WHC06590
DC L=1 TO GIO; WH006600
iANO=MANO+*1; WHOO6610
GAT1O (1A NC) =AT->N CDE. SPII L) ; W H006620
END; WH006630
END; WH006640
ECC&=AT->NODE.LIL; W11006650
DO M=1 TO MCOM; WHO06660
mISH=AT->NODE.TIL h) ; WH006670
IF IMISH=0) THEN GO TO ANZ; WHO06680
BOOK CI.x+1,3ISH)=3OK (IX+1,AdIS1) +1 WHO06690
N=BOOK(IX+1,MISH) ; WH006700
NPOINT (IX+1 , MISH, I) =AT; WHO06210
ANZ: END; WH006720
GNO=GNO+1; WHO06730
AT=GATNC (GNO) WH006740
IFAT-='NUlL) THEN GC TO BGAIN; WH006750
END; WH006760
2R2 GATIO; WHO06770
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are replicated. Component 2 is repeated twice in the domain of the
top event, and components 3 and 5 are repeated once in each TOP and G7
domain. It is clear that components 3 and 5 cannot be handled by the
old PL-MOD code. To remove the dependences between gates TOP and G7
one can use, temporarily, different numbers for the components 3 and 5
in each domain. Particularly, any replicated component that is repeated
only once in a specific domain can be treated as an ON compcnent.
However, an OFF pair will be temporarily assigned to all ON components
without an OFF pair. The process of adding this OFF pair is more fully
discussed later in this section. The NPOINT assay stores the following
pointers:
NT 2 '. . , Null NT4,NT6,...,Null NT 3,...,Null NT5 ,...,Null
NT 6,...Null Null,...,Null Null,...,Null
NPOINT =
Null,...,Null Null,...,Null NT7 ,...,Null Null,...,Null
NT 8,...Null NT 8,...Null NT ,...,Null
For example, NT4 and NT6 indicate the NODE pointers for gates
-numbers 4 and 6 to which component 2 is attached. Proper numbers
for the replicated components 2, 3 and 5 for disconnecting dependences
between the gates TOP and G7 are as follows
1 20001 21002 1 21004 0 0
BOOK =
0 0 21003 0 21005 1 1
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Where, for instance, 21002 means that there is a pair of ON and
OFF replciated components in which the ON part is identified by 21002 and
the OFF part has a value of 22002. The OFF pairs of all temporary ON
components must be attached to a new gate added to the main event
domain (i.e. replicated event domain or the top event domain) with a
gate type opposite to the previous main event. For example, gate G7,
which is an OR gate, will be input to a new OR gate with all of the
OFF temporary components in the G7 domain input to this new gate. Therefore,
the fault tree in Figure (7.3.1) will be changed to the form illustrated
in Figure (7.3.2). This fault tree is clearly an independent one which
can be handled by the PL-MOD Code.
To account for the changes in the structure of the tree and by
using the data in arrays BOOK and NPOINT, those NODE structures that
are not reflecting the new form of the nodes of the tree must be changed
(e.g. gates 4, 7, 8, 3 and 6 must be accounted for in the new replicated
event inputs). Also, a new NODE structure must be allocated for the
gates added to the top and replicated events with added OFF components
in their domains (e.g. nodes 9 and 10). The set of statements in
the TREE-IN procedure to handle the changes in the NODE structure data
are shown in Table (7.3.3).
To keep track of all these changes a based structure named NOT and
an array BKEEP are used. The NOT structure and BKEEP arrays are declared
as follows:
DECLARE 1 NOT BASED (KT),
2 DIR FIXED BINARY,
2 TIR (LIRO REFER (NOT.DIR)) FIXED BINARY;
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Figure (7.3.2) -
New Form of the Fault Tree Given in Figure (7-3-1)
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Table (7.3.3) Set of Statements to Make Replicated Gates and the
Top Event Independent
ALLCCATE CCiM PO ; W1100678u
NMANG=E.MOD+NNOT+ 1; WH006790
NIA=0; WH006800
ALLOCATE GATNA; WH006810
GAT HA=NU LL; WH006820
ALLCCATE EAM; WH006830
BAil='.); V#HOO6840
ALLOCATE NODA; WH1006850
NODA=O; WHO06860
DO J=1 TC NCCIP; WH006870
CO U.N11T=0; WH006880
DO 1=1 TC NRG; WHO06E90
COUNT=CCUNT+BOOK (I,J) W1006900
END; W HO0691 0
IFfCOUNT<=1) ThiN GO TO FATM; WHO06920
NIA=NIA+1; W11006930
CCMENO NIA) =J; WH1C06940
DO K=1 TO NRG; W11006950
IF (BOOK (K,J)-=1) T ifEN GO TO GOOD; W 1C06960
B AM (K)=E.44(K) +1; WH006970
BOOK .K,J)=212 .- +N.A tG ; WH1006980
NiAG=1AN G+ 1; WHO06990
ZAP=NPCINT(K,J,1) ; WHOO7COO
LILO=ZAP->NODE. LIL- 1; W11007010
IF (LILO=0f) THEN LILC=1; WH007020
GINC=Z AP->FODE. GIN; WH007030
IF ZAP->NCDE.TI1 (1)-=0) THEN WH007C40
LINC=ZAP-)NCDE.EI F+1; WHC07050
ELSE LIRO=1; WHO7060
ALLCCATE NCDE; WHO07C70
LILO=ZAP->NODE. L!; WH007080
DO 1=1 TO LILO; WHO07090
KAP=ZAP; WH007100
HAS =2 ; WHO07110
MISHf=ZAP->NODEwTIL(M) ;WHOO7120
DO WHILE (FAP,=NULL) ; 11007 130
1ASH= MASH+1 WHCO7140
KAP=NPOINT .K,flISH ,:ASHI) WH007150
Continued
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Table (7.3.3) continued
IF(KAP=ZAP) THEN tPCINT'K,MISH,NASH)=NT; WHO0716G
END; WH007170
END; WH007180
LA M3=ZAP->NODE. EIR; WH007190
DO 3=1 TC LA?3; W HO07200
NODE".TIE(M)=ZAP->NOE.TIIR (M) WH007210
END; W HO07 220
NODE.TIR (LIFRO)=BOCK 1K,J); WHO07230
L=0; WH17 240
JAPE=ZAP->NCDE.LIL; WHO07250
DO M=1 TO JAPE; WH007260
IF(J,-ZAP->NODE.TIL M)) THEN DC; WHO07270
Ll+ 1; WHO07 280
NODE.TIL (1)=ZAP->NODE.TIL "i) WHO-17290
END; WHC07300
END; WHO07310
NODE.TIPC=1; W11007 320
NODE. NALIE=ZAP->NODE.NAMB; WHO07330
NODE.VALUE=ZAP->NCDE. VALUE; WH007340
NODE.GINT=ZAP->NO LEE.GIN; WH007350
NODE. LILT=ZAP-> NODE. LILI- 1 W11007360
NODE.iI RT=ZAP->NOEE.LIE+1; WHC07370
NODE.LIMD=AP->NOCE.LIkD; WHO )7380
NODE.LILIT=ZAP->NODE.LIMT; WH007 390
NODE. NEST ; W HOO)7 400
NODE.WHIZ=0; WH11007 410
NODE. ROOT=ZAP-> iiOCE.2OOT; WHO0)7420
NODE. 1P=U LL; WH007430
NODE. LI=NULL; W11007440
NODE. NAIL=NUll; WH007450
NOD. WHIP= NULL; WHOO7 460
GNO=ZAP->NCDE. GINT; WHO07470
DC d=1 TO GINO: WH007480
AT=ZAP->NODE.SPIT 43); WHOOI7490
NODE.SPITM)=AT WH007500
AT->NODE. ROOTNT; WHOO7 510
END; WHC07520
LAMB=ZAP->NODE. NAME; W8007530
SPINE LAMB)=NT; WHO07540
AT=ZAP->NCE. 0OT; -W11007550
LAHD=AT->NODE.GI NT W800756C
IF 1AT-=NULL) THEIN WHO07570
DO 1=1 TO IAMB; WHO07580
IF(ZAP=AT->UD0E.SPII(1)) THEN WHCO7590
AT->NODE.SPIT :3)=NT; WH07600
ENE; WH007610
FREE ZAP->NODE; WH007620
NODAfK,BAM(K))=22000+NMANG-1; WHO07630
GO TO FAIN; WHOO7640
GOOD: IF'BOOK 1K,J)<=1) THEN GC TO FATN; WHO07650
CCU NT=BOCK (K,J) ; WHO07660
BOOK 'K,J)=BOOK:K,J) *1 tCO+NZIANG; WH007670
NMANG=N MANG+1 ; WHC07680
DO N=1 TO COUNT; WH007690
ZAP=NPOINT.K,J, N) WH001700
(continued)
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Table (7.3.3)(continued)
LILC=ZAP->NODE.LIL-1;WHOO7710
17 'LILO=-)) THE N LILC=1; WH0077120
GINUC=ZAP->NOD0E.GIN; W1C07730
IF Z.aP->NCDET. T IR (1),=0) TH E N W0O0774
LIPC=ZAP-)NO)E. CI+1; WHC07750
ELSE LIROL=1; WHO07760
AILCCATE NCDE; W IC07770
LILO=ZAP->UIODE. LII; WHO07780
DO M=1 TO LILO; WHO07790
MASH=0; WHOO7800
KA P=ZAP; WH007810
*1IS H=ZAP->NODE.TI LM); WHO07820
CO WHILE(FAP-=NULL) ; WHO7830
m ASit-mASi1+ 1; WH007840
KAP=NPOINT K, M1ISH, ASH) ;WHOO750
IF(KAP=ZAP) THEN NPOINT(K,MISH,NASH)=NT; WH007860
END; WHOO7E70
END; WHC07880
LAUB=ZAP->NODE.DIR; WHOG7890
EO =1 TO LAMB; WHC07900
NODE. TIR ',)=ZAP->NODE.TlR ",,); W)HOC7910
END; WH007920
ODE. TIR (LIRO)= NOON (KJ); WH007930
L=D; WHOO7940
JA PE=ZAP->NODE. LIL; WHO7950
DO 1=1 TO JAPE; WHO)76')
I F(J-=ZAP->NOO E.ETIL(M)) THEN DC; WHC07970
1=.L+ 1; WHO0798f)
NOflE. TIL (1) =ZAP->NO EE .IIL (M); WH007990
END; W HOC80001
END; WHOO8010
NODE.TIPO=1; WHO08020
NODE.NAME=ZAP->NCDE. NAME; WHO08030
NODE.VALJE=ZA?->UOCE. VALUE; WHOO8040
NODE .GINT=ZA P->NCDE .GINT; WHO18050
NODE.LILT=ZAP-X4OEE.LILI-1; WHCO8060
NODE.LIRT=ZAP->NO fE.LIRT+1; WHO08C7U
NCDE.LIDC=ZAP->NODE.LI'ID; WHC08080
NODE. LIMT=ZAP->NODE. LIlT WHO08090
NODE. NEST=n; WHCO8100
NODE. WHIZ=0; WHOO8110
NOD.ROOT=ZAP->NCDE. RCGT; WHOO8120
NODE.LIP= NULL; WHOO8130
NODZ.LID=NULL; WHO0814C
NODE. NAIL=NULL; WHCO08 150
NODE. WHIP=NULL; WHO08 160
GINO=ZAP->NODE.GINT; WHOO8170
DO 3=1 TO GINO; WHOO8180
AT=ZAP->NCDE.SPITkfM); WHOO8190
1ODE. SPIT (ii) = AT; WHOO8200
AT-> NODE. 5C0T=IUT; WHO00821 0
END; WHO08220
LAUI3=ZAP->NUDE. AE W;HO08230
SPI N E LA MB) =N T*-; WfHC08240
AT=ZAP->NCDE. ROOT ; WHU8250
(continued)
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Table (7.3.3) (continued)
LAMB=AT->NODE.GINT;
IF(AT-,=-NULL) TH ZN
DO 3=1 TC IAMB;
I F(ZAP"'=A T->MO D t.SPIT1(1)) T11EN
AT->NOD.SPIT )NT;
END;
FEEE ZAP->NODE;
END;
FATN: END;
FATi: END; 
-
DC K=1 TC NRG;
IF 1NODA %K,1)=)) THEN GO TO BALY;
IlIR C=-BA - fK) ;
GIN O= 1;
LILO=1;
ALLOCATE NODE;
IF.K,=1) THEN GO 0 FAMN;
GATNA(1)=NT;
NODE.ROOT=NULL;
NODE. TIL= 0;
NODE. WHIP=NULL;
NCDE.NAIL=NULL;
NODE.WHI2=0;
NODE. LIRT=LI RO;
NODE.LILT=0;
NODE.LIMT=!;
NODE.LIMC=0;
NODE.LIP=NULI;
NODE.LID =NULL;
GUI=G UM+ 1;
NODE. NA MIE=G UN;
NODE. GINT= 1;
NODE.TIPC=1;
NODE. NEST=0;
AT=SPINE3 TCPENO) ;
IF(AT->NOEE.VALUE=1) THEN NCIE.VALUE=2;
ELSE UODE.VALUE=1;
AT-> NODE. EOOT= NT:
NODESPIT(1)= SPINE(TOPENO);
T1REE=NT;
LO I=1 TO BAM(K)
NODE.TIR (I)=NODA 1X,I)
END;
GO TO BALY
FAMN: GATNAK)=NT;
NODE.TIL=C;
NODE.WHIP=NULL;
NODi.NAIL=NULL;
NOD2. WHIZ=O;
NODE.ROCT=NULL;
NODE. LIIT=LIRO;
NODE. LILT =f;
NODE. LIT=0;
NODE. LI'D=0;
NODd.LIP=NULL:
(continued)
L
WHOO82*60
WHC08270
WO08280
WHC08290
WHO08300o
WHC08 310
WHO08320
WH008330
WHOO8340
WHO08350
WHOO8360
WHO0837f)
WHO08380
WHOO8390
WHOO8400
WHO08410
WHO08420
WHO08430
WHO08440
WHO08450
WHO08460
WHOO8470
WHO08480
WHOO8490
WH008500
WHCO8510
WHOO8520
WHO08530
WHO08540
WHO08550
WHCO08 560
WHO08570
WHC08580
WHO8590
WHO08600
WHO08610
W11008620
WHO08630
WHOO8640
WH008650
WHC08660
WHO08670
WHO08 680
PHOO8690
WHOO8700
WHO08710
WHO08720
WHC08730
WHOO8740
WHOO9750
WHO08760
WH1006270
WHOO8780
WHO08290
WH OR.800
-241
Table (7.3.3) continued
NODa. LID=NULL;
GU M=GUM1;
NCODE. NAM E=GU:';
NODE.GINT=1;
NOD2.TI PC1;
NODE. NEST=;
RG=TRIl 11(,K-1) ;
Ph IN 1K- 1) =NT ;
TEI N 'K- 1) =G U &';
SPINA(K- 1)=NT;
AT=SPINE (RG) ;
IF(AT->UOCE.VALUE=1) THEN MCDE.VALUE=2;
ELSE NODE.VALUE=1;
AT-> NODE. OOT= UT;
NODE. SPIT (1)=SPI NE 'FG)
DO I=1 TC BAM(K);
NODE. TIR 'I)=NODA , 1)
END;
BALY: END;
FREE NODA;
FBE3 BAM;
FREE NPOINT;
EiRG=NRG+1;
ALLOCATE BKEEP; *
UfKEEP 0;
DC J=1 TC NIA;
BKE EP (1, J)=CCNPNO (J);
N=CCMPNC "J)
DO I=2 TC NRG;
BKEEP 1,J)=BOOK '1-1 ,14)
END;
END;
FREE BOOK;
FREE COM PNO
NRG=N RG- 1;
ALLOCATE AUDNOT;
ADDNOT=NUII;
DO I=1 IC NEG;
IFGATNAI)-=NUll) THEN DO;
LIRO=GAT'NA (I) ->UODE.DIR;
ALLOCATE NOT;
ADDNOT I) =9T;
DO J=1 TC LIRO;
NOT.TIE 'J)=GATU1A 1)->NCDE. TI R 'J)
END;
END;
FREE GAIN;
tiO=NIMANG-1
WHO08810
WHOOdE20
WHO08830
WHO08E40
WHC088 50
WHO08860
W H 008 87 0
WHOO8890UH10 08900
WHOO8 900
WHO 0891 0
WH008920
WHO08530
WHO08940
W 1008950
WHC08960
WHO08970
WHO08980
WHO08990
WHC09000
WHO09010
WHO09020
WH009030
WHO09040
WHO09050
W11009C60
WH009070
wHSOG9080
WHC09090
WH0O09 101i
WHC09110
W HOO9 120
WH009130
WHOO9140
WHO09150
WH009160
WHOQ.9 170
WHCO9180
WHO109190
W HC09 200
UH009210
WH009220
WH009230
WHO09240
WH009250
WH00926')
WHC09270
WHOO9280
WHO09290
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DECLARE BKEEP (NRGNIA) FIXED BINARY CONTROLLED EXTERNAL;
The NOT structure stores the OFF components presented in the new gate
added to the top and replicated gates. For example, in the fault
tree of Figure (7.3.2) the following values are assigned to the NOT
structure for gate (9):
NOT.TIR(l) = 22003
NOT.TIR(2) = 22005
The. BKEEP array has one more row than the BOOK array-, and its
number of columns is equal to the number of replicated events in the
original tree. In this example, the number of rows is 3 and the number
of columns is also 3. Therefore, the BKEEP would store the following
values for the fault tree:
2 3 5
BKEEP = 20001 21002 21004
0 21003 21005
The BKEEP array and NOT structure will be used in the TOP-SET
procedure to identify the replicated components that are identical, for
the proper treatment of the disconnection process performed in the
procedure TREE-IN. The rest of the calculations in the TREE-IN are
very similar to the PL-MOD code as discussed in Reference [1].
The TOP-SET procedure is used to treat the effect of changes made
in the structural organization of the fanlt tree during the procedure
TREE-IN. Procedure TOP-SET is called whenever an improper module of
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the fault tree is generated. In the TOP-SET procedure all replicated
modules are replaced by their own modular cutsets in the improper
module. For example, when the top event of the fault tree shown in
Figure (7.3.2) is reached, the modular cutsets of the replicated
gate G7 that is previously calculated will be combined with the
modular minimal cutsets of the top event, in order to find a unique
set of modular minimal cutsets for the top event. Replicated
events 20001, 21002, 21003, 21004, 21005, 22002, 22003, 22004 and 22005
are obviously replicated components appearing in the set of modular
cutsets. Three steps will treat the effect of making the fault tree
independent:
(1) By using the NOT structure. In this case all of the
bits corresponding to the added imaginary OFF components
must be set equal to zero (i.e. bits corresponding to
components 22002, 22003, 22004 and 22005).
(2) By using the BKEEP array. In this case the corresponding
values for replicated components should be set equal to
their real values that are given in the first row of the
BKEEP array (e.g. change 20001 to 2, 21003 and 21003 to 3,
and 21005 and 21004 to 5).
(3) Due to the replication of one component in a modular
cutset (e.g. components 3 and 5), the bits corresponding
to it must be ORed with the first appearance of the
component in each modular cutset. The rest of the bits
should be set equal to zero after the component's first
244
appearance in the cutset.
The method of combining the modular cutsets is similar to the method
of generating simple cutsets in the MODCUT code. Similarly, Step (3)
for treating the effect of replications in the improper modular cutsets
is identical to the method utilized by the MODCUT for the removal of
this effect. Due to the more general method used in the TOP-SET procedure
in the MODCUT code, the reader is referred to Section 7.3 of this thesis
for a more detailed discussion.
Two important structures exist in the TOP-SET procedure of the
PL-MODMC; one is the MISS based structure and the other is the MODCUT
based structed. These structures have the following compositions:
DECLARE 1 MISS BASED (ALM),
2 MOS FIXED BINARY,
2 SIN FIXED BINARY,
2 SON FIXED BINARY,
2 MIN FIXED BINARY,
2 LIL (NUB REFER (MESS.SON)),
2 AOMP(JUMP REFER (MISS.MOS))
BIT (LARG REFER (MISS.SIN)),
2 TIL (WEST REFER (MISS.MIN));
DECLARE 1 MODCUT BASED (RA),
2 MOS FIXED BINARY,
2 SIN FIXED BINARY,
2 AOMP -(MOSE REFER (MODCUT.MOS))
BIT (SINE REFER (MODCUT.SIN));
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The MISS structure is used to store the information in the PER
structure and the modular minimal cutsets after the TOP-SET is called
for an improper module. The MODCUT structure is used to store a
combination of the modular cutsets, if any, due to the presence of
replicated modules in the modular cutsets of the improper module. The
set of statements for the TOP-SET procedure which transfers data from
the PER structure and modular minimal cutsets of an imrpoper module
to the MISS structure is shown in Table (7.3.4).
To remove the OFF complementary components by using the NOT
structure, the list of components in the TOP-SET procedure to perform
this task is shown in Table (7.3.5).
The set of statements to find the simple cutsets from the modular
minimal cutsets by inserting the cutsets of all modules in modular
minimal cutsets is listed in Table (7.3.6).
Finding minimal modular cutsets, and treating the replication
of a component in the resulting combination of modular minimal cutsets
is similar to the procedures TOP-SET and CUT-SET of the MODCUT
code which will be extensively discussed in the next section. However,
it should be noted that if the replication of a component in the set of
modular cutsets does not exist then the set of combined modular cutsets
is minimal and there would be no need for further minimization. Because
if there are no identical components in two or more sets of modular
minimal cutsets, the combination of these minimal cutsets is still
minimal. For example, if components 5 and 3 were not replicated in
'both domains of the top event and replicated gate G7, then the final
set of modular minimal cutsets obtained by combining the modular minimal
cutsets of TOP and G7 modules is still minimal.
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Table (7.3.4) Set of Statements to Transfer PER Structure Data and
Minimal Modular Cutsets to MISS Structure
MA-=- WH023340
X=20; ED CiC 23 350
IF 'DEL= 1) T HED WHO23360
ALLOCATE BABA; WH023370
ALLOCATE JAJA; WHO23380
ALLOCATE DADA; WH023390
DO 1=1 TO 20; WHO2.3400
BABA kI)=NUL; W11023410
JAJA (I) =NULL; WHC23420
DADA'I) =0 WH023430
ND;WHC23440
END; WH023450
DEL=DEL+ 1 WHO23460
IF({EEL>2) THEN DEI=2; WH023470
1=1; W 0H23 480
VIT=BA (I) ; WHO23490
DO WUILEf (VIT,=NUL L) ; WH023500
1=1+1; W1123510
VIT=E AEA (I) ; WHC23520
END; WHO23530
EABA (I) = PE; WH02-3540
JAJA :I)=PT; WH023550
DA DA (I)=STORK ->PROP.NALIE; WH C2.3560
DMISH=PER.RAN1; -WHC23570
JU M3I=0 ; W H 2.3580
PER.DEXTER=STOdK; WIf2359'0
VIT=PER .HECTCR; WHC23600
DO WHILE (VIT-,=NGLL) ; WH023610
Y IC=VIT; 7WH023620
VIT=VIC->F LUCi; WHO23630
JU IP= 1JU p+ 1 WH023640
END; WH023650
NUD=PER. RAM; WHO2.:b60
WEST=PER..LZAL; WH023670
VIT=PER. HECTOR; WHO23680
LARG=VIT->VECTOS. LOEC; WH023690
IF (PEOP. VALU<=2) THEN WH023700
WEST=WEST+1; -- WH023710
ALLOCATE MISS; WH023720
MISS.LIL=PEV.TAR; WH023730
IFfEEOp.VAL GE<=2) THEN W HC23740
MISS. TIL(1)=STORK->FR OP.NA AE WH023750
1O I=2 TO WEST; WHC23760
IF (PROP.V.ALUE<=2) T HEN WH023770
J=1-1; WHC23780
ELSE J=I; WH023790
MUSS.TIL (I)=PER.JI1J) ; 1WH023800
E ND; ;WH023810
N=0; WH023820
DC WHILE (VI T-=1ULL) WHC 238 30
VIC=VIT; WH02384C
N=N1+1; .. HC238 50
MISS. AOMP .(N)=VIC->VECTOR.CCGP; WH023860
VIT=VIC->ELOOR; WHC23270
END; WH023880
JOSA CST CR K-> ES02. NA L') =ALM: WH02-3 890
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Table (7.3.5) Removal of OFF Complementary Components and
Treatment of Replications
K=0;
DC N=1 TO N EG;
IF(ADDNOT N)-,=NULL) THEE EO;
AHIlSH=ArDDECTf( E) ->NlCT.DIR;
DO I=1 TO AMISH;
IIA=ADD NCT f(N) ->NO0T.7TI E ',I) ;
DO J=1 TO BmIsi;
IF (MI SS. LIL (J) =MA) THEN
DO =1 S10 dISS.MiOS;
SUBSTR. lMISS.A CfiP (M,),J1)'B;
K=1;
END;
E IiD;
END;
EN;
JUflP l=UMP;
IF (K=1) THEN DO I=1 T0 MISS.iOS;
IF 5ISS.A03?'I)=REPfAT '0'B,LAP.G-1) THEN JUMP1=JUMP1-1;
END;
IF(JUMP1<JUIP) THEN DO;
JU MP=JU EP 1
ALLOCATE MISS;
VIC=JCSA 1STCRK->POP. NAME)
J UMP1=VIC->MISS. SIN;
JUllP=V iC->1USS.MCS;
M.ISS.LIL=VIC->3ISS. LII;
MISS.TIL= VIC-> MISS.TIl1;
=1 ;
D0 &-=1 10JUMP;
IF VIC->MISS.ACMP'ii) ,=EPEATf'0'E,JUMP1-1) THEN
flISS.AOI P J) =VIC->MISS.AOMP I) ;
J=J+ 1;
END;
EN;
JOSA (STOBK->EBOP. NAM E)=AL1;
FREE VIC->MISS;
P ND;
L
II
WH023900
WHC23910
WH023920
WHo23S30
WHO23940
WiHu23 950
WHO23960
WH023S70
WHO23980
WH023990
WHC24000
WHO24010
WHO24020
WHO24030
WH024040
WHC24050
WH024060
WHC24070
WH024080
WH024C90
WH024100
WH024110
WH024120
WH024130
WHO24 140
WHO24 150
WHC24 160
WH024170
WHC24180
WHO24190
DO;WIJO24200
WHC24; 10
WH024220
WH024 230
WHO24240
WH024250
WH024260
WH024270
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Table (7.3.6) Set of Statements to Combine Modular Minimal Cutsets
JA,)=ALM; WHO24280
0O L= 1 TO E IIH; WHO24290
MA=PER.TAR(I) ; WHC24300
DA=-CEIL (-MA/10000) ; WH024310
JA=-CEII I-MA/1000) ; WH024.320
IF((JA-1C*CA)=9) THEN M ARK= C; WHO24330
END; WH024340
IF(MARK=1) THIN GO 30 SKAP; WH024350
MOSE=1; WH024360
A MISHII .SS.OS; WH24370
BMISH=MISS. SON WH024380
DC J=1 TO AMISH; WHC24390
JEST= 1; WH024400
MISH=); W11024410
YNASH=0; WH024 420
DO I=1 TO BMISH; WH024430
A=MISS.LIL(I); WHC24440
DA=-CEIL (-MA/1000) WH024450
JA=-CEIL I-MA/1000); WHC24460
IF,!JA-10*DA)=9) THEN DC; W8024470
EO II=1 TC RMOD; WHC24480
IF(MA=TRI:(IX)) TREN SAN=TRIN(IX) WH024490
END; WH024500
IF(SUBSTB(MISS.AOMP(J),,1)='1'E) THEN DO; WH024510
HISH=JOSA (SA j)->MISS.SIN; WH024520
IF (J=1) THEN SI NE=MISH+!ASH; WHC24530
AKME=JOSA (SALM)->MISS.MOS W1H024540
JEST=JEST*AK E; WH024Z-50
HASH=1JISH+ASH; WH24560
END; WH024570
ELSE IF(J=n1) THIN CC; WH024580
JEST=MCSE; WH024590
MISH=JOSA (SA) ->IISS. SIN; WH024600
SINE=1ISu1+MASH; WHO24610
MA SH=MIASH -+,1A S,' HC 24620
END; WO024630
IND; WH024640
ELSE IF (J= 1) T H EN DC; WH024650
JEST=LOSE; 'WH024660
SINE=MASH+1; WHO24'670
MASH=MASH1; WH024680
END; WH024690
END; WH024700
IF fJ=1) THEN SINE=M ASH+MISS. MIN; WHC247 10
IF J=1 & JEST=1) THEN MCSE=1 ; WH024720
ELSE MOSE=MOSE+JEST; WH024730
END; WH024740
EH= WHC24750
continued
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Table (7.3.6) continued
ALLCCATE MODCUT;
DO J=1 TO AMISH;
MISH=0;
MASHO;=0
EA C=AH+1 ;
H11H1= ANO;
NH=1ANO;
DO 1=1 TO BMISH;
MA=MISS.LIL (I) ;
DA =-C EIL (-MA/ 1C0 0) ;
JA=-CEIL (-MA/1000) ;
IFUfJA-104DA)=9) THEN DO;
DO IX=1 TO RMOD;
IF1MA=TRIM1IX)) THE SAM=TRIUfIX);
END;
IF{SUBSTR (MISS.AC1P'J) ,I,1)=''B ) THEN DO;
rISI= JOS A (3A M) -> M ISS. SIN;
?MIISH=JCSA (SM)->tISS.MCS;
ALLCCATE FOLL;
ALLOCATE FOLLA;
IF (J=1) THEN DO;
NUB=JOSA (SA)->,IISS.SON;
IC K=1 TC NUB;
HODCU T. LIL(MAS H+ K)= JOSA(SA M)->MlS S. III K);
END;
WEST=JOS A (SAM) ->,lSS. MIN;
DO K=1 TO WEST;
MIODCUT.LIL (3AS[! +N US+K)=JOSA (SA I)->MISS.TIL(1K) ;
END;
END;
DO K=HANO TO MH;
FOLLA=MCDCUT.AC0P (K);
DO N=1 TO MIlSH;
FOLL=JCSASA M)->MISS.ACMPN);
EODCUT.AC IP(NH)=FCilAJjFOL1;
NH*NH+1;
END;
END;
IEEE FOLLA;
FREE FOLL;
EASH=MISH +AASH;
IEF(MIANO,=NH) THE21 M H=NUH- 1
LH=MANO;
£lD;
ELSZ DO;
MfISH=JOSA SAM) ->IISS. SIN;
ALLOCATE FOLL;
ALLCCATE ECLLA;
IF(J=1) THEN DO;
NUB=JOSA ISA M) ->MISS. SC ;
DC K=1 IC NUB;
MCDCIT.Ll MASH+K)=JCSA (SAi)->iiISS.LIL(K)
END;
WEST=JOSA (SAM)->1ISS.MIN;
rC K=1 TO WEST;
continued
WHO24760
WH024270
WH024780
WH024793
WH024800
WH024810
WHO24620
WH024830
WH24E40
WH 024850
WH024860
WHC24870
WH024880
WHC24890
WH024900
W11024910
WHO24920
WH024 S30
WHC24940
W11024 95)
WHC 24960
WH024970
WHC24980
WHO24990
WH025C00
W110250 10
W11025020
WHD 25030
911025U40
WHC25050
WH025060
WHC25070
WH025080
WH025090
WHO25100
WH025110
WHC25120
WH025130
WHC25140
WH025 150
WH025160
WH025170
WH25180
WH025190
WH025200
WHC25210
11HO25220
WHC25230
WH025240
WH025250
WH025260
WH025270
WHO25280
WH025290
WHC25300
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Table (7.3.6) continued
;ODCUT.LILW(HASH+NCB+K)=JOSA (SAHM)->0SSTI I(E)  25310
END; WH025320
END; WHO25330
DC K=A NC TC MH; WH02 53L0
FOLLA=dCCUT.AO1P(K); WH025350
FOLL=REPEAT ''B, MIS- 1) WH025360
?1ODCUT.ACMP(K)=FOLLAl FCLL; WHC25370
END; U H025380
PREE FOLL; WHC25.390
FREE FOLLA; WH025400
MASH=M1ISH+MASH; WHC25410
END; WH025420
END; W11025430
ELSE DO; WH025440
ALLOCATE FOLLA; WH025450
IF J=1) THEN W HC251460
MODCUT.LIL MASIf+1)=MlA WH025470
DO K=MANG TC 11H; WH025480
FOLLA= MCDCUT . AOMP (K); WH025490
MODCUT.ACMP(X) =FCLLA I SUBSTE.MISS. AGM P J) ,I, 1); WH25500
END; WH025510
FEEE FOIIA; WH025520
"A SI=MA SH +1; WH025530
AEND; W H025540
ED D; WH025550
ALLCCATE FOLLA; WH025560
IF(J=1) THEN WH025570
WEST=MISS.MIN; WH025580
DC K=1 10 WESI; WHC25590
MODCUT.LIL 'MASH+K)=MISS.TII K) WH025600
IND; WHC25610
MARD=iMISS.SON+1; WH025620
NARD=MISS.SIN; WHC25630
NARD=NARC-MAPE; WH025640
DO K=MANC TC MiH; W11025650
FCLLA=MOCCUT.AOM1P (K); WHC25660
MODCUT.AOMIP K)=FOILAl ISUBSTR'MISS.AC1PJ),IAED,NARD); WH025670
IND; WHC25680
END: - 025690
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At the end of the TOP-.SET procedure a new PER structure is allocated
to incorporate all changes that are made during the TOP-SET procedure
in the PER structure. The new PER structure will be further used in
the numerical calculations performed in the NUMERO procedure. The
list of computer statements for this purpose is given in Table (7.3.7).
7.3.2 Incorporation of the Monte-Carlo Package NUMERO into the
PL-MODMC Code
The NUMERO external procedure is used to propagate failure parameters
of the components of a fault tree. The NUMERO procedure consists of
a main routine and four internal procedures as follows:
(a) MONTCA procedure
(b) EXPECT procedure
(c) DOT procedure
(d) PLUS procedure
In the main routine of the NUMERO procedure, one of the three
different processes should be performed, depending on the three types
of fault trees. These three types of fault trees are as follows:
(1) A fault tree containing no replicated component or
replicated gate
(2) A fault tree containing only replicated and free
components, but no replicated gate (i.e. only one
improper module exists)
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Table (7.3.7) Allocation of the New PER Structure
'VIT=PR ;
NU B=K;
IF (POP.VALUE>2) THEN GO TO SIBE;
WEST=1ODCUT SIN-K;
ALLOCATE PER;
PER . DEXTER=VI T-)PER .DLIER;
NU8=1;
PER .Kl11=11 UL.;
DO I=1 TO. K ;
PiB. -TAR ('I) =.PODCU T.LL (1)
END;
DO I=K+1 TO MCD CUI. SIN;
PER-.JIM (NUB)= MOECUT.L IL (I);
N1UB=NUB+1;
END;
N=1;
DC WHILE(EABA(J)-=NUL) 
WEST=BASBA (J)->PB. LEA L;
DO 1=1 TO WES2;
DO K=1 TO PER.LEAL;
IF(PZR.JI(K) =BABA (J)->PER.JI.M (I)) THEN
PP.R. KI K) =BABA (J) ->E Z2 . KI1 'I)
END;
ZAP=BABA (J)
J=J+1;
END;
J=1;
WEST=P ER. IEAL;
DO. 1=1 TO WEST;
IF (P EE.KIM (l)= NUll)
THEN DO WHILE (DADA (J)-,0)
IF (PER.JIi (I)=DAUA (J) ) THEN
J=J+1;
END;
ZND;
SIBEH: AT=RA;
EM E=R A;
SKAP: ZAP=PB;
KAP= PT:
PEE .KIM (I)=JAJA (J) ;
WH026730
WHO26740
W8026750
WHO26760
WH026770
W HC26780
WIHO26790
W HO26800
W H026810
WHC 26820
WH026830
WH026840
WH026850
W11026860
WHC26870
WH026880
W11026890
WH026900
W H026910
WH026920
WH026930
WHC26940
.- HO26 950
WHO2696U
WH026970
W1 H02 6 S80
WHC26990
WH027000
WHC27C10
WHO27020
WH027030
WH027040
WH027050
WHO27060
W H027073
WHO27080
WH027090
WH027100
WHO27 110
WHO27120
WH027130
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(3) A fault tree containing free components replicated gates
and/or replicated components.
For the fault trees with no replicated gate or component (type 1)
there are no improper modules and therefore the procedure TOP-SET
has never been called prior to the NUMERO procedure. In this case
the variable BECHE, which will be set to NULL if the TOP-SET procedure
is called, is not equal to NULL and thus no additional process is
required to be performed in the main routine of the NUMERO procedure.
For the fault trees with no replicated gate (type 2), proper
treatments which are made in the TOP-SET procedure for the disconnections
made in the TREE-IN procedure have not been performed in the TOP-SET.
Therefore, the set of statements in Table (7.3.8) is used to account
for these disconnections in NUMERO. This process is very similar to
the one in the TOP-SET procedure and uses the BKEEP array- for the proper
treatment of the replicated events.
For fault trees with replicated gates and/or replicated components
(type 3), two arrays TEMP1 and TEMP2 are used to store the cutsets
represented by the bit strings in the MODCUT structure in terms of
the corresponding number of components in the fault tree. Declarations
for the TEMP1 and TEMP2 arrays are as follows:
DECLARE TEMPl(ALAS) FIXED BINARY CONTROLLED;
DECLARE TEMP2(ALAS) FIXED BINARY CONTROLLED;
Table (7.3.9) shows the set of statements to transfer modular cutsets
from the MODCUT.AOMP(I) bitstrings to the TEMP1 and TEMP2 arrays. The
TEMP2 array will be used in the MONTE-CARLO simulation procedure to
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Table (7.3.8) Proper Treatment of the Disconnections 
Made
in the TREE-IN Procedure
PT=PER. DEX TBE 2 lO28240
SA= AT; WHO28250
IF DME=NULL THZN DO, WH028250
AL.=.AAM; WHO28260
SINE=aISS.SIN -WHC28270
1!OS E=!ISS . OS 
1H02280
ALLOCATE MODCUT; WHC28290
MODCUT.ACmP=MIS.ACE; WH028300
2REEM ISS; WHO28310
DO 1=1 TO PEi. AM; WH028320
HA=PEB.TAR(I) W11028330
DO J=1 TO NIA; WHC283O
IF IBK IEP 12,J) =OA ) UE835 DO0
22R TAR .I)=BEEP 1 J) WHC20360
J=NIA+1; WH028370
END; 
WH028390
ND; 
WH028400
FREE BKEEP; 
WH028410
WU 102 8 4 29.
1.
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Table (7.3.9) Set of Statements to Transfer Cutsets Stored in the
Bitstrings MODCUT.AOMP(I) to the TEMPI and TEMP2 Arrays
NUB=PER. RAM
WEST=P2R.LEAL+1
IF (PROP.VALUi<=2) THEN DC;
ALLOCATE PER;
PER. HECTOR=2AP->P ER .HECTCR;
PER.DEX TEBR=ZA F ->PER. DEXTE R;
PEE. TAR=ZAP->PEE-TAP.;
PER.JIM (1)=PBCP. NAME;
PER .KIM (1) =PT;
DO I=2 TO WEST;
PER .JIM fI) =Z AP->)PE R.JIM(I- 1);
PEE. KIM (I:)=ZAP->P ER. KIM 'I-1) ;
END;
F REE ZAP-> PE1B
IN B;
MIS f=MOECCUT .S:N ;
TEMP1=0;
CCUNI=C;
MAGIC:
RETURN:
I F (iC-NT=0) IHEN GO 0O 1AGIC; .
DO 1=1 TO MCCCUtI.MOS;
IF H0DCUT.ACNP(I),=REFEAT'
CCUN1T=CO UN T+1;
DO J=1 TO liUDCUT.S11;
IF TSUDSIE(MODCUT.AOA(I),J,1)='1'B) 
TEMP I COU [IT) =J;
COUNT'=COUNl+1;
END;
END;
E D;
ALAS=COUNT;
ALLOCATE TEMP2;
TEMP2=0;
DO I=1 TO COUNT;
TLMP2(I) =TEn P1(I)
INU;
FREE CDCUT;
CALL MONICA;
THEN £0;E
HEN DO;
WHC28430
WH028440
W H028450
WH028460
WHC28470
WHO28480
WH028490
WH028500
WH028510
WH028520
WH028530
VHC28540
W11028550
9H028560
WH028570
WH028580
WHC28590
W H128600
WH026610
WHO28620
WH028630
WHC28640
WH02865,.
WHC28660
WH028670
WH028680
W8028690
WH028700
WH028710
WHC 28720
WH028730
W H028740
WHC28750
WH028760
WH028770
WHO28780
WH028790
WHO28800
WH028810
WH028820
-W10 283)
I
4
I
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calculate the top event at each trial. For example, if a fault
tree consists of two sets of modular cutsets as follows:
(1) M1  M2;
(2) M2 M3 M14;
then the TEMP2 array stores the following numbers corresponding to
the modules in the modular cutsets:
TEMP2 = 1 2 0 2 3 4 0
(a) MONTCA Procedure: This procedure consists of statements to
read failure parameters of the components in the -fault tree.
There are two options for the unavailability calculations. The
first option is used when the point unavailability of the top
event only is calculated, whereas the second option represents the
Monte-Carlo simulation. The Monte-Carlo simulation option is the
more general form of the point unavailability calculation option.
In particular, equivalent error factor calculations for the
multiplication of the lognormal distributions has been performed
during the input process. The set of statements to input
failure parameters, and to calculated equivalent mean and error
factors for Class 3 and 4 components are shown in Table (7.3.10).
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Table (7.3.10) Input Data Treatment by the MONTE-CARLO Package
IF(ROM=0) TH EN DO; WH0297 10
RCM=21; WH029720
ALLOCATE CONPNT; WH1C29730
ALLOCATE TORI2; W 1102974s)
CCNPNT (1)=0.5; CONPNT(2)=1; CONPNT (3)=2.5; WHC29750
CONPNT ,4)=5; CCNP1T?,5)=10; CCNPNT(6) =15; W10029760
CONP NT,7)=20; CCNEN1,8)=25; WHC29770
CONPNT(9)=30; WH029780
CCNPNT10)=4C; CCNPNT,11)=50; CONPNT1,12)=60; hH02S290
CCNP1iU'(13)=70; COPN(14)=75; CCNPNT(15)=80; W11029800
CONPNT 16)=85; CC1NPNT 4 17) =9:; CONPNT 18)=95; WHU029810
CCNENT(19)=97.5; CCNP11T (20)=99 CONPNT (21)=99.5; WH029820
END; WH029830
ELSE DO; -WHC29840
ALLOCATE CONPNT; WH029859
AILOCATE TCRI2; WHC29860
DO 1=1 TO ROM; WH029870
GET LIST (I,CCNPNT(I)) WHO29E80
END; W11029890
END; WH029900
GET LIST (IPP) ; WHC29910
PSUA=0; WH029920
PSU 2=0; WHO29930
GET LIST (NAllD, NTER ;) WHO29940
VEN =FU.+ DUU; WH029950
IF(V E N<MISH) THIN V NI MlSf10WHO29960
AlLOCATE MEDIAN; WHfO29570
MIIAN=0; WHC29980
ALLOCAT2 FEN1; WHO29990
ALLCCATE EEN2; HC30000
FEN1=0; WH03130 1)
EE20; WH11C30 C 20
DO K=1 TO NCOMP+NNCT; WH30030
GET LIST (AAA,OPTICN) WHC3004O
IF(AAA="'END') THEN GO IO BEGA; WHO3C050
DO I=1 TC NCCMP; WH030060
IF(AAA-=CO1PNAM (I)) THEN GO '10 MARIOT1; . WH30070
IF#OPTICN=1) THEN DO; W11HO3,8 0
GET LIST (MEEIAN (I) ,FEN2(I)); WH030090
GO TO MINiK1 WH030100
END; WH030110
IF (OPTION=2) THEN DC; WH030120
GET LIST M1ED1, FEN2fI),MED2) WHC30130
MEDIAN 'I)=MED1*mE E2*0.5; WH030 140
GO TC INK1; WHC30150
END; WHO30160
IF(OPTION=3) THEN DC; W11030170
GET LIST(MED1,FAC1,FE2,FAC2); WH030180
hEDIAN 'I)=LED1*11BED2; w HO03 1190
FEN2I)=10**(SQBT((LOG10(FAC1))**2+(LOG10 (FAC2))**2)); WH30200
GO TO MINK1; WH1030210
END; W1HC30220
IF(OPTION=4) TH EN DO; WHO30 230
GET LIST ,1ED1,FAC1, ME D2,FAC2, MED3,FAC3,MED4)W; H030240
EDIAN(I)EE1*ME.E4*.5+4E1 1*ME2+D3/iED4; 0WH030250
Table (7.3.10) continued
FAC2=10** 'StT ,1GG10:FACl)I*+ 0G 10'F AC2) )**2)
FEN2 'I)'=FAC1*FAC2*7AC3)**1/3) ;
GO TO MINK1;
END;
?ARLiCT1: END;
IF BECiiZ=NUll) THEN
DO 1=1 T0 PE.R.RAM;
IF $PER.TAR (I)<1 )r0) THEN GO TO AWL1;
MA=PEE.TARl(I) ;
DA=-CEIL -MA/1C00C)
JA=-CEIL l-3A/lu00)
JAK=JA-10*DA;
NA=MA- 1 000*JA;
IF(JAK-=1 I AAA-=REPNAME(NA)) THEN GC TC AWL1;
NA=I;
IF(OPTION=1) THEN CO;
J=NA+FUN;
GET LIST MEDIAN(J),1EN21J))
GO TO HINK1;
END;
IF(CPTICN=2) THEN EO;
J=NA*FUN;
GET LIST (MEE1,FEN2 (J) ,MEE2)
MEDIAN(J) =MED1*3BD2*0,5;
GO TO HINK1;
END;
IF(CPTION=13) THEN CO;
J=NA+FUN;
GET LIST(MlE!:1,FAC1, tEi2,FAC2);
HED IAN14J)=OED1* MED2;
FEN21J)=1C**(SQaT((LOG10(FAC1))**2+ (LOG10 (FAC2))**2
GO TO MI.K1;
END;
IF(OPTION=4) THEN DO;
J=NA+FU1N;
GET LIST (MED1,F AC1, ME2,FAC2.,IE3,FAC3,IED4);
MEDIAN fJ)= ED1*MED4*0.5+HED1*ED2+I ED3/IED4;
FAC2=10**(SQT(LCG10(FAC1))**2+(LOG10(FAC2))**2));
FEN2 (J)= ,zAC1*FAC2*FAC3)**(1/3)
GO TO MINK1;
END;
AW L1: IND.;
MINK1: END;
IF (BECHE=NULL) THE N
DO I=1 10 PER.RAM;
IF(PEE. TA(I)(10'(J & PER.TAR(I)>0) THE
K=PER.TAP.(I) ;
HEDIAN 9rFUJl4+I)=MEDIAN(K)
FENI2(FUN+I)=FEN2 (K);
FEN2(K)= 0;
)) ;
N CO:;
END;
ELSE DO;
MA=PER.TAIR (I)
DA*-CEIL(-M2A/10000);
JA=-CEIL,-MA/1000)
JAN=JA-10* LA;
NA=?A-lN'('c*JA;
IFIJAK=2) THEN STATE (1,T)=1-STATD (1,DA)
END0:
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W110301260
WlIC30270
WHC30.290
WHO30300
WH030310
WHitO30320
WHO03u330
WHC30340
WH030350
WHC30360
WHj030370
WH0302360
WH030390
WHO30 400
WHC30410
WH030420
WHC30430
WHO30440
WHC30450
WHO30460
wHo3 0470
WHO30480
wHo30490
WHO30-500
WHO30510
WHO30520
WHo30530
W11030540
WHO30550
WHC30560
WH03;570
WHIC30580
WH030590
W11030600
WHO30610
WH030620
WHo30630
WHO30640
wiC 30650
WH03to660
WH030670
WH030680
WH030690
WHO30700
1Ho30 710
WH030720
WH30730
WHC30740
WH11030750
WHC30760
W1130 770
WH030780
WHO30790
.WH030800
WH030810
W11030820
WHO30830
WHC30840
wH030850
WHC30860
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A part of the MONTCA procedure deals with the calculation of the
accuracy of data for the unavailabilities calculated for different
probability intervals. The mathematical concepts of these calculation
have been discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The set of statements
for the MONTCA procedure for these calculations is listed in Table (7.3.11).
The sampling process is one of the most important processes in
the MONTCA procedure. In this process, samples are taken from the
unavailability distributions found for the input components. In this
process the random number generator provides normal random numbers
(variable AA) with a Central Limit Theorem Approximation that is shown
by the variable NTERM. By using the variable AA, as discussed in
Section 4.6 of this thesis, one would be able to find a sample unavailability
from the unavailability distribution of the component. The random
number generator and the sampling process in the MONTCA procedure are
shown in Table (7.3.12).
Immediately after a set of samples is found for the modules and
components in the fault tree, the internal procedure EXPECT is called
in order to calculate the unavailability of the top event. The value of
the unavailability is stored in the variable REY which will be transferred
to the TOP-P(I) array in each trial. Therefore, the TOP-P(I) array
must be allocated such that its dimension is equal to the number of
trials NRAND. The TOP-P(I)array is used to sort the unavailabilities
calculated in each trial. The method of sorting is simple and has been
discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Mean, standard deviation and
the TOP event error factors are also calculated in this part of the MONTCA
procedure. The set of statements shown in Table (7.3.13) is used to store
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Table (7.3.11) Set of Statements for the Measure of Accuracy of
the Monte-Carlo Calculations
BEGA:F(NF.AND=0) TSEN NRANL=2DGO; WH030870
IF (NTER I-)) THEN NTErR 3=12; WH030680
ALLOCATE TORI1; WHO30890
ALLOCATE TO13; WHO30900
ALLCCATE TORI4; WH030910
DO 1=1 TO ROM WHO30920
TORI2 (I)-100-COTNPNT(I); WHC30930
DUd1=CONNT I) *TORI2"I) *2.0; WH030940
EUREY1=NRAND/DUrMY1; W HC3095 0
TORI1(I)=CO1iPNT (1)* ((DUii1Y1) **0.5) ; WH030960
IF (TOR11 (I) >13) T HEN TCSIlIT)=13; W1HO30S70
TOR4(I)= ERF (TORIl(I)); WHC3C980
DO ,r1=NRAND*CCNP TfI)*TOEI2I WHO3059so
TORI3(I)= (EXP(-ORI1 ()**2) (SQR T (EUMMY1*6..283186) )+ (0.2+ WHO31co
0 .25* 'A BS 'C'CNPT ANA''I)- TO El2 'I))) /EU.MMYl+ EXP '-1 .5* SQRT ( D UL Y1 WH031410
)) ) ; 0WH031020
END: WH031030
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Table (7.3.12) The Random Number Generator and 
the Sampling
Procedure in the PL-MODMC Code
DO I=1 TO VEN;
IF IEDIA N 'I) =r) THEN ?E ' 1 I)=-);
ELSE FEN1 (I) =LOG (MEDIAN (I))
IF IFEN2I)-,=0) TBIEN
FEN2 (I)= LOG(FEN2(I))/1.645;
END;
AMGIS=SQRTX'12/VTrE EM)
ALLOCATE TOPP;
IY=IPP/) .499977;
IY11Y;
DO WHIL E fAS ACH< NRANDl) ;D
DO 1=1 TO VEN;
AA=0;
DO IPAND=1 TO NTEEB;
IY 1=C EIL (:Y 1)
1Y=1Y-.1+1
AA=AA +IY;
IY1=IY*65539;
IY=IY1;
END;
XCCMP=AMGIS*'AA-' .5*NTE.M) *FEN2(I)+EN1fI) ;
IF(XCCMP=0) THEN GO TO EACON;
dBDIAN (I)=EXP IXCCMP) ;
BACCN: ENJD;
WH031450
WHO31460
WHC31470
WHO31480
- Wc 801490
WH031500
WH031 510
WHO31520
Mi031 530
WHC.315 40
WH031550
WHC31560
WHO31570
WHO31580
WHC31 590
WH031600
WHC31610
WHO31620
WH031630
WHO31640
WHO31650
.. WH031660
. WH031670
WHC.3 16R0
Table (7.3.13) Set of Statements to Sort the Unavailabilities
REY= 1; 2
1 EX=1;
IF :3EcH3=NUEL) THEN
DO N=1 TO ALAS;
IF -TEMP2 (N),=C) T HEN R EX=REX*tLEEIAN (TE iP2 N))
ELSE DO;
REY=REY* 41-REX)
REX=1;
END;
END;
ELSE DO;
R EY=M EDI AU 1)
GO TC TOPP;
ZND;
REY=1-REY;
TCPP: TOPP(ASACH)=EEY;
PSU =PS U+RE Y;
ESU2=PSUM2+REY**2;
ASACH=ASAC+1;
END;
XhE AN=PSUM/NR AN ;
STDDEV=(PSUM2-PSUM*X1ZAN) /(NRAND- 1)
STDDEV=SCT(STE1);
1!1=NRAND;
MAYA2: N1=M1/2;
K1=NBAND-M1
DO 1= 1 TO K1
J=I;
MAYA1: ,11=J+1;
IF (TOP PJ)-TOP P I))<=O) T EN GO '10 C4AYA;
OBAB= TOrP(J)
TOP2 (J) TOP_ P (I"1) ;
TOP? (I M1)=PRC3AB;
3=J-51;
IF (J>0) TH EN GO TO MA YA1;
MAYA: END;
IF (111>1) THEN GC TO IAYA2;,
INDEX=NR AND*0. 5;
INDEX=CEIIfINDEX)
X MEJD=TOP_ E (INEDEX) ;
INDEX=CEII (NRAND*0.05)
505=TOP P(INDEX);
F1=XIED/P05;
INDEX=CEIL (NRAN *C. 95)
P95=TOPP (INDEX);
F2= P95/ XM ED;
PUT EDIT 1'MEAN PROB=',XEAN,'STANDARD DEVIATION=',STDDEV,
'MEDIAN PROB= ',XNIE) (SKIP (5) ,A(1 0) ,E (18,6) ,X 10) ,A 19) ,
( 418 ,6) ,X (10) ,A (12) ,E 118, 6) );
PUT EDIT ('ERROR FACTOR (5.)',F1,'ERROR FACTOR(95%)=',F2)
(SHIP( 2) , A(17).,F (12,5) , X(10) , A(18),F (12,5) ) ;
PUT EDIT 'CONFIDENCE LEVEL','UNAVAILABilITY', INTVL PROBAEILITY'
'MAX ERROR')
(SKIP (2) , X (1 ) ,A (16) X (1),A(14),XI(7),A(17),X(1)),A(9));
NRAN D=N BAN /1C -00;
DO 1=1 TO ROM ;
INDEX=CEIL (NRANC*CONPNT(I))
PUT EDIT (CONPNT (I) TOP_P (INEEX) TCRI4 I), TOR13 (I))
(SKIP (2) ,X (10) ,F(12,5) ,X (10) ,E(18,6) ,X (4 ),E (18,6) , (3),E (18,6)
END;
NHONT: BETURN;
END MONTCA;
WHO31690
62 WHC31700
WHO31710
WHC31720
WH031 73')
WHC.3 1740
WH031750
WHO3 1~60
WH031770
WHO31 780
WHC31790
WHO31800
WH03 1810
WHO31820
WH031830
WHO31840
WH031650
WHC31860
Wh031870
W HC31880
WHO31890
WH031900
WHO031910
WH031920
WHO31930
W 10319 40
WHO3 1950
WHO31960
WHO3 1970
WH031980
WHO31990
WHO32000
WH032010
WH032020
WH032030
W HC32040
WH032050
WH C32060
WHO32070
WH032080
WHO32C90
WH032100
WHC32110
W H032120
WHO32130
WH032140
WH032150
WH032160
WH032170
WH1032180
WH032190
WH032200
WH032210
WH032220
W 032230
WH032240
WH032250
W111C32260
WH032271
; WH032280
WH032290
WH032300
WHO032310
263
unavailabilities in the TOP-P(I) array and to sort them.
(b) EXPECT Procedure: This procedure uses the PER structure, and
TEMP2 array or MODCUT-AOMP(I) bitstrings for calculating the top event
unavailability. The TEMP2 array is used for the Monte-Carlo simulation
and MODCUT.AOMP(I) bitstrings are used only for point unavailability
calculations.
The PER structure is used to identify the nested and parent
modules, and the BOST(I) array (see Chapter 3 of Reference [1]) is
used to identify free modules. Whenever an AND module is found the
procedure DOT is called to obtain its equivalent unavailability distribution
of the AND modules. For OR modules the procedure PLUS is called for
the same reason. Finally, the EXPECT procedure uses the TEMP2 array or
MODCUT.AOMP(I) bitstrings to obtain the unavailability of the
top event from the values obtained in the DOT and PLUS procedures for
the modules of the fault tree. The set of statemetns for calculating
the top event unavailability is summarized in Table (7.3.14).
(c) PLUS and DOT procedures: The PLUS Procedure finds equivalent
unavailability distributions for the OR modules (see Chapter 4).
Obviously, the unavailability of an OR module is found by calculating
the union of the unavailabilities of input components to that module.
Table (7.3.15) shows the list of statements of the PLUS procedure.
Similar to the PLUS procedure, the DOT procedure is internally called
from the EXPECT Procedure to calculate the equivalent unavailability
distributions for AND modules, by multiplying the unavailabilities of
input components to that ANDmodule. The set of statements shown in
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Table (7.3.14) The EXPECT Procedure
EXPECT: PFOc; WH.032930
IF MCHT-,=)) TEIN . W8032940
MEDIAN= 0; WH032950
DO 1=1 TO ID; WH032960
CAT=BOST fI) W1H032970
PT=CAT; WHO329580
IF(PROPHOST,=tULL) THEN GO TO SHOH; WH032990IF (PROP, VALUE=1) T11 CALL DOT(CAT,ENTA) WH033C0')
IFfPROP.VALUE=2) THEN CALL PLUS(CAT,ENTA); WHO33010
ENTA: EY=PROP.REL(1); WH033020
END; WH03303 0
SHOH: IF (OCNT=0 & EEC1ENULL) THEN GC TC EXCEL; WH033040
IF ISONT-=0 & BECHE-=NULL) 'IHN DC; .WHO33C50
MELIAN (1)=1EY; WH033060
FEN2 (1)=PROP.TIPC; WH033070
GO TO EXCEL; WHO33080
END; WH033090
IF(1MCNT-=0 & "ISH>VEN) THEN DO; WC33100
E N= IS H; WH033110
FREE MEDIAN; WH033120
ALLCCATE MECIAN; W11033130
MED IA N=0 ; WH033140
FREE FEN1; WHGO33150
ALLOCATE FEN1; WH033160
F. N1=0; -HC33170
END; WHO033180
DO I=1 TC PEE.LEAL; WHC33190
CAT=PER. KIM (l) WH033200
PT=CAT; WH033210
IF (PT=NULL) THEN GO TO CUTS; WH033220
IF PRCP.VALUE=1 THEN CALL DOT (CAT, EST A); W8033230
IF (PROP.VALUE=2) THEN CALL PLUS (CAT,ESTA); WHO33240
ESTA: J=PER.IAM+I; WHO33250
PROY (J)=PROP.R 1L (1); WH033260
IF iMONT=0) THEN GO TO CUTS; W H033270
MkDIAN fJ) =PROY (J) ; .. WH033280
FEN1 (J)=PRCP.TIPO; WH033290
_CUTS: END; WHO33300
continued
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- Table (7.3.14) continued
ro i=1 TO PER.RA M;
PFOY 'I) =STAID 1,I1);
IF(MONT=0) THiN GO 10 MONIC;
MEDIAN(I)=EFOY 'I) ;
FEN1 (1)= FEN2 (I +E UN)
MONIC: ENE;
IF(MCNT,=0) V1iN CO;
FREE FEN2;
ALLCCATE FEN2;
FEN2=FEN1;
FEN1=0;
END;
REY= 1;
RE X=1;
IF (1ONT-,=) THEN
DO I=1 TO ALAS;
IF ITEM? 2 1)-=)) THEN NEX=REX*PRO)
ELSE Lc;
REY=R EY * '1-REX)
REX=1;
1ISD;
END ;
ELSE DO I=1 10 MOCUT.MOS;
IF MODCUT.AO 1P (I) -=REPEAT, (0B, MIS11)
DO J=1 TC MOECUT.SIN;
IF(SUESTRa(1ODCUT.AOP i),J,1)=1'D)
REX=BEX*PROY %J)
IN 1;
DEY=REY *1- REX);
REX=1;
END;
ElD;
REY=1-REY;
EXCEL: ETURtN;
INr EXPECT;
END NUMIEO:
Y %TELIP2 (I) );
THEN DO;
THE.N
WH033310
WH033320
W11033330
RH03334
WHC33350
WH033360
WH C33370
W H033383
W11033390
V 11033400
WHC33410
WH033420
W H033430
WHO33440
WH 033450
WHC33460
i H033470
WHC33480
W HO33499
W1H033500
WH033510
WH033520
WH033530
WH033540
WH033550
WH033560
WH033570
WHO33580
W8033590
WH033600
WH033610
WHO33620
WH033630
WHO33640
WH03-3650
WH033660
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Table (7.3.15) The PLUS Procedure
RELIABILITY CALCULATIC N */ WH032320
PLUS: PROC (BAT, EXA) ; C32330
DECLARE BAT POINTER; WHO32340
DECLARE EXA LABEL; WHO32350
PT=E.AT; W11032360
REX=1; W HC32370
P=1; WHO32380
COU NT=0 WH032390
IF (PROP.LItl=1 & PFOP.TII(1)=O) THIN GO TO SLUA; WH032400
DO J=1 TO EROP.LliI; W11o32410
IF (STAT]E(1,PROP.TIL(J))<1) THEN DO; WHC32420
REX=REX* (1-STATE (1, PRCP.TIL (J))W) W H032430
IF(5ONT-=0) THEN DO; W11032440
P=P*FEN2'PROP.TILfJ)) WH032450
COTTOUNT+1; 'W H 032460
END; W11032470
END; W11032480
END; WHO32'490
SLUA: IF (PROP.1I1d=1 & PEOP.PI1,1)=NULL) THEN GO TO SLUB; WH032500
DO J=1 TO P50. 1M; WHO32510
REX=REX* (1-PROP.PIE)->PROP.HEL(1)) ; W11032520
IFfMONT-=0) THEN DO; WHC32530
K=PROP. PIA (J)->PEOP. TIE0; W11032540
P=P*K; WH032550
COUNT=COUNT+1; W HO32560
IND; WHC32570
END; WH032580
SLUB: REX=1-PEX; WHC32590
ZACH: PROP.i-EL(1)= REX; WH032600
IF (1CNT-') & CCUNTX) THEN DO; WHO32610
P=P** (1/cOUNT) ; WH032620
PROP. TIPO=P; W1032630
END; WHIC 32640
ELSE PROP.TIPO=0; WH032650
GO TO EXA; WH032660
END PLUS; WHO32670
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Table (7.3.16) forms the procedure DOT used in the external procedure
NUMERO.
7.4 Organization OF The Procedures used in MODCUT
In Chapter 5 the methodology used in the code MODCUT has been
discussed in detail. In this section the programming of this methodology
is presented. Two procedures exist in the MODCUT code:
(1) CUT-SET Procedure
(2) TOP-SET Procedure
The CUT-SET procedure is used to generate cutsets of proper modules
(i.e. free, nested and parent modules), and the TOP-SET procedure
is used to generate cutsets of the improper modules, that is modules
represented by minimal modular cutsets (see Figures 5.2.1). Each of the
CUT-SET and the TOP-SET procedures is called immediately after a proper
or improper module is generated. The procedure to determine proper
and improper modules of a fault tree in MODCUT is exactly similar to
the procedure contained in PL-MOD and will not be further discussed in
this thesis. However, the reader is referred to reference [1] for
more information with regard to proper and improper modules and the
methodology used for their determination.
7.4.1 CUT-SET Procedure
The CUT-SET procedure is constructed such as to find cutsets of
proper modules. The cutsets for each module will be represented by a
set of bit-string vectors. The modules are either AND or OR; and they
have either a set of modules as input or not. Therefore a proper module
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Table (7.3.16) The DOT Procedure
DOT: PROC (3AT,EXA)
DECL ARE EAT POINTER;
DECLARE EXA LABEL;
PT=BA T;
REX=1;
P=0;
IF (PRO?.LIH=1 & PROP.T11(1)=0) THEN GC TC CCTA;
DO J=1 TC PBOP.LIM;
PEX= REX* STAT E (1, PROP .11. (J))
IF f1CNT-=0 & FEN2 (FROP.TIL'J))>0) THEN
PP+(1OG10 (12 (PRO . TIL (J) )))**2;
END;
DOTA: IF 'P1%OP.MIM=1 & PEO?.PI,1M(1)=NULL) THEN GO TO DOTE;
DO J=1 TO PROP.MIM!;
REX=REX*PROP.PIM'J) ->PEOP.EL (1);
IF 1MOT-=0 & PEOP.PIM J)->PBOP.TIPO>0) THEN
P=P+(LOG10(PSOP.PId(J)->PROP.TIPO))**2;
DOTB:
END;
PROP.REL 01)=REX;
IF'LONT=0) THEN GO TO EXA;
IF P-,=O) THEN
PROP.TIPO= 10**SQRT (P);
ELSE PECP.TIEC=0;
GC TO EXA;
ND)OT :
WH11032680
WH032690
WHO32700
W HO 32710
WO32720
WHO32730
WHO32740
WHO32250
WHO32760
WH032770
WHO32780
WH032790
WHC32800
WHO32810
WHC32820
WH032830
WHC32840
W H032850
WHC32860
WHO3287')
WHC32E8O
WH032890
WH032S00
WH032910
WH032920
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can be one of the following categories:
(1) OR module with no input modules
(2) OR module with one or more input modules
(3) AND module with no input module and
(4) AND module with one or more input modules.
For categories (1) and (3) the generation of simple cutsets is easy
whereas for categories (2) and (4) the determination of the cutsets
is more involved.
Some of the important structuresgarrays, and variables which
are used in the CUT-SET procedure are defined below.
Variable CUTNO is read from the input data and, if it is 1,
this indicates that only the number of cutsets in each module should be
obtained; otherwise, the cutsets should be determined in the form of
bitstrings.
SIZE indicates the maximum size of the cutsets for the module
whose cutsets are generated.
Based structure MCSG stores the PROP structure data [1] and
evaluates bit strings for the cutsets (i.e. bitstrings for the combination
of simple component and proper modules). The PROP structure is allocated
in the modularization process to store the data of proper modules.
The MCSG has the following configuration:
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DECLARE 1 MCSG BASED (AW),
2 LIM FIXED BINARY
2 TIL(LILE REFER(MCSG.LIM))FIXED BINARY,
2 MIM FIXED BINARY,
2 TIM(LIME REFER(MCSG.MIM))FIXED BINARY,
2 JIM FIXED BINARY
2 AOMP(JIME REFER(MCSG.JIM))BIT(LILE REFER(MCSG.LIM)),
2 KIM FIXED BINARY
2 NAME FIXED BINARY
2 PIM FIXED BINARY,
2 BOMP(PIME REFER(MCSG.PIM))BIT(TTME REFER(MCSG.KIM));
MCSG.TIL(I) and MCSG.TIM(I) store simple input components and input
modules, respectively. MSCG.AOMP(l) and MCSG.BOMP(l) stores bitstrings
represent input components and modules. For example, if 3 components
and 2 modules are input to an AND module then MCSG.AOMP(1) =
'l 1 1 1 1 B and the first three bits represent input components, and
the rest represent the input modules.
Based structure CUTSET stores the cutsets and components of a module.
The difference between CUTSET and MCSG structures is that the CUTSET
structure stores only bit-strings representing components, but the MCSG
structure stores bit-strings representing components and modules.
Therefore, for categories (1) and (3) in which no modules are inputted,
CUTSET and MCSG structures store identical information, but for
categories C2) and (4) CUTSET data must be derived from the MCSG data
by replacing input modules to the module which is represented by the
MCSG structure with their simple cutsets. The cutset structure has
the following configuration:
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DECLARE 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
CUTSET BASED(AY),
MOS FIXED BINARY (31,0),
SIN FIXED BINARY,
MIN FIXED BINARY,
JIN FIXED BINARY,
KIN FIXED BINARY,
COMP(SINE REFER(CUTSET.MOS))BIT(SINE REFER(CUTSET.SIN)),
LIL(SINE REFER(CUTSET.MIN))FIXED BINARY,
AOMP(MOSE REFER(CUTSET.JIN))BIT(SINE REFER(CUTSET.KIN));
The LIL array is used to store components and CUTSET.COMP and CUTSET.AOMP
are bit strings to store cutsets of the module. For example, if the
MSCG structure for an AND Module (module Ml) has stored MCSG.AOMP(l)
= 'l 1 1 1 l'B, for input components Cl, C2, C3 and input modules Ml
and M2; and modules Ml and M2 have the following cutsets (i.e. previously
found by calling CUT-SET procedures):
CUTSET.COMP(1) = ' 1 l'B (Module M1 )C5 C6
CUTSET.COMP(1) = '0 l'B
CUTSET.CONP(2) = '1 0'B (Module M2
C8 C3
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Then the following values will be assigned to the CUTSET structure
of the module Ml in two steps:
Step 1) To assign cutsets of module Ml
CUTSET.LIL(1) = Cl
CUTSET.LIL(2) = C2
CUTSET.LIL(3) = C3
CUTSET.LIL(4) = C5
CUTSET.LIL(5) = C6
CUTSET.LIL(6) = C8
CUTSET.LIL(7) = C3
CUTSET.AOMP(1) = '1 1 1 1 1 0 O'B
CUTSET.AOMP(2) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 0'B
CUTSET.COMP(1) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
SModule M2
Components Module M1
Step 2) To assign cutsets of module M2
Same CUTSET.LILs
CUTSET.AOMP(1) = 'l 1 1 1 1 0 O'B
CUTSET.A0MP(2) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 0'B
CUTSET.COMP(1) = '1 1 1 1 1 0 l'B
CUTSET.COMT(2) = 'l 1 1 1 1 1 O'B
It can be seen that CUTSET.AOMP is a set of intermediate bitstrings
to help generate the final set of bitstrings which are stored in the
CUTSET.COMP.
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JOSA(GUM) is an array of pointers to store pointer (AY) related
to the CUTSET structure.
The Operator 1I has been extensively used in developing the
bit strings. The function of this operator is to join two bitstrings
together. For example:
'1 0 l'B 11 '0 0 1 l'B = 'l 0 1 0 0 1 l'B
The set of statements in Table (7.4.1) transfers proper
AND and OR modules to the MCSG structure, and generates the bit strings
for their representation.
For generating cutsets from MCSG structures with one or more input
modules the set of statements in Table (7.4.2) calculates the number
of bitstrings and the length of the CUTSET.LIL array in the CUTSET
structure.
The statements listed in Table (7.4.3) allocate the CUTSET structure
for the AND module, and generate the bit strings from the bitstrings of
the MCSG structure.
The CUTSET structure for OR modules is allocated and obtained
from a somewhat similar approach to the AND module shown in Table (7.4.3).
The procedures for minimizing and sorting the cutsets stored in the form
of bit-strings in the CUTSET structure are discussed in the following
section.
7.4.2 TOP-SET Procedure
The TOP-SET procedure is constructed so that cutsets of improper
modules can be found from their modular minimal cutsets. Each
improper module has a corresponding PER structure which is similar to
the PROP structure for proper module [see Reference 11. In
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Table (7.4.1) List of Statements to Transfer Proper AND and OR Modules
to the MCSG Structure and Generate the Bitstrings for them
IF(PROP.VALUE-=1) THEN GO TC ABO;
01dE2=1;
PImE=1;
IF PROP.TItM(1)=0) THEN
TE=PROP.LIM;
ELSE TTME=9RCP.lII+PRCr.fIM; .
llLE=PROP.LIM;
LIhE=PROP.11IM;
ALLOCATE- fCSG;
DME=AW;
1CSG.NAME=PRO.NAf!E;
KCSG. TL=PROP. TIL;
KCSG.TIM=PBOP.TIM;
IEF(MCSG.TIL(1)-,=0) THEN EC;
AMISH=MCSG.LId;
AMISH=AMISH-1;
fCSG.AOMN(1)=REPEAT(*1'E,AMISH);
END;
2LSE MCSG.ACMP(1)='0'E;
IElCSG.TIM1(1)=0) THEN
MICSG.BOMP (1) =B3EFEAT(*1'1E,.AMISE);
ELSE DO BtISH=ASH+PROP.UI;
MCSG.BCMr(1)=RIPEAT(*1'EBSh);
END:
GO TO BORC;
ARC: IF(PROP.TI (1)=0) THEN DO;
JIME=PCP.IIM;
TThE=JIM1E:
END:
ELSE O;
JIIE=PRCP. LIM;
TTME=JIME+PROP. MIM;
P IME=TTllE;
END;
LILE=PRCP. LIM;
LIdE=PROF. Mt.
CUT00750
CUT00760
CUT00770
. CUT00780
CUT00790
CUT00800
CUT00810
CUTOO820
CUT00830
CUT00840
CUT00850
CUT00860
CUT00870
CUT00880
CUT00890
CUT00900
CUT00910
CUT00920
CUT00930
CUT00940
CUT00950
CUT00960
CUT00970
CUT00980
CUT00990
CUT01000
- CUT01010
CUT01020
CUT01030
CUT01040
CUT01050
CUT01060
CUT01070
CUT01080
CUT01090
CUTOl100
continued
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Table (7.4.1) continued
ALLOCATE MCSG; CUT01110
DME=AW: -CUT01120
?ISH=0;' CUT01130
hCSG.NAME=PRCP .NAE; CUT01140
hCSG.TIL=PROP.ItIL; CUT01150
MCSG.TIN=PRCP.TI; CUT01160
IF (MCSG.TIL( 1)-=0) 7HIN Co; CUT01170
MISH=JIME; CUT01180
ALLOCATE FOLL: CUT01190
DO 1=1 TO MISH; CUT01200
FOLL-SEPEAT('O'B,MISH); CUT01210
SUESTR(FCI1,1,1)=t1'B; CDT01220
CSG.AOMIPLI)=FOLL; CUT01230
END CUT01240
FBEE POLL; CUT01'250
N D: CUT01260
ELSE MCSG.ACMrPj1)=*'CE: CUT01270
I5(MCSG.TIM(1)=0) THEN DC; CUT01280
AMSHJIME;- CUTC1290
MISH=JIME: CUT01300
HCSG.B0MP=ZfCSG.ACEP; CUT01310
END: CUT01320
ELSE E: CUT01330
I-SH=.MCSG.LIM+MCSG.MIM; CUT01340
ALLOCATE FOLL; CUT01350
DC 1=1 TC MISH; CUT01360
FCLL=BEPEAT('0',MISH); CUT01370
SUBSTR (FOLLI, 1) =1 'D; CUT01380
MCSG.BOMP (I)=FOLL CUT01390
END; CUT01400
FEEE FOLL; CUT01410
END: CUT01420
CUT01430
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Table (7.4.2) List of Statements for Calculating the Number and
Dimension fo Bitstrings in the CUTSET Structure
BOBO: IF(MCSG.TIM(1)-=0) THEi DC;- CUT02320
CCUNI=1: CUT02330
SINE=MCSG.IIM; CUT02340
BMISH=MCSG.MIM: CUT02350
DO £=1 TO EMISH; CUT02360
SALI=MCSG.TIft (I) CUTO2370
ZAP=JOSA (SAM); CUT02380
COUNT=COUNT*ZAP->CUTSIT.EC5; CUT02390
END; CUT02400
MOSE=COUNT CUTO2410
DO I=1 TC BISH CUT02420
SAd=MCSG.TI IIj) CUTo2430
- ZAP=JCSA(SAM); CUT02440
SINE=SINE+2AP->CUTSET.SIN; CUT02450
END: CUT02460
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Table (7.4.3) List of Statements to Allocate CUTSET Structure
for an AND Gate and Generate the Bitstrings of the
CUTSET Structure
-IF(CUTNO=1) THEN GO TO FROG1;
ALLCCATZ CUTSET;
DSI=AY:
8ANO=BCSG.II!;
HASH=8A NO;
BAP=AY;
CUTSET.LIL=3CSG.T1L:
DO 1=1 TC BMISH;
SAM=MCSG.T1,1(l);
ZAP=JOSA(SAMt);
AJMISH=ZA?->CUTSEt.S-N;
DO K=1 TO AMISH;
dAVO=MANO+1;
MCSY=ZAP->CUTSET.LII(K);
CUTSET.Ill(MANC)=MCSY;
END;
E ED;
.CUTSET.CCL'P ( 1) =MCSG. ACLIP (1) ;
HH1;
DO 1=1 TO BMISH;
SAd=MCSG.TIM l) ;
ZAP=JOSA(SAM);
NH=O:
f1SH=ZAP->CUTSET.SIN;
ALLOCATE FOLLA;
ALlOCATE FC1L;
-M2ISH=ZAP->CUTSET.dCS;
LO J=1 TO EH;
DO K=1 TC MMISH;
FCLL=ZAP->CUTSET.COMP (K)
IF(CLL=REPEAT('C'B,tlSH)) 7EEN GO TO FATAK;
NH=NH+1;
FO1LA-CUTSET.CCP(J);
.CUTSET.AO8P(NH)=FOLLA JFCIlL;
FATAK: END:
ENE; '
MASH=tASB+MISH;
FREE FCLL;
FREE FCilA;
CUTSET.COMP=CUTSET.ACMP;
EH= SH;
CUT02470
CUTO2480
CUT02490
CUT02500
CUT02510
CUT02520
CUT02530
CUT02540
CUTO2550
CUT02560
CUT02570
CUT02580
CUT02590
CUT02600
CUT02610
CUT02620
CUT02630
CU T02640
CUT02650
CUT02660
CUT02670
CUTC2680
CUT02690
CUT02700
CUTO2710
CUT02720
CUTO2730
CUT02740
CUT02750
CUTO2760
CUT02770
CUT02780
CUT02790
CUT02800
CUT02810
CUT02820
CUTO2830
CUTO2840
CUT02850
CUTO2860
CUT02870
CUT02880
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the PER structure of an improper module input components, nested and
parent modules are stored. Every time that a set of minimal modular
cutsets is obtained for an improper higher order module (i.e. improper
top event, K-out-of-N gates or replicated gates), the procedure TOP-SET
is called.
The structure MCSG has exactly the same composition as in the
CUT-SET procedure. But, in the TOP-SET procedure the MCSG structure
is used to transfer data from the PER structure, and transfers modular
minimal cutsets to the bit-string arrays MCSG.AOMP(I). Therefore, the
MCSG structure should be allocated such that the number of bitstrings
MCSG.AOMP(I) is equal to the number of minimal modular cutsets for the
corresponding module. Array MCSG.TIL(I) stores the list of replicated
modules, ON-OFF complementary components, parent and nested modules
input to the improper module. Array MCSG.TIM(I) stores only parent and
nested modules. The set of statements listed in Table (7.4.4) transfers
the data of the PER structure and modular minimal cutsets to the MCSG
structure.
From the MCSG structure and the cutsets generated for modules input
to the improper module, through the CUT-SET procedure, it would be
possible to calculate the number and length of the CUTSET structure for
the improper module in question.
The statements summarized in Table (7.4.5) are part of the TOP-SET
procedure to find the dimensions of the CUTSET structure.
The process for finding simple cutsets from the MCSG structure
of the improper module and the cutsets of the input module's is as
follows:
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Table (7.4.4) List of Statements to Transfer Data from PER Structure
and Transfer Modular Minimal Cutsets to the MCSG Structure
IF(SY 11=1) THEN LIL E=PER. BA M+PER.LEAL;
ELSE LILE=PER.EAM+PER.LEAL+1;
LISE=LILE;
N=0;
VIT=PER.HECTOR;
DO WHILE(VIT-=NUll);
VIC=VII;:
VIT=VIC->FLCCR;
N=N+1;
E24D:
JIBE=N;
PIME=1;
TIM=0;
ALLOCATE MCSG;
DME=AW:
8CSG. NAME=STQRK->PROP. NAME;
BCSG.TII=PER.TAB;
IF(SYM1=1) THEN GC IC FAT;
MCSG.1IL(I)=LCSG. NAM E;
EAT: K=1;
DO J=1 TO LILE;
HC SG. TIL (J) =PE-cR.J I d(K);
K=K+1;
END;
KCSG.TIM=PER.JIM;
N=1;
VIT=PER.HECTOR;
DO WHILE(VI>=NULL);
VIC=VIT:
VIT=VIC->FLOOGR;
?iCSG.AOIE (N) =VIC->VECTCi.CC P;
N=N+;
CUTO4980
CUT04990
CUT05000
CUT05010
COT05020
CUT05030
CUT05040
CUT05050
CUT05060
CUT05070
CUT05080
CUT05090
CUT05100
CUT05110
CUT05120
CUT05130
CUT05140
CUTC5150
CUT05160
CUT05170
CUT05180
CUT05190
CUT05200
CUT05210
CUT05220
CUT05230
CUT05240
CUT05250
CUT05260
CUT05270
CUT05280
CUT05290
CUT05300
CUT05310
CUT05320
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Table (7.4.5) List of Statements to Calculate Number and Length of
the CUTSET Structure Bit-strings for Improper Modules
COUNT=1;
SINE=0;
A0ISH=MCSG.JIM;
BMISH=PER.RAM;
CMISHf=B MIS H+ 1;
DMISH=MCSG.LM;
1=1;
DO J=1 TC BMISH;
NA=CSG.TIL() :
DA=-CEIL(-MA/10000);
JA=-CEII (-MA/1000)
IX=MA-JA*1000;
IF((JA-10*DA)=9) THEN rC;
SAM=TBIN (IX) ;
ZAP=JOSA (SAM);
SINE=SINk+ZAP->CUTSET .SIN;
IF(SUBSTR (MCSG.CMP(),Jl1)=1'E) THEN
COUNT=COUNT*ZAP->CU2SET.MCS;
END;
ELSE SINE=SINE+1;
END:
DO K=CMISH TC DMISH;.
SAM=MCSG.TIL(K);
ZAP=JCSA ISAM);
IF(SUEST(4CSG.AC1(I),.K,1)='1'E) THEN
COUNT=COUNT*ZAP->CUTSET. MCS;
SIN2=SINE+ZAP->CUTSET..SIE;
END;
CS F.=COUNT ;
DlC 1=2 TO AMISH;
CCUNT=1;
DC J=1 TC BMISH;
HA=L1CSG, T11W) ;
DA=-CEIL(-1A/10000) ;
JA=-CEIL(-MA/1000};
IX=MA-JA*1C0G0;
IF((JA-10*DA)=9) THEN DO;
SAM=TRIN (lX)
ZAP=JOSA(SAM);
IE(SUESTR(MCSG.ACLE(I),J,1)='1'H) THEN
COUNT=COUNT*ZAP->CUTSET. MCS;
ZNE*
DO K=CMISE.TC EMISH;
SAM=MCSG. TIL (K)
ZAP=JOSA(SAM);
IF (SUBSTE (ICSG. ACIP (I) , K, 1)=' 1'B) THEN
COUNT=C0UN1T*2AP->CUTSET.ECS;
END;
MOSE=MOSE+CCUNT;
E ND;
CUT05330
-CUT05340
CUT05350
CUT05360
CUT05370
- CUT05380
CUT05390
CUT05400
CUT05410
CUT05420
CUT05430
CUT05440
CUT05450
CUT05460
CUT05470
CUT0548C
CUT05490
CUT05500
CUT05510
CUT05520
CUT05530
CUT05540
CUTC5550
CUT05560
CUT05570
CUT05580
CUT05590
CUTOS600
CUT05610
CUT05620
CUT05630
CUT05640
CUT05650
CUT05660
CUT05670
CUT05680.
CUT05690
CUT05700
CUT05710
CUT05720
CUT05730
CUT05740
CUT05750
CUT05760
CUT05770
CUT05780
CUT05790
CUT05800
CUT05810
CUT05820
CUTC5830
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(1) All of the components representing the modules
input to the improper module are transferred to the
CUTSET.LIL(I) array.
(2) All bit strings representing the modules input
to the improper module are transferred to the CUTSET.COMP (I)
and CUTSET.AOMP(I) bitstrings.
For example the following modular cutsets are given for an improper
module M . with the following data:
MCSG.NAME = M.
1
MCSG.LIL(1) = 29001 (This represents the input replicated module 29001)
MCSG.LIL(2) = *M. (This represents the proper section of the improper
module)
MCSG.LIL(3) = M. (This represents the nested module input to
improper module M.)
MCSG.AOMP(l) = '0 1 O'B
MCSG.AOMP(2) = '1 0 l'B
Also, suppose the following cutsets are determined through the previous
CUT-SET and TOP-SET procedures for modules 29001, *M iand M ;
(1) for 29001 CUTSET.COMP(l) = '0 l'B
CUTSET.COMP(2) = 'l O'B
(2) for *M. CUTSET.COMP(1) = '0 l'B
(3) for Ml CUTSET.COMP(1) = 'l 1 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '0 1 l'B
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There is a total of 5 bit-strings and 7 components for M., and to
obtain simple cutsets the following calculations must be performed for
the evaluation of the bitstrings for M.:
(1) Put CUTSETS that
CUTSET.A0NI(1) =
CUTSET.A0MP(2) =
CUTSET.AOMP(3) =
CUTSET.AOMP(4) =
CUTSET.A0MP(5) =
represent replicated module 29001
'0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
'0 1 0 0 0 0 O'B
'l 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
'0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
'0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.AOMP(l) represents the first modular minimal cutset for
the M. module, and the rest of the CUTSET.AOMP(I) bitstrings represent
the second modular minimal cutset of the M module. In this step all
of the CUTSET.COMP(I) bitstrings will be set equal to the CUTSET.AOMP(I)
bitstrings given above.
(2) In this step the calculations will be started by using the
CUTSET.COMP(I) bit strings for inputting the module *M.
cutsets. As a result one gets the following bitstrings:
CUTSET.COMP(l) = '0 0 0 1 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(2) = '0 1 0 0 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(3) = '1 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(4) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.COMP(5) = '0 0 0 0 0 0 O'B
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Again, at this point the CUTSET.AOMP(I) bitstring will be set equal
to the CUTSET.COMP(I) bitstrings given above.
(3) Finally, put cutsets representing the nested module
M by starting from CUTSET.AOMP bitstrings:
CUTSET.AOMP(l) = '0 0 0 1 0 0 O'B
CUTSET.AOMP(2) = '0 1 0 0 1 1 O'B
CUTSET.AOMP(3) = '0 1 0 0 0 1 l'B
CUTSET.AOMP(4) = 'l 0 0 0 1 1 O'B
CUTSET.AOMP(5) = 'l 0 0 0 0 1 l'B
All CUTSET.COMP(I) will be set equal to CUTSET.AOMP(I). Statements
shown in Table (7.4.6) are part of the TOP-SET procedure to perform the
aforementioned operations.
To remove the effect of the replication of a component in the
array CUTSET.LIL(I) the statements in Table (7.4.7) are used, based
on the discussion in Chapter 5, to properly treat this effect.
By using the methodology for discriminating the cutsets, the
statements in Table (7.4.8) are used in the TOP-SET procedure to
perform a size discrimination.
All of the cutsets which meet the size criterion have their
corresponding size stored in an array called CUT(I). This array will be
used -in the minimization process to remove nonminimal cutsets based
on the OR method which has been fully discussed in Chapter 5. The
set of statements in Table (7.4.9) is used to perform the minimization
process, sorting and printing of minimal cutsets.
Table (7.4.6) List of Statements to Generate Cutsets of Improper
Modules from the CUTSET Structure
MH1=0;
DO I=1 TC CUTSET.mCS;
CUTSET.CCP(I)=EEPEAT('C'E,SINE);
CUTSET.ACMP=CUTSET.CCHP;
DO 1=1 TO AMISH;
MANO=HH+1;
N H=ANO0
N U= ANO
NASH=0;
CC J=1 TO BMISH;
K A=fCSG.TIL(J)
DA=-CEIL (-LIA/10000)
JA=-CETL (-MA/1000);
IX=MA-JA*1000 ;
IF((JA-10*DA)-=9) THEN GO TO FAT;
IF(SUBSTR(iCSG.AOMP(l),J1)=*1'E) THEN DO;
SAM=TRIN (IX) ;
ZAP=JOSA(SAil)
MISH=ZAP->CUTSET.SIN;
ALLOCATE FOLL;
ALLOCATE FOLIA;
M MISH=ZAP->CUT SET. MCS;
EC K=MANO TC MH;
DC N=1 TC MMISH;
FCLLA=CUTSET.C1P 1K);
FCLL=ZAP->CUTSET.COMP(N)
IF FOLL=REPEAT(O'B,MISB) TEEN GO TC FATAJ;
- CUTSET.AOMP (NH) =FCLLA OICL;
NH=Nj+1:
FATAJ: ENE;
END:
NASfl=MASH+MISH;
.- IF( ANO-=NH) THEN
1H=NH-1:
NH=MANO;
END:
ELSE DO;
SAM=TEIN(IX) -
ZAP=JOSA(SAM);
MISH=ZA->CUTSET.SIN;
ALLOCATE FOLLA;
ALLOCATE ECLL;
DO K=MANO TO MH;
FOLLA=CUTSET.CCM1P(u)
FCLL=BEPEAT('0'E,MISH);
CUTS'ET.ACIMP(K)=FCILAj IFC1L;
END;
HASH=MASHi+MISH;
END;
FREE FOLL;
FREE FCLLA;
DO M=MANO TO MH;
CUTSET.CCME(M)=CUISET.ACF() ;
END;
GO TO THIN;
continued
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CUT06270
CUT06280
CUT06290
CUT06300
C0T06310
CUT06320
CUT06330
CUT06340
C0T06350
CUT06360
CUT06370
CUT06380
CU'T06390
CUT06400
CUt06410
CUT06420
CUT06430
CUT06440
CUT06450
CUT06460
CUTC6470
CUT06480
CUTO&490
CUT06500
CUT06510
CUT06520
-CUT06530
CUT06540
CUT06550
CUTC6 560
CUT06570
CUT06580
CUT06590
CUT06600
CUT06610
CUT06620
CUT06630
CUT06640
CUT06650
CUT06660
CUT06670
CUT06680
CUT06690
CUT06700
CUT06710
CUT06720
CUT06730
CUT06740
CUT06750
CUT06760
CUT06770
CUT06780
CUT06790
CUT06800
CUT06810
CUT06820
Table (7.4.6) continued
FAT: IF(SUESTR(MCSG.ACMP(I)J,1)='1'B) THEN CC;
ALLOCATE FCILA;
DC K=MANO TC MH;
FOLLA=CUTSET.CCMP (K);
CUTSET.AOMP(K)=FOLLA j'l'E;
MASH=MASH+1;
ENE;
ELSE C:,
ALLOCATE FOLLA;
DC K=MANO TC ME;
FCLLA=CUTSET.COMP(K);
CUTSET.AGMFPiK)=FCLLA 'O'B;
END;
HASH=UASH+1;
END; - .
FREE FOl;-
FREE FOLILA;
DC =MANG TC MH;
CUTSET.CCMP(M)=CUTSET.ACMP(M);
END;
THIN: END;
DO J=CSISH TO DMISH.;
SAtf=MCSG.Tl(J)
ZAP=JOSA(SAM) ;
I(SUESTR(MCSG.ACMP(I),,1)='1'E) THEN DC;
dISH=AP->CUTSET.SIN:
AlLOCATE FCLL;
ALLOCATE FOLIA;
. MISH=ZAP->CUTSET.ECS;
DC- K=tANC TC MRH;
DO N=l TC MMISH;
FOtLA=CUT SET.CCiIP (K);
FOLL=ZAP->CU7SE'l.CCIP(1)
IF FOLL=EEPEA'('C'EMISR) TIEN GO TO FATAG;
CUTSET.ACMr (NH)=FCLlAjlF0L;
NH=Nd+1;
FATAG: END;
END;
HASH=ASH+MISH;
If (MANO-=NH) THEN
4H=NH-1;
NH=HANO.;-
END;
ELSE nO;
HISH=ZAP->CUT5ET.SIN;
ALLOCATE FCLL;
ALLOCATE FOLLA;
DO K=MANO TC MH;
FCLLA=CUTSET.CCMP (K)
FCLL=REPEAT ('O'BM4ISH);
CUTSET.ACMP(K)=FCLLA IIFOLL;
END;
MASH=MASH+fMISH;
END;
DC M=HANC TC ME;
CUTSET.COLMP(M)=CU'TSET.ACMP(M)
END;
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CUT06830
CUT06840
CUT06850
CUT06860
CUT06870
CUT06880
CUT06890
CUT06900
CUT06910
CUT06920
CUT06930
CUT06940
CUT06950
CUT06960
CUT06970
CUT06980
CUT06990
CUT07000
CUT07010
CUT07020
CUT07030
CUT07040
CUT07050
CUT07060
CUT07070
CUT07080
CUT07090
CUT07100
CUT07110
CUT0712C
CUT07130
CUT07140
CUT07150
CUT07160
CUT07170
CUT07180
CUT07190
CUT 07200
CUT07210
CUT07220
CUT07230
CUT07240
CUT07250
CUT07260
CU707270
CUT07280
CUT07290
CUTO7300
CUT07310
CUT07320
CUT07330
CUT07340
CUT07350
CUT07360
CUT07370
CUT07380
CUT07390
CUT07400
CUT07 410
CUT07420
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Table (7.4.7) List of Statements to Account for Replication of
a Component in the CUTSET.COMP(I) Bitstring
MISH=CUTSET.SI ;
MANO=CUTSET.MOS;
AMISH=MISH-1
DO 1=1 TC AMISH;
K=I+1;
DC J=K TO MISH;
N=CUTSEI.LIL (I);.
I (CUTSE', LIL(J)=N) THEN EO;
DC =1 IC.NANO;
SUDSTR (CUTS ET.CCMP.() ,I1)=SU ESIR (CU.TSET.C1P (i),-I,1)j
SUBSTR (CUTSEI.COmp(M),J,1)
SUBSTR (CUTSET .CC 3E() ,0, 1)='0'B ;
END;
END:
EUD
CUT07590
CUT07600
CUT07610
CUT07620
CUT07630
CUT07640
CUT07650
CUT07660
CUT07670
-CUT07 680 -
CUT07690
CUT07700
CULuI lIu
CUT07720
CUT07730
CUT'07740
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Table (7.4.8) List of Statements to Perform a Size Discrimination
NCTA=O
ALLOCATE CUT;
ALLOCATE FCIL;
CUT=0;
DO 1=1 TC bANC;
SCORE=O:
IF CUTSET.COCMP(I),=2EPIAT('C'E,MISH) THEN
rO N=1 TO MISH;
IF( SUBSTR CUTSET..CC,(EI),N,1)='1'B ) THEN SCORE=SCORE+1;
END;
IF( SCCRE<=S.ZE ) THEN CUT(I)=SCORiE;
ELSE CUT(I)=0;
ENE: --
CUTO//0U
CUT07760
CUT07770
CUT07780
CUT07790
CUT07800
CUT07810
CUT07820
CUT0783C
CUT07840
CUT07850
CUT07860
CUT07870
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Table (7.4.9) List of Statements to Minimize, Sort and Print the Cutsets
DC 1=1 TC MANO;
IF CUT(I)=0 THEN GO TC FATAH;
DO J=EMISH TC MANC;
IF CUT(J)=0 THEN GO TC FATAN;
FOLL=CUTSET.CC MP (I) ;
FCLL=FOLljCUTSET.CC.P ();
If (FOLL=CUTSET. CCHP (J)) THEN -DO;
CUTSET.CC MP(J)=REEEAT('0'E,MISH) ;
CUT(J)= 0;
END:
ELSE IF(FOL1=CUTSET.CCMP(I)) THEN DO;
CUTSET.CC1P(I)=REPEAT('O'E,EISH) ;
J=UANO;
NCTA=1;
CUT(1)=0;
END;
FATAN: END;
IF NOTA=0 THEN MOSE=MOSE+1;
EISE NOTA=0;
FATAH: gND;
SAEK=0;
IF (SPINE (MCSG.NAME)=NULL) TBEN
DO J=1 TC SIZE ;
DO 1=1 TO MANO;
I(F CUT(I)=J) THEN DC;
MARK=MAEK+ 1;
PUT FILE(Y) -EDIT(MARK) (SKIP(2),F(4),SKIP(1));
DC N=1 TC'MISH;
IF(SUESTR(CUTSET.CCME(I),N,1)='1'B) THEN
IF(CUTSET.LIL (11)(10C0) THEN PUT FILE(Y) EDIT(COPNA1I
(A(12)) ;
ELSE DC;
HA=CUTSET.LIL (N)
DA=-CEIL(-k!A/100CO)
J A=-CEI.3L (-I A/100C 0 )
JAK=JA-1C*DA:
NA=A-1000*JA;
CUT07880
CUT07890
CUT07900
CUT07910
CUT07920
-. CUTC07930
CUT07940
CUT07950
CUT07960
.- CUT07970
CUT07980
CUT07990
CUT08000
CUT08010
CUT08020
CUT08030
CUT08040
CUT08050
CUT08060
CUT08070
CUT08080
CUT08090
CUT08100
CUT08 110
CUT08120
CUT08130
CUT08140
CUT08150
CUTOB160
CUT08170
(CUTSET.1IL(N)))CUTO8180
CUTO8190
CUT08200
CUT08210
CUT08220
CUT08230
CUT08240
CUT08250
IF(JAK=1) THEN PUT FILE(Y) EDIT(REPNAME(NA)) (A(12));
ELSE PUT FILE(Y) EDfIT(.'jBEPNAME(NA)) (A(12));
END;
END;
END:
END:
END;
CUT08260
CUT08270
CUT08280
CUT08290
CUT08300
CUTO8 310
CUT08320
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If the TOP event has not been reached yet, a special procedure
will be used to allocate a new CUTSET structure, so as to store only
bit strings that remaine through the discrimination and minimization
processes and, thereby, release space which is occupied by the "non-
essential" bit strings. The set of statements shown in Table (7.4.10)
is performing this task.
Finally, it should be noticed that the treatment of replications,
the discrimination, the minimization and the sorting of the cutsets
are exactly similar for the CUT-SET and TOP-SET procedures.
7.5 Organization of the MOCUS-BACFIRE Package
The MOCUS-BACFIRE Package is obtained by coupling the codes MOCUS[4]
and BACFIRE [5]. The code MOCUS is a computer program to generate
cutsets of a fault tree (see also Appendix A of this thesis). This code is
written in FORTRANIV for the IBM 360/370 computer series. BACFIRE is a
computer program to search among the basic events of a minimal cutset
for potential causes of failure. A minimal cutset with a common
potential cause of failure is called a common cause candidate (see Chapter
6 of this thesis). BACFIRE is written in FORTRAN IV for the IBM 360/370
computers. BACFIRE reads as input the cutsets provided by a cutset
generator code. Therefore, it would be much easier, due to the
numerous cutsets in a fault tree, to couple a cutset generator code with
BACFIRE. The package resulting from this coupling would be very simple
to use, because only the fault tree and common cause succeptibility data
would have to be inputted to that package.
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Table (7.4.10) List of Statements to Allocate a New CUTSET Structure
to Store only Essential Cutsets
MAO=1;
IF (1OSE<CUTSET.MOS & .GATEN AM (MCSG. NAIMS----TOP') THEN
DO;
SINE=CUTSE7. SIN;
ALLOCATE CUTSET;
DSI=AY ;
JOSA (ICSG.NAME)=AY
CUTSET.LIl=KAE->CUITSET.LIl;
AM1ISH=KAP->CUTSET.CS;
DO 1=1 TC AMISH;
IF(CUT(I),=0) THEN'"' E;C:
CUTSET.CCMP(MANC)=KAP->CUTSET.CCMiP(I)
MANG=BANC+1;
ENE;
END;
FREE KAP->CUTSET;
END;
CUT08330
CUTD08340.
CUT08350
CUT08360
CUT08370
CUT08380
CUT08390
CUT08400
CUT08410
CUT08420
CUT08430
CUT08440
CUT08450
CUT08460
CUT08470
CUT08480
CU.TaO&490
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By carefully reviewing the present cutset generation codes, the
code MOCUS has been selected for coupling with BACFIRE. Also, enough
information, experience and literature is available for the MOCUS code,
so that the user can easily familiarize himself with the background
information.
The process of coupling the two codes is very simple and straight-
forward. The input section in which BACFIRE reads the cutsets and the
output from which MOCUS writes cutsets have been changed such as to
make it possible for BACFIRE to read the cutsets directly from the
NAM(I), and ICS(I,J) arrays in MOCUS after they have been generated.
In BACFIRE, array CSM(I) reads the cutsets. Each time that a set
of cutsets is transferred to CSM(I), the BACFIRE Code is called to
search for common cause cnadidates in that cutset. Hence, in the
PRINTR subroutine of the MOCUS code which prints the minimal cutsets,
the following statements transfer cutsets to the CSM(I) array and
call the BACFIRE code for the identification of common cause failures.
Most of the variables that are used in both MOCUS and BACFIRE
codes are set in the COMMON blocks for all subroutines for which these
variables are essential. The main routine in the MOCUS Code in which the
fault tree data are read has been slightly changed, so that in addition
to fault tree data, susceptibility data can also be read by calling only
that portion of the BACFIRE code that reads the susceptibility data. The
changes in the main routine of the MOCUS Code is shown below.
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In the MOCUS-BACFIRE package, the BACFIRE code has been considered
as a subroutine of the MOCUS code that is called whenever a minimal
cutset is assigned to the CSM(I) array. The statements in the two
subroutines of the MOCUS code which have been changed (i.e. Main and
PRINTR subroutines) are listed in Table (7.5.1). Table (7.5.2)
summarizes the parameters in the common blocks and parts of the
BACFIRE Code that have been changed.
7.6 Organization of the MODCUT-BACFIRE Package
The MODCUT-BACFIRE package is an alternative to the MOCUS-BACFIRE
Package. As has been discussed in Section 7.4 and Chapter 5 of this
thesis, the MODCUT code is a computer program to generate cutsets of a
fault tree using the modularization technique. In particular, MODCUT
is capable of handling a variety of fault tree types. MODCUT is written
in PL/I language, and although direct coupling of MODCUT and BACFIRE
is possible with the inter-language facilities of the PL/I language,
it has been decided to generate the package by creating intermediate
auxiliary files to store minimal cutsets generated by the MODCUT code.
The reason is that the direct coupling results in some handling
difficulties, and furthermore the package would be highly dependent
upon the type of PL/I compiler available. However, by using the
conversational Monitor System (CMS) of the IBM 370/168 computers
and by defining an intermediate file, the coupling of MODCUT-BACFIRE
has been easily performed.
A file named Y is defined for the MODCUT code to store all minimal
cutsets generated from the fault tree. The statements in Table(7.5.3)constitute
the changes in the CUTSET, and TOP-SET procedures which print the cutsets in-the
MODCUT Code.
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ARRAY W IN LABELED COMMON /WCRK/. THE STARTING LOCATIONS
OF THE VARIOUS. ARRAYS ARE COMPUTED BY THE ROUTINE ALOCT1.
TO MODIFY THE WORK SPACZ AVAILABLE TO MOCUS, IT IS NECESSA
CNLY TO CHANGE THE DIMENSICS OF W. THE VALUE ASSIGNED TO
BY THE DATA STATEMENT MUST CORRESPOND TO THE DIMENSIONS OF
RY
w1
W
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
NOC00010
CC00020
fOC00 30
3OC00040
.:0C00050
HOC00060
'0CO0070
44OC00080
RIOC0090
OCOO100
MOC00110
MOC00120
MOC00130
H0COO 140
HOC00150
HOCO 160
MOC00170
HOCOO180
f0COC 190
MOC00200
M0C00210
MOC00220
HOC00230
OC00240
HOC00250
HOC00260
MOC00270
M0C00280
MoC00290
MOC00300
l0C00310
%0C00320
M0C00330
OC00340
OC00350
HC00360
M0C00370
MOC00380
M0C00390
HOC00400
M0C00410
?OC0042C
110CO0430
M0C00440
M0 COO 450
MOC00460
MOC00470
,aOC00480
HOC00 490
ROC00500
HOC00510
HOC00520
HOC00530
HO COO 540
MOC00550
COMMON/WOEK/ W(200C0)
REAL*8 W
DATA M/20000/
INTEGER ERROR
COMMON/ERBOSS/ NAME,CARD,EERCR
COMMON/TWO/iNAST, MAST
DIMENSION IW(50)
EQUIVALENCE (IW (1) , W (1))
EQUIVALENCE (ITMAX,IW (3)), (NROWIW (4)), (NCOL,IW (5))
DIMENSION MAXIMP (30, 2) ,SUM1IMP (30,2) , AVGIMP (30,2) , INIMP (30,2)
DIME NSION C (10 1) ,'IFG (101) ,L O(10 1, 10) ,GCS (10 1, 4, 5)
DIMENSION LOC(1001),MAP(1001,10),IMP(10C,4,5),MIMP(4,10,5)
DIHENSION A SSUS (101) ,CTG (101) ,MP (101) ,SUS (10 1,3)
DIMENSION CGCS (30,3) ,CSC (5,3)
DISENSICN MANU(37,3) ,AMAN (37)
DIMENSION DA (10, 10) ,D (10) ,CAT (4, 10,5) ,D1 (10)
COUION /LT/ NCUT,NCOM%,NIN,NLINE,D,LO,LOC,C,CAT,GCS
COMION /LY/ MILP,IMP,A2,IMPCO,ASSUS,CTG, N IAP,MP
COMMON/LP/ YES,QdAP,SUS
COHMON/LK/LAIMP,SIMi2,NUM, IFG,A NAN
COMMON/LO/ MANU,DD1,DD2
COMCN/IMPO/ MAXI P, SUMIP1,AVGIMP ,MINI MP
COMMON /CUE/ CGCSCSC,CNFG
HAXWRK=2*M-
DO 10 J=1,1
W(J)=0.D0
10 CONTINU.
NS1=1
NAST=0
HAST=O
NS2=0
CALL BACZR (NS1,NS2)
NS2=0
CALL GETNG(W,NGNI)
IW (6) =IAXWK
CALL ALOCT1(WNG,NI)
N=IW(7)
CALL PREP (NG,W(IW (1+6)),W(IW (N+1)),W(Ig (N+2)),W(IW (N)),W (IW (11))
. & ~W (I W (N+7) ) ,W (IRW (N+8) ) ,W (I W (14+9)) ). .
IF(ERROR.EQ.1) GO TO 200
30 CONTINUE
IW (10)=1
IF (IW(9) .LQ. 1) CALL ANDCR (W (IW (N+3)))
- CALL SCAN (NIG,W (IW (N+3) ) ,W (IW (N+4) ) ,W (1W (N+ 5)) ,W (1W (N+6)
C
C
C
C
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Table (7.5.1) continued
CALL ALCCT2(W,NG)
lTmiAX=MIN0 (ITMAX, NCCL)
IF (IW(9) .EQ. 1) II1AX=NCC I
IF (ITHAX .LE. 0) ITMAX=NCOL
IW (19) =0
IF (ITMAX .LT. NCOL) IW (19) =1
NAVAIL=( (NCCL + 1) *NRGW)/IW (12)
L=IW (N+6)
DO 20 J=L,
20 W(J)=O.DO
&
CALL MOCUS (W (IW (N)) , W (1W (N+1) ) ,W (IW (N+2) ) ,W (IW
W(IW (N+5)),W(IW (N+6)),W(IW(N+7)))
LFTOVR=NAVAIL - ((NCOL + 1)*IW (10))/IW(12)
NUSED=M - LFTOVY
PRINT 100, M,NUSED,LFTOV R
100 FORMAT(*1THE W ARRAY IS DIENSIONED FCR ',
& // 16,' WORDS WERE USED AND THESE WERE ',
WRITE(6,110) IW(10),NCCL
110 FORMAT ('-3OCUS USED ',15,' RCWS AND ',15,
& f COLUMNS IN THE ICS MATRIX.')
IF (IW(20)
I? (I(20)
120 FORAT('-'
130 FORMAT('-'
. EQ. 0) WRITE (6,12 0)
.EQ. 1) WRITE(6,130)
/ '-EXTE2NAL SCEATCH
/ '-EXTERNAL SCRATCH
(N+
I5,' RE
IS,' EX
STORAGE WAS NOT R
STORiAGE WAS REQUI
IF (IW (9) . NE. 2) GO TO 200
IW(9)=1
IW(20)=0
GO TO 30
C
200 CONTINUE
WRITE(6,220)
220 FORMAT('-' /1/ '-',35X,'- - - - CONCLUSION OF MOC
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE PRINTR(KOUNT, MAX, NAI,IT,1CS)
C
C ROUTINE TO PRINT MINIMAL CUT SETS. ALL CUT SETS
C 'KOUNT' COMPONENTS WILL BE PRINTED.
C.
CCMMCN /BEANCH/ IK,NTST,NGTX (20),IFLG(20)
COHMON /VRSN/ VERSU(6)
CCMIMCN /WORK/ IW(50)
EQUIVALENCE (NG,I1W (1)) , (NI,IW (2)), (ITMAX,IW (3) )
INTEGSR*2 IT(NEOW),ICS(NROW,11),LT(12)
INTEGER CUT/' CUT'/, PAT H/'PA IH'/
LOGICAL CSW/F/, PSW/F/
LOGICAL FIRST/T/
REAL*8 NAM(1)
DATA MAXLIN/55/
continued
C
MC00560
MOC00570
CC00580
HOC00590
MOC00600
1OC00610
HOC00620
NOC00630
OCC0640
MOC00650
MOC00660
KOC00670
3)) ,W (I W (N+4)), MOC00680
MOC00690
MOC00700
%1OC00710
dOC00720
M0C00730
AL*8 WORDS.', ICC00740
CESS.') MOC00750
M0C00760
MOC00770
N0C00780
MOC00790
. 0C00800
MOC00810
EQUIRED.') MCCO0820
RED.') S0C00830
OC00840
AOC00850
MOC00860
4OCQ0870
HOC00880
0C00890
ZOC00900
M0C00910
US OUTPUT - - - S0C00920
MOC00930
MOC00940
HOC00950
HOC00960
MOC00970
WITH 'K' TO MOC00980
MOC00990
noC01000
NOC01010
dOC01020
MOC01030
(NROW,IW (4)) 10 C0 1040
M0C01050
MOC01060
KOC01070
10C01080
IOC01090
SOC01100
C
C
C
C
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Table (7.5.1) continued
L;1:.ENSION CSM (10)30C01 110
COiMC1N /BK/ CsM OC01120
DIMZNSION 1AXI3?P(30,2),SUMIMP(30,2),AVGIP,(30,2),MINIMP(30,2) OC01130
DlhEN ISION1 C (10Ov1) , tr FG ( 1G1) , LC (10 1, 10.) ,GCS (1 01, 4 , 5) d0C01 140
DIMENSION LOC (100 1), MAYP (1001 ,10) ,IMP (1C0 04 .5) ,MIMP (4, 10,5) K0C0 1150
D)IENSIGN ASSUS (10 1) , CTG (101) ,P (101) ,SUS (101, 3) HOC01 160
DIIENSION CGCS (30,3) ,CSC(5,3) MOC01 170
DINENSION MANU (37 ,3) ,A1AN (37) HOC01180
DI .ENSION D A (10, 10) , D (10) , CAT (4,10,5) ,D1 (10 ) 5C0 119 0
COMMON /LT/ NCUT,ICO MP,NIN, NLI E, D, LO, LCC, C,CAT, GCS OCC120C
COMMON /LY/ flIMP,IMP, A2,IMiPCC,ASSUS,CTG,NMA?,3P M0C01210
COMMON/LP/ YES,QMAP,SUS MOC01220
COMMCN/LK/MAIMP, SIMP,NUM, MFG,AMAN . 1OC01230
COMMON/LO/ ANU,DC1,DD2 HOC01240
COMMON /IMPO/ MAXILIP,SUM1IMP,AVGI2P,MINIMtP ?MCCO1250
COMMON /ONE/ CGCS,CSC,C.IFG K0C01260
CONMCN/TWO/NAST,MAST . 0C01270
COMHCN MAP,NCSM,DA H1OC0 1.280
REAL*8 CSM, LDA (NI),TA U (NI) 0C01290
C IW (9)=0 FOR CUT SETS 11OCO1300
C IW (9)=1 FOR PATH SETS MOC01310
IF (IW(9) .EQ. 1) GO TO 10 60C01320
IF (CSW) GO TO 20 OCC1330
CSW=.TRUs. M0C01340
KIND=CUT HOC01350
GO TO 15 N0C01360
C . 40C01370
10 IF (PSW) GO TO 20 0C01330
PSA=.TRUE. OC01390
KIND=PATH MOC01400
C MOC01410
15 NT=0 f20C01420
KK=1 OC01430
LINES=7 M0C01440
C MOC01450
C FOR PATH SETS, DELETE PRINTOUT FOR THOSE WHICH ARE EMPTY MOC01460
C (CONTEOLED BY PRSW) MOC01470
C NOC01480
20 CONTINUE OC0149C
DO 50 N=KK,KCUNT OC01500
IF (IW(9) .NE. 1) GO TO 25 MOC01510
DO 22 I=1,MIAX MOC01520
IF (IT(I) .EQ. N) GO TO 25 HOC01530
22 CONTINUE KOC01540
GO TO 50 HOC01550
C IJOC01560
25 CONTINUE MOC01570
IF (Id (17) .NE. 1) GO TO 26 KOC01580
IF (LINES .GT. tiAXLIN-10) LINES=MAXLIN - 3 0c01590
LINES=MOD (LINES+3, MAXLIN) 0C01600
IF (LINTES .EQ. 0) WRITE(6,180) VERSN OC01,610
WRlTE(b,110) KIND,N tOCO16 2C
26 L=0 v0C01630
De 40 I=1,MAX M0C01640
IF (IT(I) .NE. 11) GO TO 40 LOC01650
continued
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Table (7.5.1) continued
L=L + 1 0C01660
IF (IW(17) .NL. 1) GO TO 28 60C01670
LINES=3OD(LINES+1 , MAXLIN) 3OC01680
IF (LINES .Et. 0) WRIT'Z(6,190) VEPSN,KIc,N ' 30CO1690
MRITE(6, 120) L, (NAH(ICS (I,J)),J=1,N) 0C01700
DO 27 J=1,N MOC01710
CSIM(J) =NAM (IC S(I,J)) 10C01720
27 CONTINUE 60C01730
NCSM=N MOC01740
IF(N .LT. 2) GO TO 28 MOC01750
MAST=2 0C01760
NAST=0 0C01770
CALL BACFR(2,0) 0C01780
-IF(N .GT. 10) WRITE(6,270) MOC01790
28 IF (IW (18) .NE. 1) GO TO 40 MOC01800
IF (IFLG(IK) .11. 0) GO TO 40 KOC01810
DO 30 J=1,N M0C01820
30 LT(J)=ICS(I,J) - NG OC01830
WRITE (1U,140) N, (LT (J),J=1,1) MOC01840
- WRITE( 7,140) N, (LT (J) ,J= 1, N) S0001850
40 CONTINUE M0C01860
NT=NT + L -80C01870
IF (L .!E. 0) GO TO 50 HOC01880
-W RITEB(6, 130) IOC01890
LINES=LINES + 5 M0C01900
50 CONTINUE MOCO191C
KK=KOUNT + 1 KOC01920
IF (KOUNT .LT. IT: AX) ETURS 0C01930
IF (1 W(18) .E.1 .ANii. IFLG(I,).EQ.0) END FILE 10 30C01940
WRITE(6, 150) KIND, NT I0C01950
IF (IW (19) .EQ. 0) WRITE(6, 160) KIND .OC01960
IF (IW(19) .NE. 0) WhITE(6,170) KIND,ITM AX,IW(5) 0OC01970
NSEP=1 OC01980
MAST=2 i0C01990
NAST=1 ?10C02 000
CALL BACFR (2,NSER) d0C02010
RETURN .MOC02020
C M0C02030
110 FOhM AT('-',A 4,' SETS WITH ',13,' COMPONENTS' / ) MOC02040
120 FORMAT( 5X,17,1)',4X,10(A8,1X) / (17X,10(A8,1X))) 50C02050
130 FORMTAT(6X,'NONE EXIST.') HOC02060
140 FORMAT(8I10) OC02070
150 FOR MAT('-' // '-TOTAL NUMBER OF ',A4,' SETS FOUND WAS',16) HOC02080
16C FORMAT('-ALL ',AL4,' SETS HAVE D'EEN DETEEFIINED.') HMOC02090
170 FOPMAT('-ONLY ',A4,' SETS WITH ,I3,' CR LESS COmPONENTS HAVE BEEM0C02100
&N DETERMINED.' / 'OSETS WITH UP TO ',13,' COMPONENTS MAY EXIST.') NOC02110
180 FORMAT(*1',105X,6A4) 30C02120
190 FORMAT(1',1CSX,6A4 / ' ',A4,' SETS WIT 1 ',I3,' COMPONENTS' / 1 5OC02130
C M0C02140
C * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 30C02150
C K0C02160
C THIS ENTRY FOR OUTPUTTING COMPCNUIT KEYS MOC02170
C M0C02180
ENTRY PRTN(NAI) 30C02190
C .O0C02200
continued
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Table (7.5.1) continued
FIRST=FIRST .AND. IW(18).EQ.1
IF (.UOT. FIRST) RETURN
FIRST=.FALSE.
K=50*NM
DO 250 J=1,NI,K
3)IGO(K,NI-J+1)1
N=(M + NM - 1)/Nl
M i=J + N - 1
DO 240 L=J,mm
IF (MOD(L,10) .NE.
IF (MOD(L,50) .NE.
WRITE(6,260)
GO TO 220
210 WRITE(6,270)
220 K-L + (NM-1)*N
225 IF (M .LE. NI) GO
N=M - N
1) GO TO 210
1) GO TO 220
TO 230
GO TO 225
230 WRITE(6,280) (I,NAM(I),1=L, M,N)
240 CONTINUE
250 CONTINUE
260 FORMAT('1IDENTIFICATION KEY FOR CMPONENT DATA WRITTEN TO UNIT
&' / )
270 FORIIAI(1X)
280 FORLHAT(2X,8(15,1X,A8,2X))
RETURN
THIS ENTRY WRITES PRELUDE TC MICS ON UNITS 10 AND 7
ENTRY PRELUC(LKDA,TAU)
KK= 1
NT=0
1F (IW(18) .EQ. 0) RETURN
IF (IFLG (hIK) .NE. 0) RETURN
WRITE (10, 140)
WRITE(1 3, 350)
WRITE (10,350)
WRITE( 7,140)
WRITE( 7,350)
WRITE( 7,350)
RETURN
(LMDA (I),I1=1,NI)
(TAU (I),I=1,NI)
NI
(LHDA (I),I=1,NI)
(TAU(I),1=1,NI)
350 FORMAT(1P8C10.3)
C
C
50C02210
I10C02220
10C02230
MOC02240
O0C02250
?IOC02260
10C02270
.30C02280
HOC0229C
MOC02300
i0C02310
MOC02320
B0C02330
M0C0234C-
MOC02350
OCO 2360
IS0C02370
ISOC02380
0CC2390
M0C02400
80C02410
M0C02420
MOC02430
MOC02440
MOC02450
MOC02460
MOC02470
10d0C02480
MOC02490
M0C02500
MOC02510
MOC02520
S0C02530
MOC02540
MOC02550
dOC02560
rOC002570
MOC02580
MOC02590
M0C02600
80C02610
M0C0262C
M0C02630
tiOC02640
?!0C02650
0 CO2660
MOC02670
M0C02680
O0C02690
OC02700
MOC02710
MOC02720
M0C02730
tlOC02740
HlOC02750
C
C
C.
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
Table (7.5.2) Variables That Have Been Put on the Common Blocks
in the BACFIRE Code
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
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SUBEOUTINE EACFP(iARD,NARD)
BACFIRE
BACFIRE
EACFIEE
THIS PROGRAM WAS WRITTEN IN DECEMBER, 1975, BY
T.J. ROZEK AND C.L. CATE FOR THE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
THIS PROGRAM TAKES GENERIC AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR
SECONDARY CAUSES OF FAILURE AND LOCATES POSSIBLE CRUCIAL
COMMON CAUSES FOR SUPPLIED CUI SETS AND wAP LOCATIONS.
IMPLICIT INTEGER*2 (A-Z)
REAL*8 C,SUS,CSM,MANU,CHEND,A2,CGCS,CSC,CFG,NONE,CHBL8
INTEGER NUM
INTEGER MAST,NAST
INTEGER DD1,DD2
INTEGER*4 LOC,MAP,LO,NIN,BUG,QMAP
INTEGER44 SAME
1OGICAL YES,PRNT1
DIMENSION MAXIMP(30,2),SUMIMP(30,2),AVGIMP(30,2),MINIMP(30,2)
DIMENSION C(101),MFG(101),LO(101,10),GCS(101,U,5)
DIMENSION LOC(1001),MAP(1001,10),IMP(100,4,5),M1.1 (4,10,5)
DIMENSION ASSUS(101),CTG(101),.iP(101),SUS(101,3)
DIMENSION CGCS (30,3) ,CSC (5,3)
DIMENSION MANU (37,3) ,AMAN (37)
DIMENSION CSM (10),DA(10,10),D(10),CAT(4,10,5),D1(10)
COMMON /LT/ NCUT,NCOMP,NIN,NLINE,D,LO,LOC,C,CAT,GCS
COMMON /LY/ MIMP,IMP,A2,IMPCC,ASSUS,CTG,N.1AP,MP
COMMON/LP/ YES,QMAP,SUS
COMMON/LK/MAIMP, SIMP,N UMMFG,AMA N
COMMON/LO/ MANU,DD1,DD2
DATA CHBL/' f/,CHBL8/ ' '/,PRNT2/'P'/,N/1/
DATA CHEND/'END CHAS//
COMMCN/BK/ CSM
DATA SAME/SANE/
COMMON / IMPO/ MAXIMP,SUMIMP,AVGIMP,MINIMP
COMMON /ONE/ CGCS,CSC,CMFG
COMMON MAP,NCSM,DA
COMMON/TWO/NAST,MAST
DATA BLOCK LIMITS. CAN BE REDUCED OR ENLARGED WITH
APPROPRIATE ARRAY DIMINSIONS ALSO REQUIRING CHANGE.
MAST=MAST+1
IF(MARD .GT. 1) GO TC 209
IF(MAST .GT. 1) GO TO 209
NCUT= 0
MNCOMP=100
4rCMMP=100
MOC02780
MOC02790
SOC02800
M0C02810
MOC02820
M0C02830
30C02840
MOC02850
110C02860
MOC02870
?10C02880
A0C02890
S0C02900
HOC02910
M0C02920
MOC02930
MOC02940
MOC02950
MOC02960
MOC02970
MOC02980
0CC2990
MOC03000
MOC03010
MOC030 20
M003030
MOC03040
-OC03050
110C03060
MOC03070
%10C03080
M0C03090
M0C03100
HOC03110
UOC03120
M0C03130
HOC03140
MOC03150
M0C03160
- OC03170
HOC03180
MOC03190
M0C03200
I0C03210
MOC03220
MOC03230
0 C03240
MOC03250
MOC03260
M0C03270
MOC03280
MOC03290
M0C03300
C
C
C
C
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Figure 7.5.3
List of Statements Changed in the CUT-SET and
TOP-SET Procedures of the MODCUT Code
PUT FILE(Y) EDIT(J)CF(4>);
DO N=1 TO MISH;
IF(SUBSTR(CUTSET.COMP(I),N,1)='1'B) THEN
IF(CUTSET.LILCN><19989> THEN PUT FILECY) EDIT(COMPNAM(CUTSET.LIL(H>>>
ELSE DO;
MA=CUTSET.LILCH);
DA=-CEIL(-MA/'1999);
JA--CEILC-MA/1999>;
JAK=JA-19*DA;
NA=MA-1999%JA;
IF(JAK-1) THEN PUT-FILECY) EDIT(REPNAME(NA))X(1),AC12));
ELSE PUT FILECY) EDIT('illREPHAME(HA))(X(1),A<12));
END;
END;
END;
END;
END;
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In the statements shown inTable(7.5.3),the Variable.J is changed through a DO
loop and indicates the number of components contained in the minimal
cutset. Y is the name of the file over which the minimal cutsets are
to be printed. The file Y is declared as follows in the CUT-SET and
TOP-SET procedures:
DECLARE(Y)FILE EXTERNAL;
The statements by which the BACFIRE code reads the cutsets have
also been changed to the following form:
C READ DATA SET FIVE HARDWARE MINIMAL CUTSETS.
221 READ (5, 434) Al
IF (A. NE. CHAST) GO TO 221
C READ IN MINIMAL CUTSETS AND COMPONENTS
231 READ (9, *, END = 661) NCSM, (CSM(I), I = 1, NCSM)
IF (NCSM.EQ.CHEND) GO TO 661
It can be seen that the cutsets are read from unit 9 by the
BACFIRE code, and therefore unit 9 can be defined to be the file Y
which is created by the MODCUT code prior to the execution of the
BACFIRE Code. By using the CMS of the IBM one can use a file with a
file name MOD-BAC and a file type EXEC to store all necessary commands
for coupling the MODCUT and BACFIRE Codes. If the file type of a
CMS file is EXEC then all of the commands that are stored in that
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file can be applied by issuing only the name of the EXEC File
(e.g., MOD-BAC here). For compiling MODCUT and BACFIRE, the MOD-BAC
EXEC file stores the following commands.
TOF:
FILEDEF SYSIN DISK TREE DATA (LRECL 80 RECFM FB BLOCK 800
FILEDEF Y DISK Y DATA (LRECL 80 RECFM FB BLOCK 800
MODCUT
FILEDEF 05 DISK BACFR DATA
FILEDEF 09 DISK Y DATA
FILEDEF 11 DISK
FILEDEF 12 DISK
BACFIRE
EOF:
In the first and second commands, the file tree data in which
fault tree data are stored for use in the MODCUT code, and file Y
data over which MODCUT writes the minimal cutsets are defined, respectively.
The MODCUT module which is stored in the file MODCUT MODULE is then
executed. At this point all of the cutsets are generated by the MODCUT
code and transferred to the file Y data.
Next, files BACFR DATA and Y DATA are defined as units 5 and 9
respectively. Units 11 and 12 are also defined to be internally used
by the BACFIRE code. Finally, the BACFIRE command executes the BACFIRE
code and its output will be printed. All of these commands are operated
by issuing the command MOD-BAC. Therefore, one should only provide the
TREE DATA and BACFR DATA files for the input fault tree and input common
cause failure data, and issue the MOD-BAC command to get the common cause candidates.
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CHAPTER 8
APPLICATION OF THE CODES PL-MODT, PL-MODMC, AND MODCUT
TO SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF INTEREST IN REACTOR SAFETY
8.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2, 4 and 5 the mathematical models used in the codes
PL-MODT, PL-MODMC and MODCUT were discussed. Also, the computer code
developments with regard to these three codes were verified and
discussed in Chapter 7. In this chapter several examples will be
evaluated by using these codes. Some of these examples are also solved
by using other codes, so as to provide a basis for evaluating the
efficiency, adequacy and the capabilities of these three PL-MOD based
codes. For most of the examples the CPU time spent by any of these codes
is given along with the output of results from the codes.
8.2 Examples for the Code PL-MODT
In order to more easily comprehend the use of the PL-MODT code,
four examples are presented in this section. These four examples are
as follows:
(1) Low Pressure Recirculation System (LPRS) for PWRs
(All components are of Class 1)[3].
(2) An arbitrary fault tree has been constructed and is
used to determine the unavailability of the top event
- by assuming, first, that all components are of Class 2, and
then that they are a combination of Class 2 and Class 3.
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The results for this example are compared with the results
stemming from the KITT-1 Code.
(3) An Auxiliary Feedwater System is calculated by the PL-MODT
code and the results are compared with those calculated
by the FRANTIC Code (all components are Class 4)[4].
(4) A Simple Electric Circuit System is evaluated and the
results are compared to those of the FRANTIC Code. This
simple system is discussed in Reference [5].
8.2.1 Low Pressure Recirculation System (LPRS) for PWRs (Class 1)
This system is part of the Emergency Core Cooling Recirculation
System and consists of the containment pump and two redundant pumps
in parallel. Figure(8.2.1)shows a simplified flow diagram and Figure
(8.2.2)shows its associated reduced fault tree. It should be referred
to in connection with the following discussion. All valves with the
exception of V2 4 and V2 5 are aligned for injection into the cold legs.
V24 and/or V25 should be open in order to start the LPRS and close V 2.
These valves, whether locally or remotely operated, can be manually
operated. Details of the system as well as of its fault tree can be
obtained from WASH-1400 [3].
The LPRS unavailability estimates are given in WASH-1400 as
follows:
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Simplified Flow Diagram of LPRS [3]
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WASH -
Q = 1.3 x 102med
WASH -3Q WH= 4.4 x 10lower
WASH -
Q = 2.7 x 10 2
upper
where the lower and upper bounds were evaluated by a Monte-Carlo
simulation by using the minimal cut-set approach. The point estimates
for the unavailability as a result of single and double failures, test
and maintenance as well as common mode failures are:
Q = 1.1 x 10 5
single
Q = 2.7 x 10
3
double
Q = 1.0 x 10
Qcommon =6.0x10 3
respectively.
This system has been re-analyzed by PL-MODT to determine the point
estimate probability for the occurrence of the top event and the
Vesely-Fussell importance of the components. The reduced fault tree
contains a total of 61 non-replicated basic events, 4 replicated
events and 2 replicated modular gates.
The point unavailability computed by PL-MODT using the modular
approach is
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Q = 2.83 x 10-3
The total computation time (CPU) for this example was 0.46 sec.
and included the modularization, the evaluation of the top event
probability and the determination of the importance measure for all
components and modules in the fault tree. The results obtained for the
unavailability of the top event by using the PL-MODT code is in close
agreement with those of the WASH-1400. It should be noticed that the
top event unavailability obtained by the PL-MODT code shows only random
failure contribution and does not include the common cause contribution
-3(i.e. QWASH1400 = 2.81 x 10 ).
8.2.2 Comparison Between the Results of the Codes PL-MODT and
PREP & KITT-1 (Components are of Class 2 and 3)
This comparison is based upon an example considered in Ref. [6].
The associated fault tree is shown in Figure (8.2.3). It has been
analyzed and evaluated by PL-MODT for the data summarized in Table (8.2.1)
by assuming all components have a time-dependent failure behavior, but
are non-repairable (i.e. Class 2).
Figure (8.2.4) compares the results of the two codes. Those for
PREP & KITT are taken from Reference [6]. For the first 3000 hours
PL-MODT calculates unavailabilities which are higher than those computed
by PREP & KITT. Thereafter, the trend reverses and PREP & KITT gives
higher values. Which code comes closer to the exact answer can only be
answered by benchmarking these codes against a code which employs
the Markovian approach.
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5
Figure (8.2.3) Fault Tree Example [6]
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TABLE 8.2.1
PRIMARY FAILURE RATES FOR SAMPLE
FAULT TREE SHOWN IN FIGURE (8.2.3)
Primary Failure Index X(hr~ )
1L 2.6 x 10-6
2 2.6 x 10-6
3 2.6 x 10-6
4 3.5 x 10-5
5 3.5 x 10-5
6 3.5 x 10-5
7 3.5 x 10-6
8 5.0 x 10-6
9 8.0 x 10-6
10 8.0 x 10-6
PREP S KITT- I
1.0 x 10
-25x 10
-2
.0 x 10
-3
5x 10
PL-MODT
I I IO 1000
FIGURE 8.2.4
3000
COMPARISON
ABILITIES FO
FIGURE'.iOAS
5000 7000
(hrs)
OF THE TIME-
R THE SAMPLE
9000
is
DEPENDENT UNAVAIL-
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The computation time for PL-MODT was 0.64 seconds for modularizing
the tree, finding the unavailabilities for the top event, components and
modules for 10 time steps. Advantage was taken of the fact that PL-MODT
is capable of handling directly K-out-of-N gates. Therefore, the two
2/3 gates were input to PL-MODT, rather than the one shown in Figure
(8.2.3). This approach naturally saves computer storage and computation
time.
The same fault tree in Figure (8.2.3) is used to evaluate the top
event unavailability for the case that components 1 to 6 in Figure (8.2.3)
are repairable and 7 to 10 are non-repairable (i.e. a combination of
Class 2 and 3 components). The data listed in Table (8.2.2) are used
for this analysis.
First, KITT-1 is used and its results compared with PL-MODT. Next,
FRANTIC results are obtained for the same example. Results are
shown in Figure (8.2.5).
Small differences exist due to different approximations used in
these codes. However, these three codes give essentially the same
asymptotic values for unavailabilities. The job running time for PL-MODT
to calculate the top event unavailability for 15 time steps was 0.62
seconds. The curve labeled EXACT demonstrates the unavailability
calculated by using Equations (2.3.2) and (2.4.9) for Class (2) and
Class (3) components, respectively. FRANTIC uses the asymptotic value
for Class (3) components throughout the system operation (i.e. Q % XAT).
KITT-1 uses some approximations that result in an unavailability closer
to the exact unavailability. The PL-MODT prediction for the system
unavailability is much closer to the exact value of the system unavailability,
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Table (8.2.2)
FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES FOR SAMPLE TREE IN FIGURE (2.8.3)
Primary Failure Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(hr l )
2.6
2.6
2.6
3.5
3.5
3.5
5.0
5.0
8.0
8.0
x 10-6
x 10-6
x 10-6
x 10 -5
x 10 -5
x 10 -5
x 10-6
x 10-6
x 10-6
x 10-6
(hr~ )
4.1 x 10-2
4.1 x 10-2
4.1 x 10-2
1.66 x 10
1.66 x 10~
1.66 x 10~
Ix10-6
Ix10~7
1x10 8 1I
1.0 2.0 4.0
Figure (8.2.5)
10.0 20.0 100.0 1000.0
HOU RS
Comparison of the Time-Dependent Unavailabilities of Repairable'
Components for the Sample Tree given in Figure (8.2.3) as Calculated
by FRANTIC, PREP, KITT and PL-MODT
-J
co
c~t
10,000.0
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because of its more adequate approximations for obtaining the time-
dependent unavailability functions for the Class 3 components
8.2.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System - A Comparison Between PL-MODT
and FRANTIC (Class 4)
A simplified block diagram of the Aux-Feed System of a PWR is shown
in Figure (8.2.6) and is described in detail in Reference [4]. As
can be seen from Figure(8.2.6), the system consists of two diesel driven
pumps in parallel with a pump and two valves. The pump and valves are
in series. The block diagram shown in Figure (8.2.6) is a simplified
version of the one shown in WASH-1400. It is assumed that all of the
components of the system are periodically tested. The data are summarized
in Table (8.2.3).
Figure (8.2.7) compares the results for the unavailability
computed by the two codes FRANTIC and PL-MODT. It should be noticed
that PL-MODT gives slightly higher values for the unavailability of the
system during the operation time.
The lower value obtained for the unavailability by FRANTIC is due
to the fact that FRANTIC uses the approximate versions of the general
unavailability functions used in PL-MODT. However, the difference is
negligible for small failure rates. During the inspection time of the
components in the AUX-Feed system fault tree (e.g. at 720 < t < 721.5 for
pump), both codes give essentially the same unavailability. However,
for the repiar time interval, a larger difference appears, as can be
seen from Figure (8.2.8). This is mainly due to the fact that the
continuous analytical equation for Class 4 components in PL-MODT
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Figure (8.2.6)
Block Diagram of the Simplified Aux-Feed System [4]
Valve Pump Valve
Table (8.2.3)
THE COMPONENT INPUT DATA FOR THE CODES FRANTIC AND PL-MODT [4]
Component Component
Number Name
1
2
3
4
5
Valve
Valve
Pump
Diesel
Diesel
Failure
Rate (X)
(x 10-6)
0.3
0.3
3
42
42
Test
Interval (T)
(days)
30
30
30
60
60
First Test Inspection Repair
Interval Duration (0) Duration (T) (qo) Override
q.T. (hours) (hours) Unavailability
30
30
30
30
60
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
7
7
19
21
21
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
I~)
0
Figure (8.2.7) Figure (8.2.8)
0 10 20 30 40 5C 60 70
DAYS
721 730
HOURS
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TIME-DEPENDENT UNAVAIL-
ABILITIES FOR THE AUX-FEED SYSTEM AS CALCULATED
BY FRANTIC AND PL-MODT
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(i.e. Equation (2.5.8) gives a lower value of the unavailability due
to inspection. This difference vanishes as the end of the inspection
period is approached. Thereafter, both codes predict about the same
value for the unavailability as depicted in Figure (8.2.8). To
evaluate unavailabilities shown in Figure (8.2.8), a finer time step
mesh was used.
PL-MODT treats the group "valve 1, pump, and valve 2" as a
module and therefore the unavailability of this module will be given
automatically in the output. Therefore, the unavailability for each
branch of the AUX-Feed System block diagram can automatically be obtained
from the same computer run for unavailability calculations of the top
event.
The CPU time for FRANTIC was 0.57 seconds over a period of 180 days.
The CPU time for PL-MODT was 0.57 seconds for modularizing the fault tree
and calculating the unavailabilities for 40 time steps as well as the
importance for components and modules.
It is noteworthy to mention that as the number of components in
the fault tree increases and more inspected components become involved,
the differences between PL-MODT and FRANTIC during the repair time vanishes.
This will become more apparent in the next example.
8.2.4 Example of a Simple Electric Circuit Using FRANTIC and PL-MODT
Figure (8.2.9) shows a simple electric system which has been
discussed in Reference [5]. The purpose of the system is to provide
light by the bulb when the switch is closed, the relay 1 contacts closed
and the contacts of relay 2 ( a normally closed relay) are open. Should
323
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Figure (8.2.9) Sample System for Mutually Exclusive Events [5]
-M I 'dogalf" , ,
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the contacts of relay 1 open, the light will go out and the operator will
immediately open the switch which in turn causes the contacts of relay 2
to close,. which restores the light. In what follows, operator failures,
wiring failures as well as secondary failures will be neglected. The fault
tree for this system is shown in Figure (8.2.10).
Failure rates, repair times and test periods for the various
components are summarized in Table (8.2.4). It should be noted that
no data base exists for the data in Table (8.2.4) and they are chosen
arbitrarily. Also, no replicated component or module exists in this
system.
In order to enable FRANTIC to analyze this system, the unavailability
function of the system must be provided as input. This function was
found to be:
QS = f.0 - (1 - Q(1)){l-[(l - Q(2))(1 - Q(4))(1 - Q(7))(1 - Q(8))*
*(1 - Q(9))(1 - Q(10))][l - (1 - Q(3))(1 - Q(6))(1 - Q(5))}}
Naturally, for PL-MODT the fault tree was directly input, because there
is no need for a system function. As output, PL-MODT modularizes the
tree and gives the following four modules.
OR Module #4: components 5, 6 and 3
OR Module #3: components 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 2
AND Module #2: modules 4 and 3
OR Module #1: component 1 and module 2
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Figure (8.2.10) Fault Tw~ee for Sample System in Figure (8.2.9) (5]
Failure
Rate
hr-1
2.0 x 10
2.8 x 10-5
2.8 x 10-5
3.2 x 10-3
4.1 x 10~4
3.2 x 10-4
2.8 x 10-3
2.8 x 10-3
4.5 x 10-3
4.5 x 10-3
INSPECTION
Inspection
Time (hrs)
1.0
0.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.5
1.0
0.5
1.5
TABLE 8.2.4
PARAMETERS FOR THE CIRCUIT EXAMPLE
First Time
Interval Repair Time Override
(days) (hrs) Unavailability
7 2.0 1.0
7 1.0 1.0
7 1.5 1.0
7 2.0 1.0
14 1.5 1.0
28 1.5 1.0
14 2.0 1.0
14 1.5 1.0
7 2.5 1.0
7 3.0 1.0
Component
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Time
Interval
(days)
7
14
14
7
21
28
21
14
7
7
t'-3
a'
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Figure (8.2.11) compares the output of both codes for one complete
period of 28 days. As can be seen, the results are overall in very
close agreement during the operational period. Differences are
attributed to the fact that for this example the failure rates are
comparatively high. For these high values, the FRANTIC prediction,
by using a linear approximation for the unavailability, is not very
reliable at large times.
Again, during the inspection period both codes give essentially
the same results. However, for the repair period (see Figure 8.2.12)
differences show up again which were observed already in Example (8.2.3).
It should be noticed that these differences are not as pronounced as
in Example(8.2.3) because more components are involved in the
present example.
The CPU time for PL-MODT was 0.98 seconds for modularizing the
tree, evaluating the unavailabilities for components, modules and the
top event for 32 time steps and for determining the importances for
various components and modules.
For the same tree and data, FRANTIC needed 1.12 seconds alone for
calculating the system unavailability over the period of 180 days
and to determine the mean unavailability of the system over this
period. However, it should be noted here that PL-MODT would also
be an efficient and convenient code for evaluating large fault trees
consisting of periodically tested components or any other class of
components. Examples 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 showed that the code is also
fairly fast for evaluating small fault trees as compared to other
state-of-the-art computer codes.
100
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Figure (8.2.11) Comparison Between the Unavailabilities for the Electrical System
During Its Operation as Calculated by FRANTIC and PL-MODT
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Figure (8.2.12) COMPARISON
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8.2.5 Differences Between FRANTIC and PL-MODT
The obvious difference between the two codes is that whereas
PL-MODT is capable of analyzing large fault trees and evaluating
them at the same time, the use of FRANTIC is mainly confined to the
analysis of small systems for which the system unavailability function
is known in advance. This off-line approach is not only time consuming
but has the additional disadvantage that the user may introduce spurious
errors. The mathematical functions used for evaluating system
unavailability in PL-MODT are continuous, whereas in FRANTIC they are
approximate and noncontinous.
In a case where a system, for example, the Aux-Feed System,
is to be evaluated in more detail then each valve, pump,and diesel
would be further developed down to the level of subcomponents
which are periodically tested. For this purpose, PL-MODT is especially
suited.
8.2.6 Comments on the Vesely-Fussell Importance Measure
PL-MODT enables the user to select the option for the determination
of the V.F. importance in steady-state and transient evaluations. The
Vesely-Fussell importance measure is defined as the probability that
component C. contributes to the system failure given that the system
has failed. As an example, Figure (8.2.13) shows the importance of
the pump in the Aux-Feed system as a function of time. The importance
stays about constant through the operational period. After a sudden
increase in system unavailability due to the testing of the pump, the
valves, and the diesel, the importance of the pump sharply decreases,
Inspection a Repair
Region
ILL
Operating
10 100
hrs
FIGURE8.2.13 IMPORTANCE OF THE
FUNCTION OF TIME
PUMP IN THE AUX- FEED SYSTEM AS
.7
-N0.7
I
0.6-
k0.5H
0.41-
0.3
0.2
Region
1000 HI
0 I i
I
I
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and increases again once the inspection has been finished. Thereafter,
it remains fairly constant during repair and operation periods. The
opposite behavior can be seen in Figure (8.2.14) for the valves. The
reason for this behavior is that the combination of valve 1, pump and
valve 2 constitutes a simple module which is directly connected to the
top event and thus its total importance is 1 over the whole operational
period. The same holds for diesels 4 and 5. As a result, any increase
in pump importance is accompanied at the same time by a decrease in
valve importance.
8.3 Examples for the Code PL-MODMC
In reference [12] the PL-MODMC code has been discussed and comparisons
between the PL-MODMC, LIMITS [131 and SAMPLE [3] codes are presented. In
this section the new version of the PL-MODMC in which some of the
restrictions of the old version of the code have been removed. And
approximation and mathematical formulations discussed in Chapter 4 of this
thesis are incorporated, and is testing by presenting some examples. These
examples are as follows:
(1) An arbitrarily designed fault tree consisting of a
combination of different classes of components with
uncertainty values associated with failure rates,
average downtime, average repair time, and unavailability
per demand is analyzed.
Figure 8.2.14
IMPORTANCE OF THE VALVES OF THE AUX-FEED-SYSTEM AS FUNCTION OF TIME
Inspection Operating
Region 'Region
____
L __ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ __'
A
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
La
La
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100TIME (hrs)100
1 1 
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(2) The Low Pressure Recirculation System fault tree discussed
in Section 8.2 with 61 free components and 6 replicated
components is analyzed by the PL-MODMC Code. All components
are of Class 1 and the results are compared with those
given in WASH-1400. The values of failure rates and
90% error factors are taken from WASH-1400.
(3) The new B&W Reactor Protection System fault tree [9] with
170 basic events and 157 gates is evaluated by the PL-MODMC
code. The results from PL-MODMC are compared to the median
value found by the GO methodology [9]. The components in
this fault tree are a combination of Class 1 -and 2 components.
8.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulation of Failure Parameters of a Fault Tree
Consisting of a Combination of the Four Classes of Components
Consider the fault tree in Figure (8.3.1). This fault tree
consists of 7 components and 8 gates. Components C3, C5 and Gate G7
are replicated. It should be noted that components C3 and C5 appear in
both the domain of the replicated gate and the domain of the top
event. Therefore, this fault tree obviously could not be handled by
the old version of the PL-MODMC Code. In this fault tree the components
are a mixture of different classes of components. The following
quantities of interest will be calculated:
(a) Average top event unavailability
(b) Unavailability associated with different confidence intervals
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Figure t8.3.1)
FAULT TREE FOR A MONTE-CARLO ANALYSIS
( Contains deleted text - best copy available )
For calculating the average top event point unavailabili
unavailability associated with the confidence intervals, Table
shows the input component failure data.
Table (8.3.2) presents the output from the PL-MODMC Code ft
1200 trials and for the fault tree shown in Figure (8.3.1) and i
failure data shown in Table (8.3.1). The output consists of the
results:
(a) Mean unavailability, and Standard deviation of unavailabi
calculated in each trial.
(b) Confidence levels and unavailability associated with them-
(c) 5% and 95% error factors for the top event which are defined
as follows:
P P
F 50% ndF45%
5% P 5  an F95% P
(d) Interval probability and Maximum Error associated with the
interval probability (see Chapter 4).
For comparing the accuracy of the PL-MODMC code the Code LIMITS
has been run for comparison for the same example. However, since
LIMITS handles only Class 1 components, by using the mathematical equations
discussed in Chapter 4 the value of the equivalent average unavailability
and its associated error factor for the Class 3 and 4 components was
calculated by using equations (4.3-1) through (4.3-6), prior to the
LIMITS run. These values are then used by LIMITS to evaluate the top
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Table 8.3.1
Failure Data for the Fault Tree in Figure 8.3.1
Component
Name
'C1'
'C2'
'C3'
'C4'
'C5'
'C6'
'C7'
Class
Number
2
1
3
1
4
2
4
X or Q
(hr-1)
2.0x10~ 4
1. 3x10~0
1.47x10~4
2.0x10~4
2.Ox10-5
2. OxlO5
2.0x10-5
1.0x10-5
F TD
(hr)
3
3
3
3
3
3
10
21
F TR
D (hr)
F T
TR (hr)
7
30
20
5
3
2.5
1.5
TM
F TT (hr)
- 700
5 -
- 700
3 -
T
(hr)
720
1440
Table 8.3.2
PL-MODMC Output of Fault Tree Presented in Figure 8.3.1
TREE ANALYSIS BY HoDULtS
- 00/29/79
2041os.ooo
TEST OF ACCURACY
MAX TOTAL GATESt
MAX TOTAL COMPONENTS)
MAX GATES INPUT TO A GATE -
MAX COMPONENTS INPUT TO A GATE -
100
200
5
10
FAULT TREE INPUT
00
03
DATE'
TIME:
RUN TITLEt -
ESTIMATED
tSTIMATED
ESTIMATED
ESTIMATED
GATE NAME
TOP
02
TYPE
A
A
INPUTS
02
04
Table 8.3.2 (continued)
-O 05
C~3
0 G7
t2
0 04
- C4
A 07
A 08
C3
0 C5
OF GATES- a
04 ~ C7
NUMBER OF coHPO
NEPLICATED GATE
hEPLICATED COMP
GATE NAME
. CALCULATIbN OF
NUM FREE EVENT
1UH RPLICATED
PREE INPUT
t2
- ' C4
C6
- C7
REP INPUT
C3.
CS
NENTS-
St 07
7
ONENTS8 NONE -.
MODULR mgtkL c0tSES
THE MEDIAN PO±Nt  ALU-
INPUTS- .
EVENT INPUTS=-
MEDIAN VALUE 'SPRAD
6.999999t-02
1.300000E-04
2.00000E-04
6.999999E-03
0.441664E-03
HEVliAN VALUE
3.087000E-03
1.127222E-02
3
3
3
7
SPREAD
9
* t31
b5
b 7
NUHDtR
'I
I
'0
I
Table (8.3.2) (continued)
TOP EVENT POINT AVERAGE UNAVAILABILITY
T14E MONTE-CARLO SIMILUATION STARTS NOW
TOTAL NUM OF TRIALSm 1200
5.789721E-06
MEAN PROP= 2.328730E-05
ERROR FACTOR(5%i- 14.13585
CONFILENCE LEVEL
o.500o00
i.00000
2.50000
t400000
10.00000
15.00000
20.00000
- -25.00000
30.00000
- -40.00000
50.00000
60.00000
70.00000
75.00000
80.00000
85.00000
90.00000
95.00000
97.50000
99.00000
99.50000
STANDARD DEVIATION- 6.005271E-05
ERROR FACTOR(95%)- 11.38071 .
UNAVAILADILITY INTVL PRODADILITY
1.393705ZE-07
1 .919755L-07
3,400596E-07
. 5.196343E-07
1.052895E-06
i.492676E-06
2.001615E-06
2*530474E-06
3.225246E-06
4.009005E-06
7.127903E-06
1*095650E-05
1.709651E-05
2.089908E-05
2.631526E-05
- 3.427277E-05
4.0816501E-05
8,782063E-05
1.400157E-04
2.37i144E-04
4.627793E-04
.9.059364E-01
-. 0277It-01
7s327424E-01
5.732234E-01
4.362971E-01
3.723742E-01
3.349944E-01
3.108435E-01
2.945430E-01
2.763264E-01
2,709655E-01
2.743264t-01
2.945430E-Oi
3.10843tE-0i
3.349944E-01
3.72.742E-01
4.362971E-01
5.732234E-01
f.327424C-01
9,182771E-01
9.059364E-01
MEDIAI PROBD
NAX ERROR
16"0056L7E-01
6.057973E-02
5.5i2iI1E--02
4.600069E-02
3.6190112C-02
3.112304E-02
2.803759E-02
2.59957?E-02
2.45n902E-02
2.295169E-02
2.2350fl2E-02
2.295169E-02
2.458902E--02
2.5995779E-02
2.803759E-02
3.112304E'-02
3.619nO2E-02
4.600069E-02
5.512101C-02
6.057973E-02
1.005607E-01
7.127903E-06
0
I
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event unavailability distribution. The results obtained from both codes
are very close and, in particular, PL-MODMC has a slightly longer tail
due to the approximations discussed in Chapter 4. Figure (8.3.2)
compares the results obtained for the top event unavailability distribution
using the two codes PL-MODMC and LIMITS. However, the median value of the
top event is almost the same for both codes.
8.3.2 Low Pressure Recirculation System (LPRS)
The LPRS fault tree has been shown in Figure (8.2.2). This fault
tree is input into the code PL-MODMC for the data shown in Table II 5-32
of WASH-1400 and 1200 trials were simulated. The results are presented
in Table (8.3.3). The input data are listed in WASH-1400 [3]. In
general, the results agree well with those calculated by the SAMPLE Code
and given in WASH-1400, as can be seen by the comparison presented in
Table (8.3.4). The total computation time including the modularization
process is 8 seconds.
8.3.3 New B&W Reactor Protection System
An overview of the new reactor protection system is shown in
Figure (8.3.3). The nine trip parameters in four independent channels
feed a bistable trip string with an output to the reactor trip model
which includes the two-out-of-four logic interactions with the other
channels. The nine trip parameters are as follows:
1. High Reactor Coolant Pressure (normal operation)
2. High Reactor Coolant Pressure (low setting) for shutdown
bypass mode
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Figure (8.3.2)
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Comparison of the Top Event Distribution for
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Table 8.3.3 LPRS Top Event Unavailability for 1200 Trials Using PL-MODMC
HEAN PROD= 1. 410070E-02 STANDARD DEVIA TION= 7.909754 E-03
ERROR FACTOR(5%)= 2.13365 ERROR FACTOR (95%)m 2.21611 MlEDIAN PROD= 1. 2430
CONFIDENCE LEVE.L PROBABILITY MAX ERROR o1114 PROBADILI
0.50000 3.575392B-03 1.893921E-01 7.656468
1.00000 4.353750E-03 1. 2249 11E-01 7.*222902
2.51000 5. 138319E-03 8.370483E-02 5.512648
5.00000 5.825788E-03 6 .37 1158E-0 2 4.198762
10.00000 6.662294E-03 4.763011LE-02 3.150179
15.00000 7,352761E-03 4.019815E-02 2.677403
20.00000 [f..052737 E-03 3.5859861-02 2.434665
30.00000 9.50535OE-13 3.113346E-02 2.112458
40.00000 1.096696E-02 2.891829E-02 1.982517
50.00000 1.243022E-02 2.8103 37 E-02 1.945992
60.00000 1.385169E-02 2.891828E-02 1.982517
70. 00000 1.591348E-02 3.1133 46vE-02 2.112458
80.00000 1. 868913E-02 3.585986E-02 2.434 665
85.COOOO 2.036301E-02 4.019815E-0 2 2. 6771403
90.00000 2.358368E-02 4.763011E-02 3.150179
95.00000 2.754679E-02 6.371158.E-02 4.198762
97.50000 3.381504E-02 8.370483E-02 3.5126 48
99.o00000 3.927734E-02 1.224911E-01 7. 2229 02
34.50000 4.92.3805E-02 1.t93921E-01 7.656468
22- 02
TY
1-01
E-01
E-01
E-01
E-01
E-01
E-0 1
E-01
E-01
E-0 1
E-01
E-0 1
E-01
E-01
E-01
L-0 1
E-01
E-01
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Table (8.3.4)
COMPARISON OF THE LPRS FAULT TREE SIMULATION
USING PL-MODMC AND THE RESULTS CALCULATED BY
THE SAMPLE CODE IN WASH-1400
Confidence Level
50%
WASH-1400 (SAMPLE)
1.3 x 10-2
4.4 x 10-3
3.1 x 10-295%
PL-MODMQ
1.24 x 10-2
5.82 x 10-3
2.75 x 10-2
Param
Channel A
Bistabl
strin
Reacht
Mod
Main
C' D'
CRA
B
C
D,
Channel B - Channel .C
(220)
Channel D
(220)
A B _ C D To D'
Main Power and Secondary Power
Trip Breakers (115)
0D
.Rod Reg. Rod Reg. Rod
)up 5 Group 6 Group 7
. 132 (132 (132
CRA CRA CRA
FIGURE 8.3.3
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM
CRA
I
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3. Low Reactor Coolant Pressure.
4. High Reactor Coolant Pressure.
5. Variable Reactor Coolant Low Pressure (Temperature Comparison)
6. Overpower
7. Power/Reactor Coolant Pumps Comparison (Pump Monitor)
8. Power/Imbalance/Flow (Unbalanced Power)
9. Reactor Containment Pressure High
There are actually four primary physical parameters (coolant
pressure, coolant temperature, reactor power and building pressure)
combined with other auxiliary parameters (number of pumps, power
imbalance, flow) to provide those nine trip parameters.
Trip signals interrupt main and secondary power to the power
supplies for four safety rod groups and three regulating rod groups.
Removal of holding power from the windings of the Control Rod Assemblies
(CRA) allows the rod to drop for a safe shutdown.
The channel trip relays are connected in 2-out-of-4 trip logic as
shown in Figure (8.3.4). Each relay de-energizes four auxiliary
trip relays (KAl, KA2, etc.) one in each channel. Power is provided to the
undervoltage windings of circuit breakers through the dual 2-out-of-4
matrix which provides power interrupt on any combination of two channels
tripped.
The logic for the safety groups is shown in Figure (8.3.5). Each
control rod dirve assembly has six windings driven by six-phase power
from the three-phase buses through a delta/star transformer and appropriate
power supplies. Safety rods are held out by applying power to two
windings from the independent main and secondary buses. Trip from the
-- 11--TO KA2 (B)
---- -TO KA3 (C)
~~--TO KA4 (D)
8.3.4
Al Cl Al BiI I . I lI
Bl D1 Cl D1
Ii l
To UV winding
of A breaker
Q
Ii'
Ii'
III
I
FIGURE IB IC ID
2/4 TRIP LOGIC
MAIN BUS
AA /ip
SECONDARY BUS
B TripB
group 1 (typical of up to 12)SAFETY GROUPS oo
J
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A and B channels removes power from the undervoltage windings of the
A and B breakers to interrupt both ac buses. (The A and B breakers
also interrupt power to the regulatory rod groups, discussed in the
next paragraph). Dual dc breakers (C1 , C2, Dl, D2) connected to the
C and D trip channels provided a second trip mechanism by interrupting
dc power to both CPA windings. Transfer relays are provided to allow
rod withdrawal at startup with six-phase power from the auxiliary power
supply to one group at a time.
Regulatory rod group logic is shown in Figure (8.3.6). Power is
available to all six windings, although only two or three are energized at
any one time, depending on the rotational position of the rod drive. Thus
power to all six windings is interrupted to trip. Three groups of
regulating rods are inserted on reactor trip.
The power supplies include six SCR's per group supplied by the main
bus through the A breaker and six parallel SCR's from the secondary bus
and B breaker. dc control power to the SCR's is supplied through lamps
and optical encoders (six per group) controlled by programmers (one
per group) to the gate drives (six per group). Programmers, lamps
and encoders are not shown in the figure. Independent trip is provided
from the C and D channels through E and F relays to interrupt dc control
power to the SCR's.
The fault tree for this system consists of 170 basic events and
157 gates. This fault tree is shown in Figure (8.3.7). The fault tree
has been previously evaluated for a point estimate of the system unavailability
using the GO methodology and a fault tree analysis code [9]. In this study
this fault tree is also evaluated by using the PL-MODMC Code. The
top event point unavailability calculation and a Monte-Carlo simulation
From A Breaker
Gp.7 Gp
DCPS Pa
Gp.7
DCPS
7AI
Gate drives (6 per group)
Aux. P. S. To 6 phases of group 5
Gp.6 Gp.7
FIGURE 8.3.6 Fuse
REGULATING GROUPS
T 6 i ! di f ''^ f fi.o TVn # gs o %A
From B Breaker6 Dhose bus.'
o groujyr
Figure (8.3.7) B&W Reactor Protection System Fault Tree
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are performed by using the PL-MODMC code.
Due to the fact that in the code PL-MODMC, all of the fault tree
information is stored in the main memory of the computer, and because
the fault tree for the Reactor protection system is very large (the fault
tree consists of 170 basic events and 157 gates), extra core storage was
required in the first attempt to evaluate the entire fault tree by the
PL-MODMC Code. Therefore, it has been decided to evaluate the fault tree
in two steps. First, top event point unavailability and unavailability
distribution is found for all of the independent replicated gates (i.e.,
replicated gates having no component in their domain that appears elsewhere
in the tree, for example, transfer gates 1A, 2A, 3A, 5A, ... , etc.).
Second, the median and error factors which are calculated for the
independent replicated gates (i.e. in the first step) are input to the
PL-MODMC. However, in this step, each independent replicated gate is
removed by an equivalent replicated component. Unavailability distribution
for the independent replicated gates is therefore, approximated to be
log-normal.
Failure data for this fault tree are given in Reference [9], and
they are primarily taken from WASH-1400. Some of the data are also taken
from MIL217B [10] or GIDEP[ll]. Failure rates for this fault tree are
shown in Table (8.3.5). The fault tree consists of the Class 1 and 2
components. For the Monte-Carlo analysis all unavailabilities and
failure rates with uncertainty are assigned a 90% error factor of 10,
which is comparable to the values used in WASH-1400. However, in some
cases the error factors are expected to be lower than 10 and, therefore,
the Monte-Carlo calculation is expected to give conservative results.
359Table 8.3.5
GO COMPONENTS AND FAILURE DATA
Fa
Tpe Kind Description M
1 103 Temp. ElementI
Press Xmtr
Press Xmtr Pwr Supply
Press Switch
Transformer & Relay
Ion Chambers
Aus. Pwr. Supply (Pump
Deteo. Pwr. Supply
3 501 RB Press Relay Module
3 502 Aux. Trip Relay Coil
3 503 B R Actuatorsr C&D
3 S04 BER Actuators A&B
3 SOS olding PS Pectifiers
3 506 Relay Coils E&F
3 507 Prog. Gate Driver
Circuits
3 508 Bypass Relay
Chan. Trip Relay Coil
Inductrol & Delta Star
Transf.
Prog. Lamps
Prog. Motor
Transfer Relay
CAD Stator Winding
Perfect Switch (logic)
Test Unit
Bridge 6 Signal Conv
B/S Trip Unit
Buffer Amp
Linear Amp
Sum Amp
Diff Amp
Func Gen
Pump Control Monitor Amp
Perfect Switch (logic)
Test Inhibit (logic)
Aux Trip Relay Contacts
Manual Trip Switch
Contacts
mon.)
ilure Failurt Rate
ode Per 10 hr.-
low 1
low 1
low 3
open
open 1
low 1
low 3
low. 3
open
abort to end
open
fail to oper.
premature
fail to oper.
premature
open
open
output short
open
open
0.3
0.3
0.3
1
1
3
0.3
1.4
3
0.3
open 0.3
open 2
open 3
fail to oper.
open
open
Ilowhigh
short
fail to open
16 303 Interlock. Bistable
Trip,& KA Relay Contacts short
Bypass Relay Contacts
Reset Switch Contacts
Breaker Contacts (Aaa)
Breaker Contacts (C9D)
Relay Contacts (SW)
Silicon Controlled
Rectifiers (SCR)
Photo-optical programmer
Test Switch Contacts
Logical Switch (perfect)
Aux Relay Coil
Connector Pins
Bypass Switch
Maintenance (6 hra out
of 720)
0.3
0.3
1. hours
4000
4000
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
360
1 360
0.3 360
0.01 360
0.01 360
short 0.01
fail to open
(perfect -
30
all failures included
short 0.01 360
open
short
open
short to gnd.
2
0.6
1
0.01
Short to gnd. 0.01
short 0.3
short to gnd. 0.01
360
360
360
360
360
360
30
Demand Unavailability
Failure MT or demand
4 x104
410-3
1x103
110 -4 1x10-
4.104
410-4
4x10-3
1.10
1:10-
1x10- 3 -3
4x04
1x10-3 -3
4-104-3 L-3
SX10-3
7104
iinlO'4
,1x10~
7 s10-
-4 O-4
31110 3x10
1 I10
4x10
lx104
0
0
-
4-10-6
0-5 -5
4x10'
3x0~ 11101X10~ 1IX10-5s
in actuator)
4x10~
7x10
42104
4X10
4X10-6
4X10-5s
3x10'
8103
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
3
3
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
16
16
611
615
616
617
61
619
201
202
203
204
207
208
209
210
211
212
205
402
301
302
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
5
5
5
304
305
306
307
308
311
312
313
315
11
10
13
40
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The Monte-Carlo calculation is performed by using 1200 trials, and a
Central Limit Theorem Approximation of n = 12. The results obtained
from the PL-MODMC code are shown in Table (8.3.6).
The average unavailability calculated by the PL-MODMC is 2.99 x 10-5
for the top event compared to the results of both the Go code and the
Fault Tree analysis code which are about 3 x 10-5 [9]. It should be
noticed, however, that the result given in Reference [9] is a single
point value for the top event unavailability, whereas, in PL-MODMC both
a single point unavailability and a Monte-Carlo simulation are calculated.
A total of 10.95 CPU seconds was spent by the PL-MODMC code for finding
an empirical distribution of the top event for the whole fault tree. In
addition to the Monte-Carlo simulation, a point average unavailability
is calculated for the top event (i.e., no Monte-Carlo simulation) and
a total of 2.74 seconds was used by the code to calculate this single value
for the top event average unavailability. The calculation of this value
is also performed in two steps by setting the variable MONT = 1 in the
input to PL-MODMC and by removing the error factors for the input
parameters (see Appendix C).
The Go code running time was about 30 seconds on a CDC-6400 computer.
It should be noticed that the PL-MODMC calculations are performed by
using an IBM 370/168 computer. However, the computation capacity of
this computer is smaller than that of CDC-6400 by a factor of roughly
3 to 6 depending on the computer program being analyzed. The Go model
contained 538 operators without the instrumentation channels. Running
time for this model was about 50 seconds. However, the time was reduced
to about 30 seconds when components which do not appear in the fault tree
were made perfect (see Appendix A for description of the Go methodology).
Table (8.3.6) PL-MODMC Output for the Fault Tree in Figure (8.3.7) and
Date in Table (8.3.5)
mEAN PROD= 8.154909E-05
ERROR FACiGR(5%)= 7.24407
CONFIDENCE LEVEL
0.50000
1.00000
2.50000
5.00000
10.00000
15.00000
20.00000
25.00000
30.00000
40.00000
50.00000
60.00000
70.00000
75.00000
80.00000
85.00000
90.00000
95.00000
97.50000
99.00000
99.50000
THL END
STANDARD DEVIATION
ERROR FACFOR(95%)=
UNAVAILABILITY
1.408673E-06
1.968094E-06
2.897006E-06
4.266671E-06
6.442290E-06
8.576671E-06
1.090645E-05
1.342600E-05
1.598327E-05
2.198067E-05
2.990065E-05
4.140361E-05
5.974923E-05
7.180643E-05
9.058492E-05
1.150023E-04
1.661868E-04
2.908874E-04
4.756341E-04
9.489906E-04
1.241333E-03
2.267788E-04
0.98032
INTVL PROBABILITY
9.999995E-01
9.996197E-01
9,764599E-01
8.952425E-01
7.614073E-01
6,7709D0E-01
6.232409E-01
5,857837E-01
5,595992E-01
5.295134E-01
5.204999E-01
5.295134E-01
5.595992E-1Oi
5.857837E-01
6.232409E-01
6.770980E-01
7.614073E-01
8.952425E-01
9.764599E-01
9,996197E-01
9.999995E-01
MEDIAN PROB= 2.990065E-05
MAX ERROR
1,855380E-02
9.110749E-03
6.371949E-03
8.733936E-03
1.027986E-02
1.026612E-02
9.901245E-03
9.682640E-03
9,428132E-03
9.084430E-03
8.947823E-03
9.084430E-03
9.421132E-03
9,682640E-03
9.981245E-03
1,026612E-02
1 027986E-02
8733936E-03
6*371949E-03
9.118769E-03
1.855380E-02
0O
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The Monte-Carlo calculation of the Go fault tree in this section
proved the accuracy of the results obtained by using the PL-MODMC
code. The efficiency and effectiveness of the PL-MODMC code is also
demonstrated in this example. However, for a more effective evaluation
of a large fault tree by the PL-MODMC code incorporation of an out-of-core
storage facility is inevitable.
8.4 Examples for the Code MODCUT
Four examples are discussed in this section as follows:
(1) The fault tree shown in Figure (5.3.1), which has been
used in Chapter 5 to explain the procedures employed by
the MODCUT Code to generate the cutsets is solved by the
MODCUT code. Two runs have been made, the first to evaluate
the number of cutsets in each gate, and the second to evaluate
the cutsets themselves. Also, by setting the DEBUG variable
equal to one in the second run, all modules and minimal cutsets
are printed out.
(2) Minimal cutsets of an arbitrary tree consisting of simple,
replicated and ON-OFF components, and K-out-of-N gates are
determined in this example. This fault tree had also been
used in reference [1].
(3) The cutsets of a fault tree to identify potential
sequences of events by which solidified high-level waste
could be released from containment during storage at the
Radioactive Surface Facility are generated by the MODCUT.
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(4) The fault tree for the new B&W Reactor Protection System
which is discussed in Section 8.3 of this chapter is also
analyzed by the MODCUT code to determine its low order
cutsets, (i.e., cutsets of size 1, 2 and 3).
8.4.1 Generating Cutsets of the Fault Tree Shown in Figure (5.3.1)
By Using the MODCUT Code
The fault tree shown in Figure (5.3.1) is an arbitrarily designed
fault tree used in Chapter 5 of this thesis to explain the procedures
used to generate minimal cutsets by the MODCUT Code. Two computer runs
have been performed by using the MODCUT code. First, to calculate the
number of minimal cutsets by setting the variable CUTNO equal to one
and second to generate the cutsets of the top event with the DEBUG variable
equal-to one in order to print in addition to the minimal cutsets, modular
information and modular minimal cutsets. This would further verify the
steps discussed in Chapter 5 to generate minimal cutsets.
The input to MODCUT for the first run is listed in Table (8.4.1)
and the output is shown in Table (8.4.2). The total number of non-
minimal cutsets for the top event is 20. The input for the second run
is exactly similar to the first run with the exception that the CUTNO
variable is set to zero and the DEBUG variable is set equal to one
(see Appendix D for the MODCUT users manual). The output from MODCUT is
shown in Table (8.4.3). The running time for this example was about
1.35 seconds for the step which generated minimal cutsets.
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Table (8.4.1) Input to MODCUT with
the CUTNO Variable Equal to One
EXAMPLE
0 0 0 0 1 0
'TOP' 'AND' 3 '61' 'G2' 'G3' 0
'G1' '2/3' 1 'G4' 2 'CI' 'C2'
'62' 'AND' 1 'G5' 1 'C5'
'G3' 'AND' 1 '66' 1 'C8'
'G4' 'OR' 1 'G7' 1 'C6'
'G5' 'OR' 1 'G2' 1 'C2'
'G6' 'OR' 1 'GB' 2 'C7' 'C3'
'G7' 'AND' 0 2 'C3' 'C4'
'G8' 'AND' 1 'G9' 2 'C5' 'C9'
'G9' 'OR' 0 2 'C1O' 'C11'
'END'
8 3
2 'G8' 'TOP'
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Table (8.4.2) Number of Cutsets in Each Module Calculated
by MODCUT with CUTNO = 1
GATE NAME: 07
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= I
GATE NAME: 09
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 2
GATE NAME: G4
NO, OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 2
GATE NAME* G8
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 2
GATE NAME: 01
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 5
GATE NAME: TOP
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 5
GATE NAME: G5
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 1
GATE NAME: 06
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 2
GATE NAME: TOP
NO. OF NONMINIMAL CUTSETS= 20
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Table (8.4.3) Cutsets Calculated for Fault tree in Figure (5.3.1)
with CUTNO = 0 and DEBUG = 1
TREE ANALYSIS BY MODULES
DATE: 10/10/79
TIME: 11:18.17.000
RUN TITLE: EXAMPLE
ESTIMATED
ESTIMATED
ESTIMATED
ESTIMATED
MAX TOTAL GATES:
MAX TOTAL COMPONENTS:
MAX GATES INPUT TO A GATE:
MAX COMPONENTS INPUT TO A GATE:
FAULT TREE INPUT
TYPE INPUTS
AND G1
2/3 G4
Cl
AND 65
C5
AND G6
C8
OR G7
C6
OR G
C2
OR G8
C7
AND C3
AND G9
C5
OR CIO
G3G2
C2
C3
C4
C9
C1l
(continued)
100
200
5
10
NAMEGATE
TOP
G1
82
G3
G4
G5
G6
G7
G8
G9
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Table (8.4.3) (continued)
NUMBER OF GATES= 10
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS= I11
MAX SIZE OF THE CUT..SETS= a
REPLICATED GATES: G8
ON..OFF REPLICATED COMPONENTS: NONE
GATE GATE INS FREE LEAVES
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
REP GATE
DEP LEAVES
0
2
1
1.
1
1
2
2
2
2
9 LEAF=29001
REP COMP=29001 APPEARANCES= 2
GATE NAME
NESTID=
NESTID=
6
7
G5
FREE 67
FREE G9
FREE G4
MODULAR MINIMAL CUT SETS
C3
C4
C1o C1l
C6
67
(continued)
CUT-SErS FOR GATE G8
TOP
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
66
G7
G8
G9
368
Table (8.4.3) (continued)
MCS= 1 C5
MCS= 2 C5
FREE G8
SYMM G1
C9
C9
CS
C9
G9
C1
C2
C1
C10
C11
G4
G4
C2
NUM REPLICATED LEAVES IN MODULE=
BOOLEAN HAS DEEN CALLED
*TOP CS
C8
G1
C2
C7
NEST GS
NEST G6 C3
(continued)
Table (8.4.3) (continued)
DICS COMP= 0111'B ComP= '1110i'
'1101'B COMP= '1100'B
PROP roP *TOP Gs G6
Gs *TOP
CUT..SETS FOR GATE TOP
MCS= 1 CS Ca C2 C6 C7
MCS:= 2 C5 Ce C2 C6 C3
MCS= 3 CS Ce C2 C3 C4
MCS= 4 C. CO CI C2 C7
MCS= 5 CS CS CI C2 C3
MCS= 6 C5 C9 C1O C8 CI C6
1CS= 7 CS C9 C1O Ce C2 C6
MCS= B C5 C9 CIO C8 CI C2
MCS= 9 Cs C9 C11 Cc CI C6
MCS= 10 Cs C9 C11 CB C2 C6
MCS= 11 C5 C9 CII Ce C1 C2
MCS= 12 C5 C9 C1O CO C1 C3 C4
MCS= 13 CS C9 C11 C8 CI C3 C4
THE END
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8.4.2 A Fault Tree with Different Types of Components and Gates
The fault tree in Figure (8.4.1)[1] is an arbitrary tree consisting
of simple, replicated and ON-OFF complementary components, K-out-of-N,
AND, OR, and replicated gates. The cutsets of the top event and
the replicated gate cutsets are determined for the case that the SIZE
variable is nine and SIZEl is 4 (see Appendix D). A test run (CUTNO = 1)
showed that 2772 non-minimal cutsets exist in this fault tree. The
output consists of a check on the input as well as cutsets of the gates Gi
and TOP. Table (8.4.4) shows the output of the MODCUT for the fault
tree in Figure (8.4.1). The execution time for this run is 19.8 seconds
in an IBM 370/168 computer for generating minimal cutsets of gate Gl
and the TOP event.
8.4.3 A Fault Tree to Identify Solidified High-Level Waste Release
from the Containment in the RSSF
The fault tree in Figure (8.4.2) was constructed to identify
potential sequences of events by which solidified high-level waste could
be released from containment during storage at the Radioactive Surface
Storage Facility [13].
The input to the code MODCUT for calculating the cutsets is similar
to the previous examples and is described in detail is Appendix D.
The output from MODCUT is shown in Table (8.4.5). Minimal cutsets were
calculated for the top event with variables SIZE = SIZEl = 8. A total
of 83 minimal cutsets were generated in 9.8 CPU seconds. The MOCUS
and MICSUP codes have also been used for comparison with the MODCUT code.
Output from these codes for the fault tree shown in Figure (8.4.2)
is compared to that in Table (8.4.5). The result of this comparison
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II
G14GI
G17
G1816
G22
G4
G5
G6
G8
GIO
SAMPLE FAULT TREE
I
Figure (8.4-l>)
Table (8.4.4) MODCUT Output for the Fault Tree in Figure (8.4.1)
TRCC AALYS=D DY MODULCU
rATC t
TihEST
Rit1f TITLE:
07/21/77
17115.33.000
PLMOD TEST RUN
ESTInATED MAX TOTAL GATES:
CETIMATED MAX TOTAL COMPONENTS:
ECTIMATCD MAX CATES INPUT TO A GATES
ESTIMATED MAX COMPONENTS INPUT TO A GATES
100
200
5
10
(continued)
C%4
r1%
Cn
Table (8.4.4) continued
FAULT TRCE INPUT
CATE NAME TYPE INPUTS
01 AND 02 04
C19
02 OR 03
"R6
03 OR CI C17
04 OR C5
C15 R6
C5 2/3 06
C19 C19
06 OR G7 00
07 AND 09
C22
cc AND 010
R7
C9 OR C20 C21 R7
010 OR C23 C24
TOP AND 012 G14
C1 C2
012 OR 013
R1
013 AND 01
C6
014 OR 015 017
015 AND 016
"R1
016 OR C3 C4 C5
G17 AND 019 01
010 AND 01? 022
019 OR 020
R4
G20 AND 021
C9 R3
021 OR CS C11
022 OR 023
C7 RS
023 AND 024 025 (continued)
Table (8.4.4) continued
U4 U" CI
025 OR 026
R4
1V
G26 AND C12
UUMPER or GATES- 26
NUMpBR or COMPONENTS= 30
MAX SIZE OF THE CUT..SETS- 9
r:EPLICATED GATES? 01
OrLoFF RcLICATED COMPONENTS1
CUT-SETS FOR GATE 01
MCS= I C14
MCS- 2 C14
MCC- 3 R6
MC"= 4 P
MCS 5 -R6
mCsG A C14
MCS 7 C14
MCG= 0 "R6
CUT.SETs FOR GATE TOP
MCS I -R1
MCS. 2 "R1
tiCS, 3 -RI
MCSe 4 -RI
mcS 5 "R1
MCS' A "R1
MCS. 7 "R1
mCS= 0 ^R1
MCS 9 -R1
MCS- 10 "RI
1,CS. It "R1
RCS 12 "R1
C14
C17
C14
C14
C14
C16
C17
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
R6
R6
R6
R6
R6
R6
C13 R5
R6 R1 R4
C11
Cl5
CiT
C17
Cis
CID
cis
CI6
C16
C16
C16
C17
C17
C17
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C19
C19
C19
C15
Cis
C15
C15
C15
ci5
C16
C16
Ci6
C17
C17
C17
C1
C1
C1
C1
C1
C1
CR
CI
C1
CI
C1
C1
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
C6
CS
C3
C4
C5
C3
C4
C5
C3
C4
C5
C3
C4
CS
(continued)
Table (8.4.4) continued
U,
ML',
Mcs
Mcs.
mCS-
mcsm
Mcs-,
MCS2
MCSv
Mcs-'
MCS,
MCS,
MiCS.
Mcs
IcS=
Mcs
tMCs-
tics,
MCS
MCSN
Mirs=
Mtcs=
tiCS.
mcsw
tCs-
13 - I
14 "RI
15 -R1
16 1l1
17 R11
10 1t
19 Rt
20 11
21 R
22 R1
23 RI
24 1t
25 RI
26 C14
27 C14
20 C14
29 C14
30 R16
31 R6
32 R
33 R6
34 "R4
35 -R6d
36 R1
*NH6
"R4
-Rd
C14
C14
C14
C14
R6
R6
r, 6
Rd
"RPa
"R6
C16
C16
C17
C17
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14 C16 c19 C19 C 1
C14 C16 C19 C19 CI
C14 C17 C10 C19 CI
C14 C17 c1 C19 C1
C14 C17 c1 C19 CS
"RA C14 C10 CI9 C1
C14
C14
C14
C16
C16
C17
C17
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C14
C15
c15
C15
C15
C16
C16
C17
C17
C15
C15
C1l
015
C15
C15
C15
C15
C15
C16
C16
C17
C17
c15
c15
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
114
C1O
U1
CI
CI
R4
R4
R14
R14
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
Cl
C1
C1
C1
C1
C I
C1
Ci
C1
C1
C19
C3
C4
C5
C7
R5
C7
R5
C7
R5
C7
R5
C7
R15
C7
R5
C7
R15
C7
C7
R15
C7
C'
MCSw 37 -R1
MCS- 39 "RI
tCE. 39 -R
MCS- 40 "RI
MCSO 41 "RI
MCS= 42 -R1
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C0
C6
C6
C'
C'
CA
C4
C5
C3
C4
CS
C3
(continued)
Table (8.4.4) continued
HCs 43 -RI
IICSw 44 "RI
HCS- 45 R1
HCSw 46 RI
HC~w 47 R1
ICSN 48 RI
HCS- 49 RI
MCS" 50 RI
HICs. 51 C14
MCS-e 5: C14
HCC' 53 C14
hCS* 54 C14
?1CSW 55 -R4
hCS*- 56 R4
THE CHD
"R6
-R6
C14
C14
C14
C14
-R6
"R6
C16
C16
C1y
C17
C14
C14
C1i
Cl'
C17
C17
C14
C14
C14
CI0
510
CIO
CIO
CIO
cis
CIO
CI0
CIO
510
CIO
CIO
CI9
CIO
CI?C19
C19
CIO
C14 Cie CIF R4
'0
cv., Cl?
C197
CI?
C19
C19
C19
CI?
Cl?
R4A
R4
R4
R4
R4
CS
CI
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
R4
C1
CI
C1
C1
CAI
CI
C2
C2
C1
C1
CI
CI
CI
C1
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C6
C6
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C2
C6
C6
C6
Ca
C6
C6
C4
Cs
C7
R5
C7
R5
C7
Rs
C?
PR5
C7
RS
C7
RS
~i~J
[-~1
G2 -
MG4(D
07 c8 .cg ci o12
Is i
G4 6C15 16 Q17 Ci C19 C20
C27 C21
G22g'
Figtre -. 4.2 A Fault Tree to Identify Potential Sequences of Events
by which Solidified High-Level Waste Could Be Released
during Storage at the RSSF
C251
G26
Ecs E
-378Table (8.4.5) Outputs for the Fault Tree Shown in Figure 8.4.2
C U1.!ET. Fnf GrLE G2
3.tcam 1 Xtb
8CDi 2 13
NCS= 3 Id
3cs- 4 X19
3CSS. 5 X14
BCSS t. X16
3CS= 7 117
;CS- 8 121
SCS" 9 X22
SCSu -10 .23
ECS0 11 132
QCS- 12 133
SCSu 13 136
SCSa 14 138
ACS= 15 X23
3CS= 16 124
CS- 17 ..*242
zCW 18 X29
CS- 19 40
ACSn 20 220
11CSm 21 1.13
3CS- 22 X7
XCS- 23 115
3C.3- 24 X11?
SCS& 25 132
vCS- 26 X33
SCSx 27 136
3CS- 211 13'i
3CSm 29 X23
RCS- 30 X214
XCSm 31 X21
XCSa 32 122
ACJu 33 123
3CSU 34 X2J
BCSS JS 1.7
.CSu 36 17V
3CS= 37 120
.1CSm 38 X12
AC'Sa 39 X20
.1C ' 4,,t 113
3CS= 41 X142
IC:S- 41 ra j.
X7
120
£13
115
X18
X12
114
112
219
119
119
119
219
119
X47
128
139
142
X42
143
X.44
145
247
147
X.47
1.47
X.47
1.47
X.42
X42
142
X46
120
x13
115
X15
217
X17
120.
113) (continued)
112
X19
1SO
147
147
147
X46
X.46
1146
X.46
X.46
1.46
1.49
1149
1.49
X.49
1143
1.43
X1614
144
1145
I 4.1
'.~ .J
xLd
X50
ISO0
X46
lob,
Table (8.4.5) (continued)
-ACS= 41 x3 J
qC..a 44 x33
AC S 46 I30
3C:;, 47 x3d
3CUS' 41 X3 0
3CS. 49 x23
- 3Cs. 50 x23
SCS. 51 X2e
ACS.' 52 124
SC3a 53 X40
Ca 54 X21
5CSw 55 x21
3CS- 56 121
3C5= 57 X22
SCS 58 X22
3CS- 59 X22
SCS- 6C X23
ZCS- 61 X23
11CSm 62 X23
UCS- 63 X29
3CSU 64 X21
3CS- 65 21
'CS= 66 X21
FCS- 67 X21
3C5= 61 x21
ECS- 69 122
SCS0 70 X22
KCS- 71 X22
SCS- 72 122
3CS- 73 x22
MCS= 74' X40
aCS= 75 x40
3CSm 76 X29
3CS= 77 X29
5C3* 76 229
3C0a 7d 21
lCS= 66 122
ICS H1 X22
'IC= "I J X29
Ic'.ta .x 9
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x:IN
X13
120
X13
120
x13
x20
X13
X13
X7
115
X17
17
115
X17
IS
117
128
X32
*33
136
138
124
132
133
X36
139
124
X39
239
X28
X28
x20
240
14.3
I22
X 1
126
22a
329
A40'
250
ISO
2433
ISO
247
X43
x51
X43
14 4
150
147
143
X452
143
X44
145
X43
4114
145
2
146
X46.
146
146
146
146
146
146
120
17
115
117
239
1i 5
112
136
1 16
. -eig
2.I)
x46
X46
X46
146
I46
X46
X44
146
146
X46
149
149
149
149
X49
X49
149
149
X49
X49
149
x 49
149
149
X49
x49
149
249
I14q
149
148
ISO
143
X44
145
xq6
146
x46
146
X46
14..
xgo,
I '.
'59**
X46
146
X49
149
149
249
X49
149
149
I 49
141.
149s
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showed that all these codes provide the same set of cutsets for the
fault tree in this example.
8.4.4 The Fault Tree for the New B&W Reactor Protection System
The system and its fault tree have been fully discussed in Section 8.3
of this chapter. The fault tree is input to the MODCUT code in order
to determine cutsets of order 3 and less. In Table (8.4.6) all cutsets
of order two and some of the important cutsets of order 3 are listed.
The important cutset is referred to those cutsets with a high probability
of occurrence.
The total CPU time for calculating over one thousand cutsets of
up to order 3 is about 68 seconds. It should be emphasized here that
by using failure data given in Table (8.3.8) for this fault tree it
can be seen that the cutsets shown in Table (8.4.6) constitute about 98%
of the total system unavailability. This value is obtained by using the
top event unavailability calculated for this fault tree in Section 8.3.3
by the PL-MODMC code, and by using the unavailability contribution of the
cutsets listed in Table (8.4.6) which can be found through a simple
hand calculation. Also, the cutsets of order 2 represent about 80%
of the total system unavailability, and the four cutsets that are of
order 3 are, therefore, contributing about 18% of the total system
unavailability. Table (8.4.7) shows the corresponding names in the
fault tree for the names given in the MODCUT output for this example.
Table (8.4.6) Low Order Cutsets Obtained by the MODGUT Code for the Fault Tree in Figure (8.3.7)
CUT-SETS FOR GATE TOP
hCS= 1 EEUFFO C11IFF'BO
IiCS= . :2 Pif~f'O C2IWFPBO
hCs=~ 3 Alit E1O ['1DFPBO
IAcsz 4 A[WI 'O1 D211FPF(
tc= 5 ALffP00 SeRiMSh'
M S 6 ADF0 SCRShL'S66
hCS= 7 ABfFF*B0 SCfRShBES07
MCS= U APFFPO FOOLGP5A
HCS= 9 ATIFPFIO FOOL 606A
ncs-= 10 AilrPlO F00OLGIA7A
M C S 11 AlirPIO ERFP0
iMg'= 12 AliPFF'D E 3 f*F U
t CS= 13 A~iFFIIO E4F*%FPO
M CS 14 Bilfrr'FO SCR'ISf)i135
a1iCsE 15 141171,11 SCR<5SS66
lCS= 16 bLiF-P40 SCR~SSS6G7
tics= 17 rIBFF140O FOOLGD58S
MiCS= 13 PBIFPPO FOOLGI)MI
MCS= 19 14VFPPO FOOLGII7E
MZS-= 20 E4DJF .O F2RFP0
riCS= 21 b ItFPli 0 F3RFPO
M1CS= 22 DD1FFDO F4RFPQ
eiCS= 23 CHAR [lT CIPP rMrT CHEIRTIIT
MS=3' 2 4 CHAPTMT C1ICRTMT CHDERTIIT
DlCS= 25 C~idRTrIT CHCRTMT CII4FRTMT
liCS= 26 CHART1IT C11PRTI1T CHCRTIIT
THiE CD 
-
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TABLE 8.4.7
CORRESPONDING NAMES FOR THE COMPONENTS LISTED IN THE MINIMAL CUTSETS
ABFPBO, BBFPBO "A", "B", "C 1 11, "C2 , "D1 11 , "D2 " Breaker
ClBFPBO, C2BFPBO Faults Prevent Breaker
DlBFPBO, D2BFPBO Opening
SCRSMBSG5, SCRSMBSG6 One SCR shorted on Main Bus Side
SCRSMBSG7 of Group "5", "6", "7" Regulatory Power Supply
FOOLGD5A, FOOLDG6A Fault OUTPUT on one Leg of Gate
FOOLDG7A, FOOLDG5B Driver "5A", "6A", "7A", "5B", "6B', "7B"
FOOLDG6B, FOOLDG7B
E2RFPO, E3RFPO "E2 , "E3 11, "E 4 1 , "F 2 1 F 3"', "F 4 1
E4RFPO, F2RFPO Relay Faults Prevent Opening
F3RFPO, F4RFPO
SCRSSSG5, SCRSSSG6 One SCR shorted on secondary side of
SCRSSSG7 Group "5", "6", "7" Regulatory Power Supply
CHARTMT., CHBRTMT Channel "A", "B", "C", "D" RTM in Test
CHCRTMT, CHDRTMT
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Summary and Conclusions
The method of modular decomposition of a fault tree that has been
used in the PL-MOD code is extended to include several calculational
features, and to remove some of the restrictions of the original PL-MOD
Code. The methodology to analyze a fault tree in terms of its modular
structure had been previously developed [1]. This methodology consists
of piecewise collapsing and modularizing portions of the tree, until
eventually the fault tree structure is described as a set of modular
equations recursively relating the top tree event to its basic component
inputs. For fault trees with replicated events a Boolean vector represen-
tation was chosen to express the family of.minimal cutsets corresponding
to a higher order gate. It has been demonstrated [1] that quantitative
calculations such as the top event probability and importance parameters
may be efficiently evaluated by using the modular structure of the fault
tree. In particular, the PL-MOD Code demonstrated the ability to evaluate
large fault trees in an economic, efficient, and accurate manner. The
PL-MOD Code is written in PL/I language in order to use the dynamic core
utilization techniques available in this language. Accordingly, the
extensions of the code presented in this thesis have all been performed
by using the PL/I language, too.
In this thesis the method of modular decomposition is developed to
include time-dependent fault tree evaluation, Monte-Carlo simulation of
fault tree failure parameters, fault tree reduction based on the Vesely-Fussell
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importance measures, and generation of minimal cutsets from the modular
minimal cutsets. Also, an extensive review of the common cause failure
analysis methodologies is given and the potential use of the modularization
technique in common cause failure analysis is studied.
Time-dependent models were developed to include the effect of
different classes of time-dependent components in a fault tree, on the
top event unavailability at different instants of time. Mathematical
developments showed that proper modules can also be approximated as
time-dependent components and still maintain the same top event
unavailability. These models are incorporated into the PL-MOD code
in order to obtain the code PL-MODT. It is proved, through extensive
examination and comparison with other codes, such as FRANTIC and KITT, that
PL-MODT is sufficiently accurate and fast to be used for time-dependent
evaluation of large fault trees.
One of the features that is incorporated into the PL-MODT is the
automatic reduction of large fault trees. In this procedure a CUTOFF
value is defined for the V-F importance measures in order to eliminate
those components and modules of the fault tree whose importance are less
than this value. The elimination of "non-important" components and modules
in the fault tree provides an objective basis with which to reduce large
fault trees. This procedure is performed in the Code PL-MODT very
efficiently and takes only a negligible fraction of the total fault tree
evaluation time consumed by the computer for modularizing the tree and
calculating the probabilities.
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For the PL-MODMC Code a Monte-Carlo simulation package is incorporated
into the PL-MOD Code for the Monte-Carlo simulation of those parameters,
of the fault tree for which uncertainties can be assigned. The log-normal
distribution is chosen to represent the unavailability spread for the
parameters of the fault tree. Four classes of components are chosen
to represent different types of components in a fault tree. Failure
rates, repair duration, average downtime, and unavailability per demand
are the parameters in these four classes of components to which log-normal
distributions can be assigned. A PL/I random number generator is designed
to be used in the procedure to select samples from the log-normal
distribution. The accuracy of this random number generator is tested
by comparing it to other random number generators (e.g. the one in the
LIMITS code [2]), and by using the Chi-square test. A fast sorting
routine has been employed similar to that used in the LIMITS Code [2].
Some mathematical models were developed in order to approximate
unavailability distributions for evaluating equivalent log-normal distribution
for the modules of the fault tree. These approximations have resulted in
an enormous reduction in the computational time for evaluating the top
event unavailability distribution.
In PL-MODMC, the restriction of not allowing a replicated component
to be repeated within all replicated domains and the top event of the
fault tree is removed. Thus, in the new form of the Code a replicated
component can appear in all domains of the fault tree without any
restriction. A preprocessor is designed to change the input and output
to PL-MOD in order to be able to input alphanumeric names for components
and gates of the fault tree. Also, many unnecessary input values to PL-MOD
that can be calculated by the code from the logical definition of the
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tree are omitted and procedures are employed to calculate these values
directly by the code itself (e.g. number of appearances of a replicated
component, number of gates, ... , etc.). These provisions help the user.
The code is also tested for its accuracy by comparing it to other codes.
Thereby it is found that PL-MODMC is especially suited for large fault
trees. In particular, the comparison with codes such as LIMITS and
SAMPLE [6] has proved the accuracy and efficiency of PL-MODMC.
An algorithm is developed based on deriving all simple minimal
cutsets from the modular cutsets. This algorithm allows the determination
of cutsets of all proper modules presented in the set of modular cutsets
to be easily calculated. Then by assigning these cutsets to the
corresponding modular minimal cutsets, a complete set of simple cutsets
for the top event of the tree can be attained. This algorithm is
incorporated into the PL-MOD Code in order to obtain the MODGUT Code.
The advantage of this code is its capability to eliminate non-essential
simple cutsets in the replicated and higher order modules before they are
expanded. Also, the use of modular minimal cutsets to generate simple
cutsets has been shown to be beneficial, because modular cutsets contain
all simple cutsets, and generation of cutsets of the modules is very
simple and straightforward. Intermediate elimination of the cutsets
that have no significance on the number and order of the top event
cutsets has proven to be a useful tool in the MODCUT Code-and reduces
computation time. For example, those cutsets which exceed the prespecified
size of the cutsets of the top event can be easily eliminated; or, in
a common cause analysis, those cutsets which are non-common-cause contributors
can be removed. Therefore, MODCUT is essentially a discriminator code
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based on any defined discrimination criterion (e.g. common cause failure,
cutset probability, ... , etc.). A very high level of computational
efficiency might be obtained by MODCUT because of these discrimination
procedures. In MODCUT the same preprocessor which is described for
the PL-MODMC code has been used to input only alphanumeric names, and
similarly the restriction with regard to the appearance of replicated
components is also removed.
Common cause failure analysis is an increasingly important segment
of a complete system reliability analysis. It was believed that the
modularization technique provided an easy tool with which to analyze the
common cause failures in a complex technical system. Qualitative
and quantitative aspects of common cause analysis have been studied.
In particular, a quantitative model has been developed to evaluate
system unavailability due to the presence of the common cause failures
from the minimal cutsets of the fault tree which have been identified
as common cause candidates. The results obtained for system
unavailability from this model are in close agreement with other available
models. Also, the codes MOCUS [3], and BACFIRE [4], and MODCUT and
BACFIRE are coupled to obtain convenient packages (i.e. MOCUS-BACFIRE,
and MODCUT-BACFIRE) for identifying common cause candidates from fault
trees of safety systems. The results obtained through the examination
of the common cause failure methods showed that the code MODCUT can be
easily used to identify common cause candidates by incorporating a common
cause discrimination criterion into this code. However, direct common
cause discrimination capability is not yet incorporated into the MODCUT
code, but if this code is coupled with the BACFIRE code it provides an
alternative to MOCUS-BACFIRE for the analysis of complex fault trees.
-U--- 
______ ______ -~
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Several examples for evaluating fault trees of different sizes and
properties are provided in Chapter 8. These fault trees are analyzed
by using the PL-MODT, PL-MODMC and MODCUT codes. The results obtained
from these examples all support the aformentioned features of the PL-MODT,
PL-MODMC and MODCUT codes.
Their application in future studies is recommended.
9.2 Recommendations
The structural and logical limitations described in the PL-MOD
code are exactly the same for the PL-MODT code. Therefore, the same
preprocessor and procedure to remove the restriction concerning the
replicated components that are used in the PL-MODMC should also be added
to the PL-MODT code.
Methodologies should be developed in order to automatically select
proper time step sizes during different periods of system operation, e.g.,
to select finer mesh time steps during the inspection time of the periodically
tested components in the fault tree. It would be highly beneficial to
implement an option which allows the use of a Calcomp plot to display
the time-dependent unavailability functions after they are calculated
by the PL-MODT code. This plotter option should possess the same flexibility
as that originally provided in the FRANTIC code by the NRC.
The reduction capabilities incorporated into the PL-MODT provid a
basis for objective reduction of complex fault tree branches and leaves
which are not significantly contributing to the failure of the top event.
Automatic reduction of a fault tree prior to the time-dependent calculations
performed by PL-MODT is highly recommended.
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PL-MODT calculates the Vesely-Fussell importance measures for each
time step. However, as has been discussed in section 8.2.6 of this thesis,
this seemingly provides less information than a unique value of importance
given for the entire period of operation. Lambert [5] uses the following
expression for the importance of repairable components (monitored
components):
[g(1.,A) - g(0.,A)/(p. + T.)
I.=
n
[g(l.,A) - g(0.,A)]/(p. + t.)
j=1 3 J
where i.: Mean time to repair (MTTR) for component i;
T: Mean time to fail (MTTF) for component i and;
g(l ,A) =(A1 ,..., A, = l,...,An)conditional structure function
It is suggested that this expression also be employed in PL-MODT so as
to obtain a unique value of the importance for a system consisting of
Class 3 components. For the importance measure of periodically tested
components (Class 4), it is suggested that the total period of component
unavailability function be divided into the following three regions:
(a) test region
(b) repair region
(c) operational region
The idea behind this division is to avoid abrupt change in the
unavailability within transitions between the different periods of
system operation. In this manner, it is believed that a unique constant
value for the importance within each specific region should be generated.
For each region the importance of the component should be appropriately
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defined. For instance, for the test region it can be the probability
that the periodically tested component i causes system failure under
the assumption that the system and component unavailabilities are constant
during test and repair periods.
Implementation of other types of probability distribution into the
PL-MODMC is recommended. In particular, normal, uniform, exponential
gamma, beta, binomial, Poisson, Weibull, and empirical distributions
(Johnson's method). Also, the possibility of having a combination of
these distributions in a fault tree would provide a reliable way of
more realistically evaluating a fault tree. Attempts must be made to
fit other types of distributions to the OR module distribution,
especially when the number of components input to the OR module is
statistically significant. The use of Johnson's distribution is highly
recommended as an approximate distribution for the OR module distribution.
It would be beneficial if the fault trees were reduced prior to the
Monte-Carlo simulation by the PL-MODMC code, particularly if an automated
method could be implemented so as to automatically exclude portions of the
fault tree that are not contributing to the failure of the top event.
Especially, the fault tree reduction based on the Vesely-Fussell importance
measure is suitable for this purpose, but it should be noted that
the CUTOFF value of a component must be reduced by a factor F, where F
is the error factor associated with that component. This is because
of the fact that the sampling routine might select an unavailability of an
order F greater than the median unavailability and therefore, the effect
of high unavailability values must be accounted for. It should be noticed
that the Vesely-Fussell reduction option presently exists in the PL-MODT
but has not been automated.
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The Code MODCUT is constructed for cutset discriminations based on
any defined criterion. At the present time only cutset size discrimination
is performed by the MODCUT. It is recommended, however, that other
important discrimination criteria be included such as common cause
failure, cutset probability, component types in a cutset, and a combination
of these criteria. In particular, common cause failure analysis can be
easily implemented, and a great deal of advantage would be obtained.
In this case all of the cutsets that are common cause contributors can
be economically obtained. It is recommended that criteria for identifying
a common cause failure candidate be revised so as to include, in the list
of common cause candidates, those cutsets that have two or more components
susceptible to a common cause. This would provide a complete set of common
cause candidates for quantification purposes. It should be noted that the
susceptibility criterion used in the BACFIRE code to identify common
cause candidates is based on the assumption that a cutset is a common
cause candidate if all of its components are susceptible to the same
cause and they are located in the same physical domain. This would,
however, eliminate from the list of common cause candidates those cutsets
in which only some, but not all, of the components are susceptible to a
common cause and which are located in the same physical domain. Elimination
of these cutsets would affect the quantification procedure, and the
unavailabilities would be underestimated, although not significantly
most of the time.
The quantification model developed in Chapter 6 of this thesis
can be easily incorporated into the MODCUT code, in order to provide
a complete list of common cause candidates for the top event unavailability
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calculationscincluding the common cause failure effect. Obviously,
if the system contains monitored components (Class 3), one should
use the Markovian Model discussed in Figure (6.3.1).
The codes PL-MODMC and MODCUT can not handle fault trees in
which a replicated gate appears in the domains of two or more other
replicated gates (i.e., similar to the PL-MOD Code restriction of not
allowing a replicated component to appear in all domains of the fault
tree, which was removed in the research presented in this thesis during
the development of MODCUT and PL-MODMC codes).
It is recommended that the method of modular decomposition be
extended in order to handle EXCLUSIVE OR, NAND, NOR, and SPECIAL gates
represented by any valid Boolean expression defined by the user. This
would enable the user to evaluate fault trees that are non-coherent
and, if implemented in the MODCUT code, one would be able to generate
"prime implicants" of a fault tree without any change in the procedures
added to the PL-MOD code in order to develop the MODCUT code (i.e.,
CUT-SET and TOP-SET procedures).
During the evaluation of the new B&W Reactor Protection System
described in Section (8.3.3) of this thesis it became apparent that
for complex fault trees additional core storage is required because
that provided by the main memory of the computer is not sufficient.
The reason is that the PL-MODT, PL-MODMC and MODCUT codes store all of
the fault tree informations in the main memory of the computer and
apparently, for complex fault trees, the use of an external core storage
facility becomes inevitable. The addition of a Random Access Temporary
storage device would greatly increase the potential use of the code to
process large fault trees. In this case the bit string elements
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associated with the minimal or modular minimal cutsets will be stored
in the out-of-core storage facility.
Fault tree diagrams for certain complex safety systems often
contain series of sub-trees of identical structure. This simply
reflects the various sub-system redundancies which the safety system
contains. It is recommended that advantage be taken of this structural
feature in MODCUT by handling this set of subtrees as simgle "Vector"
structures. As a result, the safety system design corresponding to a
fault tree will become immediately discernible and more compact and an
efficient analysis of the fault tree will be possible.
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APPENDIX A
FAULT TREE EVALUATION CODES
A.1 Introduction
Fault tree evaluation codes that are currently available can
be divided into five groups [1], namely;
1. qualitative evaluation codes
2. quantitative evaluation codes
3. direct evaluation codes
4. dual purpose codes
5. common cause analysis
This Appendix contains a brief description of some of the
well-known codes that are commonly used. Figure A.l illustrates
these five groups and their associated codes.
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FIGURE A.1
FAULT TREE EVALUATION CODES
Fault Tree
Evaluation
Codes
- Qualitative Evaluation
- Quantitative Evaluation
- Direct Evaluation
Dual Purpose
L_ Common Cause
ALLCUTS (1975)
ELRAFT (1971)
FATRAM (1978)
FTAP (1978)
MICSUP,TREEL (1975)
MOCUS (1972)
MODCUT (1979)
PREP (1970)
SETS (1974)
FRANTIC, FRANDOM (1977, 1978)
IMPORTANCE (1975)
KITTl & KITT2 (1969, 1970)
LIMITS (1977)
SAMPLE (1975)
BAM, WAM-BAM, WAM-CUT
(1975, 1976, 1978)
FAUNET (1976)
GO (1968)
PATREC, PATREC-RCM, PATREC-MC
(1974, 1977, 1977)
PL-MOD (1977)
PL-MODT (1978)
PL-MODMC (1979)
COMCAN, COMCAN II (1976, 1978)
BACFIRE, MOCUS-BACFIRE,
MODCUT-BACFIRE (1977, 1979, 1979)
SETS (1977)
- -Mw -- -- - -.- -.- - - ------------
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A.2 Qualitative Analysis Codes
(a) ALLCUTS:
ALLCUTS is a computer code [2] written in FORTRAN IV
for the CDC 6600 computers to generate minimal cutsets. It uses a
top-down algorithm similar to that of MOCUS. Auxiliary programs
are provided to check the input data and plot the fault tree diagram
based on the input description and conversational plotting instructions.
It finds cutsets of up to size ten. ALLCUTS can sort cutsets based
on their probabilities. Up to 175 basic events and 425 gate events
can be handled by this code. Probability calculations are also
performed by the code upon request, and the calculation includes the
modeling of repairable and non-repairable components, standby and
on-line components. By using the rare event approximation, the
probability of the top event is also calculated.
(b) ELRAFT:
The Efficient Logic Reduction Analysis of Fault Trees (ELRAFT) [3]
is a computer code to determine minimal cutsets of fault trees using
the unique factorization property of natural numbers. Every integer
greater than one can be expressed as a product of powers of prime
factors, except for the order in which the factors appear. Because of
the unique factorization property, the cutsets for higher level gate
events are determined through a bottom-up algorithm as a product of
the numbers associated with each of the input events. Therefore,
cutsets indicated by, say 30, are logically contained in the cutsets
by 15, and the cutsets with the larger number are non-minimal and can
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be eliminated. The major drawback of ELRAFT is that it requires large
amounts of storage capacity. It is written in FORTRAN IV for the CDC
6600 and is capable of finding cutsets of up to 6 basic events.
(c) FATRAM
FATRAM (Fault Tree Reduction Algorithm) [4] is a top-down
algorithm similar to that of MOCUS. Beginning with the top event,
FATRAM resolves the gates. If the top event is an AND gate, all
inputs are listed as one set; and if it is an OR gate the inputs are
listed as separate sets. Iteration to resolve gates continues until
all OR gates with gate inputs and all AND gates are resolved and
replaced by their input components. At this point non-minimal cutsets
are removed. FATRAM will process any replicated events remaining
in the unresolved OR gates, by replacing them with all unresolved
gates of which this replicated event is an input. These new sets
are added to the collection and replicated events are disconnected from
the gate, and minimal cutsets are found. Finally, all remaining OR
gates are resolved.
FATRAM handles only AND and OR gates. It's computation time is
highly dependent upon the logical configuration of the fault tree.
FATRAM is written in FORTRAN for the CDC Cyber 76 computers.
(d) FTAP
FTAP is a computer program that finds prime implicant families
of a fault tree [5]. This program is written in FORTRAN language for
the CDC 6600/7600 computer series. Some of the operations in the code
which cannot be handled by FORTRAN are written in Assembler language.
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A pre-processor checks the consistency and the correctness of the
input data.
The code is based on a semi-modularization method in which only
portions of the tree which are considered as "independent branches"
are modularized (i.e. simple modules are created). Three methods of
analysis are available and the user can choose one of them along with
some options to specify any special procedure that the method should
perform. The methods are NELSON, MSUP and MSDOWN. These methods are
fully described in Reference [5]. FTAP is available in two distinct
versions that differ only in the internal storage format for
representing implicant sets. FTAP1 stores implicants as a variable
number of consecutive computer words in the main memory. FTAP2 uses
a bit of the computer to store an implicant, and therefore, implicants
will be stored as a fixed group of consecutive words. FTAP2 is more
suitable to be used for large fault trees and is limited to implicants
with small number of events.
(e) MICSUP and TREEL
MICSUP and TREEL [7] is a computer code that generates cutsets, and
employs an upward algorithm, starting with the basic events at the
bottom of the tree and working upward to the top event. TREEL reads
the input representation of the tree to check the tree for errors,
and determines in advance,number and size of the BICS. The MICSUP
and TREEL programs are coded in FORTRAN for the CDC 6400 Computer. The
program output includes the minimal cutsets for the top event and for
any requested intermediate event. Most of the features of these codes
are similar to MOCUS, except MOCUS's algorithm is downward.
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(f) MOCUS
MOCUS [8,9] is a computer program which determines the minimal cut
and path sets of a fault tree. It is written in FORTRAN IV for the
IBM-360/370 computer series. MOCUS is designed to replace the PREP
code and can be used as the cutset generator of the KITT-l and KITT-2
codes. MOCUS utilizes a top-down algorithm and performs a successive
substitution of gate equations, to move down the tree until only basic
events remain. The program handles only AND and OR gates, and all
minimal cut and path sets of a fault tree of up to a size 20 can be
handled. All types of events including house events are handled by
this code. MOCUS can determine cutsets of all intermediate gates
upon request of the user. Compared to the PREP code, MOCUS is much
faster and more efficient. An input preprocessor extensively checks
the input for errors.
(g) MODCUT
MODCUT code is written in PL/l language and is part of the research
presented in this thesis. For a complete mathematical and technical
description of MODCUT the reader is referred to Chapters 5 and 7. A few
examples are also provided in Chapter 8. The MODCUT algorithm is based
on the modularization technique employed in PL-MOD and developed
by Olmos and Wolf [10, 11, 12] .
In the MODCUT algorithm, cutsets are generated through modular
cutsets of a fault tree which is a compact representation of all simple
cutsets of that tree. Hence, by generating cutsets of the modules of a
tree (i.e. proper and improper modules) and by assigning them to the
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modular cutsets, all simple cutsets can be obtained. The advantage
associated with this code is its capability to eliminate non-essential
cutsets of modules before assigning them to the modular cutsets. At
the stage where cutsets of modules are generated, it is possible to
discriminate among cutsets of an intermediate gate's module, based
on size, probability, common cause failure, ... , etc. This substantially
reduces the computation time, since simple cutsets do not expand
significantly. Currently, elimination of the cutsets are based only
on the size (order) of the cutsets. However, the code is constructed
such that other methods of discrimination can be easily incorporated.
There is no limit on the size of the cutsets or the size of the fault
tree. Therefore, if desired all of the cutsets of a tree can be calculated,
provided that sufficient core storage is available. A special procedure
is incorporated to calculate the number of cutsets that exist for each
gate event, and the top event prior to the calculation of the cut sets.
The cutset generation in MODCUT is numerically efficient because
of an extensive use of list processing techniques, and bit manipulation
available in the PL/I language. The code can also handle K-out-of-N
gates and components with a corresponding complement in the fault tree.
(h) PREP
The PREP program [13] is designed to determine minimal cutsets.
PREP consists of two parts: PREP-TREBIL and PREP-MINSET. TREBIL
determines the state of a system given the state of all basic events.
It produces a subroutine that MINSET uses to find -minimal cutsets.
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PREP-MINSET has two optionstfor cutset generation: COMBO and FATE.
The COMBO option determines minimal cutsets by a process of deterministic
testing. COMBO systematically postulates that basic events have occurred
one at a time, then two at a time, ... , etc. For each combination, the
logic of the fault tree is tested to determine if any combination of
the primary events causes the top event, and, if so, they will be
identified as a cutset. Finally, nonminimal cutsets will be removed.
FATE incorporates quantitative data on the component's reliability to
find only "most likely" minimal cutsets. This is performed by Monte-Carlo
trials. Obviously, PREP requires prohibitive computer time for large
trees, while FATE is not guaranteed to find all of the minimal cutsets of
a specific order. PREP is written in FORTRAN IV for IBM360/370 machines,
and is limited to a maximum cutset size of 10.
(i) SETS
The Set Equation Transformation System (SETS) [14, 15] is a program
which manipulates Boolean Equations. By applying Boolean identities
the equation can be transformed into a more desirable form. By writing
a SETS user program, the SETS code is able to dynamically manipulate
the tree through the SETS user program. SETS is coded in FORTRAN for
CDC6600/ 7600 machines. EOR gates and SPECIAL gates represented by a
valid Boolean expression can be handled by the SETS code. SETS uses a
bit level storage scheme and auxiliary storage for processing of large
trees.
Four methods for processing a fault tree are available for the user.
The first method is a simple step equation reduction which is very
time-consuming, particularly for large fault trees. The second method
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consists of separate processing of independent subtrees and, therefore,
independent portions of the tree must be identified by the user, with
an independent portion of the tree being the portion whose domain
has no replicated event. The third method is processing the fault
tree in stages, which include deriving the minimal cutset equation
for intermediate steps in a series of steps, and by applying the Boolean
identities the equations will be reduced at the intermediate stages.
The fourth method is a combination of the second and third methods. The
advantage associated with methods 2 through 4 is basically that they
save computing time. The disadvantage is that the identification of
independent subtrees and the section of the stages require an experienced
user and extensive familiarity with fault tree evaluation strategies.
The SETS algorithm for finding, the prime implicants of a fault tree
with complement events can be very time-consuming for even medium
sized fault trees.
A.3 Quantitative Analysis Codes
(a) FRANTIC
The FRANTIC Computer Code [16, 17] (Formal Reliability Analysis
including Normal Testing, Inspection and Checking) has been developed
by the NRC to compute the average and time-dependent unavailability of
any general system model such as a fault tree or event tree. A special
set of equations is needed to determine, from the fault tree, the
logical relations between the components of the system. This equation
is called the System Unavailability Equation and should be determined
by the user prior to the FRANTIC run. Four types of components can
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be handled by FRANTIC; they are:
i) constant unavailability (time-independent)
ii) non-repairable (time-dependent)
iii) repairable (monitored)
iv) repairable (periodically tested)
The program can be used to determine the effects of test downtime,
repair time, test inefficiency, test override probability and test-
caused failures on the total system unavailability. Human error and
common cause contributors can also be modeled by the code. Similar to
the LIMITS and SAMPLE codes, the system unavailability equation which
modeles the system must be inputted. Cal Comp Plots of the time-dependent
system unavailabililty are also provided by FRANTIC.
The Monte-Carlo version of the FRANTIC Code, FRANDOM [17], is
being made available. In this version probability distributions can
be used as inputs for component failure rates. FRANDOM produces a
probability distribution for the total system unavailability contribution
due to random failure of components contribution due to test, and
contribution due to repair. In FRANDOM, normal, lognormal, and uniform
distributions can be assigned to define the uncertainty in the failure
rates.
(b) IMPORTANCE
The Computer Code IMPORTANCE (18,19] has been developed at the
U. C. Berkeley to rank basic events and cutsets according to various
available importance measures. IMPORTANCE is written in FORTRAN IV
for CDC 7600 computers.
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The IMPORTANCE Code is capable of handling fault trees with
time-dependent components under the assumption that basic components are
statistically independent, and that their failure and repair
distributions are exponential in time. The importance measures
which are included in the IMPORTANCE Code are:
i) Birnbaum [42]
ii) Criticality [18]
iii) Upgrading Function [18]
iv) Vesely-Fussell [43]
v) Barlow-Proschan [44]
vi) Steady state Barlow-Proschan [44]
vii) Sequential contributory [18]
Input to the IMPORTANCE Code is a list of cutsets along with basic
component failure data. The output consists of the top event probability,
importance, and ranking of basic components and cutset's based on one
or more of the above-mentioned measures.
(c) KITT-1 and KITT-2
KITT-1 and KITT-2 [13,20] are two computer codes to perform fault
tree quantification calculations based on the cutsets of a fault tree.
They are written in FORTRAN IV for IBM 360/75 computers. Any Qf the
cutset generating codes described before can be used to generate cutsets
for use with the KITT codes. However, PREP and MOCUS generate the
cutsets in a form which is directly usable as the KITT input. The
KITT codes compute the following five probabilities based on the
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exponential distribution of the input components (repairable or
non-repairable) for the top event, basic event, and cutsets of the
fault tree:
i) the probability of failure at time t;
ii) the probability that failures do not occur up
to time t;
iii) the expected number of failures occurring up to time t;
iv) the failure rate (hazard rate);
v) the failure intensity per hour.
In addition to the capabilities of the KITT-1 code, KITT-2 is
capable of performing the above calculations for dynamic failure
data changes, such as for instance a fault tree which represents a
system with different phases of operation at different periods of
time. Based on the equations (1.3.4)and(l.3.5) presented in this thesis,
the KITT codes can find upper and lower bounds for the probabilities
which they calculate.
(d) LIMITS
LIMITS [21] is a Monte-Carlo simulation code similar to SAMPLE.
The code assesses the uncertainty associated with the top event
unavailability of a fault tree, through a Monte-Carlo Simulation.
LIMITS requires the system unavailability equation as input to the code.
Therefore, similar to SAMPLE and FRANTIC, it is limited to small systems
for which this equation can be found. LIMITS handles only log-normal
distributions for the failure rates of basic components. The LIMITS
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Code is significantly faster than the SAMPLE code due to an optimized
sorting routine [22] and a special random-number generator. The output
of the LIMITS code gives the top event unavailability distribution along
with probability measures to determine the accuracy of the top event
unavailability calculated for each confidence interval. LIMITS is
programmed in FORTRAN IV for the IBM 360/370 series.
(e) SAMPLE
SAMPLE [23] is a Monte Carlo simulation code written in FORTRAN IV
for the IBM 360/370 series. SAMPLE was used in the WASH-1400 study to
find upper and lower bounds of system failure probabilities for Nuclear
Reactor Safety systems. A system unavailability function representing
the logical configuration of the system components must be supplied as
an input to SAMPLE. The Monte Carlo simulation is therefore based on
the system unavailability equation. The Monte-Carlo simulation is
performed by sampling component failure rates from their input probability
distributions and finding the system unavailability corresponding to this
"trial". After several trials the system unavailabilities are sorted,
and unavailabilities corresponding to various confidence levels are
obtained. SAMPLE can use primary failure rate data with either normal,
lognormal, or uniform distribution. Once selected, the same form of
distribution is used for all components throughout the problem. After
200 trials, results are ordered and the accuracy is tested. The program
continues for another 200 trials and this process is repeated until the
number of specified trials are completed or a maximum of 4800 trials is
reached. SAMPLE is very inefficient with respect to its sorting procedure
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of the unavailabilities. Also, the provision of the System
Unavailability function is a non-trivial task for large fault trees.
An extension of the SAMPLE code is MOCARS [24] which is similar to
SAMPLE, but it can handle additional distributions including gamma,
beta, bionomial, poisson, Weibull and any other empirical distribution.
A.4 Direct Evaluation Codes
(a) WAN-BAM
The WAN-BAM Codes [25, 26, 27] were developed at Science
Applications, Inc. and are written in FORTRAN for CDC 6600 computers.
The WAM-BAM package consists of four codes: WAM, WAMTAP, BAM, and
WAMCUT. WAM and WAMTAP are input preprocessors to generate a set of
corresponding numeric descriptions of the components and gates of the
fault tree instead of the input alphanumeric names for use in the
evaluation code BAM (Boolean Algorithm Model). In addition to WAM,
WAMTAP prepares a numerical description of the tree, such that a
sensitivity analysis can also be performed by the BAM Code. WAMCUT
is a cutset generator code, and evaluates mean and variance of the
probability of the occurrence of any gate. The BAM Code is similar
to the concept of theGO methodology but applies only AND and OR
operations that are used in a fault tree diagram. BAM calculates
the top event probability via a truth table approach. As in GO, primary
techniques must be used; otherwise the truth table may soon exceed
the available storage. Each line of the truth table represents a product
term (P term) event disjoint from all other P terms. The product of the
probabilities of the events in each P term gives the probability of P term,
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and the union of the applicable P terms gives the probability of
the top event.
(b) FAUNET
FAUNET program [28, 29] is a program to evaluate fault trees
and networks based on a modularization algorithm. This code is
written in FORTRAN for the PDP8 mini computers with 8K or 16K under OS/8.
FAUNET contains a procedure to check the fault tree input data for logical
consistency and provides a graphical representation of the tree.
A special modularization algorithm is used to modularize the fault
tree prior to finding minimal cutsets. The fault tree only operates
on AND and OR gates, and handles replicated events. Components must
be indexed from 1 to 999 and gates from 1000 up.
The Modularization algorithm starts by collapsing identical gate
types. Then a "factorization" algorithm performs a bottom-up analysis
to identify pairs of basic events always occurring together in the
same types of gates (replicated events). Such a pair is replaced by
a dummy event that is called a "complex event". The tree gates are
further collapsed and the search continues for more identical complex
and basic events, until no more pairs are found. A result file stores
all information about the complex events. From the minimal cutsets
of the modularized tree, the top event time-dependent unavailability
and Murchland's failure intensity will be found. The obvious limitation
of this code is that the core storage capacity might exceed that available
in a mini computer if a large fault tree is to be run and alphanumeric
names cannot be used as inputs for identification of components and
gates of the tree.
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(c) GO
The CO Methodology [30,31] is a probabilistic combinatiorial
analysis procedure which was developed by Kamman Science Corporation
in the mid-1960's. Component probabilities and logical interactions
are combined to produce the probabilities of several output events
in several operating states. The methodology includes:
i) A set of standardized functional operators which
are used to model physical component events with
mathematical entities which are easily identified
as components.
ii) A modeling technique whose result is the GO chart.
This chart co-responds closely to the physical layout,
diagram, or schematic. For the modeling procedure,
16 GO operators are used. Some of these operators are
similar to fault tree gates, but in addition to logic
functions, time delays and switches can be modeled as well
as complementary event logic and mutually exclusive
states. A special method is used to model replicated
components which are referred to as "super type". The
development of the GO chart consists of selecting operators
to represent each component, and connecting them with
arrows to represent the flow of information. The user
must specify the probabilities associated with the possible
operational modes of each component, which is analogous
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to supplying failure probabilities for the components
of a fault tree.
iii) The GO computer code would finally perform the logical
connections, Boolean Algebra, probability calculations
and the generation of min cutsets of up to order 4.
Probabilities are traced by the model, using a Markov
Chain approach. This means that a change in component
probability requires a complete reevaluation, even though
the system structure remains unchanged.
Because of the diversity and detail of the GO operator and the
necessity of including all system components, the modeling process is
quite complex. However, the use of the GO chart can be useful for
design and system engineering. The GO code is written in FORTRAN for
CDC 7600 computers.
(d) PATREC (PATREC-RCM and PATREC-MC)
PATREC [32, 33, 34] is a computer program to evaluate the top
event probabilities of a fault tree by using a "pattern recognition
algorithm". PATREC is the first fault tree analysis code which is
written in PL/I and uses the list processing technique for efficient
use of the core memory. Although the PL-MOD code uses a completely
different algorithm for evaluating a fault tree, it has a somewhat
similar programming organization to that of PATREC. The PATREC algorithm
consists of identifying subtree patterns. Each subtree pattern is later
assigned as a super-component (leaf) which represents the subtree for
the rest of the evaluation. The probability of each subtree pattern is
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calculated through its input components, and is assigned to the
corresponding supercomponent. By continuing the search for subtrees
with or without supercomponents, and assigning new supercomponents,
the tree is finally represented by only one supercomponent. It should be
noticed that patterns are stored in a library, and thus, the approach is
limited to a limited amount of patterns.
PATREC can evaluate trees consisting of components with a
corresponding complement elsewhere in the tree as well as K-out-of-N
gates. Cutsets can be generated by using an algorithm similar to that
of MOCUS. PATREC cannot handle replicated events and therefore a new
version of PATREC (PATREC-RCM) was developed to remove this
restriction. The limitations of the PATREC-RCM code is its way of
handling replicated events. Since the pattern recognition algorithm
only yields exact probabilities, the PATREC-RCM replaces a fault tree
with n replicated events to 2n fault trees (2n is the total possible
states that combinations of n replicated components can have). Then
by multiplying the probability of the existence of each state to that
of the top event of the fault tree, and adding the resulting values
for all 2n fault trees, the top event probability is found. However,
an optional procedure has been added so that only those states with
significant probability of existences are taken into account. However,
identification of the states with low probabilities is somewhat difficult
and results in a subjective TOP event probability.
PATREC-MC is a Monte-CARLO version of the PATREC-RCM. PATREC-MC's
principle is similar to SAMPLE, except that the system function is not
required. A sampling method is incorporated into the PATREC-MC so as
to take sample probabilities from only significant contributing events.
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PATREC-MC allows the propagation of failure rates with only log-normal
distribution. PATREC-MC's output consists of the top event's
distribution with 5% and 95% confidence limits and the median value.
There is no limit on the size of the fault tree, but the'number
of replicated events plays a key role in limiting the use of the
PATREC code series. For more information on the mathematics and methodology
of the PATREC code, the reader is referred to section 1.4.3.2 of
this thesis.
A.5 Dual Purpose Codes (the PL-MOD Series)
(a) PL-MOD
PL-MOD is a computer code [10] developed at MIT, and is based on
a particular modularization algorithm that finds modules directly through
the description of the fault tree diagram. For more information about
the methods of modularization employed in PL-MOD the reader is referred
to section 1.4.2 of this thesis. The modularization process used by
PL-MOD is unique in that it is applied not only to the cutsets, but
directly to a description of the fault tree diagram, using the list
processing features of the PL/I language.
Advantages associated with the PL-MOD appraoch are as follows:
i) The structure of the tree is more easily comprehensible
from the modular description, because the modular cutset
of a fault tree is a condensed representation of all
simple minimal cutsets of the same tree. Modular cutsets
represent all the necessary information for further qualitative
and quantitative analysis of the tree. These modular cutsets
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are obtained without using the time-consuming cutset
enumeration process.
ii) PL-MOD is able to handle complement events, direct field input,
and dynamic storage allocation or release in order to
efficiently use computer storage capacity. There are no
constraints on the total number of basic events or gates
in the tree, or the number of inputs to any particular gate.
The only constraint is on the total amount of available core
storage because all of the fault tree information is stored
in the main memory of the computer. The output from
PL-MOD includes the modular minimal cutsets for the top event,
replicated gates, and K-out-of-N gates along with their
input gates.
A disadvantage of PL-MOD is its machine dependence (PL/I is
available on IBM, CDC, Honeywell, Univac). The present version of
PL-MOD does not allow symmetric gates whose inputs are replicated else-
where in the tree. A replicated component may only appear within the
domain of a replicated gate of the original fault tree. Therefore, a
replicated component cannot exist both in the domain of a replicated gate,
say G1, and the domain of the fault tree with top event, say TOP.
However, most of these restrictions have been removed in the new version
of the code (PL-MODMC and MODCUT) as a result of this thesis research.
The quantitative calculations in the code PL-MOD include the
computation of occurrence probabilities and Vesely-Fussell importance
measures for all modules, including the top event. Two advantages of the
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modular approach for quantitative calculations are (1) it is faster than
evaluating probabilities from simple cutsets and (2) it results in
tighter bounds on the probability of occurrence of the top event.
(b) PL-MODT
The original PL-MOD code can only handle class one components
(i.e. constant failure, time-independent components), and thus it is only
able to evaluate time-independent components. The PL-MODT code is
constructed to incorporate into the PL-MOD the capability of handling
time-independent components. The PL-MODT code is constructed to
incorporate into the PL-MOD the capability of handling time-dependent
components [12, 35]. There are three time-dependent classes of components
(except the Class 1 which is a time-independent class) that are used in
PL-MODT as follows:
(1) non-repairable
(2) repairable monitored
(3) periodically tested.
The mathematical descriptions of these three time-dependent classes
of components are extensively discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
PL-MODT has all the features of the PL-MOD code and therefore, the
calculations are based on the modular cutsets which are very efficient
for the fault tree quantitative evaluations. In addition to time-dependent
handling of a fault tree, a reduction strategy based on the Vsely-Fussell
importance measures has been incorporated into the code PL-MODT [36].
Therefore, by inputting a CUTOFF value for the importance measures,
those modules and components with V-F importance less than the CUTOFF value
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are automatically eliminated from the tree. The fault tree resulting
from this process still has all the features of the original tree from
the quantification point of view. The selection 9f:a proper value for
the CUTOFF value is very important. In Chapter 3 of this thesis
examples for a proper selection of this value is presented.
Restrictions to the PL-MODT code are exactly similar to those of
PL-MOD. One of the PL-MODT features is its capability to calculate
unavailabilities effectively and economically for sizable fault trees.
Also, because of the four classes of components that are modeled by
single continuous equations in the code PL-MODT, evaluation of
unavailabilities is easier, due to the elimination of the necessary
procedures to select the proper equation for each paritcular interval
of the component operation. PL-MODT also calculates average unavailabilitie
over a period of time. The capability of using different time step sizes
during different periods of the system operations enables the user to
carefully study system behavior during high unavailability periods, such
as during test and maintenance intervals. For a complete description of
technical and mathematical concepts of the PL-MODT code the reader is
referred to chapters 2, 3 and 7 of this thesis.
(c) PL-MODMC
The code PL-MODMC [12] is a time-dependent Monte-Carlo simulation
code, based on the modularization technique. In this code, most of the
restrictions contained in the PL-MOD and PL-MODT codes are removed.
PL-MODMC is capable of performing Monte-Carlo simulations of complex
fault trees with time-dependent components.
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The calculations are based on average unavailabilities over the
period of operations. The code PL-MODMC provides the following
capabilities for quantification:
(1) The ability to compute a point estimate for the
unavailability value of the top event, and/or
(2) The ability to propagate error or uncertainty
bounds on several failure parameters, including
failure rate, average downtime, average repair time,
and average test duration.
(3) The ability to simulate large fault trees.
PL-MODMC assumes that the log-normal distribution holds for all
failure data and their average unavailabilities. PL-MODMC has all features
of the PL-MOD Code, but the restriction of not allowing replicated
components to appear in different replicated gate domains has been
removed. Also, a preprocessor has been added to the code, so that
inputs to PL-MODMC can be alphanumeric names and the preprocessor would
change them automatically to the proper numeric values for use in the
code. The input to the code has been changed and made very simple and
convenient. A PL/I random number generator is designed for use in the
PL-MODMC, which is based on the Central Limit Theorem to produce normal
random numbers from uniform numbers that the computer generates. This
random number generator has proven to be very fast and accurate. Shell's
sorting method [22] is used to sort the top event unavailabilities.
For a complete description of the code PL-MODMC and some examples the
reader is referred to Chapters 4, 7 and 8 of this thesis.
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A.6 Common Cause Analysis Codes
(a) BACFIRE, MOCUS-BACFIRE, MODCUT-BACFIRE
The BACFIRE Code [37,38] is very similar to COMCAN (for complete
information see part (b) of this section). The input is almost the
same. In addition to COMCAN, BACFIRE permits a component to appear in
more than one physical location (domain). This is useful for piping
and wiring which may pass through different domain barriers. Chapter 6
of this thesis discusses the method used in COMCAN and BACFIRE to
identify cutsets that are common cause candidates.
Similar to COMCAN, BACFIRE requires cutsets as input to the code.
For that reason the code MOCUS has been coupled with BACFIRE during this
thesis research to provide an easy package similar to COMCAN-II
(see part (b) of this section), so that the cutsets are to be found
from the fault tree diagram. MOCUS-BACFIRE is capable of identifying
common cause candidates of the top events and, if required of all
other gates in a fault tree. Fore more information with regard to
coupling MOCUS and BACFIRE codes the reader is referred to Chapter 6
and 7 of this thesis.
Since MODCUT is a modular cutset generator code, it has been used
for generating cutsets for the BACFIRE Code for test purposes. This is
done by the IBM conversational Monitor System (CMS), by providing a
temporary output file which is automatically read by the BACFIRE code.
MODCUT-BACFIRE is capable of analyzing the common cause problems where
the fault tree is large and not manageable by MOCUS because of its
restrictions. The disadvantage of using MODCUT-BACFIRE is that MODCUT
is written in PL/I and BACFIRE is in FORTRAN. Thus, it may be operable
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with other machines directly. For more information on MODCUT-BACFIRE
the reader is referred to Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.
(b) COMCAN and COMCAN II
COMCAN and COMCAN 1I[39,40] are codes for common cause failure
analysis. COMCAN is the first program to perform common cause failure
analysis. COMCAN uses fault tree minimal cutsets as input for the
analysis. However, for large fault trees, time and monetary considerations
usually require that codes designed for obtainingfault tree minimal
cutsets have their outputs restricted to minimal cutsets containing
small number of events. Therefore, prohibitive amounts of computer time
must be sent to evaluate all cutsets, and then input them into the
COMCAN Code. COMCAN II has been designed to circumvent COMCAN's limitations
of dependence upon minimal cutsets obtained by other codes. COMCAN II
utilizes the fault tree cutset code FATRAM (that has been previously
discussed in this Appendix) to generate cutsets of the fault trees.
Except for the minimal cutsets, input to the COMCAN and COMCAN II codes
is similar, and describes the common susceptibility data for each basic
event. The output is a list of the minimal cutsets that are common cause
candidates. The COMCAN and COMCAN II input allows three generic cause
categories (mechanical or thermal, electrical or radiation, and chemical
or miscellaneous) and a common 'link category. Under each category a
number of causes (or links) may be specified, (e.g. under the mechanical
or thermal cause category one could specify the generic causes -- impact,
vibration, pressure, grit, stress and temperature). Optional inputs are
the component manpfactorer, location, domain definitions for each generic
cause, the location of each component implied by the basic events, and
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ranks of component susceptibility for each common cause. The output
includes the ability to permit only common cause candidates with ranks
greater than an order N, and to include similar type components as one
of the criteria for common cause candidates. COMCAN II is written in
FORTRAN IV for the CDC-CYBER-76 computer, and COMCAN is written in
FORTRAN IV for the IBM 360/370 series.
(c) SETS
The SETS code which is previously described in this Appendix can
also perform common cause analysis [41]. The analysis is conducted
similarly to COMCAN by inputting generic cause succeptibilities for
each basic event. A variable transformation incorporates the common
cause succeptibilities into the Boolean equation for the top or any
intermediate gates of the fault tree, and a few simple manipulations
allow the user to display the cutsets which are the common cause
candidates.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF INPUT DATA FOR PL-MODT
The input data for the PL-MODT code is FORMAT free. The only
requirement is that the data, when punched on the same card or
typed on the same line, be separated by at least one blank space
or a comma.
To more easily comprehended the information contained in
this manual, some sample problems are presented at the end of this
appendix, showing different inputs for PL-MODT.
B.l Description of the Code PL-MODT
1. Card groups I through VIII describe the fault tree logic
following these card .groups. Any one of the following card
group sets described in Parts 3 through 5 plus the card
group in Part 2 could be used.
2. Card groups IX and X are control cards for the type of
time-dependent analysis to be used.
3. Card groups X through XIII are devoted to the analysis
of Class 1 components (time-independent PL-MOD case).
4. Card groups XIV through XXIII are devoted to the analysis
of Class 2 components.
5. Card groups XIX through XXIII are devoted to the analysis
of Class 3 components.
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6. Card groups XXIV through XXVIII are devoted to the analysis .of
Class 4 components, or a combination of the three time-
dependent classes of components.
7. Card group XXIX is the fault tree reduction option card.
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INPUT DESCRIPTION
Title Card
CARD GROUP I: TITLE CARD
No. of Variable
1
Variable
TITLE
Entry
A set of characters
enclosed by a single
quotation mark
NOTE: Number of characters must be equal to or less than 71.
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Options for the Types of Calculations
CARD GROUP II: RELIABILITY PARAMETER OPTION
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 DEL Number of items to be
computed if DEL=1
only reliabilities
or unavailabilities
are calculated.
If DEL = 2
reliabilities and
importances are
calculated
NOTE: When periodically tested or repairable (revealed fault)
components are considered, it is recommended to set DEL = 1
because the importance measure built into the code seemingly
loses its meaning, under these conditions.
When automatic reduction of the tree is desired, the value
of DEL must be equal to 2 (i.e., DEL = 2).
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Fault Tree Characteristics
CARD GROUP III: GATES
No. of Variable
1
Variable
GUM
Entry
Total number of
fault tree gates
NOTE: GUM includes all AND, OR, and k-out-of-N gates but
excludes replicated gates (modules). The replicated
gates in the original tree will be considered as a
replicated component or module.
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CARD GROUP IV: REPLICATED MODULES
No. of Variables Variable Entry
RMOD Total number of
replicated modules;
= 0 for no replication
RMOD=0
NOTE: RMOD does not include replicated components. However,
replicated components may be represented in a replicated
module, i.e., component is replicated within this module.
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CARD GROUP V: TREE STRUCTURE
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 IGate number
2 AGIN (I) Total number of gate
inputs to gate number I
3 ALIL (I) Total number of leafs
which are input to
gate number I
4 ALIR(I) Total number of
replicated leafs which
are input to gate number I
= 0 no replicated leaf
NOTE: I = 1, 2, ... , GUM
I includes all gates and associated modules, i.e., replicated
or non-replicated modules in the tree.
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CARD GROUP VI: REPLICATED MODULES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 TRIM(I) Name of replicated
leaf associated with
a module
2 TRIN (I) Number of replicated
gate
NOTE: I = 1, 2, ... , RMOD
If RMOD = 0 on card group IV, then card group VI is to be
skipped. If replicated gates exist then TRIM(I) = A9BCD,
where
A : Total number of occurrences of the specific replicated
module
9 : Represents the replication of gate or module
BCD : Number of replicated components associated with this
module in the fault tree
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CARD GROUP VII: REPLICATED LEAVES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 NOR Total number of
replicated leaf inputs
= 0 for replicated leaf
inputs
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CARD GROUP VIII: GATE STRUCTURE
No. of Variable
2
3
4
Variable
NAME
VALUE
GIN
PIT (I)
I = l,2,...,GIN
Entry
Gate Number
= 1 for AND gate
= 2 for OR gate
= KON for K-out-of-N
gate
Total number of gate
inputs to this gate
I-th gate input
For GIN = 0, then
PIT (I) = 0
Total number of- free
leaf inputs
TIL(I)
I = L,2,...,LIL
LIR
TIR(I)
I-th free leaf input
For LIL = 0, then
TIT (I) = 0
Total number of
replicated leaf inputs
I-th replicated leaf input
I = l,2,..,LIR For LIR = 0, then
TIR(I) = 0
5 LIL
6
7
8
436
CARD GROUP VIII, (continued)
NOTE: LIR(I) = AOBCD
where A: total number of occurrences of this component
BCD: number of replicated component
For dual replicated components:
LIR(I) = AlBCD when ON
= A2BCD when OFF
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Numerical Evaluations
CARD GROUP IX: EVALUATION OPTION
No. of Variable
1
Variable
FOX
Entry
= 0 numerical evaluation
is not desired
= 1 numerical
evaluation is desired
NOTE: If FOX = 0, then all of the following card groups can be deleted.
If the former version, PL-MOD is to be run, only card groups XI,
XII and XIII should be used after this card group.
If PL-MODT is to be run, card group X must be included and the
procedure thereafter.
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CARD GROUP X: CALCULATION OPTION
No. of Variable Variable Entry
= 1 for steady state
calculation
= 2 for time-dependent
calculation of non-
repairable components
= 3 for time-dependent
calculation of repairable
components
= 4 for time-dependent
calculation of periodically
tested components, or the
combination of periodically
tested components and
time-dependent non-
repairable or repairable
nontested components.
NOTE: For ESF = 1, only card groups XI, XII, XIII
in what follows.
For ESF = 2, only card groups XIV, XV, XVI,
are needed.
For ESF r 3, only card groups XIX, XX, XXI,
and XXIX are needed
XVII, XVIII and XXIX
XXII, XXIII, and
1 ESF
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CARD GROUP X (continued)
XXIX are needed.
For ESF = 4, only card groups XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII
and XXIX are needed.
If none of these options is desired, any number other than
1, 2, 3, 4 suffices, and all of the following card groups
should be deleted.
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CARD GROUP XI: LEAF INPUT
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 FUN Total number of free leaf
inputs
2 DUN Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0, no replicated
components or modules
441
CARD GROUP XII: COMPONENT RELIABILITY
No. of Variable
1
Variable
I
Entry
Number of free component
I = l,2,...,FUN
STATE (1,I) Probability of occurrence
of the I-th free input
2
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CARD GROUP XIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT RELIABILITY
No. of Variable Variable
I
STATD(1,I)
Number of replicated
component
Probability associated
with the I-th replicated
component
= 0 if I-th component is
associated with a
replicated module
1
2
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CARD GROUP XIV: TIME STEP CHANGES
No. of Variable- Variable Entry
MOH Number of regions where
time step size changes
= 1 for no changes in
time step size
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2 (see card group X) .
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CARD GROUP XV: TIME STEP INPUT
No. of Variable
1
Variable
DEL9T(1,I) Time step associated with
the I-th region
AUN (1, I)
I = l,2,...,MOH
Time interval for which
time step size is applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2 (see card group X)
2
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CARD GROUP XVI: LEAF INPUT
No. of Variable Variable Entry
FUN Total number of free leaf
inputs
2 DUN Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
0 no replicated
components or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2 (see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XVII: FREE COMPONENT FAILURE RATE
No. of Variable Variable
I
STATT (1,I)
Number of free component
Failure rate X (hr 1 ),
associated with the I-th
free component
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2 (see card group X)
1
2
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CARD GROUP XVIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT FAILURE RATE
No. of Variable
1
2
Variable
I
STATS (1,I)
Entry
Number of replicated
component
Failure rate X (hr -)
associated with the I-th
replicated component
= 0 if I is a replicated
component associated
with a replicated module
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 2 (see card group X).
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CARD GROUP XIX: TIME STEP CHANGES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
MOH Number 9f regions where
time step size changes.
= 1 for no changes in
time step size
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3 (see card group X) .
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CARD GROUP XX: TIME STEP INPUT
No. of Variable
1
2
Variable
DEL9T (1,1)
AUN (1,1)
I = 1,2,...,MOH
Entry
Time step associated with
the Ith region
Time step interval for
which time step size is
applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3
(see card group X)
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CARD GROUP XXI: LEAF INPUT
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 FUN Total number of free
leaf inputs
2 DUN Total number of replicated
leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated
components or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3 (see card group X)
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CARD GROUP XXII: FREE COMPONENT FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
I
STATT (1,I)
STATTE (1,I)
Number gf. free
components
Failure rate X(hr )
associated with the
Ith free component
Repair rate y (hr )
associated with the Ith
free component
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 3 (see card group X)
1
2
3
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CARD GROUP XXIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
I
STATS(1,I)
STATED(1,I)
Number of replicated
component
Failure rate X(hr -)
associated with the I-th
replicated component
= 0 if I is a replicated
component associated with
a module
Repair rate pa(hr -)
associated with the I-th
replicated component
NOTE: If STATS(1,I) = 0 (i.e., the component I is associated with a
replicated module), then STATED(1,I) = 1. This card group
must be supplied for ESF = 3 (see card group X).
1-
2
3
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CARD GROUP XXIV: TIME STEP CHANGES
No. of Variable Variable Entry
MOH Number of regions where
time step size changes
= l for no changes in
time step size
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 4 (see card group X)
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CARD GROUP XXV TIME STEP INPUT
No. of Variable Variable
DEL9T(lI)
AUN (1,I)
I = 1,2,...MOH
Entry
Time step associated
with the I-th region
Time interval for which
time step size is applied
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 4 (see card group X)
1
2
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CARD GROUP XXVI: LEAF INPUT
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 FUN Total number of free
leaf inputs
2 DUN Total number of
replicated leaf inputs
= 0 no replicated
components or modules
NOTE: This card group must be supplied for ESF = 4 (see card group X)
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CARD GROUP XXVII: FREE COMPONENT TEST DATA
No. of Variables Variables
I1
2
3
STATT(1,I)
ETTA (1,1)
TTETA (1,I)
TAVV (1,I)
FIRTM(lI)
QUZR (1, I)
4
5
6
7
Entry
Number of free components
Failure rate A.(hr 1)
associated with I-th
free component
Time between inspections
(hrs)
Inspection time (hrs)
Repair time (hrs)
Time of first
inspection (hrs)
Override probability
NOTE: If the component is not inspected, then ETTA(1,I) = 0,
TTETA(1,I) = 0, TAVV(1,I) = 0, FIRT(1,I) = 0 and QUZR(l,I) = 0.
In this case the component will be considered as being a
nonrepairable one. If the component is repairable but not
tested (revealed fault), then ETTA(1,I) = 0, TTETA(l,I) = repair
rate (hr 1), TAVV(1,I) = 0, FIRT(1,I) = 0 and QUZR(1,I) = 0
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CARD GROUP XXVIII: REPLICATED COMPONENT TEST DATA
No. of Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Variable
I
STATS (1,1)
ETTAD(1,I)
TTETAD
TAVVD (1, I)
FIRTMD(1,I)
-QUZR(1,I)
Entry
Number of replicated
component
Failure rate (hr )
associated with this
component
Time between inspections
(hrs)
Inspection time (hrs)
Repair time (hrs)
Time of first
inspection (hrs)
Override probability
NOTE: If the component is not inspected then ETTAD(l,I) = 0, TTETAD(1,I)
= 0, TAVVD(1,I) = 0, FIRTMD(lI) = 0, and QUZRD(l,I) = 0.
If the component is associated with a replicated module then
STATS(l,I) = 0, ETTAD(1,I) = 0, TTETAD(1,I) = 0, TAVVD(l,I) = 0,
FIRTMD(1,I) = 0, and QUZRD(1,I) = 0. In this case the component
is considered as being a nonrepairable one. If the component
is repairable but not tested (revealed fault), then ETTAD(1,I) = 0,
TTETAD(1,I) = repair rate (hr ), TTETAD(1,I) = 0, TAVVD(1,I) = 0,
FIRTMD(1,I) = 0, and QUZRD(1,I) = 0.
458
CARD GROUP XXIX: REDUCTION OPTION CARD
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 CUT-OFF The cut-off value. Any
component having an
importance less than this
value will be cancelled
from the fault tree.
NOTE: If DEL = 1, then this card group is not needed since no
importance calculation is performed.
If DEL = 2 and CUT-OFF = 0, then no reduction process will be
performed. Only the importance of modules and components
in the fault tree will be calculated.
If DEL = 2 and CUT-OFF > 0, then the reduction procedure
will be followed.
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B.2 Input Data Example
In this section the input to PL-MODT for a time-dependent analysis
of the fault tree shown in Figure (8.4.1) of this thesis is discussed.
The data set needed to describe the logic of the fault tree is listed
in Table (B.1). Following Table (B.l) any one of the data sets shown
Tables (B.2), (B.3), (B.4) or (B.5) may be used.
Table (B.2) is used if all of the components in the tree consist
of only Class 1 components (i.e. the original PL-MOD code). Table (B.3)
is used for calculating unavailabilities of the fault tree, if all of
the components are of Class 2. Table B.4 is used if time-dependent
calculations are performed for only Class 3 components. Finally,
Table (B.5) can be used when the fault tree is composed of only Class 4
components. The particular set of data shown in Table (B.5) represents
a combination of four classes of components in the fault tree shown
in Figure (8.4.1)
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TABLE B.1
GENERAL DATA SET REPRESENTING THE LOGIC OF THE TREE
SAMPLE PROBLEM
2 26 1
1 2 1 0
2 1 0 1
3 0 2 0
4 1 1 1
5 1 2 0
6 2 0 0
7 1 1 0
8 1 0 1
9 0 2 1
10 0 2 0
11 2 2 0
12 1 0 1
13 0 1 1
14 2 0 0
15 1 0 1
16 0 3 0
17 1 0 1
18 2 0 0
19 1 0 1
20 1 1 1
21 0 2 0
22 1 1 1
23 2 0 0
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Table B.l1 (continued)
24 0 1 1
25 1 0 1
26 0 2 1
29002 1
7
1 1 2 2 4 1 14 0 0
2 2 1 3 0 0 1 22006
3 2 0 0 2 16 17 0 0
4 2 1 5 1 15 1 21006
5 203 1 6 2 18 19 0 0
6 2 7 8 0 0 0 0
7 1 1 9 1 22 0 0
8 1 1 10 0 0 1 20007
9 2 0 0 2 20 21 1 20007
10 2 0 0 2 23 24 0 0
11 1 2 12 14 2 1 2 0 0
12 2 1 13 0 0 1 21001
13 1 0 0 1 6 1 29002
14 2 2 15 17 0 0 0 0
15 1 1 16 0 0 1 22001
16 2 0 0 3 3 4 5 0 0
17 1 1 18 0 0 1 29002
18 1 2 19 22 0 0 0 0
19 2 1 20 0 0 1 21004
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Table B.1 (continued Y
20 1 1 21 1 9 1 20003
21 2 0 0 2 8 11 0 0
22 2 1 23 1 7 1 20005
23 1 2 24 25 0 0 0 0
24 2 0 0 1 10 1 20003
25 2 1 26 0 0 1 22004
26 1 0 0 2 12 13 1 20005
1
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TABLE B.2
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.l FOR ONLY
CLASS 1 COMPONENTS (PL-MOD CASE)
24 7
1 1.OE-01
2 1.OE-01
3 1 OE-02
4 1.OE-02
5 1.OE-02
6 1.OE-01
7 1.OE-03
8 0.5E-03
9 0.5E-03
10 2 .OE-05
11 2.OE-04
12 2.OE-04
13 6.1E-04
14 6.1E-04
15 8.1E-04
16 .6E-02
17 .6E-02
18 3.OE-01
19 3.0E-01
20 2.5E-04
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TABLE B.2 (continued)
21 2.5E-04
22 2.5E-04
23 2.5E-04
24 1.OE-02
1 1.OE-01
2 0
3 1.OE-02
4 1.5E-03
5 1.5E-03
6 1.2E-01
7 1.2E-01
1.OE-03
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TABLE B.3
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR ONLY CLASS 2 COMPONENTS
2
3
18 180
24 240
36 720
24 7
1 1.OE-01
2 1.OE-01
3 1.OE-02
4 1.OE-02
5 1.OE-02
6 1.OE-01
7 1.OE-03
8 0.5E-03
9 0.5E-03
10 2.OE-05
11 2. 0 E-04
12 2.OE-04
13 6.1E-04
14 6.1E-04
15 8.1E-04
16 .6E-02
17 .6E-02
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TABLE B.3 (continued)
18 3.OE-01
19 3.OE-01
20 2.5E-04
21 2.5E-04
22 2.5E-04
23 2.5E-04
24 1.0E-02
1 1.OE-01
2 0
3 1.OE-02
4 1.5E-03
5 1.5E-03
6 1.2E-01
7 1.2E-01
1.OE-03
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TABLE B.4
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.1 FOR ONLY CLASS 3 COMPONENTS
3
2
2
24
24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
24
720
7
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-01
1. OE-03
0. 5E-03
0. 5E-03
2. OE-05
2. OE-04
2. OE-04
6. 1E-04
6. 1E-04
8.1E-04
.6E-02
.6E-02
3.OE-01
3.OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. 2E-01
1. 2E-01
1. 2E-01
1. 2E-01
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-02
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
1. OE-01
5.OE-01
1. OE-01
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TABLE B.4 (continued)
20 2.5E-04 1.OE-01
21 2.5E-04 1.0E-01
22 2.5E-04 1.0E-02
23 2.5E-04 1.0E-02
24 1.OE-02 1.OE-02
1 1.OE-01 1.OE-1
2 0 0
3 1.0E-2 1.0E-01
4 1.5E-3 1.OE-01
5 1.5E-3 1.OE-01
6 1.2E-1 1.OE-01
7 1.2E-1 1.OE-01
1.OE-03
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TABLE B.5
DATA SET FOLLOWING TABLE A.l FOR ONLY CLASS 4 COMPONENTS
OR COMBINATION OF ALL TIME DEPENDENT CLASSES OF COMPONENTS
4
5
12 240
1 5
24 360
2 8
26 1440
24 7
1 1.OE-01 360 2 15 360 1
2 1.OE-01 400 3 18 700 1
3 1.OE-02 720 1.5 19 1440 1
4 1.OE-02 150 1 10 150 1
5 1.OE-02 1200 5 25 1200 .5
6 1.OE-01 600 1 20 600 1
7 1.OE-03 720 1.5 19 800 0.5
8 0.5E-03 120 1 12 120 1
9 0.5E-03 450 3 12.5 600 1
10 2.OE-05 720 1 22 720 1
11 2.OE-04 300 2.5 20 300 0.1
12 2.OE-04 0 1.OE-01 0 0 0
13 6.1E-04 0 0 0 0 0
14 6.1E-04 0 1.5E-01 0 0 0
15 8.OE-04 720 1 12 720 1
16 .6E-02 400 2 15 400 1
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TABLE B.5 (continued)
17 .6E-02 0 0 0 0 0
18 3.0E-01 120 1 12 120 1
19 3. 0 E-01 0 0 0 0 0
20 2.5E-04 840 2.6 20 1440 0.5
21 2.5E-04 140 1.5 19 280 1
22 2.5E-04 720 1.5 12 840 1
23 2.5E-04 0 1.OE-02 0 0 0
24 1. 0 E-02 720 1.5 19 1440 l
1 1.OE-01 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1.OE-02 450 2 16 720 1
4 1.5E-03 0 0 0 0 0
5 1.5E-03 1440 3 28 1440 1
6 1.2E-01 720 1.5 19 720 1
7 1.2E-01 440 1.5 20 440 1
1. OE-03
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APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF THE INPUT FOR PL-MODMC
C.1 Input Data
The input to the PL-MODMC code is FORMAT free. The only
requirement is that the data, when punched on one card, be separated
by at least one blank space or a comma. Four input groups are
required in PL-MODMC.
Group 1 - Title and parameter default cards
Group 2 - Fault tree logic cards
Group 3 - Monte-Carlo options cards
Group 4 - Component failure data cards
Group 1
TITLE CARD
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 TITLE A set of characters to be entered
for the identification of the run
NOTE: Number of characters must be less than or equal to 71.
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PARAMETER DEFAULT CARD
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 EGATE Estimated number of gates. The default
is 100 for EGATE = 0
2 ECOMP Estimated number of components. The
default is 200 for ECOMP = 0
3 EGINO Estimated maximum number of gates input
*to a gate. The default is 5 for EGINO 0
4 ELILO Estimated maximum number of components
input to a gate. The default is 10 for
ELILO = 0
5 DEBUG If DEBUG = 1, then all of the information
about the modules, number of replications,
list of proper and free modules, and
modular cutsets will be printed along with
the Monte-Carlo output. Put DEBUG = 0 if
no information except Monte-Carlo simulation
and logical relations of the fault tree
is required.
NOTE: Information printed under DEBUG = 1 is based on the numerical
values that are assigned to input alphanumeric values.
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Group 2
FAULT TREE LOGIC CARD (Input one for each fault tree gate)
No. of Variable Variable Entry
GNAME
GTYPE
NODEIN.GID
INGATE(IG)
NODEIN.LILI
Name of the gate for which inputs will
be given. A set of alphanumeric
characters enclosed by single quotation
marks
Gate GNAME's type. For AND gates, GTYPE
should be input as 'AND' or 'A'; for OR
gates, 'OR' or '0'; for K-out-of-N gates,
'K/N'
Number of gates input to the gate GNAME
Name(s) of the gates input to GNAME.
IG = 1, ... NODEIN.GID. Each input gate
name should be alphanumeric values
enclosed by single quotation marks
Number of components input to the gate
GNAME
1
2
3
4
5
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FAULT TREE LOGIC CARD (continued)
No. of Variable
6
Variable
INCOMP(IC)
Entry
Name(s) of the components input to the
gate GNAME. IC = 1, ... NODEIN.LILI.
Each input component name should be
enclosed by single quotation marks. If
the component is an OFF event, then
put a ( -1 ) character in front of its
alphanumeric name (e.g., '-i MOV 12').
NOTES: (1) All alphanumeric names should have 12 or less characters.
(2) After the last gate's card, the user should input an
'END' card.
Group 3
CONFIDENCE LEVEL DATA
No. of Variable
1
2
Variable
MONT
ROM
Entty
For Monte-Carlo analysis MONT = 1.
For an average TOP event unavailability
calculation only, set MONT = 0
Total number of confidence levels to be
used
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CONFIDENCE LEVEL DATA (continued)
No. of Variable
3
Variable
CONPNT(I)
Entry
Confidence level (e.g., CONPNT(I) = 40
means that the I-th confidence level is
40%). Not needed if ROM = 0.
NOTE: For ROM = 0 the following default confidence intervals are used:
CONPNT(1)
CONPNT(4)
CONPNT(7)
CONPTN(10)
CONPNT(13)
CONPNT(16)
CONPNT(19)
= 0.5
=5
= 20
= 40
= 70
= 85
= 97.5
CONPNT(2)
CONPNT(5)
CONPNT(8)
CONPNT(11)
CONPNT(14)
CONPTN(17)
CONPNT(20)
= 1
= 10
= 25
= 50
= 75
= 90
= 99
CONPNT(3)
CONPNT(6)
CONPNT(9)
CONPNT(12)
CONPNT(15)
CONPNT(18)
CONPNT(21)
In the Monte-Carlo calculations, the accuracy of the probabilities of
the confidence level is equal to the lowest confidence level (e.g.,
for ROM = 0, with the lowest confidence level CONPNT(1) = 0.5, then
accuracy = 0.5%).
= 2.5
= 15
= 30
= 60
= 80
= 95
= 99.5
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SIMULATION CONTROL CARD
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 IPP An arbitrary number to start the random
number generator procedure
2 NRAND Total number of trials to be used in
the simulation. Default value is 2000
for NRAND = 0
3 I NTERM Number of terms to be used in the Central
Limit Theorem Approximation. Default
value is 12 for NTERM = 0
Group 4
FAILURE DATA CARD (Input one for each component)
No. of Variable Variable Entry
1 AAA Name of the component. It should be a
12-character name and be enclosed by
single quotation marks
2 OPTION Class of the component, OPTION = 1
represents constant unavailability
component (class one component). OPTION = 2
represents non-repairable component
(class two component). OPTION = 3
represents repairable monitored component
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FAILURE DATA CARD (continued)
No. of Variable
2
Variable
OPTION
Entry
(class three component). OPTION = 4
represents periodically tested component
(class four component).
If OPTION = 1, then use the following variables
3
4
STATE
FEN2
Unavailability per demand
90% error factor associated with STATE
variable. Ignored in MONT = 0
If OPTION = 2, then use the following variables
3 MED1 Failure rate in (hr- )
4 FEN2 90% error factor associated with MED1
variable. Ignore if MONT = 0
4 MED2 Mission length (hr)
If OPTION = 3, then use the following variables
3 MED1 Failure rate in (hr -)
4 FACl 90% error factor associated with MEDl
variable. Ignore if MONT = 0
MED2 Average down time (hr)5
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FAILURE DATA CARD (continued)
No. of Variable Variable Entry
6 FAC2 90% error factor associated with MED2.
Ignore if MONT = 0
If OPTION = 4, then use the following variables
3 MED1 Failure rate (hr )
4 FACl 90% error factor associated with MED1.
Ignore if MONT = 0
5 MED2 Average repair time (hr)
6 FAC2 90% error factor associated with MED2.
Ignore if MONT = 0
7 MED3 Average test duration (hr)
8 FAC3 90% error factor associated with MED3.
Ignore if MONT = 0
9 MED4 Test interfal (hr)
NOTE: Repeat this failure data card for each component in the fault
tree. For ON-OFF components, only unavailability for the ON
components should be specified. Consider an ON component as a
class one component.
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C.2 Input Data Example
Input data for a Monte-Carlo analysis of the fault tree shown
in Figure (8.3.1) are listed in Table (C.1). This fault tree consists
of components of all four classes. All failure parameters have been assigned
unceitainty values. The output from PL-MODMC for the set of input data
is shown in Table (8.3.2).
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TABLE C.1
Inputs to Fault Tree Presented in Figure 8.3.1
MONT-CARLO ANALYSIS BY THE PL-MODMC CODE
0 0 0 0 0 0
'TOP' 'A' 2 'G2' 'G3' 0
'G2' 'A' 1 'G4' 1 'Cl'
'G3' '0' 1 'G' 1 'C3'
'G4' 'O' 1 'G' 1 'C2'
'G5' '0' 1 'G' 1 'C4'
'G6' 'A' 1 'G' 1 'C5'
'G7' 'A' 1 'G' 1 'C3'
'G8' ' ' 0 3 'C5' 'C6' 'C7'
'END
1 0
1331 1000 12
'Cl' 2 2.OE-04 3 700
'C2' 1 1.3E-04 3
'C3' 3 1.47E-04
'C4' 1 2.OE-04
'C5' 4 2.OE-05
'C6' 2 2.OE-05
'C7' 1 1.OE-05
3
3
3
3
21 7
30 5 2.5 5 720
700
10 20 3 1.5 3 1440
481
APPENDIX D
DESCRIPTION OF INPUT TO MODCUT
D.1 Input Data.
Input data to the MODCUT code are format-free. The only
requirement is that the data, when punched on the same card or
typed on the same line, be separated by at least one blank space
or a comma.
Three input groups, 1 through 3, are described below.
Group 1 - Title and Parameter Default Cards
Group 2 - Fault Tree Logic Cards
Group 3 - Cutset Option Cards
Group 1
TITLE CARD
No. of Variable Variable
1 TITLE
PARAMETER DEFAULT CARD
No. of Variable Variable
1 EGATE
2 ECOMP
Entry
A set of characters to be entered as the
name of the run*
Entry
Estimated number of gates. The default
is 100 for EaATE = 0
Estimated number of components. The default
is 200 for ECOMP = 0
*Number of characters must be less than or equal to 71
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PARAMETER DEFAULT CARD (conti
No. of Variable Variable
3 EGINO
ELILO
CUTNO
DEBUG
nued)
Entry
Estimated maximum number of gates input
to a gate. The default is 5 for EGINO = 0
Estimated maximum number of components input
to a gate. The default is 10 for ELILO = 0
If CUTNO = 1, then only the number of non-
minimal cutsets will be calculated (only for
test runs). If minimal cutsets are to be
calculated, then CUTNO should be set to zero.
If DEBUG = 1, then all of the information about
the modules, number of replications, list of
proper and free modules, modular cutsets, and
some other information will be printed along
with the generated cutsets. Put DEBUG = 0
if no information except cutsets and logical
relations of the tree are required.
NOTES: (1)
(2)
It is recommended that for very large trees, prior to
cutset calculations a test run by putting CUTNO = 1 be
performed in order to calculate the number of non-
minimal cutsets that MODCUT will treat in cutset
generation procedure.
Most of the information printed under DEBUG = 1 is based
on the numerical values that are assigned instead of the
input alphanumeric values.
483
FAULT TREE LOGIC CARD (Input
No. of Variable Variable
1 GNAME
2 GTYPE
3 NODEIN.GID
4 INGATE(IG)
5 NODEIN.LILI
GROUP 2
one for each fault tree gate)
Entry
Name of the gate for which the inputs will
be given. A set of alphanumeric characters
enclosed by single quotation marks
Gate GNAME's type. For AND gates, GTYPE
should be input as 'AND' or 'A'; for OR
gates, 'OR' or '0'; for K-out-of-N gates,
'K/N'
Number of gates input to the gate GNAME
Name(s) of the gates input to GNAME. IG = 1,
....NODEIN.GID. Each input gate name should
be alphanumeric values enclosed by single
quotation marks
Number of components input to the gate GNAME
6 INCOMP(IC) Name(s) of the components input to the gate
GNAME. IC = 1, ... NODEIN.LILI. Each
input component name should be enclosed
by single quotation marks. If the component
is an OFF event, then put a ( -j) character
in front of its alphanumeric name
(e.g. ' -1MOVR')
NOTES: (1) All alphanumeric names should have 12 or less characters.
(2) After the last gate's card, the user should input an 'END' card.
484
Group 3
SIZE CARD
No. of Variable Variable
1 SIZE
2 SIZEl
Entry
Maximum size of the cutsets to be
generated for the TOP event.
Maximum size of the cutsets to be
generated for all of the replicated modules
(gates) in the tree. If no replicated
modules, then put any arbitrary number.
Notes: (1) If SIZE is greater than SIZEl, make sure that no cutset
of order between SIZE and SIZEl will be lost
(2) For some complex trees there will be a high CPU time
gain by putting SIZEl smaller than SIZE
CUTSET REQUEST CARD
No. of Variable Variable
1 NPRN
Entry
Number of gates for which the cutsets
are to be generated
2 CPRINT Name of the gates for which the cutsets are
to be generated. Name(s) of these gates should
be enclosed by single quotation marks.
NOTE: Cutsets of those gates that will be changed to nested or coalesced
modules during the modularization process may not represent the
exact cutsets of the gate. However, the correct cutsets are
always generated for free modules, replicated gates, and the TOP event.
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D.2 Input Data Example
Input data for generating the cutsets of the fault tree shown
in Figure (8.4.1) are given in Table (D.1). This fault tree has been
described in Chapter 8 of this thesis. This Fault Tree is composed of
several types of components and gates. The listing from MODCUT for
the Input Data shown in Table (D.1) is given in Table (8.4.4).
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Table D.l
MODCUT Input for the Fault Tree Shown in Fig. 8.4.1
TEST
0 0 0 0 0 0
Gl' 1AND'
'G2' 'OR'
'G3' 'OR'
IG4' 'OR'#
;G5' '2/3' 1
'G6' 'OR'
IG7' 'AND'
4G8' 'AND'
'G9' 'OR'
G 10' ' cR'
#TOP' ' AND'
G12' 'CR'
IG13' ' AND'
G14' 'OR'
IG15' 'AND'
*G16' 'CR'
IG17' 'AND'
'G18' 'AND'
G19' ' OR'
@G20' 'AND'
IG21' 'CR'
'G22' 'CT'
IG23 I AND'
G24' *CR"'
IG25' 'OR'
"G26' 'AND'
IIND'
9 4
2 'G1' 'TOP
RU N
2 'G2' 'G
1 'G3' 1
1 2 'C16'
1 'G5' 2
'G6' 2 'C18' '
2 'G7'
1 'G91 1
1 'G10'
0 3 'C20
0 2 'C23
2 'G12'
1 'G13'
1 'G1'
2 'G15'
1 'G16 '
0 3 'C3'
2 G18'
2 'G19'
1 'G20'
1 'G21'
o 2 'C8'
1 'G23'
2 ' G24'
0
1
0
4' 1
'C 17'
'C15'
C19'
8
1
'
1
'* 0
'C22'
'R7'
'C 2 1'
'C24'
G 14'
G17' 0
1 ',51
'C4'
'G1' 0
'G22' 0
'4'
2 'C9'
' C11'1
2 'C7'
'G25'
2 '1 ' 'R3'
'G26' 1 '-F4'
3 'C12' ' C13'
'C14'
'R6'
2 'C1' 'C2'
C5'
'R3'
' E5'
0
'R5'
'
'
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APPENDIX E
DESCRIPTION OF INPUT TO MOCUS-BACFIRE PACKAGE
The MOCUS-BACFIRE Package has been obtained by coupling the
MOCUS[l] and BACFIRE [2] codes. The method by which the two codes
are coupled together is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.
In this appendix the input to MOCUS-BACFIRE is discussed.
Input to MOCUS-BACFIRE is exactly similar to input of the MOCUS
and the BACFIRE codes. No changes in the input format and the order
in which data are input have been made. The input to the BACFIRE code
is read in first by the package. However, instead of group 5 input
data to BACFIRE which are the minimal cutsets, input data of the
fault tree to MOCUS must be inserted. The input to BACFIRE is discussed
in Reference [1] and the input to MOCUS is discussed in Reference [2].
Essentially, the input to BACFIRE as discussed in [1], consists of the
following five data sets:
1. Event Definition
2. Event Location
3. Cause of Secondary Failure Library
4. Manufacturer Library
5. Hardware Minimal Cutset
Obviously, data set number 5 no longer exists in the MOCUS-BACFIRE
package. Therefore, after the data set number 4, the input to MOCUS
must be inserted. Input to MOCUS consists of the following data sets:
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(1) Control Information
(2)- Fault Tree Description
(3) Failure and Repair Data for the Components
(4) Gates for which Minimal Cutsets are to be found
Obviously, data set 3 of the MOCUS code is not necessary for
the common-cause analysis and can be omitted from the input data set.
It should be noted, however, that group (3) data set in the MOCUS code
is optional, and has been used when the code is replaced by the PREP
Code to create the MOCUS-KITT package.
The Job Control Language (JCL) Cards for the MOCUS-BACFIRE
package are similar to those used for MOCUS and BACFIRE individually.
An example of a set of input data and JCL cards to MOCUS-BACFIRE
package is shown in Table (E.1) and its output list is given in
Table (E.2). It should be added that for the MOCUS-BACFIRE package
the H-compiler must be used. The H-compiler has additional features
comparing to the G-compiler that are significantly applied in the MOCUS
Code.
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Table (E.1) Input Example to the MOCUS-BACFIRE Package
//GO. FL 1000 1 DD DS =&6FL1,UNIT=SYSDAt,DISP= (N E,2ASS) ,SACE= (TRK,5) ,
/ DcC=( ECF3=VB3, LECL=84, LKSIZ=16814)
//Go. Fr10 FO)2 D S N=& FL2, iT=SYSDA , DISP= (! Ew,? Ass) ,,o ACF= (Tv K, 5) ,
// DC= (R C E=V , L -CL-84, BLKSIZE=168 4)
//(; .FT 10FJO3 VD f N=6& FL3, UI1 T=SYsDA, DIS= itW, P AS3) ,S? AC;= (T? K,5)
// DCB(C!VBLRECL=84,BLKSIZE=1684).
//GO.FT10F004 DD DSN=6&FL4,0NIT=SYSDA,DISP=('EW,PASS) SPACE= (Tr'K,5),
/ / DCB= (C E=V BLECL84, BLSIZE=1684)
//GO.FT14F001 CD UNIT=SYSDA,DISP=(NEW,.DELTE),SPACE=(TRK,20),
// DCB=(?ECF31=VBS,DLKSIZF=1b00)
//GO.F15Fl001 DO UNIT=SYSDA,DISP=(NEW,DELETE), SEACE=(TRK,20),
/ DCB=(PECF=V3S,BLKSIZE=1600)
//GO.FT16F001 DD UNIT=SYSDA,DISP=(NEW,DELETE),SFACE=(TR'K,20),
// DCD= (BECFM=VDSBLKSIZE=1600)
//GO.FT)8F001 DD DUMMY
//GO.FT09F001 DD DUMMY
//GO.FT11F001 DO DSN=&& W AG1,DCB=( ECF M=FB,LRECL=20,BLK5SIZ E=3120),
// UNIT=SYSDA,SPACE=(TR,(100,100),RLSE),DISP=NEW
//GO. FT 12F001 DD DSN=&&W"2 ,DCB= (r.'CF M=iB, LEEC L=20 , BL KSIZE=3120)
// UNIT=SYSD ASPACE-=(TEK, (100,100) ,RLSE) ,DISP=N E
//GO.SYSIN CD *
2
2
PRINT
* EVLNT,HANUFACTUE-ER,LOCATICN, SUSCEPTABILITIES, AND SPECIAL CCNDITIN0'S
3
PIPE-1 U 1 IUPS AD 51
PlPE-i N Al 1234 56 7
PIPE-2 N 1 IUPS AO 62
PIPLI-2 N Al 12314 56 7
VALVE-4 G - 1 GIS AC 11231
VALVE-4 G Al 123 45 607
PUMP-1 1 1 GIUPS AO H1!t3E1
PUMP- 1 1 A2 12345 67 080900
PHP-2 1 1 GZUPS AO N12E2I14
PUNP-2 1 A2 12345 67 0809
HX-A 1 SUI AO N4
HX-A B A3 123 45 06
VALVE-A G 1 GIS AO 4 12
VALVE-A G A3 123 45 0607
PIPE-4 E 1 IUPS AO 114
PIPE-4 E A6 1234 56 07
VALVE-1 F 1 GIS AC N431
VALVE-1 R A6 123 45 0607
PUI3P-A A 1 GIUPS AG N4E13
PUMP-A A A4 12345 67 08
VALVE-5 R. GIS AO N132
VALVE-5 R A5 12.3 46 0507
PIPE-5 E IUPS A0 %S
PIPE-5 E A7 1234 56 07
PIPE-6 E IUPS AO N6
PIPE-6 Z A7 1234 56 07
VALVE-2 G GISS AO N6M1
(continued)
Table E.l (continued)
G A7
N
N AS
R
P A8
B A9
G
G A9
A 0
A A10O
A
A A10
1233
IUPS
1234
GISS
1233
sU I
123
GIS
123
GIUPS
12345
GIUPS
12345
45 06~
AC N6M1
45 0608
AO N5P2v3
67 000508
A0 N4E4 M4
67 030609
LOCATION AND LOCATION ON EACH MAP
C1 D1
C2 D1
C3 D1
C4 31
C5 D1
C6 D1
C7 D2
Ca D2
C9 D2
C10 D2
END
* SUSCEPTADILITIES 1I.1T MAP USED
INiPAC~ I 1
VIBRATIC.- U 1
STRESS S 1
PRESSURE P 1
GRIT ( DUST OR GRIME ) G 1
CORROSION ( ACID ) 0 3
COREcSICU ( OXIDATION ) A 3
SAME HYDEAULIC FLCW LCOP N1 4
SAME HYDEAULIC FLCi' LCCP N2 4
SAME HYDRAULIC FLOW LCCP N3 4
SAME HYDRAULIC FLOW LOCP N4 4 4
SAME HIYD RAULIC FLCW LCOP 1:5 4
SAME HYDRAULIC FLOW LOCP N6 4
SA HE POil:;R SCURCE El 4
SAME POWEr SCUpCE E2 4
SAME MAINT. PRCCEDURE ml 4
SA Ii MAIN4T. PROCEDCE E 1_R 4
SA"E MAINT. PRCCEDURE M2 4
MAINT. - JCE'S FIXII M3 4
SOUTHERN SERVICES M1AINT. M4 4
EUD
*' MAN UFACT'ULER/ABBiREVIATIUN TABLE
HANUFACTUREP - 1 N
MANUFACTURER - 1 N
MANUFACTUREP - 2 G
MANUFACTURER - 3 1
MANUFACTURER - 4 D
AND SPECIAL CO!DITIONS
1
1
3
3
3
2
2
(continued)
VALVE-2
PIPE-3
Pi P E - 3
VALVE-3
VALVE-3
fiX- 3
HX-B
VALV -B
VALVE-B3
PUnP-C
PUM P-C
PUMP- B
PUMP- a
END
* -. OF
3
490
56
AC
56
AO
45
Ac
0708
N3
07
N3M2
0608
N6
MAPS
A1
A2
A3
A4
AS
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
B1
B1
B1
B1
E1
B 1
1
Table E.1 (continued)
-51A'SU1--ACT-UREP' - 5 .E
:NAt!FACLRE - 6
AANUFACTURER - 7 A
EN D
FAULT T.ME IHPIT
A TEST TO LINK MOCUS AND DACFIR
* DATA
5 CUT PRINT
E ND
?AULT TrPEE DEECFIPTICNI
* TPEF
TOP OE 7 0 TO?1 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 TOP2
TOP1 OIR 7 0 G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13 G14
20?2 OR 3 0 G6 G7 G15
G1 AND 0 2 PUMP-A PU P-B
G2 AND 0 4 PIPE-6 PUMP-C PIPE-1 PUM?-2
G3 AND 0 2 PUMP-A RX-J
G4 AND 0 2 VALVE-A PUMP-B
GS AND 0 4 VALVE-2 PUMP-C PIPE-1 PIPE-2
G6 AND 0 4 PIPE-6 PUMP-C PUMP-1 PIPE-2
G7 AND 0 4 PIPE-4 PIE-5 PIPE-1 PIPE-2
G8 AND 0 5 PETMIP-B PUMP-C VAIVE-3 PUMP-2 VALVE-4
G9 A ND 0 3 FIPE-1 PIPE-2 PU IP-A
G10 AND 0 5 PUMP-A PUMP-C VAIVE-3 PUMP-2 VALVE-4
G11 AND 0 4 PUMP-B PUMP-C PIPE-1 PUMP-2
G12 AND 0 4 PUM?-A PUMP-C PUMP-1 PUMP-2
G13 AND 0 4 PUMP-A PiMP-C PIPE-1 PUMP-2
14 AND 0 4 VALVE-2 PUMP-C pU:lp-1 PUMP-2
G15 AND 0 4 PU: C-c PU:;P-E PUIP-1 PUMP-2
* TESTS
TOP
/*
.491
Table (E.2)
Output from MOCUS-BACFIRE Package
3
N 1 lPS A0 N1
A1 123400000056000 7 0 0 0 0
PPIP-2 N 1 lUPS A D 2
Al 123400000054000 7 #J 0 0 0
LLL-4 G 1 GIS A - 281
&1 123000000045000 6 1 0 0 0
uMP-1 1 1 GIUPS AO 11.1391
A2 12J45340V67004)0 d 9 C U 0
PUMP-2 1 1 GIUPS A D 2E254
A2 12345000 )0000 8 9 0 0 0
X-L 2 1 SUI A D 14
A3 123000000045000 6 0 0 0 0
VALVE-A G 1 GIs a £0 14.12
A3 12300J300045000 6 7 0 0 0
PIPE-4 B I IUPS 40 A 44
£6 123401)(0560C 7 4) 0 0 0
VALVL-1 a I GIS AO M4 3 1
A6 123C0000 0045L00 6 7 0 0 0
PUlP-). A 1 GlupS A D 4E1n3
A4 123450000067000 0 0 0 0 0
VALVE-S A 1 . GIs £0 4412
A5 12300JJ00046000 5 7 #Q 0 0
PIPE-5 E 1 *IupS A ) 5
A7 12340114,560100 7 U 0 04)
PIP.-6 1 IUPS AO 16
A7 123400000056000 7 0 0 0 0
VALVL-2 G 1 GISS AD 651
A7 12330000005600 1 0 0 0
PIPE-3 I 1 IopS A D 3
A 123400000056000 7 0 0 0 0
VALVE-3 R 1 GISS AO 32
£0 12334.1400045000 6 0 0 0 0
iX-0 B 1 SUI A0 46
A9 1236 ou700400 6 j 0 0 0
VALV-8 G I 1 GIS A D o1
A9 123000000045000 6 0 0 0 0
PUmP-C A I GIOPS A 45E2H3
A10 123450000067000 0 5 0 0 0-
PunP-b A 1 GIUPS A £0 14E4414
. 10 . 123453000067000 3 6 9 0 0
4-
---- ~----I----'---- -.--- --------- -------- -----------.-- -
3
&I#. Cl 01
U 1 0 02 DI
(continued)
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Table (E.2) continued
* A asass.. a OB.... a COMMO
* BACIIB -- A ?IOGDAII TO OBTAIN CONEON
* e * e e e e oe oa S e 5+ 5e *
FAGI
BACFIIE VERSION 3 JOLI/76
*C*A* * *****
*
CAUSE CANDIDATES *
*
*5*. * * * * 59*
NUMBLS Or ETZINTS WITH THEIR. J.OCATICMS AND GCS'S - - - - 20
mUmata Of "A?S USED - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
NUEJEN OF LOCATICU3 AND TjEi.R MAP LOCATIONS - - - - - - 10
1D;.'SBLR Of GCS'S - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - 20
NUHJLL OF 6A.UFACTUBEBS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8
SEN51:iVITY CUT Ora- - - --------- -- 3
(continued)
Table (E.2) continued
NOCUS - - VERSION 3/74
* * * * * * 9 * * * * * 9 * * * * * *-9 * * * 9 9 * 9 $ 9 * * 9 . * 9 *
* *
- NOCUS - - A CCRNUTER PaOGRAN T0 OBTAIN NMIAL SETS P238 FAULT TRIES -
- -
* * * * * * * * * 9 * 9 * 9 * * * * * *9* * * 9* * * 9* * * *9* *
ZOCUS INPUT EDIT
A TEST TO LINE NOCUS AND DACMIB
* DATA
5 CUT PR
FAULT ThEiE DESCRIPTION
* TSEE
Toil 0R 7 a TOP1
TOPi alt 7 j G8
TCP2 OR 3 0 L6
G1 AUD n 2 P0MP-
G2 AND 0 4 PIPr.
G3 %10 0 2 PUN?
GU AND 1 2 VALV
:15 AU, : 4 VAL V
G6 AiD A 4 PI-E
17 Au 0 4 PIPL
38 A4D 0 5 PU 111
G9 A1D 0 3 PIPL
G10 Ala 0 5 PUM P
ii AND ; 4 PUIP
G12 A:ID 'J) 4 PW.?
r;13 AND D 4 PU r- P
G14 A.)ID J 4 VAL'V
G15 AND 0 4 PUMP
* TEMiTS
TLP
1 1*4D
INr
-A
-6
-A
E-A
z-2
-6
-A-E0
-A
-A
E-2
-C
G1
69
G7
PUMP-8
?UIP-C
HX-13
PU MP-D
PU M? -C
PU NP-C
PIPE-5
PU ir-C
PI PL-2
P11 IP-C
PU NP-C
PU 1P-C
PUIP-C
PU tiP-D
G2
010
G15
PIPE-1
PIPE-1
PU21- 1
PIPE-1
VALVE-3
PUM P- A
VALVE-3
PIPE- 1
P ua P- I
P PE- I
PUlP-1
PUtP- I
G3 G'4 a5 TOP2
all 012 013 4:14
PUMP-2
PIPH-2
PIPE-2
PIP E-2
PUNP-2
PU MP-2
PUPti-2
PUMP-2
PUNP-2
PU.P-2
PUMP-2
VALVE-4
VILVE-4
.7 1
-P.
'0
U'
Table (E.2) continued
A TEST TO LINK 10CUS AND EACFIR
uunmaE or GATE3, NG---------------------- 18
NUIb-.L Of CO~iOXENTS, - -- 15
BA&IMUf SIZE Of SETS. ITMAX ----------------
CUT SLIT - PATdI SET SwITCi, IDEx--------CUT
PLINlI - PU1ICU L4I2cLI, IDkX2- -- PRINT
ROCUS - - ERISION 3/74
z0
(continued)
Table (E.2) continued
A TESI 70~ LIMAC AUCUS AND BAC?1 OCS-- ESON31
OR 7 0 TOPI al
AN 2 PUAP-A Eli ap-O
Amia 0 4 PL'E-6 PUP-C
A!1 D 3 2 PJ3P-1 li h-0
AID 0 2 VALV4-A PU.IP -B
All D ) 4 VALVL-2 PU IIII-C
A. '3 Se PI L-6 PUMP-C
AlIL 0 'a PIL'E-4 PKPL-5
AQ ) 5 YU AP-8 PU Vk-C
AND 0 3 PiUI Pa[1,..2
AN03 5 P:J.%I7-gk Pi rI'-C
A NLs 0 4 P3lP-d PUI1P-C
ANL 3 4 PJ42-A PU'11
5
-C
A!Q 0 4 We~-A Fjl 3?-C
V; D 0 4 VALVE-2 PU.1i'-C
AND 3 4 110 A P-C fli np-li
G 2
G10
GIs
63 G4 G5 r0P2
Gil G 12 G 13 G614
PIPE-1 FUNP-2
PIP E- I
?wilP- 1
PIPE-I
VALVL-I
P U1P-A
V AL VL- 3
PI Pi.- I
Pu )1P-i
PU A f- I
PI P1-2
PIPE-2
PIPE-2
PUA P- 2
PUN P- 2
PUMPL-2
Eli EIP-2
Pump- 2
PU IIP-2
p mP- 2
VAL 15-4
TOi P
TU?l
To P2
32
1i3
C
GIfJ
Gin
G 12
G13
G 14A
G1s
(continued)
60CUS - - VIRSLOd 3/74
DAY
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Table (E.2) continued
CUT SEIS VITN 4 COMPONENTS
1) PIPE-6 PUMP-C
4
2) VALVE-2 PUi'P-C
**UAR.ING**
3)
4
4
5)
3 FOUND
PIPI-6
PU NP- a
PUN?-A
REPEATZ U
PUMP-C
PU NP-C
PUMP-C
PIPt-T PUMP-2
PIPE-1 PIPE-2
ON IVENT
PUNP-1
PIPE-1
PUMP-1
DATA CAID
PIPE-2
PUNP- 2
PUMP-2
4) PUfP-A PUMP-C PUMP-1 PUMP-2
COMMON SUSCEPT1UILITY -- SECOND CRITERION
110RATION
6)
4
7)
4
8)
4
9)
P:JP-A
VALVE-2
PIPE-4
PU P-C
PU NP-C
PU NP-C
PIPC-5
PUMP-D
PI Ps- 1.
PUMP-i
PIP-1
PUSP-)
BANKS #IN MAX AVG SUN
3 3 3 12
PUMP-2
PUMP-2
PIPE-2
PUNP-2
. 5) PUNP-C PUNP-D PUMP-1 PUMP-2
COINNON SUSCEPTIBILITY -- SLCOND CEITERION
VIBPATION
RANK: imN MAI AVG
3 3 3
SU1
12
CUT SETS VITH 5 C.MPCNENTS
1) PUMP-B PUMP-C
2) PUNP-A PUP-C
5
VALVE-3 EUMP-2
VALVE-3 PUP-2
VALVE-4
VALVE-4
40
k0
(continued)
Table (E.2) continued
QUALITATIVE F AILk E CHAIACTERISTICS
IAPACT
VIDEATICS
D03AIN 21
U123 1 1-
U13 4 9
013 5 13
STRESS
DO3AIN DI
S14 3 4
DiC1AIN D1
P13 3 '4-
osII B 1 T Dst ca GI )
CORBOSION ( ACID
ccrpoSIom ( OXIDATON )
SAt4E d1DhAULIC FLOW LOOP
SA3E U13LAULIC FLOV LCOP
SAKE UYDRAUILC ILCV LCOP
SAEE HYDRAULIC FLOW LOOP
1444 1 1
t44 2 3
SAIE liJ DSAULIC FLOW LOOP 0
SA4Id HYDBAULIC FLOW LOOP
Table (E,2) continued
SAU4 &'OiaLA SOUR~CE
SAILI ."OWE1 sou!~s
SAME~ .AIWT. PROCIRDU3L
SAmlE U1:1r. FROCEOUtE
SA'ML IALINT. EROCICUI4U
1IaIJT. - joE'S rim1
soud,,im sE:i:z ICES INT.
MA33JACTUNILP - I
nAAJFAC?144ER - I
11A.33FAChiIS 2
NAANU7ACTuJ43-
ftANUACTUhtSB 4
1A.UFACTUREN 5
IIANUACTU&4E1 6
K1AFJACTUAIEa 7
fHIS CCUZ WLJLS 266 GUIUT 7105 DACPIRIC. .
502
[1] "BACFIRE - A Computer Program for Common Cause Failure
Analysis", Nucl. Eng. Dep., University of Tennessee, NERS-77-02,
May, 1977
[2] Fussell, J. B., et. al., "MOCUS - A Computer Program to Obtain
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